Montréal Trigonix inc. 2018

This dissertation studies heterogeneity in financial markets using quantile regressions. The first chapter develops uniform confidence bands for the linear quantile regression estimator in a time series setting. The confidence bands are important for estimating the precision at different quantiles of the conditional distribution. The inference procedure is carried out through bootstrapping and allows for serially correlated error terms. An empirical application to the relationship between stock returns and investor sentiments suggests the method can be informative. The second chapter analyzes the heterogeneity of firm characteristics on returns to capital. It develops a theoretical model under a utility maximization framework with imperfect insurance and credit markets constraints. From the model, the returns to capital are derived as a function of the parameters, which affects the production function of the firm and the entrepreneur utility form. Quantile regression is applied to analyze the field experiment data from the Sri Lanka Micro Enterprises Project (2005-2010). Empirical evidence shows that returns vary across different quantiles of firm profits. Further, the ability/risk aversion of entrepreneurs affect the returns differently at different quantiles. The third chapter examines capital account liberalization and its effect on price volatility in the Chinese housing market. The chapter assesses the extent to which: a) short-term capital flows and foreign direct investment may have impacted prices and volatility in the Chinese housing market; and b) whether 2006 Capital Account Regulations on foreign purchases of Chinese real estate were effective in reducing the level and volatility of prices in the housing market. The results show that hot money magnified the impacts of capital flows on housing prices during upward surges in housing prices. Quantile regression provides quantitative evidence that the more volatile the housing market was, the larger the impact short-term capital flows had on accentuating such volatility. Furthermore, the 2006 CAR continued to have a strong impact on reducing volatility in the Chinese housing market during the period under study.

Ce travail propose une présentation et une défense du "sentimentalisme", c’est-à-dire de la théorie philosophique selon laquelle les émotions constituent notre principal accès aux valeurs, et la source de nos jugements évaluatifs. Après avoir brièvement retracé les origines historiques de ce courant (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, et Adam Smith), j’examine la littérature psychologique et philosophique actuelle portant sur les émotions. Je propose une définition de la fonction des émotions, en soutenant que ce sont des "attitudes" corporelles et cognitives dotées d’une intentionnalité évaluative. Elles nous permettent ainsi d’apprécier la valeur des objets en fonction de leur pertinence pour nos états motivationnels, tels que nos désirs ou nos sentiments. Je procède ensuite à une analyse des conséquences épistémologiques et métaphysiques que l’on peut dériver de cette thèse. Je montre que les émotions sont susceptibles de jouer un rôle crucial dans notre connaissance des valeurs, en étudiant le débat relatif aux "conditions de correction" des émotions. Je propose de distinguer ici deux caractérisations des conditions de correction qui ne sont généralement pas explicitées dans les débats actuels, que j’appelle la conception "indépendantiste" et la conception "motivationnelle". J’argumente en faveur de la deuxième approche, et je défends la thèse selon laquelle les émotions constituent un accès fiable aux valeurs, lorsqu’elles sont basées sur des motivations qui sont elles-mêmes correctes ou appropriées. Selon cette approche, les valeurs doivent être comprises comme des propriétés réelles et relationnelles. Je m’intéresse enfin plus particulièrement au rôle que les émotions sont susceptibles de jouer dans les jugements moraux. Après avoir écarté les théories innéistes au sujet de la morale, je soutiens que les émotions sont des conditions nécessaires au développement de la moralité. / This dissertation is both a presentation and a defense of "sentimentalism", the philosophical theory according to which emotions constitute our main access to values, and the source of our evaluative judgments. After considering briefly the historical origins of this philosophical approach (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith), I review the current psychological and philosophical literature about emotions. I define the function of emotions, arguing that they are bodily and cognitive "attitudes" that possess an evaluative intentionality. They allow us to appraise the value of objects according to their relevance for our motivational states, like our desires or sentiments. I proceed then to an analysis of the epistemological and metaphysical consequences that we can draw from this thesis. I show that emotions are likely to play a crucial role in our knowledge of values, focusing on the debate about the "correctness conditions" of emotions. I propose a distinction between two characterizations of correctness conditions, which are generally not explicit in the literature, and which I name the "independence" approach and the "motivational" approach. I argue in favor of the latter and I defend the thesis that emotions constitute a reliable access to values, when they are based on motivations that are themselves correct or appropriate. According to this view, values should be conceived as real and relational properties. Finally, I consider the role which emotions may play in our moral judgments in particular. After having rejected nativist accounts of our moral competence, I claim that emotions are necessary conditions to the development of our moral life.

Au cours de mon programme doctoral j'ai mené plusieurs recherches, à la fois conceptuelles et empiriques, se rapportant à deux champs d'investigation importants des sciences cognitives : la schizophrénie et la métacognition. Ma dissertation se divise en deux grandes parties. La première partie inclue 3 études expérimentales (deux études menées sur des échantillons de sujets sains et une étude menée sur des individus atteints de schizophrénie) ainsi que deux études théoriques adressant des aspects spécifiques de la schizophrénie. La seconde partie présente quatre études théoriques portant sur l'apport de la métacognition dans certains débats vigoureux présents au sein de la philosophie analytique et des sciences cognitives. J'ai donc exploré deux symptômes de la schizophrénie -l'insertion de pensées et les expériences d'activité- ainsi qu'un potentiel biais cognitif ; à savoir, la présence de phénomènes aberrants de persistance perceptive. En ce qui concerne le thème de la métacognition, j'ai examiné la manière dont les sentiments métacognitifs (l'output phénoménologique des processus métacognitifs) pouvaient éclairer d'une nouvelle lumière certains débats importants de la philosophie et des sciences cognitives. Je me suis ainsi concentré tour à tour sur le problème des hallucinations ; sur le débat concernant la pénétrabilité cognitive (l'hypothèse que nos croyances peuvent influencer profondément nos expériences perceptives) ; sur la perception des absences et sur le cas de la substitution sensorielle. / Over the course of my PhD I have investigated issues related to two main areas of investigation in cognitive science, namely Schizophrenia and Metacognition. My dissertation is divided in two parts: the first part includes three experimental studies (two studies in healthy subjects and one study in people with schizophrenia) and two theoretical studies addressing specific aspects of schizophrenia; the second part includes four theoretical studies addressing the role of metacognition in specific debates in philosophy and cognitive science of perception. I have explored two symptomatic expressions of schizophrenia, thought insertion and experiences of activity, as well as a potential cognitive bias, namely the potential presence of perceptual persistence biases. With respect to metacognition, I have investigated ways in which consideration of the role of metacognitive feelings (the experiential output of metacognitive processes) could shed new light on important current debates in analytical philosophy and cognitive science. The issues I have focused on are: the problem of hallucinations, the debate about cognitive penetrability (i.e., whether or not higher-order cognitive states may influence perceptual processes), the perception of absences and sensory substitution.

La philosophie de Husserl est guidée par la volonté d'atteindre une connaissance objective du monde. La description de l'expérience de la conscience qu'elle propose porte en effet d'abord sur l'expérience des vécus par lesquels nous prenons connaissance du monde et sur les différences qu'il existe entre une connaissance authentique et une simple présomption, une croyance ou une illusion. Mais cette priorité de la connaissance objective dans l'ordre de la méthode ne doit pas occulter l'antériorité, dans l'ordre réel, de l'expérience non-conceptuelle et inobjective des biens. En effet, le monde se donne à nous d'abord comme un monde de biens et comme la manifestation sensible de certaines valeurs. Nous voyons de beaux objets, nous trouvons l'espace utile ou pratique, nous sommes attirés par un bruit, gênés par une lumière, etc. Comment concilier ces deux exigences, celle de la méthode et celle de l'expérience ? Cette question porte sur les conditions de possibilité de la phénoménologie elle-même, puisque cette méthode, pour intégrer le nouveau genre de problèmes que posent les valeurs, dans l'ordre esthétique ou éthique, doit s'amender en permanence. Les valeurs touchent en effet aux limites de la description des actes objectivants, car elles relèvent d'une dimension qui n'est pas assimilable à celle de la nature objective des choses. Les valeurs éthiques, plus précisément, touchent aux limites de l'exigence phénoménologique de l'unité de la raison et du strict parallélisme entre les différents types d'actes correspondant aux divers registres de l'expérience (théorique, axiologique et pratique). Ainsi, l'injustice ou la vertu ne se donnent pas à la manière dont se donnent les choses dans la perception sensible et ne sauraient faire l'objet d'une « constitution intentionnelle » depuis les prestations subjectives. Le sens d'une valeur ne dépasse-t-il pas toujours et par principe les possibilités constitutives du sujet ? En d'autres termes, peut-on penser les valeurs éthiques comme des « analoga » des propriétés empiriques des objets, dont il faudrait rendre compte et qu'il faudrait parvenir à connaître de manière objective, ou bien n'y a-t-il pas là un ordre qui échappe à la description, voire au rêve husserlien d'une science de tous les phénomènes et d'une description pure de tous les types d'expérience ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous procédons en deux temps. Le premier s'interroge sur les conditions de possibilité d'une théorie des valeurs élaborée au fil de la méthode phénoménologique, c'est-à-dire au moyen d'un double réquisit – analogique et transcendantal. Le second montre comment la compréhension du sens des valeurs éthiques implique des glissements et des réélaborations de cette méthode qui ont pour fonction de révéler, à la racine des actes d'évaluation et de volition qui se rapportent aux valeurs, la vie et l'œuvre du sujet éthique. / Husserl's philosophy is an attempt to obtain objective knowledge on the world, which offers a description of the cognitive consciousness, in order to distinguish a presumptive or an illusory belief and an authentic knowledge. However, such a methodological precedence of the objective knowledge should not hide the actual priority of a non-objective and pre-predicative experience of the world. Indeed, the world first appears to us as a practical and valuable world. We can see beautiful objects, useful tools, pleasant landscapes. One is drawn by a sound or disturbed by a light. How are these two points of view to be reconciled? May we conciliate the methodological priority of theoretical consciousness and the empirical precedence of values and goods? This question deals with the possibility of phenomenology itself, because this philosophical method has to transform itself in order to take into account the idiosyncratic kinds of problems that raise the experience of values. Values reach the limits of the “objectifying consciousness's” possibilities. Because they do not belong to the realm of nature, values are not one of the empirical properties of things. More precisely, ethical values query the need of unity in Reason and the need of a strict parallelism between different intentional acts. May injustice or virtue appear as do so colours or shapes in the sensible world? Can these values be intentionally constituted? Does the meaning of values ever exceed the constitutive capabilities in the subject? In order to answer these questions, two fields shall be developed. The first one questions the possibility of a value theory, which is brought by the phenomenological method, that is to say, through a demand of analogy and a demand of transcendental constitution. The second one indicates how the understanding of ethical values implies some shifting and new elaborations in the methodology itself, in order to show, behind the rationality of emotional and volitional acts, the life and work of the ethical subject.

Submitted by William Justo Figueiro (williamjf) on 2015-07-27T22:56:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 17d.pdf: 487481 bytes, checksum: 81de0b9a598058180851d36c83baab3a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-27T22:56:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 17d.pdf: 487481 bytes, checksum: 81de0b9a598058180851d36c83baab3a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-28 / Nenhuma / O presente estudo ocupa-se do tema cooperação e confiança em um diálogo com aplicação no mundo corporativo. A investigação inicia pelo estudo da dinâmica do comportamento do indivíduo em grupo com base na teoria de Raimo Tuomela, que divide a cooperação em dois modos básicos de interação: modo-eu e modo-nós. O ponto de destaque em sua análise é o modo-nós de interação, uma vez que os interesses dos membros do grupo são regulados pela condição de troca cooperativa, fazendo com que esses abandonem suas características individualistas e deem espaço às características interativas sociais, permitindo, dessa forma, o surgimento de níveis de relacionamentos mais refinados. O segundo aspecto terá por objetivo alicerçar a cooperação em bases naturais. Tal aspecto será examinado pelo viés darwinista, sendo a cooper ação considerada um instinto social que evoluiu frente à seleção natural. A confiança será apresentada logo após, juntamente com a moralidade, ambas firmadas nos sentimentos morais, ocupando o papel de mantenedoras das interações cooperativas. Seguindo, a última análise deste trabalho irá se debruçar sobre o diálogo entre cooperação e confiança com as organizações empresariais e sua ética, a partir de uma análise da dinâmica dos indivíduos (modo-eu) inseridos no grupo (modo-nós). / This study deals with the concepts of cooperation and trust applied to corporations. The text begins by studying the dynamics of individual behavior in the collective, based on the theory of Raimo Tuomela, which divides cooperation in two basic modes of interaction: mode-me and mode-us. An important feature in his analysis is the mode-us interaction, since the interests of the group members are regulated by the condition of a cooperative exchange, making them abandon their individualistic characteristics and accept the social interactive features, allowing thus, the emergence of more refined levels of relationships. The second aspect will study cooperation in its natural bases. This aspect will be examined by a Darwinist point of view, cooperation being considered a social instinct that evolved through natural selection. The concept of trust will be presented along with morality, both deeply related with moral feelings, both occupying the role of sustaining cooperative interactions. Finally the final part of this study will analyze the dialogue between cooperation and trust with business organizations and their ethics, from an analysis of the dynamics of individuals (mode-me) inserted in the group (mode-us).

Submitted by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2014-10-06T11:15:25Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Tese - Marilena Julimar Ap. Fernandes - 2013.pdf: 1424075 bytes, checksum: c952c1274f9af403956ac0f1f691b311 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2014-10-06T16:05:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Tese - Marilena Julimar Ap. Fernandes - 2013.pdf: 1424075 bytes, checksum: c952c1274f9af403956ac0f1f691b311 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-06T16:05:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Tese - Marilena Julimar Ap. Fernandes - 2013.pdf: 1424075 bytes, checksum: c952c1274f9af403956ac0f1f691b311 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-06 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Goiás - FAPEG / Dans cette étude, il est proposé, basé sur l'analyse des "Mémoires" de Pedro Ludovico Teixeira (1974), «Por este Goiás afora...‖ par Joaquim Rosa, journaux, magazines (comme "A Informação Goyana", "Revista Oeste») et les lettres, de discuter de la soi-disant«Révolution» de 1930. Plus précisément identifier les affrontements politiques, les images construites et reconstruites par Pedro Ludovico Teixeira et l'attribution de ces images pour les sujets impliqués dans ce mouvement, comme la famille Caiado. En particulier celles qui sont attribuées à Antonio Ramos (Totó) Caiado et Pedro Ludovico Teixeira, basée sur les concepts de mémoire et (re) sentiment (silences, l'oubli, l'humiliation). Sur la base de la compréhension de ces concepts sont devenus une discussion à propos de la construction et de relocalisation de la capitale de l'État de Goiás, le principal projet politique de Pedro Ludovico, et son impact, dans les revues et dans l'historiographie de Goiás. / Nesse estudo propõe-se, a partir da análise das fontes selecionadas – Memórias, de Pedro Ludovico Teixeira (1974), Por esse Goiás afora ..., de Joaquim Rosa, Jornais, Revistas (como a Informação Goiana, Revista Oeste) e cartas – discutir a chamada “Revolução” de 1930 em Goiás, mais especificamente os embates políticos, as imagens construídas e reconstruídas por Pedro Ludovico Teixeira e a atribuição dessas imagens aos sujeitos envolvidos nesse movimento, como a família Caiado, especialmente a Antônio (Totó) Ramos Caiado e o próprio Pedro Ludovico Teixeira, a partir dos conceitos memórias e sentimentos (ressentimentos, silêncios, esquecimentos, humilhação). Partindo da compreensão desses conceitos fez-se uma discussão sobre a construção e a mudança da capital do Estado de Goiás, como principal projeto político de Pedro Ludovico, e a repercussão desse acontecimento nos jornais da época e, também, na Historiografia Goiana.

Cette thèse est née d’un questionnement sur le corps de l’acteur en scène au regard des normes, insufflé par le séminaire de Jean-Jacques Courtine sur «L’histoire du corps anormal». Cette focalisation sur le corps en scène réactive ma passion pour un théâtre où les acteurs, désignés comme singuliers, ne sortent pas des grandes écoles de théâtre ou de danse. Ces spectacles, de plus en plus visibles, présentent le corps dans sa réalité et non plus son idéalité. Ces corps charnels ont un impact sur les spectateurs. Que dit ce théâtre des corps sur le corps aujourd’hui ? A quel besoin répond-il ? La partie I, en cherchant à nommer ces acteurs et ces spectacles, interroge des notions (normal/anormal/hors-normes, ordinaire/extra-ordinaire, handicap/handicapé, art/art-Thérapie, professionnel/amateur, …) et des normes corporelles en vigueur aujourd’hui, normes de l’acteur et de sa représentation. La partie II analyse des documents hétérogènes afin de cerner le ressenti de spectateurs face aux spectacles de l’Oiseau-Mouche (au fil de son histoire), de troupes et de metteurs en scène qui mettent leur corps en jeu. / This dissertation originates in a questioning of the body of the stage actor in relation to social norms, inspired by Jean-Jacques Courtine’s seminar on «the history of the abnormal body». This focus on the body on stage has revived my passion for a kind of theatre in which actors, perceived as singular, have not been trained in the main theatre or dance academies. These shows more and more conspicuously display the body as real rather than ideal. These bodies in flesh and blood have a powerful impact on spectators. What does this body theatre have to say on the current state of the body? What kind of need does it meet?The first part of this work tries to give these actors and these plays a name by questioning some of the categories (normal/abnormal/out of norms; ordinary/extra-ordinary; disability/disabled; art/art-therapy; professional/amateur, …), as well as the bodily norms of the actor and his/her representation in force to day. The second part analyses heterogeneous documents in order to grasp the perception of spectators when attending the Oiseau Mouche various plays (in the course of the company’s history), as well as those of companies’ and stage directors’ works in which the body is deeply involved.

In his 1962 paper “Freedom and Resentment," Peter Strawson attempts to reconcile incompatibilism and compatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. First, I present the error committed by the proponents of both these traditional views, which Strawson diagnoses as the source of their standoff, and the remedy Strawson offers to avoid the conflict. Second, I reconstruct the two arguments Strawson offers for a theory of moral responsibility that is based on his proposed remedy. Third, I present and respond to two proposed problems for the Strawsonian theory: moral luck and revisionism. I conclude with a summary of my defense of Strawsonian “expressivism” about moral responsibility, and offer suggestions for further research.

This work deals with changes in the expectations of seniors before and after joining the home for seniors. The aim of the research was to map out what ideas the elderly people come to and how they met their expectations after joining the home for the elderly. The thesis is divided into a theoretical part and an empirical part. The first chapter of the theoretical part defines the concepts of age and aging, describes age-related changes, seniors' needs and possible ways of preparing and adapting to old age. The second chapter explains the concept of quality of life and its dimension, describes the factors that influence the quality of life and the methods of measurement. The conclusion of the second chapter deals with the quality of life of seniors. The third chapter describes the possibilities of caring for the elderly in the home and in the homes for the elderly. In the practical part, the aim of the thesis is set out and research questions are asked: "What do the seniors come to the home for seniors?" "In what areas did the expectations of the elderly after the admission into the home for seniors have been fulfilled?" The following is a description of the used method, research carried out by a qualitative survey, a semi-structured interview technique and document analysis. Research has shown that the most important areas for seniors' satisfaction are the feeling of peace, security and safety, care and relationships with loved ones. Senior citizens were provided with care by family members in conjunction with outreach care before entering the home for the elderly. Reasons for going home for seniors were reduced self-sufficiency and repeated falls. Some seniors came to the home for seniors with prejudices, but most knew the device from personal experience, positive narrative of clients' families or websites. Everyone expected them to be adequately cared for in their homes and that their safety would be ensured. They were afraid of the regime they would have to obey, the limitations of their space, and their relations with staff and roommates. The expectation of seniors has been fully satisfied, in most cases it has surpassed them. All seniors expressed higher satisfaction with care in the home for the elderly than in home care. They were particularly valued to ensure dignified and continuous care, respect for the privacy, expertise and professionalism of staff, their willingness to solve problematic situations by individual approach, warmth and human attitude. The results of this research can contribute to the destigmatization of homes for the elderly as a facility to live. The diploma thesis can thus be beneficial especially to seniors who are afraid of leaving home for the seniors and to remove the prejudices associated with entering the home for the elderly.