The classical corporation, as described by Berle and Means (1932), was characterized by ownership that is dispersed between many small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers. This ownership structure created the conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholders. More recent empirical work (see, e.g., La Porta et al. (1999) and Barca and Becht (2001)) has shown that ownership in many countries around the world is typically concentrated in the hands of a small number of large shareholders. As a result, an equally important agency conflict arises between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. On the one hand, large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders by monitoring managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). On the other hand, large shareholders can be harmful if they pursue private goals that differ from profit maximization or if they reduce valuable managerial incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Burkart et al., 1997). In the presence of several large shareholders, a conflict of interest may arise between these controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Zwiebel (1995), Pagano and Röell (1998), and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). They can compete for control, monitor each other, or form controlling coalitions to share private benefits. The question arises as to what determines the role of controlling shareholders in various firm policies and performance. Previous literature has noted that the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders are often exacerbated by the fact that the capital invested by the controlling shareholders is relatively lower than the voting control they achieve through the use of dual class shares (i.e., shares with differential voting rights) or stock pyramids (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002). Moreover, the identity of the shareholder (e.g., family vs. financial institution) is important for understanding the role of controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Volpin (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Burkart et al. (2003)). Using Swedish data, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) show that the agency costs of family owners are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners. The role of controlling shareholders in transition countries is exacerbated by the fact that the legal and general institutional environment remains underdeveloped. In such an environment, strong owners may be the second best option to weak legal protection of investors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). The transition countries of central and eastern Europe are experiencing increasingly concentrated control structures, typically with the controlling owner actively involved in the management of the firm (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003). Moreover, experience from transition countries suggests that foreign direct investment, where investors take controlling positions, have been critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms. This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters that empirically examine various corporate governance issues. The common theme throughout the thesis is the focus on large shareholders, their identity, as well as to whether they deviate from the principle of one share-one vote. In particular, I examine the effect of large shareholders on firm value (in the first and third chapters), dividend policies (in the second chapter), and stock returns (in the final chapter). The first two chapters employ the data from Finland, the third looks at companies in seven European countries where deviations from one share-one vote are common, and the final one explores the evidence from transition countries. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004

Dividend policy has significant impact on the company's capital market, in particular the dynamics of the price of its shares. Dividends represent cash income of shareholders and to some extent, signal them about success of the firm they have invested. From that point of view dividend policy has crucial impact on investment decisions. Numbers of valuation models based on dividend payouts exist in the financial theory and they imply importance of dividends in making investment decisions. Alternatively some authors argue that role of the dividends is overestimated, as investors do not separate dividends and capital earnings. I believe that dividend policy has broad influence not only on share valuation, but also on capital structure of the company and its stock market liquidity. Study intended to discover if dividend payouts and future earnings can be predicted based on stock market liquidity and capital structure. I have analysed 72 companies associated with Nordic information technologies market and tried to find main characteristics of dividend policy adopted in those companies. I have divided my research question into three parts and studied hypotheses which are associated with the research question. I found relationship of dividend policies with future earnings growth power, firm capital structure and market liquidity. As a result of my study I have observed financial statements data and obtained the following outcome: (1) with stable dividend policy, payout ratio is positively related to the future earnings growth rate (2) companies that have less liquid stock markets are more likely to pay dividends (3) companies with low leverage ratios have more probability of paying dividends. Also I have found that historically low payout ratio is harbinger of low or even negative earnings growth rates. I believe that based on findings mentioned above, effective investment policy could be created. For the investor who favours to invest in company with high earnings growth perspectives and receive high dividends in the future, results of the study could be interesting. According to the results of the research, for “dividend preferring” investor, funds should be invested in the company with constantly high payout ratio, low stock market liquidity and debt-to-equity ratio below 1. In that case the probability of meeting investment expectations would be much higher.

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the simultaneous determination of debt, dividend, and inside ownership policies in Sweden. We apply a simultaneous equation model estimated with 3SLS. The results reveal a positive two-way causal relationship between debt and dividend polices. We also find a two-way causal relationship between inside ownership and dividend policies, but dividends affect inside ownership in a positive way while inside ownership affects dividends in a negative way. Further, we find a relationship between inside ownership and debt policies, but any causality appears to run from inside ownership to debt in a negative way. This study supports the notion that the convergence of interest and the entrenchment theory are not mutually exclusive. We also show that a SEM estimated with 3SLS is justified empirically over the OLS and that the difference between using 3SLS compared to 2SLS is negligible in our model.

La première rédaction enquête sur la politique de dividende récemment établie sur le marché boursier vietnamien et expérimente les périodes condensées de forte croissance et chute brutale avec une approche en deux étapes. Les résultats de la recherche montrent : (1) Les investisseurs sont d’avantage expropriés dans les entreprises dont la part de détention d’actions des initiés est plus élevée ; (2) Les investisseurs tendent à percevoir le versement de plus faibles dividendes comme un signal relatif à la rentabilité espérée dès lors que l’asymétrie d’information est réduite ; (3) Les investisseurs dans les entreprises contrôlées par l’Etat sont plus enclins à recevoir des dividendes que celles qui ne le sont pas. La seconde rédaction pose que le marché vietnamien des actions est un laboratoire prometteur pour enquêter sur le comportement des cours de marché le jour du Exdividende. Les résultats des recherches suggèrent que les investisseurs du marché boursiervietnamien sont indifférents à l’écart dans l’application de taxe sur les revenus des dividendes. Ils cherchent à capter des dividendes s’ils trouvent des opportunités de profit. Par conséquent, les investisseurs achètent des actions le jour du Cum-dividende et les vendent le Ex-dividende pour exploiter les opportunités de profit générées par le paiement de dividendes. La dernière rédaction examine les effets des droits des actionnaires et des créanciers sur la politique de dividende lorsqueles frais de représentation des actionnaires et des créances tendent à augmenter. Ses découvertes indiquent que les actionnaires et les créanciers sont plus souvent expropriés et l’augmentation des expropriations des créanciers (actionnaires) est plus élevée si les actionnaires (créanciers) sont fortement protégées par la réglementation. / The first essay investigates dividend policy in Vietnamese stock market which is newly established and experiences short booming and crashing periods with a two-step approach. The research findings show: (1) investors are expropriated more in firms with higher insider ownership; (2) Investors tend to receive smaller dividends paid as a signal of expected profitability when information asymmetry is lower; (3) investors in state-controlled firms are more likely to receive dividends than those in non-state-controlled firms. The second essay posits that Vietnamese stock market is a promising laboratory to investigate stock price behavior on ex-dividend day. The research results imply that investors in Vietnamese stock market is indifferent to the difference in tax treatment of capital gains to dividends, they try to capture dividends if they find profit opportunities. Therefore, investors buy stocks on the cum-dividend day and sell them on the exdividend to exploit profit opportunities created by dividend payment. The third essay examines the effects of shareholder rights and creditor rights on dividend policy when agency costs of shareholders and creditors tend to increase. Its findings indicate that are more expropriated and theincrease in the expropriation of creditors (shareholders) is higher if shareholders (creditors) are protected strongly by law.

Den 10 mars 2000 blev det lagligt för publika aktiebolag att köpa tillbaka sina egna aktier i Sverige. Företag har därefter tagit tillfället i akt och använt detta distributionssätt. Denna studie syftar till att undersöka huruvida det finns skillnader i olika branscher gällande aktieåterköp under tidsperioden 2011–2019. Branscherna som studerades var industri, läkemedel, fastigheter, dagligvaror och telekommunikation. Undersökningen utfördes för att se om branschtillhörighet hade en inverkan på företag som använder sig av aktieåterköp. Samtliga företag som ingår i undersökningen är noterade på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, Large-Cap. Studien använde en kvantitativ metod med en deduktiv ansats. Ett hypotestest utfördes som sedan prövades med en regressionsanalys för att se om det fanns signifikanta skillnader på aktieåterköp i olika branscher. Resultatet påvisade att det inte fanns några signifikanta branschskillnader, och branschtillhörighet har därför ingen inverkan på huruvida ett företag använder sig av aktieåterköp. Resultatet i denna studie går i linje med Higgins (1972) studie The corporate dividend-saving decision som menade att valet av utdelningspolitik inte påverkas av branschen företaget befinner sig i. / On March 10, 2000, it became legal for public limited companies to buy back their own shares in Sweden. Companies have since taken the opportunity and used this method of distribution. This study aims to examine whether there are differences in different industries regarding share repurchases during the period 2011-2019. The industries studied were pharmaceuticals, real estate, industry, consumer goods and telecommunications. The survey was conducted to see if industry affiliation had an impact on companies that use share repurchases. All companies included in the survey are listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, Large-Cap. The study used a quantitative method with a deductive approach. A hypothesis test was performed which was then tested with a regression analysis to see if there were significant differences in share repurchases in various industries. The results showed that there were no significant industry differences, and industry affiliation therefore has no effect on whether a company uses share repurchases. The results of this study are in line with Higgins' (1972) study the corporate dividend-saving decision, which stated that the choice of dividend policy is not affected by the industry the company operates in.

The effects of individual income taxation direct the way they choose to receive capital flows. The clientele effect suggests, investor preferences are affected by their individual taxation. A shareholder with high marginal tax will according to theory invest in stocks with low or no dividend yield, while individuals with low marginal tax opts to invest in stocks with high dividend yield. In this study we analyse how the implementation of the investeringssparkonto affects the dividend clientele theory. With our impact analysis we are able to show that Swedish individuals are able to receive dividends at a lower tax rate than before. We establish proof that tax rates have lowered for all income levels of the Swedish populations since the implementation 2012, where the largest percentage increase happened among the lower income levels. While the largest unit tax rate cut happened at the top. The investeringssparkonto has created a new scenario where the effective tax rate is lower than the traditional aktie och fonddepå, when the dividend yield is higher than the government bond rate increased by one percent. Lower effective dividend taxation amount to stockholders receiving a larger share of the distributed profit. This new scenario where all individuals are prone to choose higher dividend yields, reduced the relevancy of who the dividend policy is adjusted to. All dividend clienteles prefer the same policy. / Effekterna av privatpersoners inkomstbeskattning styr hur de väljer att få sina kapitalflöden. Klienteleffekten antyder att investerarens preferenser kommer att påverkas av deras privata beskattning. En aktieägare med hög marginalskatt ska enligt teorin dras till aktier i företag där utdelningen är låg eller obefintlig, medan personer med låg marginalskatt är intresserade av att äga aktier i bolag med höga aktieutdelningar. I denna studie undersöker vi hur införandet av investeringssparkontot påverkar de tidigare teorierna om utdelningsklientel. Vi kan med vår konsekvensanalys visa att de svenska privatpersonerna har möjlighet att ta emot utdelningar till en betydligt lägre skattesats än tidigare. Vi kan konstatera att skatten har sjunkit för samtliga inkomstnivåer sedan införandet av investeringssparkontot 2012, det gick att se att den största procentuella skillnaden skedde bland de lägre inkomst nivåerna, men den största skillnaden sett till procentenheter sker i toppen. Investeringssparkontot har medfört ett nytt scenario där den effektiva skatten är lägre än i en aktie och fonddepå, då direktavkastningen överstiger statslåneräntan ökat med en procentenhet. Lägre effektiv skatt på utdelningar innebär att ägarna får en större del av den utdelade vinsten. Detta nya scenario där alla privatpersoner har ett incitament till hög direktavkastning, gör det mindre relevant vem utdelningspolicyn anpassas till då alla “klientel” föredrar samma policy.

Dividend policy is widely researched in financial management, but determining whether it affects the market price per share is difficult. There has been much published on the subject, which presented theories such as the Modigliani, Miller, Gordon, Lintner, Walter and Richardson propositions and the relevance and irrelevance theories. However, little research has been done on the impact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth while considering the short- and long-run effects. The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) was used to describe the short-run and long-run dynamics or the adjustment of the cointegrated variables towards their equilibrium values in South Africa. This study attempts to explain the effect of dividend policy on the market price per share. A sample of 46 companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) was selected for the period 1995-2010. Three variables were used, namely the market price per share, the dividend per share and the earnings per share. The market price per share was used as a proxy in measuring shareholders’ wealth and the dividend per share was used as a proxy in measuring the dividend policy. Fixed and random effects models were applied to panel data to determine the relation between dividend policy and market price per share. The fixed effects method was used to control the stable characteristics of the companies over a fixed period. The random effects model was applied when the companies’ characteristics differed. Results for both models indicated that dividend yield is positively related to market price per share, while earnings per share do not have a significant impact on the market price per share. To test the strength of the long-run relationship, the VECM was applied. The coefficient for dividend per share in the co-integrating equation was positive, while the coefficient for earnings per share was negative. This confirms previous research findings. The results suggest that there is a long-run relationship between dividend per share and market price per share. The Granger causality test indicates there is bi-directional Granger causality between market price per share and dividend per share in South Africa. Therefore dividend policy does have a significant long-run impact on the share price and therefore provides a signal about the company’s financial success. / Dissertation (MCom)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Financial Management / Unrestricted

Die studie ondersoek die inligtingswaarde van dividende as 'n moontlike verldaring van die waargenome aandeleprysreaksie op dividendaankondigings. Twee algemene hipoteses is getoets, naamlik dat 'n betekenisvolle verandering in 'n maatskappy se dividendbeleid inligting oor daardie maatskappy se toekomstige verdienste per aandeel bevat, en tweedens dat hierdie inligting in die reaksie van aandelepryse na die aankondiging van die verandering gereflekteer word. Die belangrikste bevindinge is soos volg: • Die inligting vervat in huidige dividendaankondigings kan nie deur beleggers gebruik word om die volgende jaar se verdienste per aandeel van 'n maatskappy te voorspel nie. Die aandeleprysreaksie op positiewe, negatiewe en neutrale nuus is statisties beduidend, maar vind hoofsaaklik in dieselfde rigting plaas. Beleggers sou dus nie die inligting vervat in dividendaankondigings kan gebruik om bogemiddelde opbrengskoerse te genereer nie. • Die inligtingswaarde van dividende is dus 'n onwaarskynlike verldaring van die invloed van 'n maatskappy se dividendbeleid op die waarde van sy gewone aandele. / This research investigates the information content of dividends as a possible explanation for the observed share price reaction to dividend announcements. Two hypotheses were tested, namely that a significant change in a company's dividend policy contains information on that company's future earnings per share, and secondly, that this information is reflected in the share price reaction after the announcement of the change. The most important findings are as follows: • Investors cannot use the information contained in current dividend announcements to predict a company's earnings per share for the next year. • Share price reactions to positive, negative and neutral news are statistically significant, but will be in the same direction. Hence investors cannot use this information to generate above-normal returns. The information content of dividends is therefore an unlikely explanation of the influence a company's dividend policy has on the value of its ordinary shares. / Business Management / MCom (Sakebestuur)

Ce travail de recherche est dédié à l’analyse des politiques de dividendes dans le contexte des fusions-acquisitions américaines. Le premier chapitre de cette thèse décrit le cadre de l’étude. Il présente le cadre théorique des politiques de dividendes, puis celui des fusions-acquisitions avant d’exposer les champs exploratoires relatifs aux spécificités des politiques de dividendes lors des opérations de fusions-acquisitions. Il traite, à la fin, une illustration d’une fusion américaine qui incarne un cas réel des interactions des politiques de dividendes lors des rapprochements des firmes. Le deuxième chapitre de la thèse explore empiriquement l’impact de la différence entre les politiques de dividendes des firmes fusionnées sur la politique de dividendes post-fusion, et teste un éventuel effet de compensation de la prime de fusion. Le troisième chapitre part de l’idée que la réaction négative du marché à l’annonce des acquisitions en titres de firmes cotées est l’issu de l’évaluation incorrecte de l’acquéreur. De ce fait, il explore un possible rôle informationnel de la politique de dividendes de l’acquéreur dans ce type d’opérations qui peut réduire l’asymétrie d’information sur la valorisation de l’acquéreur, et ainsi alléger la réaction négative du marché à l’annonce. Le quatrième chapitre étudie les caractéristiques financières des firmes fusionnées qui sont déterminantes de leurs politiques de dividendes. Au vu de cela, il suppose que la réussite de la fusion peut être affectée par la différence entre les politiques de dividendes des firmes fusionnées issue de la différence entre leurs caractéristiques. Les résultats de nos recherches prouvent l’effet de la divergence entre les politiques de dividendes des firmes fusionnées sur le déroulement de la fusion au moment et après la transaction. La principale contribution de cette thèse est donc d’illustrer l’importance de tenir compte des politiques de dividendes des firmes impliquées dans des opérations de fusions-acquisitions, afin de pouvoir prendre les bonnes décisions lors du rapprochement. La généralisation de l’effet de clientèle sur les firmes fusionnées permet de détecter des chocs de clientèles de dividendes, et de révéler la nécessité d’absorber ces chocs par certains termes transactionnels et par la conduite post-fusion de la firme combinée. / This research is dedicated to the analysis of dividend policy in the context of U.S. mergers and acquisitions. The first chapter of this thesis presents the framework of the study. It outlines the theoretical framework of the dividend policies and the mergers-acquisitions before stating exploratory fields related to the specificities and contributions of dividend policies in the M&A setting. Furthermore, it discusses an illustration of an US merger that embodies a real case of interactions between dividend policies during mergers-acquisitions. The second chapter empirically explores the impact of the difference between merging firms’ dividend policies on the post-merger dividend policy, and tests a probable compensation effect of the bid premium. The third chapter starts from the idea that the negative market reaction to the announcement of stock acquisitions of listed firms is derived from the acquirer’s misevaluation. Thereby, it explores the information content of the acquirer dividend policy in such deals which may reduce the information asymmetry on the acquirer valuation, and thus alleviate the negative market reaction at the announcement. The fourth chapter examines the financial characteristics of merging firms that are determining their existing dividend policies. In light of this, it assumes that the merger completion may be affected by the difference between merging firms’ dividend policies which are resulting from the difference between their characteristics. The findings of our research confirm the impact of the difference between the merging firms’ dividend policies on the conduct of the merger during and following the transaction. The main contribution of this thesis is to illustrate the importance of considering the dividend policies of companies involved in mergers-acquisitions in order to make the right decisions in favor of the reconciliation. The generalization of the clientele effect on the M&A setting allow to detect dividend clientele shocks, and reveal the need to absorb these shocks by transaction specifics and the post-merger conduct of the merged firm.

Segundo a teoria da firma, uma empresa é um nexo de relações contratuais entre os seus diversos participantes. Nessas relações contratuais, que não são perfeitas, surgem os problemas de agência, decorridos da assimetria informacional e dos conflitos de interesses entre o contratado e o contratante, no caso, agente e principal. Neste caso, quando se tem a intenção de alinhar os interesses entre eles, aparece a governança corporativa, atuando como um meio de minimizar os conflitos e diferenças existentes e corrigir as falhas presentes no processo de comunicação e informação das firmas. No Brasil, diante da fraca proteção legal aos acionistas minoritários, da alta concentração de propriedade nas empresas e da separação dos acionistas entre ordinários e preferenciais, algumas medidas institucionais e governamentais têm sido tomadas ao longo dos anos com o objetivo de contribuir com a evolução das práticas de governança corporativa no país. Uma dessas iniciativas foi a criação em 2000 do segmento Novo Mercado pela Bovespa, composto por regras e exigências crescentes em relação às boas práticas de governança. Nesse sentido, é coerente pensar que a política de dividendos, antes influenciada pela necessidade de atuar também como instrumento de redução de conflitos entre os acionistas, passou a ser decidida a partir de um foco preponderantemente gerencial pelas companhias deste segmento, ou seja, tomada do ponto de vista financeiro de maximização da riqueza dos acionistas. Para testar esta suposição, adotou-se o modelo conceitual da Teoria Residual dos Dividendos, estabelecidos pioneiramente por Modigliani e Miller (1961) e revisitado por Jensen (1986) na Teoria Free Cash Flow. Assim, conduziu-se um levantamento do Fluxo de Caixa Livre do Acionista (FCLA) para todas as companhias listadas no Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa desde a sua criação até o ano de 2011. O objetivo foi investigar o perfil da política de dividendos dessas empresas, a partir da avaliação de como elas administram o FCLA. Além disso, foi testado se as decisões sobre a destinação do saldo de FCLA impactaram na rentabilidade do acionista, expressa pela Taxa de Retorno da Ação (TRA). Como proposta secundária, foram pesquisados também os fluxos de reinvestimento dos lucros destas companhias, buscando verificar se os acionistas são recompensados por maiores ganhos de capital em contrapartida pelo não recebimento de dividendos e, também, onde são alocados os lucros reinvestidos. Como resultado, constatou-se que grande parte das companhias apresentaram elevados níveis de sobreinvestimento no período, provocado pela retenção do FCLA, e que este problema pode ter sido a causa de uma Taxa de Retorno da Ação menor em alguns setores. Adicionalmente, foi observado que as empresas que mais retiveram lucro, ao longo do tempo, foram também as que proporcionaram os maiores retornos de ganhos de capital aos seus acionistas. Por fim, detectou-se que os lucros retidos pelas companhias foram reaplicados, em sua grande maioria, em investimentos relacionados à expansão ou manutenção de suas capacidades produtivas (capital fixo), embora a maior parcela deles acabasse não sendo identificada em nenhum dos ativos expressos pelo balanço patrimonial contábil. / According to the theory of the firm, the firm is a nexus of contractual relationships between its various participants. Such contractual relations, which are not perfect, agency problems arise, elapsed the information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between the engaged and the contractor, where, agent and principal. In this case, when it is intended to align the interests between them, appears to corporate governance, acting as a means to minimize conflicts and differences existing and correct the faults present in the process of communication and information firms. In Brazil, due to the weak legal protection for minority shareholders, the high concentration of ownership in firms and the separation between common and preferred shareholders, some institutional and government measures have been taken over the years in order to contribute to the evolution of corporate governance practices in the country. One such initiative was the creation in 2000 of the Novo Mercado segment by the Bovespa, composed of rules and increasing requirements in relation to good governance practices. Therefore, it is coherent to think that the dividend policy before influenced by the need to act as an instrument for reducing conflicts between shareholders, has to be decided from a managerial focus by companies in this segment, that is, the financial point of view of maximizing shareholder wealth. To test this assumption, we adopted the conceptual model of the Residual Theory of Dividends, established pioneered by Modigliani and Miller (1961) and revisited by Jensen (1986) in the Free Cash Flow Theory. Thus, we conducted a survey of Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) for all companies listed on the Novo Mercado of the BM&FBovespa since its inception until the year 2011. The aim was to investigate the profile of the dividend policy of these companies, based on the evaluation of how they manage the FCFE. Furthermore, was tested whether if decisions on the allocation of the balance of FCFE impacted the profitability of the shareholder, expressed by the Rate of Stock Return (RSR). As proposed secondary, were surveyed the flows of reinvestment of profits these companies, seeking first check whether the shareholders are rewarded by higher capital gains in return for non-receipt of dividends, and also where they are allocated reinvested earnings. As a result, it was found that most companies had high levels of overinvestment during the period, caused by retention of FCFE and that this problem may have been the cause of a Rate of Stock Return lower in some sectors. Additionally, it was observed that companies that retained earnings, over time, were also the ones that provided the highest returns of capital gains to its shareholders. Finally, it was found that profits retained by the companies were reapplied mostly in investments related to the expansion or maintenance of their productive capacity (capital assets), while the largest portion of them end up not being identified in any of the assets of the balance sheet accounting.