The diploma thesis topic is Voluntary agreements in the environment problems and advantages. The theoretical part describes how the attitude to the environment was developing, from the restrictive regulations to the first voluntary attitudes. The part of the thesis is devoted to the problems of the environment´s valuation because one of the tasks of the voluntary agreements is the effort to internalize externalities. For this the valuation of the environment is needed, which is problematic. At first the voluntary attitudes to the environmental protection are described in general and there are voluntary agreements that are described more in detail. The practical part is devoted to the problems of voluntary agreements in the Czech Republic. All voluntary agreements made in the Czech Republic are described. These particular agreements are assessed according to their results whether they fulfilled their purpose because of which they had been made. The component of the practical part is also a questionnaire which was to be filled in by companies which have been using some voluntary attitude, e.g. EMAS, ecolabeling or some voluntary agreement. In the conclusion the attitude of The Ministry of the Environment to the voluntary agreements is assessed as well as the effect of the voluntary agreements in the Czech Republic itself.

The aim of this thesis was based on an analysis of market gaps in the commercialization of outgoing TA through IT, to determine the possibility of eliminating their negative external influence and to propose replacement solutions. Partial aim of the thesis was to investigate the influence of IT and reservation systems on the activity of TA.

L’innovation dans les technologies de l’énergie bas-carbone est entravée, d’une part, par les externalités sur l’environnement et, d’autre part, par les externalités de connaissance. Ces défaillances de marché nécessitent d’être corrigées par l’intervention des pouvoirs publics. L’objectif de cette thèse est d’établir les conditions d’un soutien efficace à l’innovation dans les technologies de l’énergie bas-carbone. Le travail de recherche mène des analyses théoriques sur le traitement de ces défaillances de marché en conjonction avec des évaluations empiriques des politiques de soutien à l’innovation dans ces technologies mises en place jusqu’à présent. Cette thèse se structure en cinq chapitres. Le Chapitre 1 interroge la nécessité de mettre en place des politiques spécifiquement dédiées à l’innovation dans les technologies de l’énergie bas-carbone, en opposition à un soutien à l’innovation de la part des pouvoirs publics ne discriminant pas ces technologies des autres. La revue des instruments économiques mis en place jusqu’à présent est ensuite proposée et indique la prédominance du soutien à l’innovation dans ces technologies par la demande, plutôt que par l’offre. Le Chapitre 2 resserre l’analyse sur les instruments de soutien par la demande. Un modèle micro-fondé de diffusion est utilisé en vue de mener une analyse contrefactuelle évaluant les effets de ces instruments sur la diffusion de la technologie éolienne dans six pays européens. Le Chapitre 3 développe une méthode économétrique de mesure de la connaissance produite dans les technologies de l’énergie bas-carbone. L’utilisation d’un modèle à facteur latent commun permet d’estimer un indice de qualité des inventions brevetées entre 1980 et 2010, dans quinze types de technologies et dans six pays innovateurs. Le Chapitre 4 revisite la question du design optimal du système de brevet quand il s’adresse à une invention de procédé dont la rémunération dépend des politiques de tarification des externalités sur l’environnement. Le Chapitre 5 résume nos résultats et en déduit les principaux messages. / Innovation in low-carbon energy technologies (LCETs) is impeded by externalities on the environment on the one hand, and on knowledge on the other hand. These market failures need to be addressed through public policies. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the conditions for effectiveness of policies aiming at supporting innovation in LCETs. It does so by having recourse to theoretical analyses in conjunction with empirical assessments. The thesis is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 questions the need to implement innovation policies specifically dedicated to LCETs — as opposed to neutral innovation policies that do not discriminate between these technologies and other technologies. A review of the economic instruments that have been implemented is proposed and indicates the predominance of a demand-pull approach — over a supply-push approach — to support innovation in LCETs. Chapter 2 evaluates the effects of demand-pull support instruments by conducting a counterfactual analysis to determine the extent to which the diffusion of wind power in six European countries is imputable to these instruments. Chapter 3 develops an econometrical method aiming at providing a robust measure of the produced knowledge that pertains to LCETs. A common latent factor model is used to estimate the quality of inventions that have been patented by six countries between 1980 and 2010 in fifteen low-carbon energy technologies. Chapter 4 revisits the question of the optimal design of a patent system when specifically dedicated to a process invention, whose reward depends on the pricing of environmental externalities. Chapter 5 summarizes our results and articulates key issues and messages.

The thesis is devoted to an evaluation of social and economic benefit, which is produced by major international sport event. Particular costs and benefits of the alpine skiing World Cup competitions held in Czech Republic are described and evaluated, using standard tools of investment project evaluation. Applied procedure arises from CBA (cost benefit analysis) methodology. All important effects of the analysed sport event are expressed as an amount in the form of money. Based on the values of selected indicators is then pronounced a concluding verdict, if the project is acceptable or not.

This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first one (Chapter three), "Gains and Losses from Household Formation," I introduce a general equilibrium model, wherein a household may consist of more than one member, each with their own preferences and endowments. In these models at first, individuals form households. Then, collective decisions (or bargaining) within the household specifies the consumption plans of household members. Finally, competition across households determines a feasible allocation of resources. I consider a model with two types of individuals and pure group externalities. I investigate the competitive equilibrium allocation and stability of the equilibrium in that setting. Specifically, I show that under a certain set of assumptions a competitive equilibrium with free exit is also a competitive equilibrium with free household formation. Similar results are obtained for a special case of consumption externality. Illustrative examples, where prices may change as household structures change, are used to show how general equilibrium model with variable household structure works and some interesting results are discussed at the end of the first essay. In the second essay (Chapter four), “Effects of the Price System on Household Labor Supply,” I introduce leisure and labor into the two-type economy framework that was constructed in the first essay. The main objective of this essay is to investigate the effects of exogenous prices on the labor supply decisions, and completely analyze the partial equilibrium model outcomes in a two-type economy setting. I assume a wage gap and explore the effect of that gap on labor supply. The main content of the second essay is the analysis of the effect of change in wages, price of the private good, power of each individual in the household, relative importance of private consumption compared to leisure, and the level of altruism on individual's decisions about how much private good or leisure he/she wants to consume. The effect of a relative price change on labor supply, private consumption and utility level is also investigated. Moreover, one of the variations of Spence's signaling model is borrowed to explain why higher education of women in Iran does not necessarily translate into higher female labor force participation. Finally, fixed point theorem is used to calculate the power (or alternatively labor supply) of individuals in the household endogenously for the two-type economy with labor at the end of this essay. In the third essay (Chapter five), “Dynamics of Poverty in Iran: What Are the Determinants of the Probability of Being Poor?,” I explore the characteristics of the households who fall below the poverty line and stay there as well as those who climb up later. I decompose poverty in Iran into chronic and transient poverty, and investigate the relation of each component of poverty with certain characteristics of households. I also study mobility and the main characteristics of growth in expenditure of households. One of the main issues in economic policy making nowadays is the evaluation of effectiveness of anti-poverty programs. In order to achieve this goal one should be able to track down a household for a period of time. In this essay, I am going to investigate the dynamics of poverty in Iran during 1992-95. I am especially interested in finding the characteristics of the households that fall below the poverty line and stay there in addition to those that climb up later. Obviously, if policy-makers want to have efficient policies to reduce poverty, they should target the former group. I decompose poverty in Iran into chronic and transient poverty, and investigate the relation of each component of poverty with certain characteristics of households. I also study mobility in this period with an emphasis on mobility in and out of poverty and review the main characteristics of the growth in expenditure of households. / Ph. D.

本文以 Barnett (1980) 一文為基礎，採用第三地市場以納入廠商型態為多國籍企業 (multinational enterprise) 的模型。本文旨在分析當兩國政府面對獨占廠商的生產不效率及製造過程中汙染排放引發的生產外部性時，如何制定最適汙染稅稅率。並比較經濟開放後資本要素可自由於兩國間移動，最適汙染稅稅率會如何變化。 本研究發現政府課稅將受三種效果影響：消費者剩餘效果 (consumer surplus effect)、利潤移轉效果 (profit-shifting effect)、汙染控制效果 (pollution control effect)。不論在封閉經濟體系或開放經濟體系下，當消費者剩餘效果大於利潤移轉效果時，政府會將最適汙染稅率制定低於皮古稅 (Pigouvian tax)，以補貼獨占廠商增加產量以提高社會福利；若利潤移轉效果大於消費者剩餘效果時，最適汙染稅稅率將高於皮古稅，以藉由汙染稅獲取更多的企業利潤。 當經濟開放後資本可於兩國間自由移動，除原先稅率對產量的直接效果(direct effect) 外，稅率亦會透過資本間接影響產量，為間接效果 (indirect effect)。間接效果將使產量對於稅率的變動較不敏感，因此為吸引具流動性的資本要素進入當地投資，政府會將汙染稅稅率調高以獲取更多企業利潤。 / Based on the setting of Barnett (1980), the thesis develops a model to analyze the optimal pollution tax on multinational enterprises with negative externalities. Governments have only one policy variable: the pollution tax. Each government levies the pollution tax on the output of multinational enterprises, and the tax revenues are returned to the residents in a lump sum manner. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the optimal taxation on the multinational enterprise with externalities and mobile capital flow. The thesis obtains several results: First, no matter in the case of closed economy or open economy, the second-best optimal pollution tax may be less or greater than the marginal pollution damage. It may be lower because the consumer surplus effect dominates the profit-shifting effect, so the government chooses a lower tax rate to stimulate production and to increase social welfare. Second, when the capital can freely move between countries, the governments will levy a tax rate higher than that of a closed economy. Doing so can attract the flow of capital so that government can get more profit.

Phan (2003)等人的研究首先採用網路結構的觀點，來進行在獨占市場下的消費行為分析。本文延伸Phan等人的研究，採用多樣性的不同網路結構，特別是以「無標度網路」(scale-free)作為市場背後的網路結構，藉此來探討網路對於市場需求行為的影響。同時，為了有效地進行量化分析，我們建立了一些數學公式，以便能夠精準地比較不同網路對於需求面的影響程度，其中包含了消費者剩餘、雪崩效果和磁滯效果等。在實驗結果中，我們發現網路結構的確會影響到消費行為的表現，並且當市場規模變大時，仍存在著一些因網路不同而有的差異性。 / The economic implications of network topologies are studied via a monopolist's model of market networks originally proposed by Phan, et al. (2003). By embedding the market into a larger collection of network topologies, in particular, a class of scale-free networks, we extend the early analysis built upon a class of ring networks. To facilitate the study of the impacts of network topologies upon market demand, various measures concerning social welfare (the consumer's surplus), the avalanche effect, and the hysteresis effect, are formally established. Comparisons based on these measures show that network topologies matter, and their implied differences will remain even when the network size becomes large.

本文將貿易政策與環境政策做連結, 建構一雙邊貿易之架構, 設立一三階段之序列賽局,以之探討: 當具有跨國性質之消費性污染存在時, 在考量兩國政府皆有誘因在環境政策上採取非合作的態度下, 兩國政府應如何藉由貿易政策之協定, 訂定其最適之出口品補貼政策, 以矯正環境政策非合作下之不效率。 本文研究發現: 在兩國政府僅能夠進行政策的部分合作時, 當需求參數愈大, 兩國政府之最適貿易政策是應將給予其各自國家出口品之單位補貼調升;但若伴隨消費財貨所排放之污染對環境具有較高之邊際污染, 或是其本身之外溢效果愈強, 兩國政府對出口品之最適補貼則應該調降。我們同時也發現, 此時即使各國政府之最適貿易政策是調降出口補貼, 會使得各國之污染稅稅率更低, 但卻不會使其更加偏離兩國政府在環境政策上合作下之最適稅率, 並且仍會為全球帶來更高之社會福利。 / This paper constructs a reciprocal-market model, which contains a three-stage game to investigate how the two countries decide the optimal export subsidy agreement when they do not coordinate their environmental policy. We find that the level of optimal export subsidy should decrease with the strength of transboundary pollution, which is associated to consumption activities. In addition, the export subsidy agreement should increase with the demand parameter. We also find that even a reduction in the export subsidy will decrease the non-coordinated environmental tax rate, it will not deviate the tax rate away from the coordinated one and still enhance the social welfare.

More and more enterprises plan to switch their legacy system to service-oriented architecture (SOA). SOA, the focus of recent software-engineering, modulizes the IT components as “services” which could be re-jointed with each other flexibly and reused to avoid building parts repeatedly. This methodology also yields network externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1986; Markus 1987) as a number of services are integrated. An enterprise could increase the number of services to earn network externalities but such benefits come with risks. / This study aims to evaluate the investment of SOA and justifies the switch of current systems to SOA. Since SOA investment is usually a long-term and risky project for most enterprises, uncertainty becomes an important evaluation factor of an SOA project. This research applies the real option approach to evaluate an SOA switching project which majorly justifies the uncertainties, and use Monte-Carlo simulation to do the option pricing work. We consider three components of uncertainty in the model– risk, exercise time and number of connecting services for reusing- and evaluate how the uncertainty relates to the value of an SOA project. Finally, this research deduces the investment strategies under uncertainties, and describes what advantages for real option SOA has which are SOA could reduce the investment friction.

Cette thèse porte sur les mécanismes d’allocation de biens indivisibles en présence d’externalités dans les préférences individuelles. Ces externalités rendent difficile en pratique la collecte d’une information complète sur les préférences. Aussi, l’analyse normative des mécanismes d’allocation requiert de formuler des hypothèses sur la manière d’étendre l’information collectée aux préférences sur les allocations. Cette approche revient à définir des restrictions sur le domaine de préférences admissibles, une démarche bien connue de la théorie du choix social. Les trois premiers chapitres portent sur l’analyse du marché de Shapley-Scarf dans lequel les échanges sont organisés entre coalitions. Les chapitres 1 et 2 établissent des restrictions de domaine garantissant l’existence de différents types d’équilibre concurrentiel. Dans le chapitre 3, l’ensemble des biens est muni d’une géographie, ce qui permet de définir la distance entre partenaires comme source d’externalité. Nous identifions certains domaines de préférences qui assurent la non-vacuité de différents types de Coeur. Le chapitre 4 porte sur le cas de biens indivisibles publics purs. Nous montrons que le problème est formellement équivalent à celui du choix d’un comité dont les membres sont choisis dans des ensembles distincts. Nous caractérisons certains domaines de préférences sur les comités pour lesquels le choix majoritaire membre par membre est cohérent avec le choix majoritaire du comité dans son ensemble. / This thesis focuses on the allocation of indivisible goods in presence of externality in individual preferences. This externality creates a difficulty with collecting full information about preferences. Therefore, conducting a normative analysis of allocation mechanisms requires assumptions on how reported preferences can be extended to preferences over outcomes. This approach is in line with the literature on preference domain restriction well-known in Social Choice theory. The first three chapters focus on Shapley-Scarf markets where trades are organized among coalitions. Coalitional trade generates externalities in individual valuations of allocations. Chapters 1 and 2 investigate domain restrictions ensuring the existence of various types of competitive equilibrium. Chapter 3 endows the set of goods with a geographical structure and considers distance to partners as a source of externality in preference. We identify domains of preference extensions which guarantee the existence of various types of core allocations. Chapter 4 focuses the case of pure public indivisible goods, which is formally identical to choosing a committee formed by several members, each selected from a specific set. We characterize preference domains over committees for which a well-defined seat-wise choice procedure based on majority voting is consistent with choosing a committee at once from majority voting.