從1990年起，美國財政部發佈之消息顯示，公司之財稅差異不斷擴大，每年預估之財稅收入不斷向下修正，公司是否透過財務會計準則與稅法間不同規定所產生之差異進行避稅行為，引發政府機關與學者之關切。另一方面，盈餘管理為近年來熱門的探討主題之一，因此，財稅差異是否為其中一種手法，為本研究探討之主題。 過去學者透過稅前財務所得之變動及組成來判斷盈餘管理之存在，本研究則透過財稅差異之變動幅度與稅前財務所得之連動關係，及過去文獻用以衡量盈餘管理之變數來測試財稅差異是否與盈餘管理有關。另一方面，管理階層獎酬為產生盈餘管理行為的重要誘因之一，故分析管理階層之誘因是否會影響財稅差異之幅度，也納入本研究探討之主題。最後，本研究從公司治理機制中財務報表之角度，分析公司治理機制是否對於財稅差異幅度有同樣之影響，加強本研究之結果。 本研究之實證結果顯示：（1）財稅差異之幅度可能為盈餘管理操弄手法之一；（2）管理階層獎酬誘因越大，透過財稅差異操弄盈餘之幅度越大，尤其以管理階層所獲取之現金紅利具有最高關聯性，且有持續三年影響效果；（3）公司治理機制之良莠，影響財稅差異幅度；（4）當財務所得大於課稅所得或是大於零時，管理階層透過財稅差異操弄盈餘之情形更加顯著。 / According to the report published by Internal Revenue Service in 1990s, corporate tax-book differences trends increasingly and consequently brings about the government and researchers’ concerns about whether managers’ incentives influence the way they manipulate the earnings by different regulation among financial income and taxable income. In this study, I will first develop the model to measure the relation between earnings management and tax-book differences. On the other hand, compensation incentives are the major factors in earnings management. Therefore, the more the incentives, such as higher bonus, stockholding and bonus rates, the more possibilities earnings management. In addition, to enhance the result of the analysis; variables of corporate governance which have been testified as having connection with earnings management are added as robust test. The result demonstrates that corporate tax-book difference is related to earning management, and that compensation incentives are the motives of managers to manipulate financial income for extra return. Moreover, corporate governance is also another factor which affects the degree of earnings management. Besides, this situation becomes more obvious when financial income is larger than taxable income or when it appears to be zero. This study may help explaining why large tax- book gaps trend increasingly.

為了使公司帳面價值符合穩健原則，我國財務會計準則委員會於民國九十三年七月一日公布財務會計準則公報第三十五號 -- 「資產減損之會計處理」。此公報規定當資產之帳面價值高於可回收金額，對於超過的部分即須認列減損損失。本文之目的即在於藉由探討資產減損認列之決定因素，係經濟因素或報導誘因，以瞭解第三十五號公報之實施是否真能達到當初制定之目的，而使公司財報更為透明，更能反映公司的經營績效與價值，而非淪為管理階層盈餘管理之工具。此外，本文亦探討公司資產減損之認列與其股價之關係，以瞭解投資人對資產減損資訊之反應，以及第三十五號公報對市場之影響。 本研究之主要發現如下：（1）國內上市公司認列資產減損之決定因素主要係經濟因素，但亦有藉以平穩其盈餘之現象；以及（2）整體而言，資產減損對股價不具有顯著之影響力，顯示市場對於資產減損並無顯著之反應。但市場對於未提前適用之公司所認列之資產減損，則有顯著之負向反應。 / In July 2004, Financial Accounting Standards Board in Taiwan issued SFAS No. 35: Accounting for Impairment of Assets, to enhance the conservatism in corporate financial statements. SFAS No. 35 requires that when an asset’s book value is lower than its recoverable amount, a company should recognize the difference as an impairment loss. The purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants (economic factors and reporting incentives) of reported impairment losses to evaluate whether SFAS No. 35 achieves its purpose. In addition, this study examines the relationship between reported impairment losses and stock prices to determine the impact of SFAS No. 35 on the capital market investors. Our empirical results show that economic factors are the main determinants of reported impairment losses of the listed firms in Taiwan. There is also a high association between reported impairment losses and corporate “income smoothing” behavior. Overall, reported impairment losses do not have significant impact on stock prices. However, after excluding the early adopting firms, the capital market reacts negatively to reported impairment losses.

本研究旨在探討家族企業及非家族企業兩種不同的公司治理型態，其董事會各組成區塊與企業進行實質盈餘管理之間的關聯性。實質盈餘管理係以異常營運活動現金流量、異常生產成本及異常裁決性費用為衡量指標，並以2004年至2011年間我國初次上市櫃(IPO)的電子產業為樣本範圍。 實證結果發現，在家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈可顯著抑制企業進行實質盈餘管理。(2)外部董事席次比率愈高，對企業進行實質盈餘管理有反向助長之傾向。(3)獨立董事席次愈多，愈能顯著監督企業進行實質盈餘管理，唯在企業以裁決性支出方式操弄盈餘方面較無監督能力。在非家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及外部董事席次比率的增加，對抑制企業從事實質盈餘管理無顯著效果。(2)獨立董事席次的增加可顯著抑制企業操弄盈餘。(3)經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈顯著助長企業進行實質盈餘管理。 / This thesis aims to discuss the relationship between board composition and real earnings management (hereafter, REM) under family business and non-family business. This study uses abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses as a measure of real earnings management. Data is collected from electronics industry in Taiwan which applied for Initial Public Offerings (IPO) from 2004 to 2011. The empirical results show that in family business: (1) If the ratio of board seat-control of ultimate controller is over 50 percents, or the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it is helpful to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by REM.(2) Once the ratio of board seats of outside directors is higher, it is prone to promote firms to do REM.(3) Once the board seats of independent directors are more, it is significant to reduce the degree of REM. However, they seem to have no abilities to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by varying discretionary expenses. In non-family business: (1) The board seat-control of ultimate controller over 50 has nothing to do with decreasing the degree of REM. Also,the increase of the ratio of board seats of outside directors is not significantly to suppress the degree of REM. (2)The increase of board seats of independent directors is effectively to reduce the extent of REM. (3) If the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it will push firms to manipulate earnings by REM.

Since 2005, publicly traded European companies are required to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This is the result of the so-called “IAS-Regulation” of the European Parliament and of the European Council (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002) which formulates two objectives directly related to financial reporting: (higher) comparability and transparency of financial statements. With regard to transparency, researchers often rely on proxies to measure the quality of financial statements. In this dissertation, I follow this approach and examine the quality of IFRS financial statements relying on different proxies, such as value relevance, the degree of earnings management, and disclosure quality. The four papers in this dissertation cover research questions related to the determinants and consequences of managerial discretion in the three most important components of financial statements: the balance sheet, the income statement, and the notes. In summary, this dissertation answers important questions concerning the quality of accounting under IFRS which have remained unanswered – and in some cases even unasked – until now. Therefore, this dissertation has a material impact on the understanding of accounting quality under IFRS.

公司名稱不僅僅是識別的代號，還具有深切的意義存在，且更名還需花費很大的成本、面對原有客戶流失的風險，故企業更名背後的真正涵義是值得深入探討的。 本研究旨在探討在CRSP有更名紀錄之美國上市公司，是否會透過實質交易或裁決性應計之方式進行盈餘管理。除了比較更名前後盈餘管理程度之差異，同時也以更名公司為實驗組，並選取未更名公司作為對照組，檢測在更名後，更名公司與未更名公司之盈餘管理程度是否有顯著差異。另外，為額外分析不同類型的更名原因，是否會採取不同的盈餘管理方式，依不同標準選取以下二類之更名公司：第一類為因業務範圍改變而更名；第二類為無原因之更名。 實證結果發現，更名公司在更名後，比起更名前及未更名公司，可能有以操縱銷貨來壓低現金流量、透過過量生產以降低銷貨成本的實質交易行為，進行裁決性應計項目之盈餘管理也較為嚴重。額外分析不同原因的更名公司之實證結果則發現，無原因之更名公司在更名後，進行實質交易之情形較業務範圍改變之更名公司嚴重。 / This study investigates the impact of corporate name changes on earnings management. We examine earnings management behavior in the period leading to the passage of name change effective year and in the period following the passage of name change effective year, focusing on both real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management. To make further investigations, we conduct analysis of firms that change name because of broader or narrower focus the firm’s scope of business versus firms that change name with no reason. The empirical results show that name change firms use more accruals and real earnings management after name changes when compared to similar firms. Furthermore, we also find that firms change name with no reason tend to adopt real earnings management when compared to the firms that change name because of broader or narrow focus.

再保險交易為國內產物保險業者經營業務及風險管理上不可或缺之工具，近年衍生融通資金及改善財務結構之財務面功能，並傳出國際知名保險業者不當運用之情事，而引起各國保險監理機關之重視，開始建立再保險完整之監理制度及詳細規範。就我國產險業而言，現行再保險交易分出業務之會計處理，可透過再保費支出、再保佣金收入、再保攤回賠款及提存未滿期保費準備減少數等會計科目，產生盈餘釋放數，進而操控公司財務報表。本研究擬探討我國產險公司是否會利用承作再保險交易從事盈餘管理。 本研究分別採用縱橫資料迴歸及分量迴歸兩種模型，以1994-2008年之國內12家產險公司為樣本，探討再保險交易量及再保險交易盈餘釋放數與盈餘管理動機之關聯。實證結果顯示我國產險公司，就資本市場動機而言，當期盈餘數愈低者，會避免虧損而從事愈多再保險交易或有愈高之盈餘釋放數，若當期盈餘低於前期愈多者，則有愈高之盈餘釋放數；就稅負動機而言，若為高稅負成本者，將從事較少再保險交易或有較低之盈餘釋放數；惟就監理動機而言，發現產險公司保單持有人盈餘與實收資本之45%的差距愈小者，反而從事愈少之再保險交易。 / Reinsurance is an indispensable tool for property-casualty insurers’ business operating and risk management. In recent years, reinsurance derived some financial functions such capital finance and financial structure improvement. Some of the world famous insurers had been found improper use of financial reinsurance, which caused regulators of various countries try to establish more supervisory systems and detailed standards to monitor such behavior. The present accounting procedures of reinsurance ceded-out business might release surplus through reinsurance premiums ceded, reinsurance commission earned, claims recovered from reinsures, and the decrease of unearned premium reserves, which release might give insurers to manipulate the financial reporting. Therefore, this research attempts to examine association between reinsurance arrangements and earnings management on Taiwan’s property-casualty insurers. This research applies panel data model and quantile regression model to test the reinsurance transactions and the surplus release associated with earnings management motivation. The data draw from12 property-casualty Taiwan’s insurers from 1994 to 2008. For capital market motivations, the evidence indicates that property-casualty insurers manage more reinsurance transactions or the higher surplus release to avoid losses, and manage the higher surplus release to avoid earnings decreases. For tax burden motivations, the result shows that the higher tax burden insurers have, the fewer insurers manage reinsurance transactions and the lower surplus release. However, for regulatory motivations, the empirical results indicate that the less difference between policyholders’ surplus and 45% of total capital has, the fewer reinsurance transactions are being managed.

本研究以我國1994年至2003年由四大會計師事務所查核簽證之上市上櫃公司為研究對象，探討會計師之產業專精與任期及其交互作用對於查核品質之影響，其中以裁決性應計數作為查核品質之代理變數，並同時採用會計師事務所及合夥會計師在特定產業之市場佔有率，作為產業專家之衡量指標。實證結果發現，產業專家可以限制受查客戶透過裁決性應計數從事盈餘管理，而以合夥會計師為基礎所計算之市場佔有率較會計師事務所為基礎所計算之市場佔有率，更能解釋審計品質的差異。在任期方面，研究結果顯示，會計師任期愈長愈能限制盈餘管理，而任期對於裁決性應計數絕對値之影響係反映於任期較長會計師之查核年資。但進一步檢測會計師對管理當局操弄盈餘向上或向下的態度是否隨著任期之增長而有所不同時，本研究發現，當管理當局操弄盈餘使其降低時，會計師任期增長愈能抑制管理當局向下操弄盈餘以預留未來盈餘空間；而在管理當局操弄盈餘使其增加時，會計師任期增長則沒有理由支持具查核品質。此外，在產業專家與任期之交互作用對查核品質影響方面，實證結果發現，產業專家會計師抑制盈餘管理的能力較非產業專家好，所以較不須要透過任期的增加來提升其偵測盈餘管理的能力。 / This study uses the sample comprised of listed and OTC firms in Taiwan during 1994-2003 and examines the effects of auditor industry specialization, auditor tenure and the interaction on audit quality. I use discretionary accruals as proxies for audit quality and industry specialization is measured in terms of both audit firm market share in an industry and auditor market share in an industry. My empirical results provide evidence that industry specialist auditors can restrict accruals-based earnings management and explain the differentiation of audit quality more than industry specialist audit firms. About auditor tenure, I find that absolute discretionary accruals decline with auditor tenure and tenure traced at the longer auditor tenure is superior to shorter auditor tenure. The results show that longer auditor tenure enhances audit quality. In addition, a further analysis shows that the clients have motivations on income-decreasing earnings management, auditors can limit management’s ability to create reserve to manage future earnings. But the clients have motivations on income-increasing earnings management, the study did not provide sufficient evidences to explain that audit quality is improved with tenure. Besides, the result of empirical analysis support my estimation about the interaction between auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure. The industry specialist auditors mitigate earnings management more than nonspecialist auditors and don’t enhance audit quality through extending auditor tenure.

本研究旨在探討企業盈餘管理行為對其信用評等之影響，以Ordered Probit Model，探討台灣上市櫃(包含興櫃)企業之盈餘管理行為，對台灣經濟新報社(TEJ)的台灣企業信用風險指標(Taiwan Corporate Credit Risk Index, 簡稱TCRI)是否造成影響，並進一步觀察其影響為何。 本研究發現，企業之盈餘管理行會影響其信用評等，而且透過進一步之邊際影響分析，顯示企業盈餘管理對當期盈餘之影響，與信用評等之間存在著反向的關係，意味著，信用評等人員在使用財務報表，進行信用評等程序時，統計上會因為企業之盈餘管理行為而有處理上之差異；本研究另外發現就平均而言，盈餘增加(減少)之裁量性應計數影響TCRI下降機率的增加(減少)幅度，大於TCRI不變以及TCRI上升之機率變動幅度。 / This study investigates the influence of earnings management on credit rating. Using Ordered Probit Model, this study tests whether earnings management of listed companies (emerging stock included) effects Taiwan Corporate Credit Risk Index (TCRI). This study finds that earnings management does affect credit rating. In addition, it suggests that earnings with income-increasing discretionary accruals have more opportunity for getting downgradings than earnings with income-decreasing discretionary accruals through analysis of marginal effects. That is, the credit analysts treat earnings management in a different way when rating companies. Moreover, this study also finds that the marginal effects of income-increasing discretionary accruals of increasing opportunity for getting downgradings are larger than the marginal effects of opportunity for getting unchanged and upgradings. Similarly, the marginal effects of income-decreasing discretionary accruals of decreasing opportunity for getting downgradings are larger than the marginal effects of opportunity for getting unchanged and upgradings.

Redovisningsskandaler runt om i världen har medfört ett ökat intresse från lagstiftare och akademiker för ledares kontroll över finansiell rapportering. För intressenter är det viktigt att den redovisade informationen återspeglar den ekonomiska verkligheten. Tidigare forskning rapporterar att beteendeskillnader existerar mellan kvinnor och män. Studiens syfte är att analysera samband mellan kön och resultatmanipulering, vilket definieras som att en högre (lägre) grad av resultatmanipulering leder till sämre (bättre) grad av överensstämmelse mellan ett bolags resultatredovisning och bolagets ekonomiska verklighet. Tidigare forskning som undersökt detta har producerat inkonsekventa resultat både vad gäller kön hos finansdirektörer och vd:ar och dessas samband med resultatmanipulering. I ett urval om 518 räkenskapsår dragna från Stockholmsbörsens Large Cap mäter vi detta samband med två olikaregressionsmodeller. Modellerna visar inget samband mellan kvinnliga vd:ar ochresultatmanipulering. Enbart en av modellerna visar ett negativt samband mellankvinnliga finansdirektörer och resultatmanipulering. Slutsatsen är att kvinnligafinansdirektörer och vd:ar inte resultatmanipulerar mindre än manliga finansdirektörer och vd:ar på Stockholmsbörsen. / Financial accounting scandals throughout the world have led to an increased interest, among legislators and scholars, for managers’ control over financial reporting. For stakeholders, it is important that the reported financial information reflects the underlying economic reality. Earlier research report differences in behavior between women and men. The purpose of this study is to analyze correlations between gender and earnings management, which we define as: A higher (lower) level of earnings management implies a worse (better) conformity between some firm’s reported earnings and the economic reality of said firm. Earlier research studying this subject have produced inconsistent findings on the impact of CFO and CEO gender on earnings management. We measure this correlation, using two different regression models, in a sample of 518 financial years, drawn from the Large Cap list of the Nasdaq Stockholm stock exchange. These models do not show any correlation between CEO gender and earnings management in this sample. Only one of the models shows a negativecorrelation between female CFOs and earnings management. We conclude that female CFOs and CEOs do not manage earnings any differently than their male counterparts, in firms listed on the Nasdaq Stockholm stock exchange.

BakgrundVD-yrket sägs ha blivit en allt mer utsatt position. I spåren av denna utveckling kan det te sig rimligt att nytillträdda VD:ar vill ge sig själva en god start på den aktuella tjänsten. Inom akademins värld anses en VD-förändring vara den situation där resultatmanipulering genom Big Bath är främst förekommande. Vi frågar oss dock om detta är en produkt av tidigare forskning selektionsmekanism och om Big Bath påverkas mer av andra faktorer. SyfteStudiens syfte är att undersöka Big Bath från en bredare tidshorisont som inte isolerar enskilda händelser. På så sätt vi vill undersöka om VD-förändringar är den situation som starkast påverkar Big Bath. MetodGenom användning av en longitudinell panelstudie med en deduktiv ansats har studien undersökt hur resultatmanipulering och Big Bath påverkas av olika faktorer däribland VD-byten. Urvalet består av bolag från NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Large Cap under åren 2006-2017. SlutsatsResultatet visar att VD-byten inte har någon signifikant påverkan på varken resultatmanipulering eller Big Bath. I studien fann vi dock indikationer på att negativa resultat påverkar förekomsten av både resultatmanipulering och Big Bath. / BackgroundThe CEO-profession is said to be more precarious than ever before. Given this development one can assume that newly appointed CEO’s are interested in securing a good start at the beginning of their appointment. In the academic world a CEO turnover is considered to be the primary situation were earnings management in the form of Big Bath occurs. We ask ourselves if this is a product of previous selection bias and if Big Bath in true is affected by other factors. PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine Big Bath from a long-term perspective that does not isolate specific events. Through this approach we want to investigate whether CEO-turnovers is the main contributing factor behind Big Bath. MethodBy using a longitudinal panel study with a deductive approach the study have investigated how earnings management and Big Bath are affected by different factors such as CEO-turnovers. The sample consists of companies from NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Large Cap in between the time period of 2006-2017.ConclusionThe result states that CEO-turnovers have no significant effect on either earnings management or Big Bath. However through the study we find indications that negative results affects both earnings management and Big Bath.