由於當公司管理機制設計出了問題時，盈餘管理動機會較容易通過篩檢，甚至管理機制本身可能都會產生盈餘管理動機，並使得管理當局可能容易操縱公司決策或是報表數字，又從國內報章雜誌的報導，我們可以發現一些台灣管理機制上的亂象，如董監一家親、董事不懂事、監事不監視或是一個家族、機構投資包辦董事會席次的情況。 在此環境之下，為了維護股東權益、降低盈餘管理行為與促進證券市場的穩定發展，本研究擬針對三構面—與股東有關、與董監事有關、與經理人有關之管理機制，如：機構投資者持股比例、外部大股東持股比例、董事會規模大小、最大家族成員董事持股、監察人是否具獨立地位、董事長是否兼任總經理、經理人持股比例、總經理薪資總額等管理機制設計，探討其與盈餘管理程度之影響。 本研究為了達到學術與實務結合，採用會計師與會計經理之實地訪談與實證研究兩種方法，以兼具深度之訪談與廣度之實證研究，探討公司管理機制設計對盈餘管理程度之影響。 一、會計師與會計經理之訪談 本訪談目的係為了瞭解國內上市公司管理機制設計與操縱之情形，因此挑選對於實務運作有深入瞭解的執業會計師與上市公司會計經理，透過依研究問題所設計的各項訪談問題，最後依照所獲結論彙總形成研究假說。而訪談結果大部分的會計師與會計經理皆認為，有些公司的確會在股東部分、董監事部分與經理人部分的管理機制作刻意的安排，以使得其盈餘管理目的較易達成。 二、實證研究 透過以上訪談形成研究假說之後，本研究以上市公司為研究對象，蒐集民國84年至87年間盈餘管理程度與各管理機制之相關資料，進行複迴歸分析，經由會計師與資深會計經理之訪談與實證研究，本研究得出以下綜合性結論： (一)股東部分之管理機制： 1. 機構投資者持股比例：從訪談中得知，機構投資者持股對於公司盈餘管理程度有相當程度之影響，但由於其身份真假難以區分，因此較難確定其所發揮之角色，及其對盈餘管理程度之正負影響；在實證分析結果部分，此管理機制則未與盈餘管理程度成顯著關係。 2. 外部大股東持股比例：從訪談結果中得知，由於國內企業普遍存在董事席次安排的問題，因此外部大股東對於公司決策有一定程度之影響；但由於較難確定此管理機制所發揮之角色，因此較難確定其對盈餘管理程度之正負影響；在實證分析結果部分，此管理機制則未與盈餘管理程度成顯著關係。。 (二)董監事部分管理機制： 1. 董事會規模大小：從訪談結果中發現，若具有共通性的成員越多，可能越容易從事盈餘管理行為，且在實證分析部分，民國八十七年度樣本分析中發現，董事會規模大小與盈餘管理程度呈顯著正相關，即表示董事會規模越大，公司之盈餘管理程度越高。此實證分析結果與專家訪談所獲結論相符。 2. 最大家族成員董事持股比例：從訪談結果中發現，若最大家族在董事會中勢力越大，則對公司影響程度越大，而在實證分析部分，於民國八十七年度樣本分析中發現，最大家族成員董事持股比例與盈餘管理程度呈顯著正相關，表示最大家族成員董事持股比例越高，公司盈餘管理程度越高。此實證分析結果與專家訪談所獲結論相符。 3. 監察人身份是否獨立：從訪談中發現，若是機構監察人可能由於較容易操縱，不易維持獨立地位，因此較自然人監察人不易發揮監督功能，而在實證分析部分，則未與盈餘管理程度呈顯著關係。 (三)經理人部分管理機制： 1. 職務雙重性：從訪談中得知，若具有職務雙重性較不易執行相互報告與負責之制度，可能使得盈餘管理行為較易發生，但可能由於仍有其他董事會成員兼任經理人之情況未納入考慮，使得實證分析部分，未與盈餘管理程度呈顯著關係。 2. 經理人持股比例：從訪談中發現，有些產業偏好以股票招攬或鼓勵員工，因此對於經理人的激勵有相當大的誘因，但也可能因此產生盈餘管理的動機，但可能由於未能考慮不同持股來源之不同動機程度，使得在實證分析部分未能與盈餘管理程度呈顯著關係。 3. 總經理薪資總額部分： 從訪談結果中發現，總經理的薪資通常包括本薪與依照盈餘計算之紅利，因此可能由於未能詳細區分薪資內容之盈餘管理動機，使得在實證分析部分，未與盈餘管理程度成顯著關係。 目 錄 第一章 緒 論………………………………….............1 第一節 研究動機與目的…………………………………… 1 第二節 研究問題…………………………………………… 3 第三節 研究方法…………………………………………… 4 第四節 研究架構…………………………………………… 6 第二章 文獻探討…………………………………............8 第一節 盈餘管理相關文獻………………………………… 8 第二節 公司管理機制之相關文獻…………………..…….. 10 第三節 公司管理機制與盈餘管理相關文獻……………… 21 第四節 文獻彙總…………………………………………… 30 第五節 研究延伸…………………………………………… 38 第三章 資深會計經理與會計師之訪談………........ 43 第一節 訪談目的……………………………….…….……... 43 第二節 訪談問題之形成………………………….………… 43 第三節 訪談結果記錄…………………………….……….... 48 第四節 訪談內容比較與分析…………………….………… 58 第四章 研究方法論……………………………........ 61 第一節 觀念性架構………………………………...……….. 61 第二節 研究方法………………………………….…..…….. 62 第三節 研究假說…………………………………….…..….. 62 第四節 變數衡量………………………………………...….. 74 第五節 實證模式………………………………….……….... 81 第六節 研究期間與抽樣限制條件……………….………… 82 第七節 資料來源………………………………….………… 83 第八節 資料分析方法……………………………...……….. 84 第五章 實證研究結果…………………………... .........85 第一節 敘述性統計…………………………………….…… 85 第二節 複迴歸分析結果…………………………….…….... 86 第六章 結論與建議……………………….…….. .........93 第一節 研究結論………………………………………...….. 93 第二節 研究限制……………………………………………....96 第三節 建議及未來研究方向……………………….…….... 96 參考文獻………………………………............…………….99 表 次 表一、國外盈餘管理文獻彙總表………………………………. 31 表二、國內盈餘管理文獻彙總表………………………………. 31 表三、國外管理機制文獻彙總表—屬理論探討者……………. 32 表四、國外管理機制文獻彙總表—屬實證分析者……………. 32 表五、國內管理機制文獻彙總表………………………………. 34 表六、國外管理機制與盈餘管理相關性之文獻彙總表………. 35 表七、國內管理機制與盈餘管理相關性之文獻彙總表………. 36 表八、研究延伸彙總表…………………………………………. 42 表九、研究問題與訪談問題對照表……………………………. 44 表十、訪談問題形成之彙總表…………………………………. 45 表十一、問題一結論彙總表……………………………………. 49 表十二、問題二結論彙總表……………………………………. 50 表十三、問題三結論彙總表……………………………………. 52 表十四、問題四結論彙總表…………………………………… 53 表十五、問題五結論彙總表……………………………………. 54 表十六、問題六結論彙總表……………………………………. 55 表十七、問題七結論彙總表……………………………………. 56 表十八、問題八結論彙總表…………………………………… 56 表十九、問題九至十六結論彙總表……………………………. 57 表二十、會計師與會計經理訪談結果比較表…………………. 58 表二十一、變數衡量彙總表……………………………………. 80 表二十二、所有樣本之產業分布表……………………………. 82 表二十三、敘述統計分析表……………………………………. 85 表二十四、總樣本分析VIF值表……………………………… 86 表二十五、總樣本迴歸分析表…………………………………. 87 表二十六、各年度樣本獨立性假設分析表……………………. 90 表二十七、各年度樣本迴歸分析表……………………………. 90 表二十八、管理機制與盈餘管理程度之研究結果彙總表……. 94 圖 次 圖一、研究方法概念流程圖…………………………….……... 5 圖二、研究架構圖……………………………………….……... 7 圖三、訪談問題形成流程圖…………………………………… 44 圖四、股東部分管理機制與盈餘管理之觀念架構圖………... 61 圖五、董監事部分管理機制與盈餘管理之觀念架構圖……… 61 圖六、經理人部分管理機制與盈餘管理之觀念架構圖……… 62 附 錄 附錄一、國內外管理機制整理表…………………………….. 105 附錄二、統計結果彙總表……………………………….….… 110 附錄三、依照產業別估計裁決性應計項目之迴歸分析….…. 114 / If there are some deficiencies on corporate governance structure, the motivations of earnings management will pass through the corporate governance easier. The corporate governance will even create some motivations, and managers (might be owners also) will tend to manage the decisions or reported earnings. Hence, whether the corporate governance of public companies be designed and works well is the hottest topic in Taiwan, in order to assert stockholders’ rights, decrease the behaviors of earnings management, and improve the stock market develop steadily. This thesis combines interviews (with CPAs and accounting managers) and empirical study to investigate the relation between corporate governance and earnings management. 4. Interviews with CPAs and accounting managers: The main purpose of interviews is to understand how the corporate governance of public companies be designed and manipulated, so the interviews are made with CPAs and accounting managers who realize the true meanings of CG more profoundly. By the conclusions of the interviews, I can further ascertain the foundations of my assumptions and give the outcomes of empirical tests stringent explanations. In the conclusions of the interviews, most CPAs and accounting managers consider that the corporate governance in stockholders, members of board, and managers’ dimensions are indeed manipulated to achieve some purposes of earnings management in many public companies in Taiwan. 5. Empirical study: My study objects are the public companies in Taiwan Stock Trade. I collect financial and corporate governance data and run regression analysis. The comprehensive conclusions of interviews and empirical tests are as followed: 3. Stockholders’ dimension: (1) Institutional stockholders’ holdings: From the contents of interviews, I realize that institutional shareholders’ holdings have some impacts on earnings management, but the real roles of institutional shareholders are hard to clarify. As the result, it’s hard to predict the relation between institutional holdings and earnings management as positive or negative. In the empirical test, there is no significant relation between institutional holdings and the level of earnings management. (2) Outside big stockholders’ holdings: From the contents of interviews, I realize that most of big shareholders of some family company have been in the board of directors, and in the empirical test, there is no significant relation between outside big stockholders’ holdings and the level of earnings management. 4. Members of board’s dimension: (1) Size of board of directors: From the contents of interviews, I realize that the more the number of members of board with similar characteristics, the easier will they manage reported earnings. In the empirical test of 1998 samples, there is significant positive relation between size of board of directors and earnings management. It means that the bigger the board of directors, the higher the level of earnings management. (2) The holdings of the biggest family members of directors: From the contents of interviews, if the biggest family has more power in the board of directors, it influences the board of directors more. In the empirical test of 1998 samples, there is significant positive relation between the holdings of the biggest family members of directors and earnings management. It means that the higher the holdings of the biggest family members of board, the higher the level of earnings management. (3) Whether the supervisors have independent roles: From the contents of interviews, I realize that because of some regulations of supervisors, the institutional supervisors are manipulated easier than natural supervisors and hard to supervise the behavior of earnings management. But in the empirical test, there is no significant relation between supervisors’ independent role and the level of earnings management. 5. Managers’ dimension: (1) Duality (whether the chairman of board and CEO are the same): From the contents of interviews, I realize that if the chairman of board and CEO are the same, there might be deficiencies of reporting and mutual responsibility and higher level of earnings management. But in the empirical test, there is no significant relation between duality and earnings management. (2) Managers’ holding: From the contents of interviews, I realize that some companies of particular industries are preferred to give stocks to recruit or encourage employees, so the holdings of managers are very incentive. But in the empirical test, there is no significant relation between managers’ holdings and the level of earnings management. (3) CEO’ compensation: From the contents of interviews, the CEO’s compensation is often included fixed salary, bonus based on the earnings, so it might has some relation with the level of earnings management. But in the empirical test, there is no significant relation between CEO’s compensation and the level of earnings management.

本研究旨在觀察國內上市公司因經營不善、財務困難而遭管制機構處以降類、變更交易方式或終止上市之處分前，是否進行盈餘管理。由於遭降類等處分後，不僅其公司經理人有遭撤換的可能，更使公司形象、信譽受損，故本研究由實是性會計理論的觀念推衍，並參考相關的法令規定，推論經營不善之上市公司，其管理當局會有強烈的動機進行盈餘操縱，以避免遭降類等之噩運。 　　本研究利用可裁決性應計項目(discretionary accruals)在降類等事件日前後的尺度是否具顯著性差異，來偵測財務困難公司是否在降類等處分前利用可裁決性應計項目進行盈餘操縱。本研究總樣本共64家，涵蓋14種產業，其中降類公司樣本25家，變更交易方式公司樣本26家，下市公司樣本13家。樣本期間為民國66年至83年，每個樣本財務資料涵蓋7個年度。經過實證分析後獲致下列結果： 　　1. 股票遭降類公司，降類前的可裁決性應計項目有大於降類後之現象，其中尤以降類前一年度最為顯著。 　　2. 股票遭變更為全額交割公司，變更前的可裁決性應計項目有大於變更後的現象，其中尤以變更前一年度最為顯著。 　　3. 股票遭下市公司，其下市前的可裁決性應計項目與下市後的差異並不顯著。 　　綜合上述實驗結果，本研究可獲以下結論： 　　1. 第一類股票上市公司因經營不佳而遭變更為第二類股前有利用可裁決性應計項目進行盈餘管理之情形，尤以降類前一年度最為明顯。 　　2. 上市公司因財務困難而遭變更為全額交割股前，有利用可裁決性應計項目進行盈餘管理之情形，尤以變更前一年度最為明顯。 　　3. 公司下市前利用可裁決性應計項目進行盈餘管理的情形並不顯著。究其原因，可能係由全額交割股至下市這一過程乃一不算短的時間，由於應計項目具有迴轉的特性，或因公司財務結構、獲利能力的日趨惡化，使盈餘操縱的空間愈小，使公司已無能力於下市前進行盈餘操縱。

整體而言，會計盈餘提供財務報表使用者有關於企業獲利能力之相關資訊。然而，由於會計盈餘同時包含了雜訊 (noises) 與偏差 (biases)，因而影響到會計盈餘對公司獲利能力評價的正確性。因此，過去的會計文獻發展出不同的盈餘管理估計模型 (如: Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Friedlan 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994 以及Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995)，以嘗試去除這些雜訊與偏差。然而，究竟哪一個估計模型能夠提供最為純淨之非裁量性淨利 (nondiscretionary income) 的衡量指標，則並無定論。在效率市場 (market efficiency) 的假說下，本研究透過本益比 (P/E ratio) 的平均數復歸 (mean-reverting) 現象來評比五種盈餘管理估計模型。由於過去的文獻同時發現盈餘成長率與風險係數均會影響本益比的高低，因此，本研究同時將這兩個變數納入考量。 　　實證結果發現，依照上述五種盈餘管理估計模型所估計之本益比皆有平均數復歸的現象。其中Friedlan (1994) 模型在全體樣本與控制盈餘成長率之後，其本益比平均數復歸現象均較其他模型為快；次佳之盈餘管理估計模型為DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) 與Dechow et al. (1995) 兩模型；最差的則為 Healy (1985) 模型。 / Overall speaking, accounting earnings provide financial statement users with useful information about a firm's profitability. However, because of the biases and noises included in the accounting earnings, the accuracy and reliability of accounting earnings to the evaluation of a firm's profitability may be adversely influenced. In light of this, prior earnings management studies have developed various estimation models of nondiscretionary income (e.g., Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Friedlan 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995) with an attempt to remove the biases and noises embedded in the accounting earnings. Nonetheless, there is no consistent empirical evidence about the relative performance of these estimation models. Assuming market efficiency, the main purpose of this study is to utilize the mean-reverting phenomenon of P/E ratios to evaluate the relative performance of these models. Since prior studies have found that earnings growth rate and risk coefficient may affect the magnitude of P/E ratios, we also control for these two variables in our analyses. 　　The empirical results reveal several findings. First, P/E ratios calculated using different earnings management estimation models exhibit the mean-reverting phenomenon. Second, the Friedlan (1994) model has the best performance among all models when we use the overall sample and three subsamples grouped based on the earnings growth rate. In addition, the DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1995) models perform moderately. Finally, the Healy (1985) model shows the worst performance.

本研究係探析保險業在監理管制下，若有違監理標準之虞時，其經理人是否興起盈餘管理的動機，以避免不必要的監理成本。蓋保險監理最重要的目的為預防保險公司失卻清償能力，以保障被保險人的權益，並維持金融安定。在實施風險基礎資本制前，邊際清償能力的標準仍以保險法第143條第一項之規定為依歸，即保險業認許資產減除負債之餘額，未達實收資本之45%時，主管機關應命其於限期內，以現金增資補足之。若保險業不依第143條規定限期增資補足者，保險法第149條第二項授權主管機關應依情節輕重，分別處以派員監理、撤換負責人或有關人員、限期改組、甚至命其停業或解散。故本研究預期清償能力不佳的保險公司，其經理人會動用裁量性應計項目調整財務狀況，以跨過清償能力標竿，避免受到監理機關的注意與查核。另外，保險法對於保險業資金運用管道有所縮限，以驅使保險公司穩健地運用資金，預防保險公司因巨額投資損失致使清償能力敗壞。但隨著產業競爭度增強與低利率時代的來臨，保險公司在經營績效與保單預定利率的壓力下，是否會安於目前的投資限制，而放棄賺取投資報酬的機會。據此，本研究預期年度中持有短期有價證券總額超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人會選擇處分位於利得部位的短期有價證券，以規避超過保險法第146條之1第一項第二款的門檻限制。同理，年度中持有合格的公司股票及公司債超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人可能會選擇出售位於利得部位的股票或公司債，以規避超過146條之1第一項第三款的門檻限制。 　　在研究設計上，為捕捉各類操縱財務報表的淨影響，本研究採用總裁量性應計項目作為代理變數。在所有可用的裁量性應計項目估計模型中，研究指出Modified Jones模型顯示了相對較強的檢定力(Dechow et al. 1995)。因此本研究援引Modified Jones模型估計裁量性應計數字。其次，將該模型析出的裁量性應計數字與各類監理門檻距離組成一迴歸模型，以測試其關聯性強弱。實證結果如下：一、在產險業，保單持有人盈餘與實收資本之45%的距離愈小者，其盈餘管理幅度愈大。二、壽險業比較沒有利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機。但依公司規模來看，大小公司行為仍有所差異，即相較於大公司，小公司利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機較為強烈。根據本文實證研究結論，建議監理機關與被保險人應特別注意產險業及小壽險公司的財務狀況，並確認其清償能力之品質。 / This paper examined whether insurance companies have incentives to manipulate accounting accruals to appear more solvent and less risky. In Taiwan, virtually all industries are regulated to some degree, but insurance industry faces regulatory monitoring that is explicitly tied to accounting data. Insurance regulators required that insurers meet conditions for minimum financial health. It is frequency asserted that such regulations create incentives to manipulate financial statement to avoid regulatory intervention The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the incentive to manipulate financial statement is a decreasing function of the insurers’ difference between policyholders’ surplus and 45% of capital. This paper assumes that insurance managers use their reporting discretion to achieve solvency goal and avoid exceeding investment limits. Following Healy (1985), accruals-based measures are wide employed in test of earnings management hypothesis. In the past, the most frequency used techniques for estimating discretionary accruals are the cross-sectional versions of the modified Jones model. In this paper, the magnitude of earnings management is proxied by the discretionary accruals which are estimated by using a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model and regressed by three differences of regulatory requirements which measure the insurers’ behavior under the regulation. The evidence indicates that when policyholders’ surplus of property-casualty insurers is closer to 45% of capital, the incentive to manipulate financial statement is stronger. On the other hand, life insurers have less incentive to manipulate financial statement, but relative to big size insurers, small size insurers have stronger incentive to meet regulatory requirements.

中國證監會於1998年設置特別處理政策（special treatment policy, ST）以管理上市公司是否得持續保有上市的狀態，在該制度下，上市公司如果連續報導二年虧損，其股票將被標記「特別處理」。為了瞭解中國證券市場避免虧損的盈餘管理現象是證券市場誘因或是ST政策誘因所致，本文以ST監管政策的臺灣證券市場為對照樣本，以檢視ST政策影響中國上市公司盈餘管理的證據。主要研究結果為： 一、不論是臺灣上市公司或中國上市公司，都可以很清楚的看到在0%附近出現了明顯的跳動，都有為了避免虧損的盈餘管理現象。 二、中國大陸證券市場在1998年特別處理制度實施後，小額利潤佔利潤公司家數比例與小額虧損公司佔虧損公司家數比例之差異比呈現顯著上升趨勢，足見有比較多的公司會操弄盈餘通過零盈餘的門檻。 三、在排除非ST政策環境下所固有的避免虧損之證券市場誘因盈餘管理現象後，中國證券市場的差異比仍明顯集中於0%上方，這種避免虧損的嚴重傾向說明了ST監管制度為中國大陸上市公司避免虧損盈餘管理的政策誘因。

隨著經濟全球化、分工化的趨勢下，我國企業為提升競爭力並獲取更高的利潤，逐漸將企業轉移至大陸。根據投審會的統計，台灣企業單一年度在大陸的核准投資金額已從初期1991年的1.74億美元，成長至2002年的67.23億美元，去年2010年更達到146.17億美元，中國大陸已取代美國成為台灣最大的對外投資地區。然而兩岸之間敏感的政治因素，政府對於投資大陸之上限、技術及資本市場一直存在相當之限制，使得台商為了規避相關法規之限制，掙脫「台資」身份投資中國大陸的枷鎖，紛紛以各種合法及不合法的管道突圍。 有鑑於違規投資大陸事件層出不窮，我國遂於2008年放寬投資大陸之相關規定，其中影響最鉅的為投資上限淨值，將其從40%改為60%。雖然限制條件放寬了，但是投資大陸上限仍舊存在，對於投資大陸需求較高的企業，為提高投資大陸的金額，可能會透過各種管道，其中包括盈餘管理之可能。 本研究即在探討我國相關法令中，對於企業投資中國大陸的限制存在那些限制，而企業為了規避這些限制可能採取那些手法，並以計算投資上限的淨值作為主要的研究標的，探討公司是否會進行淨值管理。本研究實證結果顯示，投資大陸比例接近其限額之企業，相較於投資大陸比例很低的企業，確實較有可能透過盈餘管理，以達到提高投資中國大陸限額的目的。 / With the tendency of global economic development and collaboration, it is necessary for our enterprises to transfer their operating center to China in order to promote competition and get more profit. According to the statistics by Investment Commission, the approve amount to invest in China from Taiwanese entrepreneurs in a year has increased from 0.174 billion in 1991 to 6.723 billion in 2002. In 2010, the amount is up to 14.617 billion. Mainland China has substituted for the US to become Taiwan’s major investment area. But the sensitive political issues between two sides of Taiwan Strait make Taiwan government establish many constraints, including the upper limit for investment in China, the technology and the capital market. To avoid the regulations of constraints and the “Taiwanese identity”, Taiwanese entrepreneurs use many legal and illegal ways to invest in China. Because illegal events about investment in China emerged one after another incessantly, our government relaxed a part of the regulations in 2008. The most influence in the regulations of constraints is the upper limit for investment; it changed from 40% to 60%. Although the constraints have relaxed, the upper limit for investment still exists. For those enterprises with higher investment demand, there is still a possibility for them to use ways to enhance the investment amount, including earnings management. The purpose of this research is to clarify the regulatory policy of Taiwan government toward investment in China, and the ways enterprises use to avoid the constraints. Besides, the main object of research is net worth which is calculated for the upper limit for investment. The empirical results demonstrate that enterprises whose investments are close to the upper limit are more likely to use earnings management to enhance the investment amount than enterprises whose investments are far away from the upper limit.

<p>Nowadays, there exist two reporting regimes, rules-based and principle-based (comply-or-explain). In the rules-based environment, researchers have studied the relationship between internal control quality and accounting quality. Prior studies have suggested that reports on internal control are an effective way for investors to evaluate the quality of the firm‟s internal control. By having a sound system of internal control, it creates reliance upon the firm‟s financial reporting. Therefore, the condition of internal control has direct connection to the investors‟ decision making.  In  U.S., where the corporate governance has been known to be typically rules-based, most researches have shown a positive relationship between internal control reporting and accounting quality. In the comply-or-explain reporting regime, there has only been one research as far as we know, that investigates the relationship between internal control reporting and accounting quality. The research took place in Netherlands; their study provided positive association between internal control  reporting quality and accounting quality, particularly earnings quality. The result is consistent with other research in rules-based regime.    The Swedish code has  been enacted for  five years and it is in the same regime as Netherlands. However, under current Swedish code, we are not aware of any empirical research  that  has taken place to address the effectiveness of the code. Therefore, we conducted the study with 152 firms listed on Swedish NASDAQ OMXS to test internal control reporting quality and accounting quality. We used proxies for internal control reporting quality: effectiveness statement of  internal control, internal control reporting score and internal control proportion. Simultaneously, we use discretionary accruals as a proxy of accounting quality. Our result showed a negative significant relationship between internal control reporting score and discretionary accruals but this relationship is quite weak and sensitive. It is broken with the presence of one more variable in regression, such as size variable. The result could not give any evidence for relationships between either effectiveness statements or extent of internal control reporting with discretionary accruals. Although, the relationship between internal control reporting score and discretionary accruals is not tight, it still encourage the  notion  that firms with good internal control report will improve their accounting quality. Our research contributes knowledge to wide-range of concerned parties. Moreover, it also suggests valuable ideas for further studies in the same area.</p>

Nowadays, there exist two reporting regimes, rules-based and principle-based (comply-or-explain). In the rules-based environment, researchers have studied the relationship between internal control quality and accounting quality. Prior studies have suggested that reports on internal control are an effective way for investors to evaluate the quality of the firm‟s internal control. By having a sound system of internal control, it creates reliance upon the firm‟s financial reporting. Therefore, the condition of internal control has direct connection to the investors‟ decision making.  In  U.S., where the corporate governance has been known to be typically rules-based, most researches have shown a positive relationship between internal control reporting and accounting quality. In the comply-or-explain reporting regime, there has only been one research as far as we know, that investigates the relationship between internal control reporting and accounting quality. The research took place in Netherlands; their study provided positive association between internal control  reporting quality and accounting quality, particularly earnings quality. The result is consistent with other research in rules-based regime.    The Swedish code has  been enacted for  five years and it is in the same regime as Netherlands. However, under current Swedish code, we are not aware of any empirical research  that  has taken place to address the effectiveness of the code. Therefore, we conducted the study with 152 firms listed on Swedish NASDAQ OMXS to test internal control reporting quality and accounting quality. We used proxies for internal control reporting quality: effectiveness statement of  internal control, internal control reporting score and internal control proportion. Simultaneously, we use discretionary accruals as a proxy of accounting quality. Our result showed a negative significant relationship between internal control reporting score and discretionary accruals but this relationship is quite weak and sensitive. It is broken with the presence of one more variable in regression, such as size variable. The result could not give any evidence for relationships between either effectiveness statements or extent of internal control reporting with discretionary accruals. Although, the relationship between internal control reporting score and discretionary accruals is not tight, it still encourage the  notion  that firms with good internal control report will improve their accounting quality. Our research contributes knowledge to wide-range of concerned parties. Moreover, it also suggests valuable ideas for further studies in the same area.

This study examines whether there is an association between the length of the client-auditor relationship and audit quality, using absolute unexpected accruals estimated by industry as a measure of audit quality based on a modified Jones model. The study is motivated by the proposal on mandatory audit firm rotation for publicly traded companies from the European Commission, which is based on the notion that longer auditor firm tenure creates a familiarity threat which reduces the audit quality. Both the relation between audit quality and auditor partner tenure and audit firm tenure is examined in this study, using multivariate regression controlling for auditor type (Big 4 versus non-Big 4), signing auditors (one versus two auditors), firm size, profitability, leverage and age. There is a significant negative relationship between audit quality and audit partner tenure when only companies employing Big 4 is tested, which indicate that auditors constrain managements extreme accounting measures with longer tenure. The results provide no significant evidence of an increase in the absolute unexpected accruals with audit firm tenure, when only Big 4 companies are tested. The results also overall suggest that the audit quality is lower for shorter tenure relative to longer tenure, which is consistent with previous studies. The results of this study therefore implies that under the current regime with no obligation of firm rotation, longer audit tenure is on average associated with auditors in greater extent constraining managements extreme accounting choices. The results therefore do not support the call for mandatory rotation. However, the majority of the regression results were not statistically significant, which limits the possibility to apply these results to a population outside the scope of this study. / Revisorers oberoende i förhållande till sina klienter har under de senaste åren med anledning av finanskrisen samt de omtalade revisionsskandalerna medfört diskussioner om huruvida den befintliga lagstiftningen som reglerar revisorers arbete är tillräcklig. Det har även diskuterats om det behöver vidtas ytterligare åtgärder för att säkerställa revisorernas oberoende. Som ett led att stärka revisorernas oberoende har Europeiska Kommissionen lagt på förslag att införa obligatorisk byrårotation för publika bolag. Det har redan införts obligatorisk revisorsrotation. Dock anser emellertid kommissionen att detta inte är tillräckligt, då långa revisionsbyråuppdrag kan vara skadliga för oberoendet på grund av att det med tiden kan skapas en vänskaplig relation mellan revisionsbyrån och klienten. Majoriteten av tidigare forskning på området har emellertid inte funnit stöd för att varken långa partneruppdrag eller byråuppdrag skulle vara skadliga för revisionskvaliteten som omfattar revisorers oberoende. I studien undersöks således huruvida det finns ett samband mellan längden på revisionsuppdraget och revisionskvaliteten. Studiens syfte är därmed att undersöka om längden på partneruppdraget och byråuppdraget påverkar revisionskvaliteten. Utifrån studiens resultat syftar studien även till att kommentera rimligheten i Europeiska Kommissionens förslag på införandet av obligatorisk byrårotation. Studien utgår ifrån ett intressentperspektiv, eftersom det i slutändan är intressenter såsom aktieägare, investerare, långivare, anställda, kunder och staten som drabbas av de negativa konsekvenserna av att revisorer inte är oberoende i sin granskning, då tillförlitligheten till årsredovisningarna minskar.    De teoretiska utgångspunkterna baseras på tidigare forskning inom revision och företagsekonomi. I studien tillämpas teorier och tidigare forskningsresultat som främst gäller revisionskvalitet, vinstmanipulering och längden på partner- samt byråuppdraget i syfte att beskriva den befintliga forskningen som vid tiden för studien behandlar ämnet. En kvantitativ metod med ett deduktivt angreppssätt efter den positivistiska synssättet har använts för att på bästa möjliga sätt undersöka studiens uppställda problem och syfte. Urvalet består av publika bolag börsnoterade på NASDAQ OMX Nordics Large, Mid och Small Cap listor. I linje med tidigare studier används oväntade periodiseringar beräknad utifrån branschtillhörighet som mått på revisionskvalitet.    Resultaten visar att partnerlängden är signifikant negativt associerad med de absoluta oväntade periodiseringarna när endast företag reviderade av Big 4 studeras, vilket indikerar att revisorer begränsar företagsledningens möjlighet att genomföra extrema redovisningsbeslut i takt med att längden på partneruppdraget ökar. Resultaten ger inget stöd för att långa byråuppdrag påverkar revisionskvaliteten negativt, detta då inga signifikanta samband observerades. Studiens resultat visar även att korta revisionsuppdrag överlag har högre oväntade periodiseringar i förhållande till längre uppdrag. Studien ger således inget stöd för införandet av obligatorisk byrårotation.

This thesis investigates whether IFRS adoption has led to an increase in the relevance of accounting information for investment decisions. Furthermore, the effects of IFRS are implicitly compared across accounting traditions. As such,  the effects of IFRS on the “quality” of financial reporting are measured based on the cases of listed firms in Germany and listed firms in the UK. This study approaches the effects of IFRS on the quality of financial reporting from two angles. First a review of the academic literature is done to determine whether there has been a general consensus about the effects of IFRS adoption on financial reporting of listed firms in Germany and the UK. As a result of this literature study, a number of propositions are deduced about the effects of IFRS. Subsequently, the investigation of the effects of IFRS takes a statistical perspective. Financial and accounting data are obtained for two samples, one of German listed firms and another of UK listed firms. A number of empirical models are used to determine the quality of financial reporting, including the earnings-returns association (Lev ,1989; Lev &amp; Zarowin, 1999), asymmetric sensitivity of earnings and asymmetric persistence of earnings (Basu, 1997), and the market-to-book ratios (Roychowdhury &amp; Watts, 2003). Additionally, a new tool is introduced for a joint interpretation of the econometric test results, leading potentially to a new method of financial report analysis under dynamic regulatory conditions. Significant statistical evidence is found suggesting a drastic reduction (to the point of complete elimination) in income smoothing in Germany corresponding to the transition from the German national GAAP to IFRS. Additionally, with the introduction of IFRS, the information content of accounting earnings in German firms appears to have increased substantially, while market-to-book ratios have converged towards “1”. On the other hand, the introduction of IFRS in the UK corresponds to statistical evidence consistent with a shift from asymmetric timeliness of earnings under UK GAAP to a significant downward bias in earnings under IFRS. The study also shows significant inter-industry differences in the effects of IFRS that suggest that the inconsistencies in the results of previous studies may have been due to the significant noise created by diverse samples, or due to biased industry representations in the data.