Dans ce travail, nous étudions l’évaluation de la fiabilité, la modélisation et l’optimisation de systèmes à états arbitraires à incertitude épistémique. Tout d'abord, une approche universelle de modélisation à l'état arbitraire est proposée afin d'étudier efficacement les systèmes industriels modernes aux structures, mécanismes de fonctionnement et exigences de fiabilité de plus en plus complexes. De simples implémentations de modèles de fiabilité binaires, continus ou multi-états traditionnels ont montré leurs lacunes en termes de manque de généralité lors de la modélisation de structures, systèmes, réseaux et systèmes de systèmes industriels modernes et complexes. Dans ce travail, nous intéressons aussi particulièrement aux systèmes monotones, non seulement parce que la monotonie est apparue couramment dans la plupart des modèles de fiabilité standard, mais aussi qu’une propriété mathématique aussi simple permet une simplification énorme de nombreux problèmes extrêmement complexes. Ensuite, pour les systèmes de fiabilité monotones à états arbitraires, nous essayons de résoudre les problèmes suivants, qui sont apparus dans les principes mêmes de la modélisation mathématique: 1. L’évaluation de la fiabilité dans un environnement incertain épistémique avec des structures hiérarchiques être exploitées par toute approche de programmation 2; l'optimisation de la fiabilité / maintenance pour les systèmes à grande fiabilité avec incertitude épistémique. / In this work, we study the reliability assessment, modeling and optimization of arbitrary-state systems with epistemic uncertainty. Firstly, a universal arbitrary-state modelling approach is proposed, in order to effectively study the modern industrial systems with increasingly complicated structures, operation mechanisms and reliability demands. Simple implementations of traditional binary, continuous or multi-state reliability models have been showing their deficiencies in lack of generality, when modelling such complex modern industrial structures, systems, networks and systems-of-systems. In this work, we are also particularly interested in monotone systems, not only because monotonicity commonly appeared in most of the standard reliability models, but also that such a simple mathematical property allows a huge simplification to many extremely complex problems. Then, for the arbitrary-state monotone reliability systems, we try to solve the following challenges that appeared in its very fundamentals of mathematical modeling: 1. The reliability assessment under epistemic uncertain environment with hierarchy structures; 2. The reliability/maintenance optimization for large reliability systems under epistemic uncertainty.

La question centrale de cette étude est celle de savoir si les expériences perceptives peuvent être conçues comme des manières d’être réellement en contact avec le monde et si elles peuvent nous fournir des raisons d’entretenir certaines propositions à propos du monde, voire nous permettre d’acquérir des connaissances à son sujet. Cette compréhension intuitive de la perception est aujourd’hui comme hier largement combattue. Ce rejet passe généralement par l’adoption d’une forme ou d’une autre d’internalisme (de la perception et/ou de la justification et de la connaissance perceptive). Percevoir serait un phénomène purement ou essentiellement interne aux sujets dotés de capacités perceptives dont on pourrait douter qu’il puisse nous permettre de croire de manière justifiée ou de connaître quoi que ce soit. Peut-on éviter cette conclusion ? Peut-on apaiser les angoisses philosophiques qu’elle fait apparaître (sans pourtant affirmer y mettre fin ou encore qu’elles n’ont aucun sens) ? Tel est le but de cette étude. L’enquête philosophique proposée ici prend essentiellement trois formes: métaphysique, ontologique et épistémologique. Une investigation de la nature métaphysique de l’expérience perceptive est ensuite mise en œuvre. L’enjeu est alors de soutenir une forme assez robuste d’externalisme de la perception (Disjonctivisme métaphysique). De la nature de la perception, nous en venons dans une seconde partie à une réflexion ontologique sur la nature des propriétés avec lesquelles l’expérience perceptive nous met semble-t-il en contact. Le réalisme de la couleur est défendu contre diverses attaques antiréalistes. Les couleurs sont des propriétés réelles des choses auxquelles on les attribue correctement. Une ontologie réaliste, non réductive et non relationnelle des propriétés chromatiques est esquissée (Primitivisme de la couleur). Enfin, les enjeux épistémologiques de la perception sont mis en lumière et discutés. Nous défendons l’idée que l’expérience perceptive, en tant qu’elle nous met véritablement en contact avec le monde (objets, propriétés, faits, etc.), est un moyen par lequel certains êtres peuvent entretenir des croyances justifiées quoique cette justification soit non réflexive et prima facie. Différentes réponses aux attaques sceptiques contre la possibilité de connaître perceptivement certaines propositions sont enfin envisagées et rejetées. Une autre stratégie anti-sceptique est proposée (une défense néo-mooréenne de la possibilité de la connaissance perceptive, et une remise en cause du défi sceptique lui-même). Finalement, à la question philosophique classique « L’esprit peut-il réellement être en contact perceptif et cognitif avec le monde ? », rien ne nous force à répondre par la négative, que cette question soit abordée du point de vue de la métaphysique de la perception, d’un point de vue ontologique ou épistémologique. Du moins, c’est ce que notre étude cherche à montrer en soulignant à la fois qu’une réponse positive à cette question est parfaitement viable, voire correcte, et que la réponse négative a, quant à elle, toutes les chances d’être passablement erronée / The main topic of this study is to discuss the idea according to which perceptual experiences sould be conceive as ways of being in contact with the world and perceptual experiences can give reasons for believing some propositions about the world and can give rise to knowledge. Lots of philosophers countervail this intuitive and naive conception of perception. This rejection is linked to the fact that they adopt an internalist conception of perception and/or justication and/or perceptual knowledge. Perceiving sould be conceive as an purely internal event of subjects which possess perceptual capacities. And so, one may doubt that they can have justifications for their beliefs or that they can know anything. Is it possible to avoid this conclusion ? How to alleviate philosophical fear that this conclusion gives rise ? That is the aim of this study. The proposed philosophical inquiry comes in three forms. In the first place, indirect conception of perception is examined and criticized. Afterwards, an inquiry about the nature of perceptual experience is pursued. The stake for us is to defend a strong form of externalism about perception (metaphysical disjunctivism). Then, in the second part of this work, we get into an ontological reflexion about the nature of properties that perceptual experience seems to acquaintance us with. Color Realism is defended against various antirealist objections. Colors are or can be real properties of things. A realist, non redutive and non relationnal ontology for chromatic properties is sketched (color Primitivism). Lastly, the epistemological stakes of perception are underlined and examined. We defend the idea that perceptual experience is a mean by which certain beings can have justified beliefs although this justification is not reflexive and prima facie. It can be so if it's true that perceptual experience puts us in contact with the world (objects, properties, facts, etc.). We examine and reject different replies to skeptical attacks against the possibility of knowing anything. Then, another strategy is proposed (a morean defense of perceptual knowledge and the questioning of skeptical challenge itself). In fact, from an metaphysical, ontological or epistemological point of view, we don't have to give a negative reponse to the classical and philosophical question "Can mind be really in perceptual and cognitive contact with the world ?" or so we think. Indeed, our study underlines that a positive reply to this question is sustainable, not to say correct, and that the negative reponse is probably wrong

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Der Begriff ``Agent'''' hat sich als eine sehr nützliche Abstraktion erwiesen, um verschiedene Problembereiche auf eine intuitive und natürliche Art und Weise zu konzeptualisieren. Intelligente Agenten haben daher Anwendung gefunden in verschiedenen Teilbereichen der Informatik. Zur Modellierung werden intelligente Agenten meist als intentionale Systeme aufgefaßt und mit Hilfe von mentalistischen Begriffen wie Wissen, Glauben (oder Überzeugung), Wunsch, Pflicht, Intention usw. beschrieben. Unter diesen mentalen Begriffen gehören die epistemischen Begriffe (d.h., Wissen und Glauben) zu den wichtigsten und wurden auch am intensivsten untersucht. Zur Modellierung von Wissen und Glauben werden in der Regel modale epistemische Logiken verwendet. Solche Systeme sind aber nicht geeignet, um ressourcenbeschränkte Agenten zu beschreiben, weil sie zu starke Annahmen bezüglich der Rationalität von Agenten machen. Zum Beispiel wird angenommen, daß Agenten alle logischen Wahrheiten sowie alle Konsequenzen seines Wissens kennen. Dieses Problem ist bekannt als das Problem der logischen Allwissenheit (``logical omniscience problem''''). Da alle Agenten grundsätzlich nur über begrenzte Ressourcen (wie z.B. Zeit, Information, Speicherplatz) verfügen, können sie nur eine begrenzte Menge von Informationen verarbeiten. Daher müssen alternative Modelle entwickelt werden, um Agenten realistisch modellieren zu können (siehe Kapitel 2). Daß modale epistemische Logik für die Formalisierung des ressourcenbeschränkten Schließens (``resource-bounded reasoning'''') nicht geeignet ist, wird als ein offenes Problem der Agententheorien anerkannt. Es gibt bisher aber keine brauchbaren Alternativen zur Modallogik. Die meisten Ansätze zur Lösung des logischen Allwissenheitsproblems versuchen, Wissen und Glauben mit Hilfe schwacher Modallogiken zu beschreiben. Solche Versuche sind nicht befriedigend, da sie eine willkürliche Einschränkung der Rationalität der Agenten zur Folge haben (siehe Kapitel 3). Mein Ziel ist es, einen Rahmen für das ressourcenbeschränktes Schließen über Wissen und Glauben zu entwickeln. Damit soll eine solide Grundlage für Theorien intelligenter Agenten geschaffen werden. Als Nebenergebnis wird das logische Allwissenheitsproblem auf eine sehr intuitive Art und Weise gelöst: obwohl Agenten rational sind und alle logischen Schlußregeln anwenden können, sind sie nicht logisch allwissend, weil ihnen nicht genügend Ressourcen zu Verfügung stehen, um alle logischen Konsequenzen ihres Wissens zu ziehen. Im Kapitel 4 wird eine Reihe von Logiken vorgestellt, die den Begriff des expliziten Wissens formalisieren. Es wird eine Lösung des Problems der logischen Allwissenheit der epistemischen Logik vorgeschlagen, die die Rationalität der Agenten nicht willkürlich einschränkt. Der Grundgedanke dabei ist der folgende. Ein Agent kennt die logischen Konsequenzen seines Wissens nur dann, wenn er sie tatsächlich hergeleitet hat. Wenn ein Agent alle Prämissen einer gültigen Schlußregel kennt, kennt er nicht notwendigerweise die Konklusion: er kennt sie nur nach der Anwendung der Regel. Wenn er den Schluß nicht ziehen kann, z.B. weil er nicht die notwendigen Ressourcen dazu hat, wird sein Wissen nicht um diese herleitbare Information erweitert. Die Herleitung neuer Informationen wird als die Ausführung mentaler Handlungen aufgefaßt. Mit Hilfe einer Variante der dynamischen Logik können diese Handlungen beschrieben werden. Im Kapitel 5 werden Systeme für das ressourcenbeschränkte Schließen über Wissen und Glauben entwickelt, die auch quantitative Bedingungen über die Verfügbarkeit von Ressourcen modellieren können. Mit Hilfe dieser Logiken können Situationen beschrieben werden, wo Agenten innerhalb einer bestimmten Zeitspanne entscheiden müssen, welche Handlungen sie ausführen sollen. Der Ansatz besteht darin, epistemische Logik mit Komplexitätstheorie zu verbinden. Mit Hilfe einer Komplexitätsanalyse kann ein Agent feststellen, ob ein bestimmtes Problem innerhalb vorgegebener Zeit lösbar ist. Auf der Grundlage dieses Wissens kann er dann die für die Situation geeignete Entscheidung treffen. Damit ist es gelungen, eine direkte Verbindung zwischen dem Wissen eines Agenten und der Verfügbarkeit seiner Ressourcen herzustellen. / One of the principal goals of agent theories is to describe realistic, implementable agents, that is, those which have actually been constructed or are at least in principle implementable. That goal cannot be reached if the inherent resource-boundedness of agents is not treated correctly. Since the modal approach to epistemic logic is not suited to formalize resource-bounded reasoning, the issue of resource-boundedness remains one of the main foundational problems of any agent theory that is developed on the basis of modal epistemic logic. My work is an attempt to provide theories of agency with a more adequate epistemic foundation. It aims at developing theories of mental concepts that make much more realistic assumptions about agents than other theories. The guiding principle of my theory is that the capacities attributed to agents must be empirically verifiable, that is, it must be possible to construct artificial agents which satisfy the specifications determined by the theory. As a consequence, the unrealistic assumption that agents have unlimited reasoning capacities must be rejected. To achieve the goal of describing resource-bounded agents accurately, the cost of reasoning must be taken seriously. In the thesis I have developed a framework for modeling the relationship between knowledge, reasoning, and the availability of resources. I have argued that the correct form of an axiom for epistemic logic should be: if an agent knows all premises of a valid inference rule and if he performs the right reasoning, then he will know the conclusion as well. Because reasoning requires resources, it cannot be safely assumed that the agent can compute his knowledge if he does not have enough resources to perform the required reasoning. I have demonstrated that on the basis of that idea, the problems of traditional approaches can be avoided and rich epistemic logics can be developed which can account adequately for our intuitions about knowledge.

Growth and development are central constituents of the human experience. Although the American Psychological Association aims to understand change and behavior in ways that embrace all aspects of experience (APA, 2008), sudden, life-altering or quantum transformation has been disregarded throughout the history of psychology until recently (see Miller & C' de Baca, 1994, 2001). Quantum transformation is similar to self-surrender conversion (James, 1902), but different from peak experiences (Maslow, 1964) and near death experiences (Lorimer, 1990) because quantum transformation, by definition, involves lasting change. Quantum transformation contains epistemic qualities, which refer to the content and process of knowing (Miller & C' de Baca, 2001), but little is known about these qualities. The current study employed a qualitative method to better understand the epistemic qualities of quantum transformation. Fourteen participants were extensively interviewed about their experience. Analysis involved hermeneutic methods (Kvale, 1996) and phenomenological description (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). Quantum transformation is essentially a process of knowing that unfolded in the form of Disintegration, Insight, and Integration in the present study. First, Disintegration is presented by themes of Overwhelming stress, Relational struggle, Hopelessness, Holding-on, Control, Psychological turmoil, Self-discrepancy, and Guilt. Second, Insight is presented by the Content and Tacit knowing of the experience. Third, Integration is presented by Changes in values, Other-orientation, and A process of development. The results suggest that the disintegration and the suffering that characterizes the pre-transformation milieu inform how quantum transformation relates to lasting change. Therapists that automatically aim to alleviate moral-emotional sorrow or guilt should consider whether the emotional experience can bring about positive transformation. Overall, quantum transformation has potentially major implications for our understanding of personality change and moral development.

[pt] Atualmente, diferenças de visões de mundo, especialmente as de natureza ideológica e política, vêm promovendo um clima de polarização, seja no ambiente off-line ou online. Uma das munições utilizadas na guerra do nós contra eles é o conhecimento. Discussões acaloradas são sustentadas por uma disputa de quem tem razão, quem está certo ao defender determinada posição. À luz de uma abordagem que integra a teoria do conhecimento aos estudos sobre postura epistêmica, na perspectiva da Análise da Conversa Etnometodológica, este trabalho tem por objetivo examinar como são construídas as batalhas epistêmicas na seção de comentários de um jornal digital, hospedado no YouTube, que posta vídeos de operações policiais avaliadas como abusivas. Os resultados demonstram que os participantes buscam derrotar o oponente invocando um desiquilíbrio epistêmico entre as partes. Para tanto, mobilizam diferentes recursos linguísticos para reivindicar uma postura epistêmica de mais conhecimento e deslegitimam posições que não são sustentadas por conhecimentos fundamentados e confiáveis. Os resultados revelam também que, em termos de efeitos argumentativos, as batalhas epistêmicas são um jogo sem vencedores. Elas não contribuem para modificar crenças enganosas, informações falsas e preconceitos. Elas servem apenas para reforçar a construção de identidades totalizantes, dificultando qualquer possibilidade de entendimento mútuo, ainda que não haja acordo. / [en] Currently, differences in worldviews, especially those of ideological and political nature, are promoting a climate of polarization, whether in the offline or online environment. One of the ammunitions used in the we versus they war is knowledge. Heated discussions are supported by a dispute of right or wrong, that is, who is right in defending a determined position. In the light of an approach that integrates the theory of knowledge to the studies on epistemic stance, from the perspective of the Conversation Analysis, this paper aims to examine how epistemic changes are constructed in the comments section of a digital newspaper, hosted on YouTube, which posts videos of police operations evaluated as abusive. The results demonstrate that the participants seek to defeat the opponent by invoking an epistemic imbalance between the parties. To this end, they mobilize different linguistic resources to claim an epistemic stance of more knowledge and delegitimize positions that are not supported by reliable and well-founded knowledge. The results also reveal that, in terms of argumentative effects, epistemic battles are a game with no winners. They do not contribute to modifying misleading beliefs, false information, and prejudices. They only serve to reinforce the construction of totalizing identities, hindering any possibility of mutual understanding, even if there is no agreement.

This is a thesis about anti-paternalism – the liberal doctrine that we may not interfere with a person’s liberty for her own good. Empirical circumstances and moral values may certainly give us reason to avoid benevolent interference. Anti-paternalism as a normative doctrine should, however, be rejected. Essay I concerns the definitions of paternalism and anti-paternalism. It is argued that only a definition of paternalism in terms of compound reason-actions can accommodate its special moral properties. Definitions in terms of actions, common in the literature, cannot. It is argued, furthermore, that in specifying the reason-actions in further detail, the notion of what is self-regarding, as opposed to other-regarding, is irrelevant, contrary to received opinion. Essay II starts out with the definition of paternalism defended in essay I and claims that however this very general definition is specified, anti-paternalism is unreasonable and should be rejected. Anti-paternalism is the position that certain reasons – referring one way or the other to the good of a person, give no valid normative support to certain actions – some kind of interferences with the same person. Since the reasons in question are normally quite legitimate and important reasons for action, a convincing argument for anti-paternalism must explain why they are invalid in cases of interference. A closer look at the reasons and actions in question provides no basis for such an explanation. Essay III considers a concrete case of benevolent interference – the withholding of information concerning uncertain threats to public health in the public’s best interest. Such a policy has been suggested in relation to the European Commission’s proposed new system for the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH). Information about uncertain threats to health from chemicals would allegedly spread anxiety and depression and thus do more harm than good. The avoidance of negative health effects is accepted as a legitimate and good reason for withholding of information, thus respecting the conclusion of essay II, that anti-paternalism should be rejected. Other reasons, however, tip the balance in favour of making the information available. These reasons include the net effects on knowledge, psychological effects, effects on private decisions and effects on political decisions. / QC 20101115

In 1988, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved an amendment that allowed the use of best-estimate methods. This led to an increased development, and application of Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) safety analyses. However, a greater burden was placed on the licensee to justify all uncertainty estimates. A review of the current state of the BEPU methods indicate that there exists a number of significant criticisms, which limits the BEPU methods from reaching its full potential as a comprehensive licensing basis. The most significant criticism relates to the lack of a formal framework for distinguishing between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. This has led to a prevalent belief that such separation of uncertainties is for convenience, rather than one out of necessity. In this thesis, we address the above concerns by developing a statistically rigorous framework to characterize the different uncertainty types. This framework is grounded on the philosophical concepts of knowledge. Considering the Plato problem, we explore the use of probability as a means to gain knowledge, which allows us to relate the inherent distinctness in knowledge with the different uncertaintytypesforanycomplexphysicalsystem. Thisframeworkis demonstrated using nuclear analysis problems, and we show through the use of structural models that the separation of these uncertainties leads to more accurate tolerance limits relative to existing BEPU methods. In existing BEPU methods, where such a distinction is not applied, the total uncertainty is essentially treated as the aleatory uncertainty. Thus, the resulting estimated percentile is much larger than the actual (true) percentile of the system's response. Our results support the premise that the separation of these two distinct uncertainty types is necessary and leads to more accurate estimates of the reactor safety margins. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

[pt] Desde a criação da MoLIC, diversas extensões foram propostas com o objetivo de trazer melhorias à linguagem. Entretanto, muitas dessas propostas não foram minuciosamente avaliadas e se distanciaram da metáfora original de interação como uma conversa. Neste trabalho, analisamos e consolidamos propostas existentes e, com base em conceitos linguísticos e de análise da conversação e do discurso, decidimos se e como incluir as mudanças propostas. Como resultado, nós criamos uma versão revisada da linguagem, a MoLIC V4, elaborada visando um melhor alinhamento com a metáfora de interação como uma conversa e com os conceitos teóricos. Para avaliar a MoLIC V4, nós conduzimos um estudo através de questionário para coletar avaliações de estudantes, profissionais e pesquisadores da área de design de interação. Nós também criamos um conjunto de exemplos e trouxemos para a discussão uma breve análise do caráter epistêmico da MoLIC. Esperamos que essas discussões e exemplos sirvam como material de referência no ensino de design de interação a partir de diagramas MoLIC. / [en] Since the creation of MoLIC, several extensions have been proposed to improve the language. However, many of those proposals have not been thoroughly evaluated and have drifted away from the original interaction-asconversation metaphor. In this work, we analyzed and consolidated existing proposals and, based on concepts of Linguistics and conversation and discourse analysis, decided whether and how to include the proposed changes. As a result, we created a revised version of the language, MoLIC V4, better aligned with the interaction-as-conversation metaphor and theoretical concepts. To evaluate MoLIC V4, we conducted a survey study to collect feedback from students, practitioners, and researchers on interaction design. We also created a set of examples and brought to the discussion a brief analysis of the epistemic character of MoLIC. We hope that these discussions and examples will serve as a reference when teaching interaction design through MoLIC diagrams.

Naturvetenskapsundervisning idag tenderar att måla en bild av att allt redan är förklarat och alla samband är upptäckta inom naturvetenskap. Skolans jobb handlar bara om att lära ut alla förklaringarna. Medan skolans undervisning fokuserar på att återge de rätta svaren ärforskare ofta djupt engagerade i frågor som ännu inte har något svar. Bland forskare inom naturvetenskap uttrycks även att en viktig drivkraft i deras arbete handlar om förundran inför det som studeras. Är det då möjligt att inom ramen för skolans undervisning använda sig av förundran som ett pedagogiskt verktyg, där det skapas en medvetenhet om att det finns mer att utforska? Ett växande forskningsfält rör förundrans betydelse för lärande i egenskap av epistemisk känsla och hur det kan integreras i undervisningen. I denna rapport undersöks hur elever på högstadiet upplever förundran i fysikundervisningen och deras syn på effekten och betydelsen av förundran för att lära sig fysikämnet. Studien har genomförts genom gruppintervjuer med elever där underlaget analyserats utifrån ett fenomenologiskt ramverk. Analysresultatet återger att essensen av elevernas upplevelser är att förundran upplevs om än inte så ofta. När det gäller vad som stimulerar förundran är essenserna flera sinnesintryck och elevens agens. I synen på effekterna och betydelsen av förundran anges sambandet mellan förundran, intresse och lärande som essensen, där speciell tonvikt läggs på att lärandet gynnas av att möta förundran tidigt. Slutsatsen av rapporten föreslår en uppgradering av begreppet förundran inom lärarutbildning, en medveten användning av undersökande arbetssätt för att stimulera förundran samt att förundran kan vara en nyckel till att starta en lärandeprocess. / Today's science education tends to portray a picture of science where everything has already been explained and all relations discovered. The task of schools is just to teach these explanations. While school education focuses on giving the right answers, scientists are often deeply engaged in questions that have not yet been resolved. Among scientists, wonder in relation to the object of study is expressed as an important motivation for their work. Is it then possible to use wonder as a pedagogical tool in school science, where an awareness is created that there is more to be discovered? An expanding field of research concerns wonder as an epistemic emotion and its implications for teaching. In this report, students' experiences of wonder in physics teaching and their view of the effects and significance of wonder in the learning of physics are investigated in lower secondary school. The study has been carried out using group interviews with students and the data set has been analysed through a phenomenological framework. The results of the analysis suggest that the essence of the students' experiences include that wonder is experienced but not so often. The found essences of what stimulates wonder are perception from several senses and students' agency. Regarding students' view of the effects and significance of wonder, the connection between wonder, interest and learning are noted as the essence, where there is a special emphasis on the claim that learning is facilitated by starting with wonder. The conclusions of the report propose an upgrade of the concept of wonder in teacher education, an intentional use of inquiry-based teaching to stimulate wonder and wonder as a key concept to start a process of learning.