Magister Legum - LLM / Even though sexual violence has always been a part and parcel of conflicts and atrocities throughout the ages, it never found any interpretation by subsequent tribunals who were responsible for prosecuting offenders.The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first of its kind to give jurisprudential recognition and interpretation to sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide respectively. This case was important for the following reasons:1. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to an act of genocide; 2. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to a crime against humanity; and 3. It was the first case to define rape within an international context.Following the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu many tribunals gave recognition to the extent of which sexual violence takes place during atrocities by correctly convicting accused for either participating in sexual violence or aiding and abetting to sexual violence. Amidst the various interpretations on what constitutes sexual violence and how it is defined, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone all either conceptualised sexual violence as genocide, war crimes or/ and crimes against humanity.At the same time, the development of sexual violence as either a crime against humanity or a war crime did not end with the courts. The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu sparked a fire in the international community, which led to it paying more attention to the place of sexual violence in treaty law. Taking into account that rape is listed as a crime against humanity in both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda statutes, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court statutes both list more than one form of sexual violence as a crime against humanity. It is interesting to note that the latter two treaty developments took place only after the International Criminal Tribunal conceptualised sexual violence as a crime against humanity.Thus apart from merely listing rape as a crime against humanity, the Statute establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone, states in article 2(g) that sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence constitutes a crime against humanity. The Statute establishing the International Criminal Court states in article 7(1)(g) that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity constitutes a crime against humanity. The interpretation of these acts is further guided by the ‘Elements of Crimes’ which are annexed to the International Criminal Court statute.Once again it is interesting to note that the ‘Elements of Crimes’ for these acts are similar to how the International Criminal Tribunals (both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals) conceptualised various acts of sexual violence.On the other hand, the definition of genocide remained the same as it was defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. This definition does not expressly mention any form of sexual violence as a form of genocide.However, once again, the trial chamber in the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu set the benchmark for sexual violence to constitute a form of genocide by way of interpretation. The definition of genocide did not subsequently change in the Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.Based on these premises, this thesis attempts to investigate the similarities and differences in sexual violence as a form of both genocide and a crime against humanity,by addressing the following question:What are the essential and practical differences between sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide and what is the legal effect of the differences, should there be any? Chapter 1 highlights the historical overview and developments of sexual violence as genocide and crimes against humanity, while chapter 2 investigates how sexual violence can amount to a form of genocide. Chapter 3 assesses the advances made in sexual violence as a crime against humanity, while chapter 4 importantly draws a comparative analysis between sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity. Chapter 4 draws this comparison by weighing up four differences and four similarities in sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity.Chapter 5 highlights the conclusion and provides an answer for the research question that is posed above. Here it is concluded that even though there exist multiple differences in sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide, there are also multiple similarities which could possibly amount to a better chance for conviction of an accused under a crime against humanity than genocide. Chapter 5 also provide possible recommendations for the consequences that might flow should sexual violence as a crime against humanity be fairly similar to sexual violence as genocide.

L’étude du dossier de la procédure devant la Cour pénale internationale permet de mettre en lumière les subtilités du procès pénal international, traversé par des cultures juridiques et des techniques procédurales différentes, appartenant tantôt à la common law, tantôt à la civil law. Dénominateur commun à tous les systèmes ainsi qu’à toutes les procédures, le dossier est une notion encore méconnue, bien qu’elle soit une notion clé du système établi à Rome. Le dossier protège en effet l’intégrité des procédures et il permettrait d’en assurer l’efficacité, si son rôle était revalorisé, et si l’accès des juges et des parties à son contenu était facilité. Dans cette perspective, la présente étude a pour ambition de proposer une nouvelle clé de lecture du procès pénal international et de révéler tout le potentiel du dossier de la procédure. Plus précisément, cette étude propose de comprendre la procédure, de manière empirique, à travers le prisme du dossier plutôt que de manière théorique, à travers la vision d’un système. Et il en ressort que le dossier mériterait d’être érigé en notion autonome, au soutien de la procédure devant la Cour pénale internationale. / The study of the record of the proceedings before the International criminal court brings to light the subtleties of the international criminal trial, crossed by legal cultures and different procedural techniques, belonging either to common law, or to civil law. Common denominator to all systems and to all proceedings, the record is still an unknown concept despite being a key notion established in Rome. The record protects proceedings’ integrity and could ensure effectiveness if its role was enhanced and if access to its content by judges and parties was facilitated. In this regard, this study intends to offer a new key to understanding the international criminal trial and to reveal the full potential of the record of the proceedings. Specifically, this project proposes to understand proceedings in an empirical approach through the prism of the record than in a theoretical approach, through the vision of a system. It appears that the record should be erected as an autonomous notion, supporting the proceedings before the International criminal court.

L’échec de l’impérativité du droit international pénal et la fragilité de la justice pénale internationale qui en résulte ne dépendent pas du choix normatif d’un modèle de juridiction, ad hoc ou conventionnel, mais simplement des défaillances et des réticences des États à l’égard de la norme choisie. Ce constat d’évidence trouve sa confirmation dans le processus de mise en place et de fonctionnement de la Cour pénale internationale, fâcheusement contournée à faire prévaloir sur la lutte contre l’impunité une lutte pour la « justiciabilité » des auteurs des crimes les plus graves qui heurtent la conscience de l’Humanité : crimes contre l’humanité, crime de génocide, crimes de guerre, crime d’agression. L’obstacle qu’elle doit essentiellement surmonter est en effet que sa compétence peut être délibérément mise en échec à tout moment, directement ou indirectement, par tout État avant tout soucieux de sa propre souveraineté, qu’il soit ou non partie au Statut de Rome. L’observation des stratégies étatiques montre d’une part que la faculté de renoncer à l’exercice de sa propre compétence répressive se traduit par une négation de l’impérativité des engagements souscrits auparavant, certains Etats se désolidarisent de la répression dont ils se sont désistés. D’autre part, et à l’inverse, l’exercice légitime de sa compétence répressive par un Etat peut très facilement lui permettre de glisser vers une obstruction chronique de la juridiction internationale, voire ou déni du droit impératif qui la régit. En l’absence d’une réelle reconnaissance de la juridiction internationale, les conséquences de telles attitudes sont d’une ampleur qui dépasse l’imagination. Seul un comportement coopératif et constructif, affranchi des compromis égoïstes et opportunistes des États, pourrait parer au risque actuel d’une érosion progressive de l’architecture punitive partagée mise en place par les États eux-mêmes lors de la création de la Cour pénale internationale et ainsi de garantir que soient punis à coup sûr les auteurs de crimes insupportables. / The failure to make international criminal law imperative and the resulting fragility of international criminal justice should not be understood as the consequence of a normative choice toward a jurisdictional model, be it ad hoc or conventional. Rather, it derives from the State's weaknesses and reluctance to abide by the chosen norm. This is clearly confirmed by the very way the International Criminal Court was implemented, functions and is being sadly circumvented. Instead of bolstering the fight against impunity, it focuses on the fight for the “justiciability” of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes, resulting in subsequent negative effects on Humanity’s consciousness: crimes against humanity, crime of genocide, war crimes and crime of aggression. Owing to the fact that a State's primary concern is its own sovereignty, the biggest obstacle the Court has to overcome remains that at any moment, directly or indirectly, its competence can be intentionally overruled by any State, signatory or not of the Treaty of Rome. Observing State strategies shows that relinquishing one’s repressive authority is generally seen through a negation of formerly made commitments: some States dissociate from the repression monopoly they disclaim. Conversely, the legitimate exercise of a State’s repressive authority can easily result in regular obstruction of international jurisdiction, and even the refusal of the imperative law that governs it. Without any genuine recognition of international jurisdiction, such attitudes have undeniable serious consequences that far outreach the imagination. The only solution is cooperative and constructive behavior, free of opportunistic and selfish compromises of States. This behavior could protect against the current risk of the progressive erosion regarding shared punitive organization which States themselves implemented through the creation of the International Criminal Court. The result would guarantee the punishment of perpetrators of unbearable crimes.

Délimitée par référence à la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, le champ pénal de l’Union européenne se révèle plus conséquent que ce que l’apposition du qualificatif « pénal », en droit de l’Union, ne le laisse penser. Envisager dans sa globalité, à l’aune des caractéristiques d’un système juridique et des modèles pénaux existant, les éléments du champ pénal de l’Union européenne peuvent alors s’agencer comme les pièces d'un puzzle qui prend progressivement forme et dont l'image générale se dessine peu à peu. Le champ pénal de l’Union européenne n’est plus qu’une compilation de normes. Il constitue désormais un système juridique : un ensemble d'éléments en interaction, évoluant dans un environnement déterminé, structuré en fonction des finalités qu’il est destiné à satisfaire, agissant sur son environnement et se transformant avec le temps sans perdre son identité. Son idéologie pénale à dominante répressive n’a rien de particulièrement original ; sa physionomie, en tant que système pénal, en revanche, reproduit l'atypisme proprement unioniste / Defined by the Europe court of human rights (ECHR), the EU extend its scope of action beyond the definition of « penal » as found in the EU law. Seen as a whole, taken the characteristics and models of already existing law systems, the different elements of the EU law scope can be put together like a jigsaw puzzle, revealing pieces after pieces the general picture. The penal scope of the EU isn’t just about regulations anymore. It acts as a legal system - a set of elements interacting with one another, evolving in set environment, structured to meet set up goals, taking action on its environment and evolving with time without losing its identity/nature. Its penal ideology and restrictive tendencies are not innovative, but its structure, on the other hand, replicate the atypical trait of the EU

In the perilous waters of the Mediterranean Sea, migrants find themselves facing limited choices when in distress. Their options are stark: either to rely on the lifesaving efforts of Non- Governmental Organisations (NGO) aid workers conducting Search and Rescue (SAR) Operations, to be intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) and subsequently detained in Libya where their human rights are gravely violated, or to face the tragic fate of perishing at sea. Unfortunately, the criminalisation of SAR Operations, spearheaded by NGO aid workers, hinders the rescue of migrants, thereby exacerbating the risks they face and leaving them vulnerable to interception by the LCG. This interception, as argued in this thesis, inevitably leads to the perpetration of Crimes Against Humanity (CAH) against these vulnerable migrants. This thesis sheds light on the issue of Italy’s increasing criminalisation and vilification of humanitarian aid workers engaged in SAR missions in the Mediterranean Sea. It critically examines the consequences of such criminalisation on the lives and rights of migrants, exploring the complex dynamics between SAR Operations, interception by the LCG, and the commission of CAH. Drawing upon a comprehensive lens of interpretation that integrates legal analysis, human rights principles, and the international legal framework, this study concludes that criminalisation of SAR operations is indeed a contributing factor towards the CAH faced by migrants in Libya. Moreover, it identifies the potential liability of Italian State Officials (ISO) at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their role in enacting legislations that effectively criminalises SAR operations.

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"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des Études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LL.M. en Maîtrise en droit Option recherche" / Le crime d'agression se veut etre un des quatre crimes internationaux sous la juridiction de la CPI. Lorsque les delegues a la Conference de Rome n'eurent point atteint de consensus sur une definition du crime, celui-ci resta, depuis, indefini en droit. En consequence, la CPI n'aura juridiction pour entendre des causes portant sur le crime d'agression qu'une fois la definition sera adoptee par l'Assemblee des Etats Parties au plus tot en 2009. Ce memoire traite trois problematiques liees au crime d'agression : la question de la responsabilite penale individuelle, le role du Conseil de securite de l'ONU, et les parametres du crime en tant que tel. La responsabilite penale individuelle est analysee, inter alia, du point de vue du principe des sources du droit international. Quant al'eventuelle implication du Conseil de securite dans le champ de competence de la CPI sur le crime d'agression, l'auteure soutient tel que suit: Si le Conseil de securite se voit accorde un pouvoir plus large que celui dont il est presentement dote en vertu des articles 13(b) et 16 du Statut de Rome, chaque membre permanent aura un veto sur toute situation d'agression qui serait autrement portee devant la Cour. Ceci aura pour consequence de politiser la CPI en ce qui a trait au crime et rendra hypothethique toute definition eventuelle. Si la definition est bien con9ue et redigee, on fait valoir, qu'il n' est point necessaire de limiter davantage la competence de la CPI. Les parametres de la definition du crime proposes par l'auteure sont etablis selon les conclusions d'une analyse des notions composantes de l'agression. L'essentiel du concept se veut un recours illegal et non-necessaire qui constitue une rupture ala paix. Amoins qu'il ne soit exerce en « legitime defence» ou en vertu d'un mandat du Chapitre VII, Ie recours ala force constitue prima facie une agression et s'il est suffisamment grave, il s'agira d'un crime d'agression. Ce memoire termine avec un projet de definition du crime d'agression en vue d'avancer Ie discours vers un consensus sur ces problematiques majeures. Non seulement est-il possible d'arriver aun consensus sur la definition, croit l'auteure, mais nous sommes plus que jamais al'aube d'y parvenir. / The crime of aggression is one of the four international crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. When delegates at the Rome Conference were unable to agree on the content of a definition, the crime was left undefined. As a result, the ICC can only begin prosecuting individuals for the crime of aggression once a definition is adopted by the Assembly of States Parties in 2009, at the earliest. This thesis examines three issues associated with the crime of aggression: the question of individual criminal responsibility, the role of the UN Security Council and the general scope of the definition of the crime of aggression itself Individual criminal liability is reviewed, inter alia, from the perspective of international sources doctrine. Regarding the role of the Security Council in relation to the crime of aggression, the author concludes: if the Security Council is vested with more powers than it already has under Articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute, each permanent member will have a veto over any situation of aggression that might otherwise be brought before the Court. This would result in a complete politicization of the ICC and render moot any future definition of the crime of aggression. If a definition for the crime of aggression is properly conceived and constructed, it is argued, there is no need to further limit the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. The author proposes general parameters for the scope ofthe definition based on conclusions reached in the analysis of the conceptual components of aggression. At its essence, the act of aggression is the unnecessary, unlawful use of force which constitutes a breach ofthe peace. Unless employed in "self-defence" or under a Chapter VII mandate, the use offorce constitutes prima facie an act of aggression, and if it is sufficiently grave, a crime ofaggression. This thesis concludes with a working definition ofthe crime of aggression to promote dialogue and ultimately a consensus on these core issues. Not only is a definition is within reach, the author believes, we are closer to it than we ever have been before.

Ph.D. Thesis ABSTRACT Mgr. Veronika Kristková, LL.M., 2013 Position of victims of human rights violations in international law with focus on victims of serious violations of human rights and international humantiarian law This work focuses within the broad theme of " Position of the victims of the human rights violations in international law" on victims of serious human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law (hereinafter only serious violations). The author decided to focus on the victims of serious violations because the research revealed that while the rights of victims of human rights violations are in general relatively settled in theory as well in practice of international law, the rights of the victims of serious violations is an area, which raises several doctrinal questions, encountered rapid development in recent years and continues to develop. Analysis of the rights of the victims of serious violations necessary must be based on the rights of the victims of human rights violations in general, which serves as a baseline for the analysis of the rights of the victims of serious violations. Only in comparison with the general rights of the victims of human rights violations the specificities of the rights of the victims of serious violations stand up. First the work...

Le Tribunal spécial pour le Liban (TSL) est établi en vertu d’un accord bilatéral conclu entre l’ONU et le Gouvernement libanais; mais ses instruments constitutifs ne sont entrés en vigueur qu’en vertu de la résolution 1757 (2007) du Conseil de sécurité adoptée sur la base du Chapitre VII de la Charte. Le TSL, siégeant aux Pays-Bas, composé de juges étrangers et libanais, s’avère un tribunal pénal internationalisé sui generis. Son mandat principal consiste à poursuivre les responsables de l’attentat du 14 février 2005 ôtant la vie à l’ancien Premier Ministre libanais Rafic HARIRI et de 22 autres personnes ; toutefois la compétence du TSL peut être élargie pour couvrir des attentats connexes. Plusieurs caractéristiques distinguent le TSL du fait qu’il est le premier tribunal pénal créé sous les auspices des Nations Unies, sans appartenir à la discipline du droit international humanitaire, et qui ne juge que des crimes de terrorisme en temps de paix à la lumière du droit national libanais ; comme il est le premier tribunal pénal international qui mène des procès in absentia; et le premier qui est doté d’un Bureau pour la Défense - comme organe autonome du TSL – sur un même pied d’égalité avec le Bureau du Procureur en conférant des pouvoirs larges aux conseils de la Défense. Le TSL fonctionne selon son propre Règlement de procédure et de preuve - adopté par ses juges - associant à la fois le système romano-germanique et le système anglo-saxon. Le fonctionnement du TSL confronte des défis juridiques, de par son financement mixte assuré à travers la contribution conventionnelle du Gouvernement libanais et les contributions volontaires des États membres, ou de par sa primauté restreinte qui est juste limitée aux juridictions libanaises, générant une coopération problématique avec les États tiers et hésitante avec le Liban. Également, le Statut du Tribunal est réticent sur la question des immunités. La mise en place du TSL a créé une grande polémique politique au Liban, son fonctionnement au cœur d’un cadre géopolitique instable provoque des enjeux stratégiques pertinents ayant des impacts sur la scène politique au Liban et au Moyen-Orient. Le TSL encourt des enjeux stratégiques du fait que son premier acte d’accusation incrimine des membres appartenant au Hezbollah - une résistance armée contre Israël - allié de l’Iran et de la Syrie. Le Printemps arabe et ses implications sur la révolte syrienne générèrent une instabilité politique et sécuritaire au Liban, alertant une nouvelle série d’attentats terroristes. La mission principale du TSL consiste à mettre fin à l’impunité au Liban, principalement celle relative aux assassinats politiques. Du fait que le TSL est établi juste pour juger un seul attentat et un nombre restreint de crimes connexes dans un cadre temporel et spatial restreints, alors qu’un grand nombre de crimes graves de droit international humanitaire et de crimes politiques et terroristes restent impunis au Liban, le TSL est conçu comme un instrument de justice sélective. Pour ses détracteurs, le TSL concrétise le dilemme entre « paix civile » et « justice internationale », bien que sa finalité consiste à consolider la réconciliation nationale à travers la découverte de la vérité. / The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is created through a bilateral agreement concluded between the UN and the Lebanese Government; but its essential instruments didn’t come into force until the adoption of the binding resolution 1757 (2007) of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The STL, sitting in the Netherlands, composed of foreign and Lebanese judges, is an internationalized criminal tribunal sui generis. Its primary mandate consists on prosecuting those responsible for the 14th February 2005 attempt which caused the death of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic HARIRI and 22 other people; nevertheless the STL’s jurisdiction can be extended to cover connected attacks. Many features distinguish the STL, since it is the first criminal tribunal that was created under the UN’s framework outside of the International humanitarian law’s discipline; it judges terrorism crimes in peace time under the Lebanese domestic law; moreover, it is the first international criminal tribunal which holds trials in absentia, establishes an Office for the Defense as an autonomous organ equally with the Office of the Prosecutor giving the defense counsel large powers. The STL works according to its proper Rules of Procedure and Evidence – adopted by its judges – associating the civil law system and the common law system. The STL’s functioning confronts legal challenges due to its combined funding mechanism, assured by the conventional contribution of the Lebanese Government as by the voluntary contributions of member States; or due to its restricted primacy limited only to Lebanese courts, arising a problematical horizontal cooperation. In addition, the STL’s Statute expresses reluctance on the immunities’ question. The implementation of the STL has created a large political controversy in Lebanon; its work in an unstable geopolitical framework triggers relevant strategic issues having impacts on the political scene in Lebanon and Middle-East. The STL incurs strategic challenges since its first indictment incriminates Hezbollah members – an armed resistance against Israel – ally of Iran and Syria. The Arab spring and its implications on the Syrian revolution generate instability to the political and security conditions of Lebanon, alerting a new series of terrorist attempts. The main mission of the STL consists to end impunity in Lebanon related first and foremost to political assassinations. The STL is considered as an instrument of selective justice since it is established only to judge a single attempt and a small number of connected crimes in a restricted spatiotemporal framework, whereas a large number of serious crimes of International humanitarian law and political crimes perpetrated in Lebanon are still unpunished. For its detractors, the STL embodies the dilemma between "civil peace" and "international justice", although its finality seeks to consolidate the national reconciliation through the discovery of the truth.

L’entraide policière internationale, en raison de la multiplicité de ses sources et de ses applications, apparaît comme un phénomène pluriel difficile à appréhender. Sa mise en œuvre différenciée dans les différents espaces géographiques et les nombreuses évolutions qu’elle a connues aggravent sa complexité. L’objet de la présente étude est de proposer une grille de lecture dont l’ambition est de donner une vision plus claire et plus cohérente. En définitive, deux types d’entraide se dessinent : l’assistance et la coopération. Ce résultat est révélé par une étude notionnelle et conforté par la modélisation du régime. L’étude de la notion permet de révéler, malgré une définition unitaire, la nature duale de l’entraide policière. Cette dualité se répercute sur le régime puisque deux types distincts apparaissent : l’assistance s’apparente au régime de droit commun et la coopération prend les traits d’un régime spécial. En filigrane, il apparaît que l’entraide policière internationale emprunte à la procédure pénale et au droit international leurs caractères et leurs facteurs d’influence. / Due to the several sources and its implementation, the international mutual help between the polices tends to be a concept difficult to understand. The different ways to set up the cooperation in the different part of the world and the several evolutions known, are increasing the difficulties to understand its complexity. This study wants to show and give a clearer vision of this mutual help. Basically, there are two kinds of mutual helps: the assistance and the cooperation. The result appears after a notional study and is consolidated by the establishment of a framework. Despite a commom definition, the study of the notion reveals a duality in the international mutual help between the polices. This duality has an impact on the legal framework, as two types of frameworks are appearing: the assistance relates on the common law system and the cooperation tends to be a specific framework. Finally, it appears the international mutual helps between the polices borrows from the criminal proceedings and from the international rights their caracteristics and their influences.