Copyright contractual law consist of rules that regulate contracts within copyright law. One of the main characteristics of copyright contracts is that they are often characterised by differences in bargaining power between the parties. The weak position of authors has therefore become the subject of mandatory legislation in various respects. Recently, Article 20 of the Directive (EU) 2019/790 (DSM-Directive) incorporated such a rule. This article provides authors with a right to additional, appropriate and fair remuneratiom after the conclusion of the contract if their remuneration proves to be disproportionately low. That is, a right to obtain post-contractual remuneration through mandatory legislation. It is in theory possible to also achieve similar results by applying Section 36 of the Swedish Contracts Act. This paper will examine both of these rules. This constitutes an interesting area of law, but the detailed applications of the rules are still understudied. This paper therefore aims to take a holistic approach to the possibility for authors to obtain additional post-contractual remuneration through mandatory legislation. The study identifies several problems and ambiguities in the application and proposes solutions to these issues. The conclusion was that the requirements for applying Article 20 are generally to be seen as lower than Section 36 of the Swedish Contracts Act, while in theory it should also lead to higher remuneration for authors. However, Section 36 of the Copyright Act can be applied to a wider range of cases and to some extent addresses other circumstances. The addition of article 20 has either way improved authors right to remuneration as well as bargaining power. However, some of the other issues that authors face during the contract negotiations were not solved through the directive.

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This essay explores the rules of adjustment of compensation for wrongful imprisonment as applied to juveniles aged 15–18 from a child law perspective.  The Law of Compensation for Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty[1] excludes claims where the complainant has contributed to causing the deprivation, for instance through false confessions or other suspicious behavior. There are no exceptions for those who exhibited such behavior while they were underage. There is also no other guidance or precedent for special treatment of such cases with regard to the level of responsibility for the damages, although children are generally awarded a somewhat larger sum than adults. This essay considers the rules of exclusion in light of child rights, material laws concerning children in the justice system, as well as tort law principles regarding participation in causing damages to oneself. The purpose is to investigate whether there would be cause to change the law to include separate rules for children. The essay finds that preferential treatment of children is the rule rather than the exception, both in the criminal justice system, in torts, as well as with regard to the ability to enter agreements. This is mainly motivated by children's inability to take responsibility for their actions. Adults, commonly the child's parents or other legal guardians, but also representatives of the state, are to varying degrees tasked with taking responsibility for children and to protect them not only from others – but from themselves. The essay also finds that the cause of the damage, the deprivation of liberty, is different when it occurs during childhood, because: ·       Children are officially not punished for their crimes; their deprivation of liberty is defined as receiving care.  ·       The treatment children receive through the criminal justice system is more psychologically damaging to them than prison sentences are to adults and has far-reaching consequences regarding their development.  ·       The state has greater responsibility for children than for adults. ·       The nature of the fundamental rights violated through the confinement are different, as children do not fully have the same freedom as adults, and because they have rights which adults do not have. After considering a range of legal and non-legal factors, it would be reasonable and consistent to regulate children's claims to compensation for wrongful deprivation of liberty more preferentially. The state has a responsibility for the welfare and healthy development of children in general, as well as a duty to ensure that children are not being deprived of their liberty unless it is necessary to do so, according to article 37 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which holds a status as Swedish law since January 2020.[2] Research has shown young age and life adversity to be clear risk factors for falsely confessing to a crime. This should merit some caution on the side of the state when handling confessions from young people; especially when adult family members or friends could be suspected of the same crime. The very unequal power balance between the child and the state in that context should be reflected in the rules of adjustment of compensation. Another important issue with the current legislation is that children are unable to apply for the compensation without the signature(s) of their legal guardian(s), which has not been compensated for with regard to prescription. This is the case for various damage claims of children against the state. Thus, children are offered a shorter time than adults to personally claim compensation. The essay also considers whether an individual could claim this type of preferential treatment more directly based on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Results in this regard are inconclusive. Importantly, while there may be reasons both for and against any changes, it is clear from the seriousness of the subject matter that such reasons should be explored and considered by the lawmaker.   [1] Lag (1998:714) om ersättning för felaktigt frihetsberövande (My translation. No official English translation appears to be available.)[2] Although originally ratified in 1989.

When a company is part of an agreement there is a risk that one of the collaborators pursues similar business and takes up competition with the partner or chooses to reveal information about their partner to other parties. To avoid this, companies establish a confidentiality agreement that prohibits the parties to reveal any information. Confidentiality agreements that are eternal have become more common in Swedish contract law in commercial relations. As a result, disputes between collaborators have occurred regarding the unreasonable length and validity of the agreement at a later stage. When a confidentiality agreement is considered to be unreasonable, 36 § of the Swedish contract law (AvtL) can be applicable. The paragraph deals with the legitimacy and the opportunities of re-adjustment of the unreasonable contract. The question is, can a confidentiality agreement that is eternally valid in commercial relations be modified with the support of 36 § AvtL? Pacta sunt servanda is an important principle in Swedish contract law and the confidentiality agreement is no exception. Hence, the duty of fulfilling a contractual obligation is important. The 36 § of AvtL can be applied when an obligation can be considered to be unreasonable. Confidentiality agreements in commercial relations that are eternal can be seen as unreasonable if a partner is inferior or if later occurred relations changes the meaning of an agreement. If information is considered to be an industrial secret it should be classified according to Act on the Protection of Business Secrets (FHL). However, when the information is not any longer regarded as an industrial secret, it can be unreasonable to have a eternal confidentiality agreement. An example of this can be a patent that expires after a certain period of time. Hence the confidentiality agreement should be able to modify, with the support of 36 § AvtL.

Inom den internationella privaträtt- och processrätten är lagvalsfrihet, s.k. parts-autonomi, ett allt vanligare inslag. Vad gäller makars förmögenhetsförhållanden förekommer lagvalsfrihet i svensk lagstiftning genom NÄF (som är tillämplig på äktenskap med endast nordisk anknytning) och LIMF (som tillämpas på övriga förhållanden med utländsk anknytning). Dessutom finns lagvalsfrihet mellan makar i ett förslag till en EU-rättsakt om makars förmögenhetsförhållanden som förväntas bli antagen inom en snar framtid av 17 medlemsländer inklusive Sverige.   En obegränsad lagvalsfrihet kan leda till oönskade effekter på bodelningen med oskäliga bodelningsresultat som följd. Syftet med uppsatsen är dels att identifiera eventuella brister med utformningen av lagvalsfriheten som rör internationella makars förmögenhetsförhållanden, dels att behandla vilket skydd som finns i lagstiftningen för makar som p.g.a. ett oförmånligt lagvalsavtal drabbats av ett oskäligt bodelnings-resultat. Förutom vad avser nuvarande svensk lagstiftning diskuteras dessa frågor även med utgångspunkt ur en framtida EU-rättsakt.   De största problemen med utformningen av lagvalsfriheten är hänförliga till hemvist-kriteriet som är kopplat till lagvalsbestämmelserna. Inom svensk rättspraxis tenderar rättstillämparna göra inte helt samstämmiga tolkningar av hemvistbegreppet, trots att en definition finns i lagen. Skillnaderna i tolkningen av hemvistbegreppet torde således kunna bli än mer uttalade i en EU-rättsakt där någon definition av hemvistbegreppet inte förekommer. Eftersom lagvalsavtal mellan makar kan ha grundats på den ena makens hemvist, riskerar divergerande tolkningar av hemvistbegreppet leda till olika bedömningar av lagvalsavtalets giltighet. Det i sin tur är ett hot mot rättssäkerheten på området, vilket går stick i stäv med lagvalsfrihetens syfte. Det föreligger således ett behov av att införa en tydlig definition av hemvistbegreppet till det förslag som ligger till grund för den kommande rättsakten. En definition som har sin utgångspunkt ur målet med rättsakten, nämligen att öka förutsebarheten om tillämplig lag för att främja fri rörlighet inom unionen.   Inom svensk Äktenskapsbalk (ÄktB) finns flera bestämmelser till skydd för makar mot oskäliga bodelningar. Dessa ges ett tydligt tillämpningsutrymme även i LIMF där de stadgats som internationellt tvingande, oavsett vilken stats rättsordning som är tillämplig. I NÄF däremot är dessa bestämmelsers tillämpningsutrymme betydligt mer osäkert. Det är inte i linje med EU-domstolens strängare tolkning av vad som kan betraktas som internationellt tvingande regler. Vidare är ÄktB:s skyddsregler inte formulerade på så sätt att det framgår att lagstiftarens avsikt är att de ska vara internationellt tvingande. Sammantaget finns risk att ÄktB:s skyddsregler mot oskäliga bodelningar inte kommer att kunna åberopas i framtida tvister där utländsk lag har valts genom ett avtal mellan makarna.   För att förstärka ställningen av ÄktB:s skyddsregler om bland annat jämkning av oskäliga bodelningar, finns det skäl för lagstiftaren att vidta åtgärder inför antagandet av en EU-rättsakt. Åtgärderna kan innefatta omformulering av bestämmelserna i ÄktB, alternativt införande av kompletterande bestämmelser till den rättsakt som ska antas. Endast därigenom kan vi garantera ett fortsatt skydd för makar som drabbas av oskäliga bodelningar och riskerar att gå miste om egendom de borde ha rätt till.