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11	Corroboration and the Popper debate in phylogenetic systematics Bzovy, Justin 27 August 2012 (has links) I evaluate the methods of cladistic parsimony and maximum likelihood in phylogenetic systematics by their affinity to Popper‘s degree of corroboration. My work analyzes an important recent exchange between the proponents of the two methods. Until this exchange, only advocates of cladistic parsimony have claimed a basis for their method on epistemological grounds through corroboration. Advocates of maximum likelihood, on the other hand, have based the rational justification for their method largely on statistical grounds. In Part One I outline corroboration in terms of content, severity of test and explanatory power. In Part Two I introduce the two methods. In Part Three I analyze three important debates. The first involves the appropriate probability interpretation for phylogenetics. The second is about severity of test. The third concerns explanatory power. In Part Four I conclude that corroboration can decide none of these debates, and therefore cannot decide the debate between cladistic parsimony and maximum likelihood. Corroboration Karl Popper Maximum Likelihood Cladistic Parsimony Epistemology Phylogenetic Systematics Probability Testability Explanatory Power Explanation Ad hoc hypotheses
12	REALISMO MORAL: PROPOSTA A PARTIR DA TEORIA POPPERIANA DOS TRÊS MUNDOS / MORAL REALISM: PROPOSAL FROM THE POPPERIAN THEORY OF THREE WORLDS Romanini, Mateus 10 March 2016 (has links) Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work is primarily engaged in formulating a moral realism proposition based on Karl Popper s Three Worlds Theory. As there is a range of metaethical positions in question, first we seek to present the contemporary meta-ethical debate in order to place some of the key positions existing in it and explain why we assume moral realism. After this presentation, we approach in more detailed way what constitutes moral realism, presenting some of its main aspects as well some of the best-known criticisms that are made to this position. In a third step, already developing the proposal of moral realism that we fetch to formulate in this paper, we explain the Theory of Three Popper Worlds, a theory which states that the reality of the way that humans know consists of the interaction of three worlds: physical world (world 1), the world of mental states (world 2) and the objective world of abstract entities (world 3). From these three worlds, that most important for us is the world 3 because it is inhabited by different types of objective abstract entities, among which we suggest here, is the idea of good and the moral facts, so we call our proposed World 3 Moral Realism. The idea of good is that we consider to be the idea that governs the search for solutions to moral problems, these solutions once established through continuous use of language, especially of the higher functions that characterize human language, become objective moral facts which, in turn, are the references to the truth of moral discourse and the correction of moral actions. Finally, we seek to show how our proposal fulfills the necessary conditions for it to be considered a moral realism and also point out some negative aspects and some positive aspects since we can already identify in this kind of realism. After weigh these aspects, we maintain that this is a promising proposal and therefore deserves a place in the list of metaethical positions. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo principal formular uma proposta de realismo moral baseada na Teoria dos Três Mundos de Karl Raimund Popper. Como há uma gama de posições metaéticas em questão, primeiramente buscamos apresentar o debate metaético contemporâneo de modo a situar algumas das principais posições existentes nele, bem como explicar o porquê de assumirmos o realismo moral. Após tal apresentação, abordamos de modo mais detalhado em que consiste o realismo moral, apresentando algumas de suas principais vertentes bem como algumas críticas mais conhecidas que são feitas a esta posição. Em um terceiro momento, já desenvolvendo a proposta de realismo moral que buscamos formular neste trabalho, explicamos a Teoria dos Três Mundos de Popper, uma teoria que afirma que a realidade da forma que os seres humanos conhecem é composta pela interação de três mundos: o mundo físico (mundo 1), o mundo dos estados mentais (mundo 2) e o mundo das entidades abstratas objetivas (mundo 3). Destes três mundos o que mais nos importa é o mundo 3, pois ele é habitado por diferentes tipos de entidades abstratas objetivas, dentre as quais, sugerimos aqui, estão a ideia de bem e os fatos morais, por isso chamamos nossa proposta de Realismo Moral de Mundo 3. A ideia de bem é por nós considerada como sendo a ideia que regula a busca por soluções para os problemas morais, soluções essas que uma vez instituídas através do uso contínuo da linguagem, especialmente das funções superiores que caracterizam a linguagem humana, se tornam fatos morais objetivos que, por sua vez, são as referências para a verdade do discurso moral e a correção das ações morais. Por fim, buscamos mostrar de que forma nossa proposta satisfaz as condições necessárias para que ela seja considerada um realismo moral e, além disso, apontamos alguns aspectos negativos e alguns aspectos positivos que desde já podemos identificar nesse tipo de realismo. Após sopesar esses aspectos, sustentamos que esta é uma proposta promissora e que, portanto, merece um lugar no rol de posições metaéticas. Realismo moral Metaética Teoria dos três mundos Karl Popper Philosophy of science Theory of three worlds CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
13	Socratisme et démocratie athénienne : un rapport de désengagement Ouellette, Patrick January 2017 (has links) Ce mémoire veut rendre compte de la relation qu’entretient le Socrate historique avec la cité athénienne en tentant de dégager des témoignages de Platon, de Xénophon et d’Aristophane une pensée politique propre au personnage historique. Notre hypothèse consiste à affirmer que la philosophie socratique s’oppose aux valeurs du régime démocratique athénien dans la mesure où elle recherche l’excellence de l’âme. Constatant que les conditions nécessaires pour obtenir le meilleur jugement politique se font absentes de l’espace public démocratique, Socrate prône un désengagement des citoyens par rapport aux affaires publiques de leur cité. Nous défendons donc l’idée selon laquelle la pensée politique du Socrate de l’histoire peut se comprendre comme un « désengagement » politique puisque Socrate ne détient pas la science politique (vertu-science) et s’oppose à la conception de l’intérêt personnel que promeut sa cité. Socrate Platon Xénophon Aristophane Karl Popper Michel Foucault Elenchos Parrêsia Démocratie athénienne Vertu-science Nuées Gorgias Apologie Criton
14	Hypotheses and Predictions in Biology Research and Education: An Investigation of Contemporary Relevance Anupriya S. Karippadath (5930693) 26 April 2023 (has links) <p>The process of scientific inquiry is critical for students to understand how knowledge is developed and validated. Representations of the process of inquiry have varied over time, from simple to complex, but some concepts are persistent – such as the concept of a scientific hypothesis. Current guidelines for undergraduate biology education prioritize developing student competence in generating and evaluating hypotheses but fail to define the concept and role of hypotheses. The nature of science literature points to the hypothetico-deductive method of inquiry originated by Karl Popper as a widely accepted conception of scientific hypotheses. Popper characterized a hypothesis as a falsifiable explanation of observed phenomena deduced from previously established knowledge. Alongside hypotheses, Popper also emphasizes the role of predictions, which are logically derived from hypotheses and characterized as testable expectations regarding the outcomes of an experiment or study. Together, hypotheses and predictions are thought to provide a framework for establishing rigorous conclusions in scientific studies. However, the absence of explicit definitions of hypotheses, or predictions, in guidelines and assessment for biology higher education makes it difficult to determine the current relevance of this perspective on hypotheses and predictions in teaching and learning. This leaves us with an unanswered question – what do biology undergraduate students need to know about scientific hypotheses? We addressed this question over three studies each investigating conceptions of scientific hypotheses, and the related concept of predictions, in a different context – (a) contemporary biology research communications, (b) a case study of biology faculty, graduate teaching assistants, and undergraduate students at a single institution, and (c) a national survey of biology faculty members. We found that the terms “hypothesis” and “prediction” used in varied ways in biology research communication and, most notably, often not connected with each other. We also found variation in conceptions of both hypothesis and prediction among faculty members, both in our case study and in the national survey. Our results indicate that faculty members did not always distinguish between the terms hypothesis and prediction in research or teaching or approach them the same way in research contexts. However, they had largely consistent ideas of the underlying reasoning connecting these concepts to each other and to scientific inquiry. Among graduate teaching assistants and undergraduate students in the case study, we found variation in conceptions of both hypotheses and predictions that was different from conceptions held by faculty members. Both graduate teaching assistants and undergraduate students often did not connect the two concepts in terms of underlying reasoning. Overall, our results indicate that there are some misalignments between students’ and instructors’ conceptions of hypotheses and predictions and their role in inquiry. We further discuss these findings in the context of teaching implications for undergraduate biology.</p> Higher education DBER biology education research Karl Popper Hypothesis Prediction Scientific inquiry
15	Pluralidade de mundos do conhecimento em Karl Popper Bettin, Rogério 01 September 2014 (has links) Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rogerio Bettin.pdf: 901827 bytes, checksum: a7d6c66d907176975e5b667d88dcdc29 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-01 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper aims at analyzing the plurality of realities of worlds of knowledge in Karl Popper. In the first section, we have chosen to analyze the object studied respecting the chronological order of the Popperian publications, bearing in mind the verification of the development of the three worlds thesis in Popper. The author rejects both monistic and dualistic positions and hence proposes a notion of a tripartite reality, claiming that reality is made up by the interaction among three worlds: World 1, of physical objects and material states; World 2, of states of consciousness or mental states or, maybe, of behavioral willingness to act, the world of subjective knowledge; and World 3, of objective autonomous knowledge, which doesn't depend on the subject who knows. World 3 is inhabited by problems, critical arguments and theories, as a result of the evolution of human language. It contains the history of our ideas, of how we invent and react to such products of our own elaboration of objective contents of thinking. In the second section, aiming at better understanding the three worlds theory, even though it is metaphysical, we present a connection between this thesis and the Popperian epistemology, known as critical rationalism. For the author, scientific knowledge is fallible, correctable and provisional, thus making criticism assume a crucial role in the development of knowledge. Therefore, as we analyse the thesis of the three worlds inserted in Popperian epistemology, we can better understand some aspects of the theory of the three worlds, as well as how knowledge grows, according to the presuppositions defended by Karl Popper / Esta pesquisa tem o objetivo de analisar a pluralidade de realidades de mundos do conhecimento em Karl Popper. Na primeira seção, optamos por analisar o objeto aqui estudado respeitando a ordem cronológica das publicações popperianas, tendo em vista a verificação do desenvolvimento da tese dos três mundos em Popper. O autor não aceita as posições monistas e dualistas, por isso que ele propõe uma noção de realidade tripartite, ao afirmar que a realidade é composta pela interação de três mundos: mundo um, dos objetos físicos ou de estados materiais; mundo dois, de estados de consciência ou de estados mentais, ou, talvez, de disposições comportamentais para agir é o mundo do conhecimento subjetivo; e, mundo três, do conhecimento objetivo e autônomo que independe do sujeito que conhece. Este é habitado pelos problemas, argumentos críticos e teorias, como resultado da evolução da linguagem humana. O mundo três é a história de nossas ideias, de como a inventamos e reagimos diante desses produtos de nossas próprias elaborações de conteúdos objetivos de pensamento. Na segunda seção, com o intuito de melhor compreendermos a tese dos três mundos, mesmo sendo uma teoria metafísica, apresentaremos uma conexão desta tese em relação a epistemologia popperiana - o racionalismo crítico. Para o autor, todo conhecimento científico é falível, corrigível e provisório, tendo a crítica papel fundamental para o desenvolvimento do conhecimento. Portanto, ao analisarmos a o estatuto da tese dos três mundos inserida na epistemologia popperiana, nos será permitido compreender melhor alguns aspectos da teoria dos três mundos, assim como de que forma ocorre o crescimento do conhecimento, segundo os pressupostos defendidos por Karl Popper Karl Popper Epistemologia Teoria dos três mundos Falsificação Conjectura Refutações Epistemology Theory of the three worlds Falsificationism Conjecture Refutability CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
16	Towards a philosophical understanding of agile software methodologies : the case of Kuhn versus Popper Northover, Mandy 24 February 2009 (has links) This dissertation is original in using the contrasting ideas of two leading 20th century philosophers of science, Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, to provide a philosophical understanding, firstly, of the shift from traditional software methodologies to the so-called Agile methodologies, and, secondly, of the values, principles and practices underlying the most prominent of the Agile methodologies, Extreme Programming (XP). This dissertation will take a revisionist approach, following Fuller—the founder of social epistemology—in reading Popper against Kuhn's epistemological hegemony. The investigations in this dissertation relate to two main branches of philosophy— epistemology and ethics. The epistemological part of this dissertation compares both Kuhn and Popper's alternative ideas of the development of scientific knowledge to the Agile methodologists' ideas of the development of software, in order to assess the extent to which Agile software development resembles a scientific discipline. The investigations relating to ethics in this dissertation transfer concepts from social engineering—in particular, Popper's distinction between piecemeal and utopian social engineering—to software engineering, in order to assess both the democratic and authoritarian aspects of Agile software development and management. The use of Kuhn's ideas of scientific revolutions and paradigm shift by several leading figures of the Agile software methodologies—most notably, Kent Beck, the leader of the most prominent Agile software methodology, Extreme Programming (XP)—to predict a fundamental shift from traditional to Agile software methodologies, is critically assessed in this dissertation. A systematic investigation into whether Kuhn's theory as a whole, can provide an adequate account of the day-to-day practice of Agile software development is also provided. As an alternative to the use of Kuhn's ideas, the critical rationalist philosophy of Karl Popper is investigated. On the one hand, this dissertation assesses whether the epistemological aspects of Popper's philosophy—especially his notions of falsificationism, evolutionary epistemology, and three worlds metaphysics—provide a suitable framework for understanding the philosophical basis of everyday Agile software development. On the other hand, the aspects of Popper's philosophy relating to ethics, which provide an ideal for scientific practice in an open society, are investigated in order to determine whether they coincide with the avowedly democratic values of Agile software methodologies. The investigations in this dissertation led to the following conclusions. Firstly, Kuhn's ideas are useful in predicting the effects of the full-scale adoption of Agile methodologies, and they describe the way in which several leaders of the Agile methodologies promote their methodologies; they do not, however, account for the detailed methodological practice of Agile software development. Secondly, several aspects of Popper's philosophy, were found to be aligned with several aspects of Agile software development. In relation to epistemology, Popper's principle of falsificationism provides a criterion for understanding the rational and scientific basis of several Agile principles and practices, his evolutionary epistemology resembles the iterative-incremental design approach of Agile methodologies, and his three worlds metaphysical model provides an understanding of both the nature of software, and the approach advocated by the Agile methodologists' of creating and sharing knowledge. In relation to ethics, Popper's notion of an open society provides an understanding of the rational and ethical basis of the values underlying Agile software development and management, as well as the piecemeal adoption of Agile software methodologies. / Dissertation (MSc)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Computer Science / unrestricted Kent beck Philosophy of science Philosophy of software development Karl popper Thomas kuhn Peopleware Change Christopher alexander Extreme programming Xp Agile software engineering methodologies Paradigm shift UCTD
17	Pensée, politique, totalitarisme : lire Platon avec Hannah Arendt Lavallée, Marie-Josée 08 1900 (has links) Cette étude, qui s'intéresse aux appropriations de l'Antiquité grecque au XXe siècle, se propose d'analyser les impacts de la lecture de Platon sur le développement de la pensée politique et éthique de Hannah Arendt. Notre approche du sujet est historique et philosophique. Premièrement, nous considérerons la toile de fond biographique, intellectuelle et historique de cette lecture. La relation intellectuelle entre Hannah Arendt et Martin Heidegger reçoit une attention particulière, puisque le Platon arendtien présente parfois des similarités avec celui de Heidegger. Nous considérerons également la réception de Platon en Allemagne entre la période de Weimar et l'après-guerre : les lectures idéologiques de l'époque nazie, et le débat autour du statut de Platon en tant qu'ancêtre du totalitarisme, clamé par Karl Popper, ont assombri la réputation philosophique de Platon jusqu'à la fin du XXe siècle. Nous trouvons des échos de ce climat intellectuel particulier dans le traitement de Platon chez Arendt. Dans un deuxième temps, nous examinerons les thèmes et les motifs de la lecture arendtienne en observant minutieusement une sélection d'ouvrages, d'essais, d'ébauches d'Arendt, en plus des notes du Journal de pensée (Denktagebuch) et des extraits de dialogues de Platon sur lesquels s'appuient sa lecture. Arendt déconstruit, transforme, altère et utilise ces textes afin de démontrer que notre tradition de pensée politique s'est édifiée sur un mépris de la politique qui trouve sa source dans la pensée platonicienne. Ce mépris culmine dans la pensée de Marx et le totalitarisme. Mais les réflexions d'Arendt sur la pensée, le jugement et la conscience, et son traitement du cas Eichmann suggère qu'elle s'approprie par moments la pensée de Platon. Des comparaisons avec d'autres penseurs émigrés allemands, qui s'inspirent aussi de Platon et des Grecs pour édifier leur pensée politique, Leo Strauss et Eric Voegelin, vont nous permettre d'affiner notre compréhension du Platon d'Arendt. / This study, which concerns the appropriations of Greek Antiquity in the 20th century, proposes to analyze the impacts of the reading of Plato on the development of Hannah Arendt's political and ethical thought. Our approach of this subject is historical and philosophical. First, we will consider the biographical, intellectual and historical background of this reading. The intellectual relationship between Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger receive a special attention, since Arendt's Plato is sometimes similar to the heiddeggerian one. We also consider Platonic reception in Germany between the Weimar period and the postwar era : the ideological readings of the Nazi era, and the debate surrounding Plato's status as the forebearer of totalitarianism, as claimed by Karl Popper, darkened Plato's philosophical reputation until the end of 20th century. We find some echoes of this particular intellectual climax in Arendt's treatment of Plato. Second, we will examine the themes and motives of arendtian reading by scrutinizing a selection of Arendt's books, essays, drafts, and notes from the Denktagebuch, and excerpts from the Platonic dialogues that informs her reading. Arendt deconstructs, transforms, distorts and uses these texts in order to show that our tradition of political thought was founded on a contempt for politics that finds its source in Platonic thought. This contempt culminates in Marx's thought and totalitarianism. But Arendt's reflections on thinking, judgment and conscience, and her treatment of Eichmann's case suggests that she sometimes appropriates Plato. Some comparisons with other German Émigrés thinkers who also reads Plato and the Greeks to inform their political thought, Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, will enhance our understanding of Arendt's Plato. Arendt Platon Heidegger tradition classique Leo Strauss Eric Voegelin phénoménologie Karl Popper Weimar Émigrés allemands pensée américaine Plato Heidegger classical tradition phenomenology German émigrés American thought
18	A Content Analysis of Citations to Four Prominent Philosophers of Science in Selected Sociology Journals Rowe, M. Edward (Montie Edward) 08 1900 (has links) Numerous studies have attempted to measure scientists' influence by measuring the quantity of citations to their works. The problem with "citation counting," as it is called, is that it assumes that each listing of an author in a citation index is equal to another without bothering to explore the substantive uses of citations in the source article. The present study attempts to alleviate this problem by content analysis of citations in a limited sphere: reference to major philosophers of science by sociologists. In just over 100 sociology journals, citations to Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, Ernst Nagel, and Carl Hempel (overall, the most frequently cited philosophers of science) from 1971-1982 were randomly sampled. Each citation was classified according to the following criteria: 1) philosopher cited; 2) work cited, 3) exclusivity (whether cited with others); 4) multiplicity (number of citations by the philosopher in the same article); 5) type of article; and 6) purpose of citation. Purposes of citation included seven categories: 1) listing as relevant literature; 2) definition of a concept; 3) modification or extension of a philosopher's theory; 4) formulation of a research problem; 5) interpretation of results; 6) critical of philosopher's work; and 7) other. Analysis of these data revealed the following conclusions: 1) the major use of philosophy was the furnishing of concepts and their definitions; 2) philosophy of science played little or no role in directing research or interpreting results; 3) the use of citations differed greatly among the philosophers; 4) simple citation counting would have severely distorted the relative influences of each philosopher; and 5) the dialogue between sociology and the philosophy of science has, in the last decade, been dominated by Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions. citation counting Thomas Kuhn Karl Popper Ernst Nagel Carl Hempel Kuhn, Thomas S. Nagel, Ernest, 1901-1985. Sociology. Science -- Philosophy.
19	The Darwinian revolution as a knowledge reorganization Zacharias, Sebastian 24 February 2015 (has links) Die Dissertation leistet drei Beiträge zur Forschung: (1) Sie entwickelt ein neuartiges vierstufiges Modell wissenschaftlicher Theorien. Dieses Modell kombiniert logisch-empiristische Ansätze (Carnap, Popper, Frege) mit Konzepten von Metaphern & Narrativen (Wittgenstein, Burke, Morgan), erlaubt so deutlich präzisiere Beschreibungen wissenschaftlicher Theorien bereit und löst/mildert Widersprüche in logisch-empiristischen Modellen. (Realismus vs. Empirismus, analytische vs. synthetische Aussagen, Unterdeterminiertheit/ Holismus, wissenschaftliche Erklärungen, Demarkation) (2) Mit diesem Modell gelingt ein Reihenvergleich sechs biologischer Theorien von Lamarck (1809), über Cuvier (1811), Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1835), Chambers (1844-60), Owen (1848-68), Wallace (1855/8) zu Darwin (1859-1872). Dieser Vergleich offenbart eine interessante Asymmetrie: Vergleicht man Darwin mit je einem Vorgänger, so bestehen zahlreiche wichtige Unterschiede. Vergleicht man ihn mit fünf Vorgängern, verschwinden diese fast völlig: Darwins originärer Beitrag zur Revolution in der Biologie des 19.Jh ist klein und seine Antwort nur eine aus einer kontinuierlichen Serie auf die empirischen Herausforderungen durch Paläontologie & Biogeographie seit Ende des 18. Jh. (3) Eine gestufte Rezeptionsanalyse zeigt, warum wir dennoch von einer Darwinschen Revolution sprechen. Zuerst zeigt eine quantitative Analyse der fast 2.000 biologischen Artikel in Britannien zwischen 1858 und 1876, dass Darwinsche Konzepte zwar wichtige Neuerungen brachten, jedoch nicht singulär herausragen. Verlässt man die Biologie und schaut sich die Rezeption bei anderen Wissenschaftlern und gebildeten Laien an, wechselt das Bild: Je weiter man aus der Biologie heraustritt, desto weniger Ebenen biologischen Wissens kennen die Rezipienten und desto sichtbarer wird Darwins Beitrag. Schließlich findet sich sein Beitrag in den abstraktesten Ebenen des biologischen Wissens: in Narrativ und Weltbild – den Ebenen die Laien rezipieren. / The dissertation makes three contributions to research: (1) It develops a novel 4-level-model of scientific theories which combines logical-empirical ideas (Carnap, Popper, Frege) with concepts of metaphors & narratives (Wittgenstein, Burke, Morgan), providing a new powerful toolbox for the analysis & comparison of scientific theories and overcoming/softening contradictions in logical-empirical models. (realism vs. empiricism, analytic vs. synthetic statements, holism, theory-laden observations, scientific explanations, demarcation) (2) Based on this model, the dissertation compares six biological theories from Lamarck (1809), via Cuvier (1811), Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1835), Chambers (1844-60), Owen (1848-68), Wallace (1855/8) to Darwin (1859-1872) and reveals an interesting asymmetry: Compared to any one of his predecessors, Darwins theory appears very original, however, compared to all five predecessor theories, many of these differences disappear and it remains but a small original contribution by Darwin. Thus, Darwin’s is but one in a continuous series of responses to the challenges posed to biology by paleontology and biogeography since the end of the 18th century. (3) A 3-level reception analysis, finally, demonstrates why we speak of a Darwinian revolution nevertheless. (i) A quantitative analysis of nearly 2.000 biological articles reveals that Darwinian concepts where indeed an important theoretical innovation – but definitely not the most important of the time. (ii) When leaving the circle of biology and moving to scientists from other disciplines or educated laymen, the landscape changes. The further outside the biological community, the shallower the audience’s knowledge – and the more visible Darwin’s original contribution. After all, most of Darwin’s contribution can be found in the narrative and worldview of 19th century biology: the only level of knowledge which laymen receive. Evolution Interpretation Rudolf Carnap Ludwig Wittgenstein Beschreibung Historische Epistemologie wissenschaftliche Revolution wissenschaftlicher Fortschritt wissenschaftliche Theorie Kontinuität Diskontinuität wissenschaftliche Erklärungen Abgrenzungskriterium Unterdeterminiertheit analytische Sätze synthetische Sätze Logischer Empirismus wissenschaftlicher Realismus Metaphern Narrative wissenschaftliche Modelle Natürliche Auslese Natürliche Selektion Kampf ums Dasein Homologie Archetype Charles Darwin Robert Chambers Richard Owen Alfred Russel Wallace Georges Cuvier Jean-Baptiste Lamarck Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire Gottlob Frege Karl Popper evolution interpretation Rudolf Carnap Ludwig Wittgenstein Historical epistemology scientific revolution scientific progress scientific theory continuity discontinuity scientific explanations demarcation criterion underdetermination analytic statements synthetic statements logical empiricism scientific realism metaphors narratives description scientific models natural selection struggle for existence homology archetype Charles Darwin Robert Chambers Richard Owen Alfred Russel Wallace Georges Cuvier Jean-Baptiste Lamarck Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire Gottlob Frege Karl Popper WH 2000

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