Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabio Suardi D Elia.pdf: 5922733 bytes, checksum: 9ca5ecff5986a8f4b10273ed00851326 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-10-25 / This paper aims to analyze the concept of vulnerability in the Brazilian Criminal Code, introduced by Law n. 12.015/09 in the chapter Of crimes against sexual dignity . To reach this goal we shall study the sociological evolution of the criminal tutelage of human sexuality, highlighting the theoretical components which lay the foundation of vulnerability. The research is justified due to the fact that vulnerability has a close relationship with the recognition of the individual s human dignity as a legitimating and motivating of the legal reform analyzed in this paper. Since vulnerability refers to the victim, the need to study consent -which is based on the victim s behavior-was part of our study plans . We thus set forth, from the study of the legal interest the and of its availability, proceeding to the relevance of the victim s behavior and to the legal nature of consent, arriving at vulnerability. Once the latter is examined, we proceed to the evaluation of the elements which integrate and legitimate it, such as the criminalization movement under the guise of the treaties of penalization, the consideration of the dignity of the human individual as an element of normative orientation, the situations of vulnerability foreseen by the legislator, their nature and, finally, to the interpretation of said concept in the legal realm. From this vantage point, we conclude that the dignity of the human individual represents a fundamental requirement in the interpretation of vulnerability, demanding a non-prejudiced view, the opposite of which results only in further the increase of suffering and in social exclusion / O trabalho apresentado tem o objetivo de avaliar a noção de vulnerabilidade no Código Penal brasileiro, introduzida pela Lei n. 12.015/09 no capítulo Dos Crimes Contra a Dignidade Sexual . Para alçar tal objetivo, estuda-se a evolução sociológica da tutela penal da sexualidade humana, identificando os componentes teóricos que fundamentam a vulnerabilidade. A análise se justifica porque a vulnerabilidade guarda estrita relação com o reconhecimento da dignidade da pessoa humana como elemento propulsor e legitimador da reforma legislativa ora em comento. Uma vez que na vulnerabilidade se refere à qualidade de vítima, de antemão previu-se a necessidade de estudo do consentimento, teoria que se funda no comportamento da vítima. Parte-se, portanto, do estudo acerca do bem jurídico e de sua disponibilidade, passando-se à relevância do comportamento da vítima e da natureza jurídica do consentimento, alcançando, então, a vulnerabilidade. Posta a vulnerabilidade, passa-se à apreciação dos elementos que a integram e a legitimam, como o movimento de criminalização sob a observância dos mandados de penalização, a aproximação da dignidade da pessoa humana como elemento de orientação normativa, as situações de vulnerabilidade previstas pelo legislador, suas naturezas e, por fim, a interpretação do conceito no universo jurídico. Sob esse prisma, tem-se que a dignidade da pessoa humana representa requisito fundamental na interpretação da vulnerabilidade, a exigir uma leitura que não admite uma faceta preconceituosa, consistente no aumento da desdita das vítimas e na exclusão social.

La victime en col blanc est mésestimée, tant par l’opinion publique que par le droit. Si les infractions en matière économique, financière et boursière heurtent, les personnes lésées par ces agissements bénéficient peu de l’empathie traditionnellement accordée aux victimes pénales. Parmi elles, il en est cependant une qui mérite une attention particulière : l’associé. Alors qu’une personne sur trois dispose en France de cette qualité, l’associé est susceptible d’être une victime du fait de son engagement. Acteur social majeur, il peut subir les effets d’une infraction au droit pénal des sociétés. Lorsqu’il est la victime d’une telle infraction, l’associé a vocation à exercer une action civile. Action en réparation appartenant à tous ceux ayant subi un dommage directement causé par l’infraction, celle-ci est toutefois réservée aux seuls associés titulaires du bien juridique protégé par l’incrimination chef des poursuites. Alors que le droit d’agir en action civile de l’associé est ainsi limité, le bien-fondé de la demande en réparation de son préjudice est également soumis à des conditions interprétées à l’aune de théories singulières. Le brouillard dans lequel se situe aujourd’hui l’associé victime d’une infraction au droit pénal des sociétés est dense. Il nous revient de l’en sortir en proposant des évolutions conformes au droit et répondant à la situation réelle de cette victime pénale jusque-là oubliée. / White-collar victims are usually left on the sidelines, both by the public opinion and the law. While economic and financial offences, without mentioning those related to stock market, are conscience-shocking, the victims of those offences are not of much concern. Yet, one of them is worth paying attention to, i.e. the partner. Being a partner, which is the case for one-in-three French people, may involve a side-effect, that is being victim of his or her own commitment. As a major actor of both business and social life, the partner may be harmed by a business crime. When victim, the partner may bring the civil proceedings, which are actions for compensation belonging to those directly harmed by the criminal offence. Nonetheless, this action is restricted to the partner bearer of the protected legal interest. As for the right of action, the validity of damage claims is limited by conditions interpreted in the light of peculiar theories. The partner, victim of business crimes, is thus lost in a heavy mist, from which he or she must be shown the way out by proposing legal changes addressing the real situation of the up-to-now forgotten victim.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo de Campos Costa.pdf: 1073563 bytes, checksum: 1b76a957a9efc81c59983f1b5391296d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-09 / The purpose of this paper is to analyse Criminal Law in relation to the fight against organized crime. The evolution of Criminal Law was outlined, starting with the main penal schools and also with the dogmatic lines of thought, from Causalism to Functionalism. Considering the legal interest as Criminal Law's main objective, parameters based on constitutional values were established for its definition. The analysis of the legal interest was double folded, having been classified as being of both individual and universal nature, thus enabling the defence of the constitutionality of crimes of abstract danger. The warrants of criminalization, whose fundamentals oblige the infra-constitutional legislator to protect the legal interest elected by the Constitution, were object of analysis. As for organized crime, its evolution as a social and legal phenomenon was analysed, focusing on the history of Brazilian legislation, from the Imperial Penal Code to today's Law 9.034/95. The analysis of the concept of organized crime was based on the concept taken from the Palermo Convention, more open and permissive, so as not to restrict legislation on the account of the effects of the advance of globalization. Thus, in order to establish the concept of organized crime, its characteristics were identified insisting on the need for legal definition. The investigation tools of the Law 9.034/95 were also analysed, following legitimizing arguments. Lastly, the Enemy's Criminal Law and the Right to Safety were analysed as ways to interpret and provide justification for legislations both from penal as well as processual order in the fight against organized crime. From the research done, we conclude for the interpretation of the Right to Safety as a fundamental right, in its objective acception, based on imperatives of tutelage. The collision between constitutional principles must be solved through the application of the principle of proportionality / O objetivo do presente trabalho consiste na análise do Direito Penal, no que diz respeito ao enfrentamento da criminalidade organizada. Foi delineada evolução do Direito Penal, com início nas principais escolas penais e também através das linhas do pensamento dogmático, do causalismo ao funcionalismo. Com norte no bem jurídico, como finalidade do Direito Penal, foram estabelecidos parâmetros para sua definição, ancorado nos valores constitucionais. O bem jurídico foi cindido em sua análise, sendo classificado como de natureza individual e universal, classificação essa que permitiu defender a constitucionalidade dos crimes de perigo abstrato. Foram objeto de análise os mandados de criminalização, cuja fundamentação, obriga o legislador infraconstitucional à proteção do bem eleito pela Constituição. Quanto ao crime organizado, foi analisada sua evolução enquanto fenômeno social e jurídico. Foi objeto de análise a história da legislação brasileira, desde o Código Penal do Império até a atual Lei 9.034/95. Na análise do conceito do crime organizado, levou-se em consideração o conceito previsto pela Convenção de Palermo, mais aberto e permissivo, de modo a não engessar a legislação, devido aos efeitos do avanço da globalização, de modo que para estabelecer o conceito foram identificadas suas características, firmando ainda posicionamento pela necessidade de definição legal. Os instrumentos de investigação da Lei 9.034/95 também foram analisados, firmando-se por argumentos legitimadores. Por fim, foram analisados o Direito Penal do Inimigo e o Direito à Segurança, como formas de se interpretar e fundamentar legislações tanto de ordem penal como processual no enfrentamento à criminalidade organizada. Pela pesquisa feita, posicionamo-nos no sentido de interpretar o Direito à Segurança, como um direito fundamental, na acepção objetiva, com base nos imperativos de tutela. A colisão de princípios constitucionais deve ser sanada através da aplicação do princípio da proporcionalidade

Les recours individuels directs devant la juridiction constitutionnelle sont marqués par une forte originalité. Leur originalité se caractérise tant par la possibilité qu’un individu puisse accéder sans intermédiaire au prétoire du juge constitutionnel, que par la diversité des actes contestables devant ce juge et par cet individu. Afin d’appréhender les diverses formes de recours individuel direct en Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique et Espagne, il convenait de mobiliser un instrument qui mette en évidence cette double spécificité d’études : le droit processuel. Celui-ci se définit en effet par l’ambition de traiter les divers contentieux de manière comparée, au-delà de leur nature particulière.Cette démarche comparative permet plus spécialement de relativiser le clivage droit privé/droit public : tandis que le droit processuel trouve habituellement son terrain d’élection dans le droit judiciaire privé, alors que le contentieux public est accaparé par la dimension du « procès fait à un acte », l’analyse des recours individuels directs permet d’appréhender pleinement le contentieux constitutionnel comme structure procédurale de protection des droits. Le droit processuel permet ainsi d’analyser les recours individuels directs comme forme entièrement développée de recours en protection des droit devant la juridiction constitutionnelle, forme qui n’existe pas en France : il permet une mise en perspective de notre culture juridique centrée sur la conformité juridique objective des actes. / Direct constitutional complaints before the Constitutional Court appear as a strongly original procedure. It is caracterized both by the possibility for an individual to have direct access to the Court and by the wide variety of the legal acts that can be challenged there. The analysis of the diverse forms of direct constitutional complaints in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain requires a conceptual framework that allows those two characteristics to stand out: processual law. Processual law can be defined by its ambition to consider various kinds of litigation in a comparative way beyond their specific nature. This comparative approach especially allows for a relativisation of the public law/private law distinction. In France, processual law is generally used in private litigation context, whereas public litigation is more focused on the “procès fait à un acte” dimension. By contrast, the analysis of direct constitutional complaints through processual law sheds a specific light on it as a procedural structure directed towards the protection of rights. In other words, direct constitutional complaints appear in this light as a fully developed form of procedure for the protection of rights, a form that does not exist in France. Our legal culture which is focused on the question of the objective legal conformity of acts is thus put into a new perspective.

L’action en justice intentée en matière de Responsabilité Sociale de l’Entreprise révèle certaines limites lorsque les justiciables parties prenantes souhaitent protéger leurs intérêts. Par une juridicisation du droit de la RSE à mi-chemin entre la soft law et la hard law, l’action en justice des parties prenantes pourrait être véritablement efficiente. Dès lors, les mécanismes processuels traditionnels sont insuffisants lorsqu’il s’agit d’agir en justice dans ce domaine. C’est notamment à travers l’intérêt et la qualité à agir en justice des parties prenantes que des aménagements de la procédure civile vont être véritablement nécessaires. Des améliorations supplémentaires telles que l’instauration d’une action de groupe élargie au domaine de la RSE et davantage américanisée permettrait notamment aux parties prenantes d’assurer leur défense grâce à un dispositif nouveau très efficace. De plus et par la voie extrajudiciaire des modes alternatifs de règlement des litiges, les acteurs de la RSE peuvent également décider de porter le différend qui les oppose hors de la connaissance du juge étatique. Ce choix d’action peut être révélateur d’une préférence pour une justice davantage négociée. Ces propositions semblent être indispensables à la mise en œuvre d’une action en justice efficace en matière de RSE. Les parties prenantes pourront alors agir en justice de manière inédite afin de parachever leur protection. Les nécessités juridiques et sociales actuelles semblent ainsi faire évoluer le droit afin que les parties prenantes puissent bénéficier d’une action en justice considérée comme un véritable contre-pouvoir face à l’entreprise. / Legal actions brought to court concerning Corporate Social Responsability reveal certain limits when litigants’ stakeholders wish to protect their interests. The Corporate Social Responsability law falls between soft law and hard law. Going through CSR law’s judicalization could really make litigation of stakeholders efficient. Usual processual mechanisms are insufficient once an action has to be brought to court dealing with CSR. The civil procedure will need some changes, specifically relating to legal standing and stakeholder interest. Some added improvement would allow stakeholders to ensure their legal defence thanks to this new and efficient legal device. The setting up of a collective action including a CSR with more resemblance to the American one would represent one such improvement. Moreover, stakeholders can decide to settle the matter out-of-court with an extrajudicial approach, using alternative dispute resolution. This choice could amount to a more negotiated inflection of justice. These proposals seem to be necessary to settle an efficient legal action concerning CSR. In this way stakeholders will be able to litigate in a whole new way in order to consolidate their protection. Current legal and social needs seem to make the law evolve so that stakeholders benefit from a legal action which can be considered as a real countervailing power against a corporation.

當人們談論動物保護時，可能提出的問題大約不脫「人類是否應該保護動物」、「人類為何保護動物」、「人類應該保護哪些動物」，以及「人類如何保護動物」之延伸範疇，針對這四個問題又可以依所採之研究基礎偏重倫理學或法學，而有各種不同的回應。 本文採取偏重法學角度之立場，從實定法出發，隨時序個別分析我國及德國動物保護法之歷史發展及現行法呈現之樣貌後，藉由與咸認先進的德國動物保護法制及其背後所可能隱含之人與動物關係的歷史變遷進行比較研究，試圖在同與異之間尋找我國動物保護法所隱含的人與動物關係之可能解釋，此乃嘗試從實定法追溯背後的倫理學意涵，並在此解釋基礎上，進一步探求動物保護法益之可能回答，由倫理學再回歸法學領域，均是試圖回應「人類是否應該保護動物」及「人類為何保護動物」二問。 最後嘗試藉由求得之動物保護法益「道德感情」來建構我國動物保護刑事規範，則是試圖給出「人類應該保護哪些動物」及「人類如何保護動物」二問在刑事法層面上之回答，對現行動物保護法刑事規範提出修正建議，包括將動物一般保護規定及刑事規範分勾，擴張動物一般保護之客體範疇而維持刑事規範涉及之行為客體範圍，以重構本文理想之動保刑事規範。 / When referring to animal protection, the most popular questions probably will be within the range of the following four. Should humans protect animals? Why should humans protect animals? What kind of animals should humans protect? And the final one, how do humans protect animals? The answers can be changed depending on the different views, like ethics view or legal point of view. This study basically focuses on the legal point of view, starting with Taiwan’s Animal Protection Act and German’s Animal Welfare Act (in German: Tierschutzgesetz), by comparing those two different animal protection systems, trying to figure out the development level of Taiwan’s Animal Protection Act in the tide of the world’s development of animal welfare, then using the conclusion to explore the legal interest of animal protection, attempting to answer the first two questions: Should humans protect animals? And why? Furthermore, using the legal interest “moral emotion” to construct ideal animal protection criminal legal norms, attempting to answer the rest of the questions: What kind of animals should humans protect? And how to protect? The final purpose is to reconstruct an ideal animal protection criminal law system in Taiwan.