This study critically and systematically analyses the purported democratic values of freedom and equality with a view to clarifying the meaning of the concepts of democracy, freedom and equality; and examining the nature of the relations between kinds of freedom and kinds of equality, their association with democracy, and assessing their reconcilability within the two broad schools of democratic theory, namely, Anglo American democratic theory and Continental democratic theory. Put slightly differently, the issue is whether freedom and equality are mutually compatible or incompatible within democratic contexts. The analysis necessitates exploring the possible reason or reasons for the reconcilability or incompatibility of freedom and equality. Hence, the arguments in democratic literature relevant to the meanings of freedom and equality, and the relations between them will be examined. The first set of arguments concern the question of whether kinds of freedom endanger kinds of equality, and conversely, whether kinds of equality erode or hamper kinds of freedom. The relation existing between freedom and equality, and equality and freedom, in both instances purport to demonstrate the tension existing between them in theory as well as in practice. The second set of arguments concern the question of whether kinds of freedom promote kinds of equality, and conversely, whether kinds of equality further kinds of freedom. The relation in both instances is deemed to demonstrate the affinity between freedom and equality, and equality and freedom. An attempt will thus be made to address the issue of the seemingly confusing array of meanings of democracy, freedom and equality, and the potentially problematic relations between them, and particularly those between freedom and equality as represented by the two sets of arguments within appropriate democratic contexts. The study will endeavour to examine the analytic and synthetic interplay of meanings and relations, their nature and compatibility or incompatibility, and the possible reasons for this state of affairs, in an attempt to identify and address the perceived misapprehensions concerning their meanings and relations in democratic literature. / Political Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)

Text in Afrikaans / Daar is 'n toenemende bewuswording van die noodsaaklikheid van effektiewe beskerming vir minderhede. Die rede vir hierdie toenemende erkenning aan die behoefte aan minderheidsbeskerming is waarskynlik toe te skryf aan die beset dat dit nie alleen die minderheidsaandeelhouers is wat skade ly in geval van benadelende optrede nie, maar ook die ekonomie. Maatskappye word ingevolge die beginsel van meerderheidsbewind bestuur, met die gevolg dat die minderheid onderworpe is aan die wil van die meerderheid. Die minderheid kan hulself hierdeur in 'n onbenydenswaardige posisie bevind, veral indien die meerderheid hul mag aanwend om hul eie belange te bevorder. Gemeenregtelik is die reel in Foss v Harbottle 'n struikelblok vir minderheidsaandeelhouers wat gedingvoering beoog. In 'n poging om die gebrekkige gemeenregtelike beskerming van minderhede te ondervang, is bepaalde statutere maatreels ingevoer. Die evaluasie van hierdie maatreels geskied aan die hand van 'n regsvergelykende ondersoek na verskeie buitelandse stelsels, waarvan die van Nieu-Seeland en Kanada uit staan vanwee die innoverende aard van hul statutere beskermingsmaatreels. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die beskerming wat die Suid-Afrikaanse statutere maatreels aan minderhede bied, onbevredigend is om verskeie redes. Eerstens is hierdie maatreels dikwels te eng bewoord wat daartoe lei dat die aanwendingsveld van die maatreels beperk is. Tweedens hou die maatreels nie tred met ontwikkelings elders in die wereld en veranderende omstandighede en behoeftes in die praktyk nie. Derdens ontbreek goed geformuleerde remedies wat aanvullend tot artikel 252 van die Wet sal wees. Daar is verder bevind dat ad hocwysigings van bestaande maatreels nie die gewenste resultaat gaan bereik nie en 'n algehele hervorming van die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg word aanbeveel. Ten slotte word konkrete voorstelle in die vorm van konsepwetgewing gemaak en word vergesel van verduidelikende notas. Hierdie wetgewing is hoofsaaklik aan die hand van die Nieu-Seelandse en Kanadese modelle geformuleer. / There is a growing awareness of the need for effective protection of minority shareholders. This can probably be ascribed to the acknowledgement of the fact that prejudicial conduct harms not only minority shareholders, but also the economy at large. Companies are governed by the principle of majority rule; consequently the minority is subjected to the will of the majority. This often places the minority in an invidious position, especially when the majority use their power to further their own interests. The rule in Foss v Harbottle presents a stumbling block to minority shareholder action. Certain statutory measures have been introduced in an effort to counter defective minority protection. These statutory measures are evaluated in the light of a comparative study of several foreign jurisdictions, the most prominent of which are New Zealand and Canada, because of the innovative nature of the measures which they employ. The conclusion arrived at is that, for various reasons, the protection afforded minorities by the South African statutory measures is unsatisfactory. Firstly, the wording of these measures is narrowly construed; this in turn results in a narrow field of application. Secondly, these measures are not in step with developments elsewhere in the world and with the changing circumstances and needs in practice. Thirdly, well-formulated remedies needed in order to supplement section 252 of the Act are non-existent. It has also been found that ad hoc amendments of existing measures will not achieve the required result, and consequently a complete reform of South African company law is recommended. Finally, specific recommendations in the form of draft legislation are made; these are accompanied by explanatory notes. This draft legislation was formulated primarily along the lines of the New Zealand and Canadian models. / Private Law / LL.D.

A tese propõe uma análise multidisciplinar e dogmática da arbitragem societária, notadamente do processo de inclusão de cláusula compromissória no estatuto social de sociedades anônimas fechadas, com base em uma deliberação assemblear tomada pela regra da maioria (fase pré-arbitral). O ponto de partida do trabalho é o exame da dimensão jurídica do contrato de sociedade aliado à verificação dos limites da autonomia privada dos sócios na definição da estrutura do negócio jurídico societário, à compreensão da categoria dos direitos subjetivos e dos traços fundamentais que formam a tipologia das anônimas fechadas, incluindo o tratamento dado aos direitos individuais dos acionistas. Ato contínuo, desloca-se a discussão para as esferas arbitral e constitucional, com especial atenção para os pressupostos da arbitragem como método de resolução de conflitos. O cerne do trabalho reside na relação entre a situação subjetiva ativa do acionista de manifestar sua vontade favorável ou contrariamente à escolha da arbitragem e a eficácia da regra da maioria como pilar de funcionamento das sociedades anônimas. Sustenta-se que a escolha da arbitragem constitui um direito fundamental de todo o acionista, cuja renúncia depende de manifestação, expressa ou tácita, de sua vontade, a qual não pode ser elidida ou alterada pelo estatuto ou pela assembleia geral majoritária sem o seu consentimento. Após examinar as correntes doutrinárias sobre o tema no Brasil e as possíveis alternativas para resolver o imbróglio, o estudo concluiu que a alteração legislativa que cria uma hipótese adicional de recesso representa a melhor solução para a problemática. / The thesis examines arbitration in corporate law, namely the inclusion of a statutory arbitration clause in the by-laws of a closely held corporation based on a deliberation taken by the majority rule (pre-arbitration phase). The study starts by analyzing the legal aspects of the corporate contract together with the limits of shareholders autonomy in defining the structure of such contract and the characteristics that form the typology of corporations, including shareholders individual rights. The discussion then moves on the arbitration and constitutional spheres, particularly to the premises of arbitration as a form of settling conflicts. The core of the thesis is the relation between the prerogative of a shareholder to express its will in favor of or against arbitration and the incidence of the full effects of the majority rule as an essential element in the structure of a corporation. The study sustains that the choice for arbitration is a fundamental right of all shareholders, which is why renunciation depends on their express or tacit individual manifestation and therefore, majority deliberation cannot in itself insert or remove it from by-laws. Finally, the thesis provides different scholars understandings on the issue as well as the main possible alternatives to dealt with it. The creation of an additional hypothesis of appraisal right within the existing law is suggested as the best solution to solve this conundrum.

Collective decision making can be seen as a means of designing and understanding swarm robotics systems. While decision-making is generally conceived as the cognitive ability of individual agents to select a belief based only on their preferences and available information, collective decision making is a decentralized cognitive process, whereby an ensemble of agents gathers, shares, and processes information as a single organism and makes a choice that is not attributable to any of its individuals. A principled selection of the rules governing this cognitive process allows the designer to define, shape, and foresee the dynamics of the swarm.We begin this monograph by introducing the reader to the topic of collective decision making. We focus on artificial systems for discrete consensus achievement and review the literature of swarm robotics. In this endeavor, we formalize the best-of-n problem—a generalization of the logic underlying several cognitive problems—and define a taxonomy of its possible variants that are of interest for the design of robot swarms. By leveraging on this understanding, we identify the building-blocks that are essential to achieve a collective decision addressing the best-of-n problem: option exploration, opinion dissemination, modulation of positive feedback, and individual decision-making mechanism. We show how a modular perspective of a collective decision-making strategy allows for the systematic modeling of the resulting swarm performance. In doing so, we put forward a modular and model-driven design methodology that allows the designer to study the dynamics of a swarm at different level of abstractions. Successively, we employ the proposed design methodology to derive and to study different collective decision-making strategies for the best-of-n problem. We show how the designed strategies can be readily applied to different real-world scenarios by performing two series of robot experiments. In the first series, we use a swarm of 100 robots to tackle a site-selection scenario; in the second series, we show instead how the same strategies apply to a collective perception scenario. We conclude with a discussion of our research contributions and provide futuredirection of research. / Doctorat en Sciences de l'ingénieur et technologie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Notion fondamentale du droit des sociétés, la collégialité est souvent réduite aux organes sociaux, voire cantonnée au processus de formation des décisions collectives. L'étude tend à dépasser la dimension institutionnelle du pouvoir collégial. Il s'agit de rechercher, en dépit de la diversité des collèges, les fondements, l'unité, le régime, les limites et la valeur de la collégialité en tant que notion et pratique. À cette fin, il convient d'envisager autant l'organisation collégiale que le fonctionnement collégial. Il en résulte que toute collégialité suppose une pluralité de personnes ou des collèges (au moins deux) (1) qui ensemble et à égalité par voie de délibération en concertation (2), poursuivent la réalisation d'un projet commun ou l'exécution d'une mission commune (3). Toutefois il existe deux catégories de collégialité selon ce qui fait l'unité du collège: projet commun (associés) ; fonction ou mission commune (autres organes). Ce qui fait l'unité du collège influence la nature et l'intensité des droits et obligations que toute organisation collégiale suppose pour ses membres. Il en est de même du fonctionnement. Unitaire en ce qu'il renvoie au processus de formation de l'acte collectif unilatéral, le fonctionnement collégial suppose des techniques variables selon chaque figure. Enfin, la collégialité est-elle un principe du droit des sociétés ? Pour les associés, cela est certain : la collégialité renvoie au groupement qu'ils forment, organisation et fonctionnement, sans qu'une prévision en ce sens ne soit nécessaire. Pour les autres organes la réponse est variable. Elle n'est un principe d'organisation et de fonctionnement qu'autant qu'une norme l'impose. / Collegiality, as the pivotal concept in corporate law, is often limited to the corporate bodies, if not confined to the collective decision-making process. The study tends to go beyond the institutional dimesion of the collegial authority. The aim is to investigate the foundations, the unity, the ambit, the limits and the value of collegiality as both a notion and a practice, in spite of the variety of colleges. To this end, the collegial organization and function should be considered equally. As a result, collegiality means a plurality of persons or colleges (at least two) (1) who, together and equally by conciliated deliberation (2), promote the realization of a collaborative project or the performance of a shared mission (3). However, there are two types of collegiality as defined by the college's unity itself: there are collaborative projects (partners) ; and shared missions or functions (other bodies). The essence and the strength of rights and obligations to each of the members is influenced by what makes the unity of a college. The same thing goes for the way in which the collegial organization functions. It will function in a unitary manner for unilateral establishment and collective acts. A collegial functioning, on the other hand, supposes flexible and adjustable techniques. Finally is collegiality a principle of corporate law ? For the partners this is obvious: collegiality is intrinsic to the group they constitute, to the organization and to their functioning, without having to plan it. For the other bodies the answer may vary. Collegiality is only a principle of organization and functioning if a norm requires it to be.

Department of Development Studies / PhD (African Studies) / There is a political conflict in Zimbabwe between the ruling Zimbabwean African National Union-PatrioticFront (ZANU-PF) and the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Political conflict is a battle that occurs between two or more sides with different beliefs. Although Zimbabwe is a sovereign state, South Africa used a foreign policy of “quiet diplomacy” to contribute to the peaceful resolution of Zimbabwe’s political conflict. A sovereign state is a state which administers its own government and is not dependent upon or subjected to another state. Dissent in Zimbabwe centres around the land issue, land ownership, land reform, and land appropriation – problems caused as a result of parliamentary and presidential elections. Land reform led the government to introduce “Operation Murambatsvina” which was a campaign to forcibly clear slum areas across the country. The government depicted the operation as a crackdown against illegal housing and commercial activities and as an effort to reduce the risk of the spread of infectious disease in these areas. South Africa’s “quiet diplomacy” succeeded in the peaceful resolution of the Zimbabwean political conflict because the land issue was deemed legitimate; however, the methods used for land reform seem to be problematic. For a way forward, the Zimbabwean government needs to be accountable, transparent and democratic. The researcher used a qualitative research method to gather an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons that govern such behaviour. The researcher asked broad questions and collected word data from participants. The researcher used different approaches in collecting data, such as narratology, storytelling, classical ethnography and shadowing. In addition the researcher used primary and secondary sources.

Les sociétés sont traditionnellement classées en sociétés de personnes et sociétés de capitaux. L’intuitus personae constitue le fondement sur lequel repose cette distinction. Fort présent dans les sociétés de personnes, l’intuitus personae serait, en théorie, absent dans les sociétés de capitaux. Toutefois, cette distinction classique ne correspond plus, aujourd’hui, à la réalité. Nous assistons, en effet, à la résurgence de la considération de la personne dans les sociétés de capitaux à travers le développement de techniques contractuelles dont le but est de contrôler l’accès à ces sociétés. Ce mouvement de personnalisation a été renforcé par le législateur, d’abord, par la création de la société par actions simplifiée, mais aussi par la reconnaissance, dans les sociétés cotées, de la notion de concert ou encore d’un droit de sortie au profit des actionnaires minoritaires. La consécration de la validité de l’exclusion, qu’elle soit conventionnelle ou le résultat d’un mécanisme spécifique du droit des sociétés comme le retrait obligatoire ou le coup d’accordéon, participe également de ce phénomène. Cette présence a des conséquences majeures sur le fonctionnement de ces sociétés, mais aussi sur le droit des sociétés en général. En effet, d’une part, la reconnaissance de la primauté des relations entre actionnaires sur les capitaux offre une nouvelle perspective de la notion d’affectio societatis et du principe majoritaire. Et d’autre part, la mise en oeuvre de l’intuitus personae dans des sociétés dans lesquelles il est censé être absent affecte la cohérence même du droit des sociétés en anéantissant la summa divisio sur laquelle ce droit est bâti et en dénaturant le choix du pluralisme juridique, fait de longue date par le législateur français, qui commande en présence d’une pluralité de structures offertes aux opérateurs, une distinction de chacune d’elles reposant sur des critères précis et invariables. / Companies are traditionally classified into partnerships and joint stock companies. Intuitus personae is the basis for this distinction. Clearly present in partnership companies, intuitus personae is, in theory, absent in joint stock companies. However, this traditional distinction does not correspond today to reality. We are, in fact, witnessing a resurgence of the consideration of the individual in joint stock companies by means of contractual techniques whose aim is to control access to these companies. This resurgence has been further strengthened by the legislator, first by the creation of the status of simplified stock company and also by the recognition in listed companies of the existence of concerted action and a right to voluntary withdrawal benefiting minority stockholders. The admission of the validity of exclusion, either conventional or resulting from mechanisms specific to company law such as a squeeze out or even an “accordion squeeze”, add to the growth of this phenomenon. This presence of intuitus personae has major implications on the functioning of joint stock companies and on company law, in general. Indeed, on the one hand, the primacy of shareholder relationships over capital offers a new perspective of the notion of affectio societatis and the principle of majority rule. On the other hand, the introduction of intuitus personae into companies where this concept should have been absent affects the coherence of company law by destroying the summa divisio basis on which this law is founded and by distorting the legal pluralism long ago adopted by the French legislator which, in the presence of diverse legal structures, necessitates a distinction amongst them based on precise and invariable criteria.

Le droit de vote est la prérogative politique suprême de l’associé. Si de nombreux débats se sont intéressés à son caractère essentiel et à ses conditions d’attribution, peu de réflexions se sont concentrées sur ses modalités d’exercice. Celles-ci font pourtant l’originalité de ce droit individuel qui ne peut s’exercer que collectivement et sont déterminantes de son effectivité, lui qui ne peut se manifester qu’épisodiquement au gré des réunions de la collectivité des associés. La recherche des principes gouvernant son exercice, sujet méconnu car relevant surtout de la pratique, devrait permettre de mieux cerner sa portée. Sur le plan individuel, le principe essentiel est celui de la liberté du vote, qui peut même neutraliser partiellement les règles de son attribution, comme en cas d’abstention ou d’activisme actionnarial. Cette liberté suppose toutefois que l’intégrité du vote et son caractère éclairé soient préservés. Or il peut être altéré par des pressions extérieures, motivées par la valeur économique du droit de vote, ce qui requiert des dispositifs renforcés de protection. Sur le plan de l’organisation collective du scrutin, l’accent est mis sur l’intérêt social, justifiant la prédominance de la loi de la majorité et venant tempérer la liberté du vote. Ces règles organisationnelles, tout en garantissant le droit de participer aux décisions collectives, promeuvent une certaine loyauté du vote, notamment en sanctionnant les abus du droit de vote, et une certaine éthique du vote, comme au travers du say on pay. Cette prise en compte croissante des intérêts collectifs lors du vote invite à renouveler certaines réflexions majeures du droit des sociétés. Elle interroge en particulier sur le rôle de l’associé et sur le bien-fondé de certains principes tels que celui qui prohibe les cessions de droits de vote. / The right to vote is the supreme political prerogative of shareholders. While many debates have focused on its essential nature and the conditions under which it is granted, little thought has been given to how it should be exercised. The mode of exercise makes the right to vote unusual in that it arises from an individual right which can only be exercised collectively and indeed is critical for its effectiveness since voting rights can only be utilized episodically within the framework of general meetings of shareholders. The consideration of the principles governing the exercise of voting rights, a relatively unexplored topic since most effort in this area refers to practical aspects, should clarify the impact of this mechanism. At the individual level, the freedom to vote is a key principle, which can even partially neutralize the rules of its allocation, as in the case of abstention or shareholder activism. However, this freedom presupposes that the integrity of the vote and the right to information related to it are preserved. However, these features can be altered by external pressures motivated by the economic value of voting rights, which leads to a requirement for reinforced protection measures. At the collective level of the organisation of the ballot, the emphasis is placed on corporate interests, justifying the predominance of the majority rule and tempering the freedom to vote. These organisational rules, while guaranteeing the right to participate in collective decisions, promote a certain loyalty, in particular by punishing abuses of the right to vote, and via the application of a collective ethical approach (e.g. say-on-pay). This growing influence of collective interests in the voting process invites us to reconsider certain major company law principles. In particular, questions are around the role of the shareholder and the validity of certain of those principles such as that prohibiting the sale of voting rights.

In the interplay between protection of rights and majoritarianism, the court is the arena. This research focuses on the conflicting role of the court within a constitutional democracy and a contestation of the counter-majoritarian dilemma that emerges from such a role. The counter-majoritarian dilemma centres on the idea that judges overturning decisions of the legislature through judicial review undermines democracy by thwarting the will of the majority through a subjective reading of abstract constitutional principles. As a point of departure, the counter-majoritarian dilemma is contested by revealing that the court can be seen as a democratically consistent institution if democracy can be reconceptualised. The examination of the South African jurisprudential climate and the adjudicative guidelines followed by the court suggests a rejection of such anti-democratic contention. The court upholds the commitments consented to at the time of the Constitution’s adoption and adjudication is reflective of the values undertaken by the country in reaction to its past. Within these values, minority rights can find a lifeline. Thus minority rights can exist through the implications of majoritarian consent. This research further identifies, in response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma, a constraining self-consciousness on the part of the court and an acute awareness of the court’s precarious role within a democratic infancy. The core of the counter-majoritarian dilemma is the view that interpretative indeterminacy of the Constitution means that the will of the people could be substituted for judicial preference. Through the examination of the court’s interpretative strategies and judicial subjectivity, this research suggests that within judicial subjectivity, adjudication continues to be reflective of the will of the people. Far from a constraining and mechanistic interpretation to avoid judicial subjectivity, the research reveals that open and non-formalist interpretative strategies are necessary to effectuate democratic conciliation within the judicial mandate. The results of this research suggest that, far from being a democratically deviant institution, the court in the current South African jurisprudential context, is the most suited to uphold the concept of democracy. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

公司法上股東會與董事會之定足數門檻（Quorum），規制股份有限公司作成決策時，應有一定比例之股份數及董事人數出席會議。然而隨著現代公司經濟規模擴張，面對眾多的股東人數，及瞬息萬變的資訊，既有規制方式是否應一併調整值得研議。為深入研究此議題，本文將先介紹定足數門檻所涉之上位概念，說明多數決原則下，為保障公司決議之作成具有一定民主基礎，應設定法定出席門檻規制，確保公司治理運行。 就股東會決議之定足數門檻，目前我國法院見解認為，此係股東會之法定成立要件，如未達定足數，股東會決議當然不成立，顯示公司法對於資本多數決原則「程序正義」與「實質正義」面向之重視。然而，我國法律實踐上，為使一般股東亦有意願出席股東會，以達定足數要求，部分公司股東會開會成本偏高。是以，本研究擬參酌外國法制及分析我國規範後，重新思考就目前規範放寬之可能性及其限度，以合理減輕實務負擔。 至於董事會決議部分，我國法亦定有定足數門檻要求，彰顯立法者認為在於追求議事效率同時，應同樣重視董事之出席義務及受任人義務。惟我國法上董事會決議區分普通與特別決議，而有不同之定足數門檻，係比較法上較為少見之立法模式。因此，本文將分析現行規範，對公司董事會運作產生何種影響、實務上發生之爭議，及是否有調整規範之必要性，期望能使公司運作更為流暢。