There is a debate on how air power should be employed to attain success in war and conflicts. Although scholars do not fully agree on the subject, there is a consensus that attacking the opponents military forces’, a course of action referred to as denial, can contribute to a positive outcome on the battlefield. This thesis investigates the utility of denial in air operations against regular and irregular opponents. The purpose of this study was to examine Robert Pape’s Denial Theory in a focused and structured comparative case study of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. The investigation reveals that denial contributed to the ground offensives in both cases, specifically by providing air support in the theatre, which led to the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and drew the opponents out of several cities in Afghanistan. The use of operative interdiction made freedom of action possible and resulted in the final collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In conclusion the investigation shows that denial may be a suitable modus operandi against both regular and irregular opponents. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning</strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>

Airpower has shown its usefulness throughout many wars and was seen as a key instrument in the Libyan war 2011. However, the use of airpower and how it should be applied has been a highly debated topic for as long as airpower has been around. Two theorists, John A. Warden III and Robert A. Pape, have received a lot of attention and there is a debate regarding which one of these theorists has the best solution on how to use airpower. The purpose with this essay is to apply some of the two theorists’ ideas on the Libyan war 2011 and investigate their explanatory power in the conflict. To reach an answer, a case study has been used with a theory testing method which would further seek to contribute to the debate that exists between the two theorists. Results show that some parts of the theorists’ ideas have a high explanatory power in the conflict and some parts do not. As individuals, they cannot explain the whole war, but together their ideas have a high explanatory power in the conflict. Based on the ongoing debate that provides two different ways of using airpower, the conclusions suggest that a combination of the two theorists’ ideas might be the answer to how airpower can be employed in the best way for future operations. Further research is required to investigate this thesis. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning</strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018. </strong></p>

Robert A. Pape, an American political scientist, have created a universally known theory about how to successfully conduct military coercion. In his comprehensive quantitative research from multiple cases of coercion Pape’s conclusion is that the denial strategy of air power is what historically have been working. From his cases where he draws his conclusion there is one case missing. Pape has excluded the case of the Falklands war. According to some researchers, the Falklands war which was won by Great Britain, had a successful outcome due to their utility of the air power. This essay aims to test if Papes theory of military coercion has the potential to explain the victory of Great Britain in the Falklands War. By conducting a single case study by means of a qualitative text analysis, the answer is to be found. The results shows that Great Britain mainly used a denial strategy with the air powers. The Falklands war could have been predicted by this usage. Although it is a conventional conflict, involving both the navy, army and the airforce, it is hard to believe it was only because of the air powers the war was won. The use of a denial strategy can therefore not explain the victory for Great Britain, but it can be a part of the explanation. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning</strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.  </strong></p>

In the spring of 1999 NATO started the air campaign Operation Allied Force against the Serb president Slobodan Milošević’s dictatorship. Operation Allied Force unfolded during a 78-day long campaign in former Yugoslavia. The aim of the operation was to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in the Serb province Kosovo. The operation, that initially was supposed to be over in a week, continued for almost three months. Why did the campaign take such a long time compared to what was predicted? The aim of this study was to analyze Operation Allied Force from a time perspective to be able to tell why the operation became so protracted. The analyze was made by consuming two of the best well-known air power theories written by Robert A. Pape and John A. Warden. The result showed that there were several different factors that contributed to the protracted process. Too strict rules of engagement, few targets, lack of resources and the lack of a unified strategy inside NATO are believed to be the main factors that caused the lengthy process.

This study examines the unexpected outcome of the six day war between Israel and it’s neighboring countries. Israel who managed to fend off four aggressors in a war that lasted only six days, where the success was greatly attributed to the Israeli air force. This outcome played an important role for the future of airpower and gave rise to the theoretical framework we have today. Two of the most established theories that arised after the war is John. A. Wardens ”The enemy as a system” and Robert. A. Papes ”Bombing to win”. These theories advocates different approaches to the use of airpower and how to generate success. The aim of the study is to analyze in which way Israel used their air-force to generate this success and to challenge the view of a single theoretical framework as superior over the other. The result indicate that the success in the use of airpower in the six day war was achieved by a combination of methods from both theories where air superiority was a critical factor. The result also challenges the view of Wardens five ring model and how strategic effect is actually generated. The final conclusions of the study is hard to generalize due to the specific circumstances of the war and more research is needed.

Operation Rolling Thunder was a United States led operation, with the political aims of interdicting and preventing the North Vietnamese support of the South Vietnam rebellion, during the later stage of the Vietnam war. Despite being a superpower, Operation Rolling Thunder failed, and the USA lost the war. In this essay, the air power theorists John A. Warden and Robert A. Pape, and their theories regarding how air power should be used to reach success, are used to analyze this failure. The use of these theories in a parallel manner enables to comprehend empirical sources and in turn recognize anomalies in the decision making and missteps of the American leadership. By keeping the case of Rolling Thunder in focus and thereby try and understand what happened, the aim is to create an understanding for why the potent power of the US Air Force made an inadvertent turn despite exercising air superiority throughout most of the operation. This examination concludes that there were three deciding factors in the American failure, which are: (i) absence of efficient attacks against the North Vietnamese leadership, (ii) lack of correlation between strategy and political aim, (iii) lack of experience and communication within the American leadership.

Airpower theorists through history have by one or another reason chosen not to use wars or conflicts between India and Pakistan. Both the war 1965 and 1971 had the use of airpower, especially the war 1971 where India was victorious. This study examines India’s use of airpower against Pakistan in the war of 1971. The theories that are chosen for the examination is coming from the airpower theorist Robert Pape. Pape presents four different coercion air strategies, by them ‘coercion by denial’ and ‘coercion by decapitation’ are chosen for this study.    The purpose of this study was to give more explanation and understanding of the war between India and Pakistan in 1971 and more closely India’s use of airpower. Because of the lack of airpower studies between the countries mentioned above, this study will also give some insight into why previous airpower theorists may have chosen to look past wars between India and Pakistan.    The results show that Pape’s different theories gave a good overall explanation of India’s use of airpower in the war of 1971. This study also indicates and points a direction to which airpower theory is most likely to explain India’s use of airpower. It also gives some possible alternatives to why previous airpower theorists chose not to study the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971.

This paper aspires to answer the question of what mistakes the United States Air Force committed during operation rolling thunder in the Vietnam war. The purpose of this is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the operation and moreover to contextualise the mistakes that were made and that according to modern papers of military failures are continuing to be made. There have been studies that have sought to explain the operations failures but by using the framework of the prevalent theorists John A. Warden and Robert A. Papes theories i hope to shed new light on this topic. By using John A. Warden and Robert A. Papes theories concerning the use and implementation of airpower important factors missing from the planning or execution of this operation can be identified. One overarching problem with the operation is the continued meddling by politicians and civilian cabinet members in the planning and execution of the operation. A fear of Chinese involvement also lead to incredibly strict rules of engagements that forbade american pilots from even returning fire in some instances. A lack of commitment and constant ceasefires hindered the operation from succeeding in putting enough pressure on the north vietnamese and allowed them to rebuild what was destroyed. One last key factor was the lack of coordination between the aerial and ground forces, this deminitied the effectiveness of both.

The debate amongst theorists on how to best utilize airpower is still ongoing. There is some consensus among scholars that attacking military targets directly is an effective strategy, one of those theorists is Robert A. Pape. Most research on the subject only examine historical cases and does not factor in more contemporary difficulties. The purpose of this study is to examine Robert A. Pape’s airpower theory of denial in a comparative case study. The two cases, Operation Odyssey Dawn and Enduring Freedom, are succesful contemporary operations where airpower played a major role in a military intervention with the intent to examine which part of Pape’s theory is still curant in modern and dynamic conflicts. The results show that the denial strategy contributed to the success in both cases for the most part by providing air support to ground troops. The effect of operational interventions differed between the cases and the reasons why may have several explanations. Strategic intervention had neither effect nor occurrence in either case which may be due to the operations reaching objectives in a short amount of time and to restrictions on collateral damage. Further research is required to cement the conclusions.

Framträdande luftmaktsteorier förefaller i regel vara skrivna av stormaktsföreträdare. Ett implicit antagande att dessa teorier förutsätter betydande militär kapacitet och sofistikerad teknologi gör att de uppfattas som ”stormaktsteorier” som likt en klubba slår hårt mot motståndaren, med begränsad relevans för mindre stater som saknar stormakternas omfattande resurser. Luftmakt finns dock också i länder som kan betraktas som småstater. Även småstater kan – teoretiskt – antingen enskilt eller i en småstatsallians genom välriktade nålstick också skapa strategisk effekt med befintliga resurser.   Denna studie utmanar antagandet att luftmaktsteorier kan betraktas som antingen stormakts- eller småstatsteorier. Genom att pröva Robert Papes luftmaktsteori och Shaun Clarkes SPOT-paradigm i såväl stormakts- som småstatsperspektivet på ett gemensamt fall, Georgienkriget 2008 mellan Ryssland och Georgien, skapas ny kunskap om förklaringskraften hos respektive teori. Studien visar att Papes luftmaktsteori kan förklara stormakters användning av luftmakt, men belägg saknas för att den också kan förklara småstaters luftmaktsanvändning. Vidare saknas belägg för att Clarkes SPOT-paradigm kan förklara vare sig småstaters eller stormakters användande av luftmakt i det aktuella fallet. Däremot visar analysen att SPOT-paradigmet förutsätter ett visst mått av kvantitet och kvalitet, även hos småstater, för att omsättas i en skarp operation. Då ett mått på detta inte ges, bör SPOT-paradigmet främst betraktas som ett förhållningssätt till hur strategisk effekt kan skapas med tillgängliga resurser.