Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / No autorizada por el autor para ser publicada a texto completo / Debo partir señalando, ante todo, que mi interés en la controversia entre liberales y comunitaristas no sólo es de corte intelectual. La atracción que me produce este debate tiene que ver justamente con las implicancias contingentes que lleva inmerso, y en donde se conjugan de manera muy singular la filosofía, la política y el derecho. El liberalismo es, sin duda, la teoría política más importante de la actualidad y, por su parte, el comunitarismo representa la refutación no-marxista más importante que se ha hecho al liberalismo en sus tres siglos de historia. Este es uno de los motivos para pensar que el estudio de este debate resulta fundamental para entender desde una perspectiva crítica una serie de aspectos del debate político contemporáneo.

The aim of this thesis is to describe and defend ‘The Constraint-Based View’, which is a particular conception of the nature of, and relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theories of justice. Traditionally, ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘full compliance’, while non-ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘partial compliance’. In other words, ideal theories assume that those for whom the theory is meant to apply will be entirely willing and able to comply with the theory’s requirements, while non-ideal theories do not. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I describe and assess this original conception as well as several alternative accounts of ideal and non-ideal theory, in order to offer a broad survey of the existing literature, and to identify the various ways that these conceptions fail to capture fully the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory. In Chapter 2, I draw a distinction between two different approaches to theorising about justice. ‘Axiological’ or ‘A-Type’ approaches are characterised by the fact that they include almost no assumptions as inputs to the theory, and that they are not intended to provide action-guiding recommendations as part of the outputs of the theory. In contrast, ‘Practical’ or ‘P-Type’ approaches include additional assumptions as part of their inputs and are intended to form part of a process that ultimately produces action-guiding recommendations. In Chapter 3, I describe and defend my preferred conception of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory – the ‘Constraint-Based View’ (CBV). According to the CBV, there is a spectrum of theoretical approaches that can be more or less ideal, depending on the extent to which they include ‘soft constraints’ as part of the inputs to the theory. Soft constraints are facts about the world that can be changed, in contrast to hard constraints, which are facts about the world that cannot. I argue that this way of thinking about the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory is more useful than the alternative conceptions considered in Chapter 1. In Chapter 4, I examine the roles that feasibility considerations should play in ideal and non-ideal theory, from the perspective of the CBV and in Chapter 5, I explain the implications of adopting the CBV for what I call ‘transitional theory’, which is concerned with the transition from the status quo towards a more ideal state of affairs. In Chapter 6, I offer an example of the CBV in action, by considering its implications for the debate over duties of justice towards future generations.

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Thesis advisor: David Rasmussen / When is political power legitimate? Public reasons liberals argue that political power is legitimate only when it is supported by reasons drawn from principles of justice that each citizen could endorse. The most well known model for identifying whether a principle satisfies this requirement is John Rawls’ idea of an overlapping consensus. Typical interpretations of the idea of overlapping consensus hold that it expresses a necessary conceptual condition of any reasonable conception of justice. Against this ahistorical view, my analysis shows that Rawls’ mature account of overlapping consensus rests on a particular historicist thesis that liberal institutions are necessary for social cooperation given the presumption of moral and religious pluralism. The authority of public reasoning ultimately rests on a widespread consensus about the necessity of liberal institutions, rather than on a consensus on any particular conception of justice. The limits of public reason, on my analysis, are fixed first and foremost by liberal institutions. Given the prominent historical role of classical liberalism in specifying and defending liberal institutions, one might suppose that classical liberal conceptions of justice would have a central place in any consensus that defines the boundaries of public reasoning. I argue that this appearance is misleading. The work of scholars in disability studies show that conceptions of justice must be sufficiently sensitive to the unique needs and interests of citizens with disabilities. I argue that applying these insights to the idea of public reason shows that classical liberalism can satisfy the requirements of public reason only by unjustly ignoring the perspective of disabled citizens I show that Rawls’ model of public reason rests on a nuanced and historically grounded view of the consensus circumscribing public reason. Further, it shows that a historically conditioned concept of public reason and political legitimacy need not imply a drastic retreat from central egalitarian commitments, despite initial appearances to the contrary. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The purpose of this essay is to increase the understanding of the discussion of political obligation. This concern the questions if, how, and to what extent people are required to obey state commands. More specifically the purpose is to increase the understanding of one of the topics main theories, the natural duty of justice. This account states that people have a natural duty to comply with just institutions that apply to them, independent of any voluntary actions.  For this a discourse surrounding the theory has been examined and evaluated. It consists of Rawls argument for the theory, a criticism formulated by Simmons, and a defence formulated by Waldron. Rawls argues that for a just society to be stable, the natural duty of justice is necessary, and also sufficient for basing political obligations. Simmons criticises this account for dispensing of voluntary actions that he sees as necessary for political obligation. Without these, the application of just institutions is morally insignificant. Waldron then defends the account by adding additional requirements for institutions to apply, besides justice. Institutions also have to be effective, in the sense that they are able to enact justice, and legitimate in the sense that they are preferable to other alternatives.  I will argue that justice of institutions is necessary but insufficient for them to apply to people. Voluntary actions like consent will also be argued to be unnecessary for institutions application to be morally significant. If institutions are not only just but also effective and legitimate, in the sense that they are the most just and effective in relation to the viable alternatives, then their application and commands has moral significance. The conclusion of this essay then is that the natural duty of justice can account for political obligations, given high demands for institutions to apply.

The thesis revolves around the transformation of liberal citizenship to a higher degree of conditionality in the face of pluralist challenges revolving around achieving a shared common good. John Rawls’ Political Liberalism serves as the theoretical foundation for the argumentative analysis conducted, utilizing specific civic integration policies of Sweden and Denmark. The normative policy analysis reveals that the “civic integrationist turn” in itself is largely compatible with Rawls’ liberal principles of justice and equality. However, the problematic component lies in the de facto implementation of those measures which can have exclusionary and discriminatory effects i.e. the formulation of citizenship test questions and the portrayal of particular comprehensive doctrines of minority groups as incompatible with national liberal values. The most substantial challenge for a liberal pluralist society remains achieving “overlapping consensus” in the political sphere and guaranteeing safeguards for citizen’s personal comprehensive doctrines in the private sphere.

John Rawls defines civil disobediance as a ”public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.” (Rawls, 1999:320). Rawls has developed a theory of civil disobediance that has been widely discussed (Månsson, 2004:153). His theory explains when one can break the law and what has to be taken into consideration (Rawls, 1996:345-346). The theory is designed only for the special case of a nearly just society where the members of the community are rational beings. Rawls has a democratic and constitutional perspective that cares for a stable state power. The theory has been criticized by philosophers such as Kimberley Browlee and Tomas Månsson that claim that it is too narrow (Månsson, 2004:157-159, Brownlee 2012:2). The Swedish legal system does not regulate civil disobediance in any particulary law, rather it is the criminal acts that are connected to the civil disobediance that are prohibited. A dilemma for the criminal law is the amount of tolerance that should be allowed for criminal acts that we morally can understand (Asp & Ulväng, 2019:13). In common practice there has been a very low acceptence of civil disobediance. There has not been any case of discharge and the court has expressed a concern in judging these acts too light (NJA 1982 s. 376).

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<p>I seek to answer a specific question of justice: namely, how to find an equitable division of the Earth’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases, here termed as the global carbon sink. The dominant approach to date has been a variation of equal per-capita emissions. My aim is to expand on the Rawlsian legacy by presenting a viable alternative to the dominant approach in the form of an adaptation of Rawls’s <em>difference principle </em>in the form of a <em>climatic difference principle</em>. The climatic difference principle takes the conceptual idea behind the difference principle – of justifying inequalities so long as they result in a compensating benefit for everyone, with a particular concern for the least advantaged – and applying it to the problem of how to divide the global carbon sink.</p> <p>I begin with a critique of the dominant approach in order rectify the lack of critical scrutiny that the scheme has enjoyed in order to illustrate that the scheme fails for two reasons: first, it violates the ideal that it purports to promote; second, the reasons to support the proposal rest on shallow, rather than deep, reasons alone. Next, I engage in a critique of past attempts to globalize the difference principle, for if it were possible to merely globalize the difference principle, we wouldn’t need a distinct principle to guide emissions allocations.</p> <p>The climatic difference principle itself takes the distributive outcomes of equal per-capita emissions, as measured on the Human Development Index (HDI), as a baseline to judge alternative schemes. My conjecture is that the way emissions are used will have an effect on the amount of net benefits that we can derive per unit of the global carbon sink. Shares of the global carbon sink can be used more or less efficiently, and incentives in the form of a greater share of the sink will spur technological innovation. However, Rawls was correct to insist that the most efficient scheme is not necessarily just.</p> <p>A division of the global sink is considered <em>just </em>if we can compensate everyone (in particular the least advantaged) for accepting an unequal share. Specifically, when judged by improvements from the baseline created by the distributive outcomes of equal per-capita emissions, as measured on the Human Development Index (HDI). In order to realize the distributive obligations of the climatic difference principle, a green-technology transfer program will be advanced along with other forms of aid and compensation.</p> / Master of Philosophy (MA)

In dieser Dissertation argumentiere ich (gegen John Rawls und andere) erstens dafür, dass perfektionistische Gründe gute Gründe für Gesetze sind, die ein Staat erlässt, ohne, zweitens, die These zu teilen, die Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom vertritt, dass nur die Gesetze eines Staates legitim sind, die mit perfektionistischen Gründen gerechtfertigt werden können – weil alle anderen die Autonomie der Bürger notwendig verletzen würden. Im ersten Punkt halte ich den Perfektionismus für die Standardposition, und die gängigen liberalen Argumente für einen neutralen Staat überzeugen nicht, egal ob sie als ökumenische oder nicht-neutrale vertreten werden. Die ökumenischen Argumente, wie sie etwa bei Rawls und Bruce Ackerman zu finden sind, überzeugen nicht, weil sich ihre behauptete Neutralität letztlich als schädlich parteiisch erweist. Die nicht-neutralen Argumente, die unter anderem von Rawls und Charles Larmore angeführt werden, reichen nicht aus, um die Notwendigkeit eines Prinzips der staatlichen Neutralität zu begründen. Und zwar aus verschiedenen Gründen: Einer dieser Gründe ist, dass die Berufung der Konsequenzialisten auf den Wert der Autonomie übersieht, dass der Wert der Autonomie in Wertkonflikten anderen Werten nicht überlegen ist, und ein zweiter Grund wäre, dass Rawls in seinem Appell an die „Bürden des Urteils“, etwa in seinem Buch Political Liberalism, eher voraussetzt als zeigt, dass Respekt vor der Autonomie der Bürger die staatliche Förderung des Guten ausschließt. Zu dem zweiten Punkt mache ich geltend, dass es unerheblich ist, ob die These von Raz, dass Autonomie wertlos wird, wenn den Bürgern nicht ausreichend gute Optionen an Lebensformen zur Verfügung stehen, zwischen denen sie wählen können, überzeugend ist oder nicht, weil daraus nicht folgt, dass der Staat das Gute in jedem möglichen politischen System fördern muss. Es ist einfach nicht der Fall, dass die Zahl der den Staatsbürgern offenstehenden wertvollen Lebensformen unter eine Schwelle fällt, die den Wert der Autonomie erst möglich macht, sobald der Staat das Gute nicht fördert. / I argue, in this dissertation, first, that, contrary to the views of John Rawls and others, governments are entitled to make policy on the basis of perfectionist judgements, but second, that the claim, in particular as it is argued for in Joseph Raz’s The Morality of Freedom, that governments must make policy on a perfectionist basis, failing which the autonomy of citizens will be damaged, cannot be sustained. I argue the first point on the grounds that perfectionism is the default position, and that standard liberal arguments, which I categorise as either ecumenical or non-neutral, for a principle of state neutrality fail. The ecumenical arguments, which I discover in the writings of Rawls and Bruce Ackerman, fail because their purported neutrality turns out to be damagingly partisan. The non-neutral arguments, which I discover in the writings of, amongst others, Rawls and Charles Larmore, fall short of establishing the necessity of a principle of state neutrality for a number of widely-differing reasons, which include, for example, that a consequentialist appeal to the good of autonomy cannot establish that the good of autonomy trumps all other goods, or any other combination of goods, in all conflicts of goods which might arise, and that Rawls’s appeal to the burdens of judgement, founds in his Political Liberalism, assumes rather than shows that respect for the autonomy of citizens rules out state promotion of the good. I argue the second point on the grounds that although Raz is correct in arguing that autonomy is of no value unless the options between which citizens can choose are worthwhile forms of life, it does not follow that the state must promote the good in any and every possible political dispensation, as it is simply not the case that, in general, unless the state promotes the good, the number of valuable forms of life available to citizens will fall below the threshold which is necessary for their autonomy to be worth having.