Text in Afrikaans / This thesis deals with the nature and operation of liens in South African law. Whereas enrichment liens are classified as real rights, debtor creditor liens are not (sometimes they are referred to as personal rights). The South African law of lien is principally founded on Roman Dutch law and is similar to Dutch law before the enactment of the current Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW). In Dutch law the BW specifies which persons have a lien and under what circumstances. In South African law a creditor can establish a lien against an owner who has a duty to perform in terms of an agreement between the parties or, in the absence of such an agreement, on the basis of unjustified enrichment. My research has shown that a lien is not a subjective right but a capacity vested in a creditor by operation of law. It empowers him to retain an owner’s (debtor) thing until the creditor’s claim against him has been discharged. Extra-judicially the lien holder can rely on his lien or he can raise it as a defence against the owner’s rei vindicatio. The categorisation of liens as either enrichment liens, or debtor creditor liens is at the most an indication of the different sources of the creditor’s right to which the lien is accessory. In Dutch law liens are classified as verhaalsrechten on the owner’s estate. These rights (verhaalsrechten) are further classified as specific opschortingsrechten. A lien is therefore a capacity granted to certain creditors by law to retain an owner’s (debtor) thing. Regarding the operation of liens against third parties (derdenwerking), Dutch law distinguishes between a third party with an older right to the thing and a third party with a later right to the thing. In South African case law derdewerking (real operation) of liens is often used to explain the fact that the lienholder may, in the absence of an agreement with the owner, retain the owner’s thing until his claim against the owner has been discharged. In South African law a lien is a defence to the owner’s rei vindicatio. Reliance on real operation (derdewerking) is often a means of explaining that a lien exists against an owner with whom the creditor had no agreement. Real operation, however, refers to the question against whom other than the owner the lien may be enforced once its existence has been established. A lien can be enforced against the creditors of the owner (debtor), the curator of the debtor’s insolvent estate, heirs, mortgagees and servitude holders. In Dutch law the BW grants preference to liens. Owing to the particular provisions of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 liens in South African law enjoy preference above other secured creditors of the insolvent owner (debtor). / Hierdie proefskrif handel oor die aard en werking van retensieregte in die Suid- Afrikaanse reg. Verrykingsretensieregte word algemeen as saaklike regte bestempel en skuldeiser-skuldenaar-retensieregte nie. Laasgenoemde word soms as persoonlike regte tipeer. Die Suid-Afrikaanse reg insake retensieregte is hoofsaaklik op die Romeins-Hollandse reg geskoei en stem in ‘n groot mate ooreen met die posisie in die Nederlandse reg voor die inwerkingtreding van die huidige Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW). In die Nederlandse reg bepaal die BW uitdruklik watter persone in watter omstandighede ‘n retensiereg het. In die Suid-Afrikaanse reg kan ‘n skuldeiser ‘n retensiereg vestig teen ‘n eienaar wat prestasiepligtig is op grond van ‘n ooreenkoms met die skuldeiser of, in die afwesigheid van ‘n ooreenkoms, op grond van verryking. My navorsing toon dat ‘n retensiereg nie ‘n subjektiewe reg is nie, maar ‘n terughoudingsbevoegdheid wat deur regswerking totstandkom. Dit stel die skuldeiser in staat om die eienaar (skuldenaar) se saak te hou totdat die eienaar voldoen aan die vorderingsreg wat die skuldeiser teen hom het. Die retensiereghouer kan buitegeregtelik daarop steun, of dit as ‘n verweer teen die eienaar se rei vindicatio aanwend. Die kategorisering van retensieregte in skuldeiser-skuldenaar-retensieregte en verrykingsretensieregte is hoogstens aanduidend van die verskillende ontstaansbronne van die vorderingsreg waartoe die retensiereg aksessoor is. In die Nederlandse reg word retensieregte in die BW as verhaalsregte op die eienaar se boedel geklassifiseer. Hierdie verhaalsregte word uitdruklik as besondere opskortingsregte getipeer. ‘n Retensiereg is dus ‘n terughoudingsbevoegdheid wat deur die objektiewe reg aan sekere skuldeisers verleen word. Ten aansien van die derdewerking van retensieregte tref die Nederlandse reg ‘n onderskeid tussen ‘n derde met ‘n later reg op die saak en ‘n derde met ‘n ouer reg op die saak. In die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak word “derdewerking” dikwels aangewend om te verklaar waarom die retensiereghouer ‘n eienaar se saak mag terughou totdat hy vergoed is vir uitgawes wat hy aan die eienaar se saak aangebring het, terwyl hy geen ooreenkoms met die eienaar gehad het nie. In die Suid-Afrikaanse reg is ‘n retensiereg ‘n verweer wat teen die eienaar se rei vindicatio geopper kan word. Die beroep op “derdewerking” is dus dikwels die kapstok om te bepaal of ‘n retensiereg teen die eienaar geopper kan word, terwyl dit eintlik verwys na die afdwingbaarheid van ‘n bestaande retensiereg teen ander persone as die eienaar. ‘n Retensiereg kan teen skuldeisers van die skuldenaar, die kurator van die skuldenaar se insolvente boedel, erfgename, verbandhouers en serwituutgeregtigdes afgedwing word. In die Nederlandse reg verleen die BW voorkeur aan retensieregte. Vanweë die besondere bepalings in die Insolvensiewet 24 van 1936 geniet retensieregte in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg ook voorkeur bo ander versekerde skuldeisers van die insolvente eienaar (skuldenaar). / Private Law / LL.D.

Parallèlement à la dernière réforme française du droit des sûretés, les sûretés réelles chinoises ont été rénovées par la loi sur les droits réels promulguée à la même période. En s’appuyant sur une étude compréhensive des normes législative et réglementaire autour du sujet, cette thèse, essentiellement basée sur le droit chinois, révèle qu’en matière de sûreté réelle, le droit chinois se nuance du droit français et analyse les raisons et les effets de ces différences au-dessous des termes ou notions similaires. Après l’étude comparative, la thèse arrive à la conclusion que le droit chinois des sûretés réelles nécessite un futur regroupement en dépit de la nouvelle loi sur les droits réels. / During the same period, a reform of security law had completed in France, while the Chinese real rights law which has renovated security rights in rem was about to be promulgated in China. This thesis, based on Chinese law and drawing upon a comprehensive study of laws and administrative regulations on the subject, reveals the differences between Chinese and French law and analyze their cause and effect behind similar terms and notions. Grounded on the comparative study, the thesis draws the conclusion that the Chinese system of security rights in rem requires a further reform despite the arrival of new law.

Au lendemain de la renaissance juridique du XIIe siècle, la redécouverte du régime romain de la superficie amorce une réflexion doctrinale sur ce mode de dissociation juridique du sol et de la construction. Les glossateurs suivis par les commentateurs et une partie de la doctrine moderne distinguent le pouvoir du superficiaire sur la construction et celui maître du sol sur l’intégralité du fonds en qualifiant le premier de domaine utile et le second de domaine direct. Le dominium du superficiaire rassemble ainsi l’ensemble de ses actions et prérogatives sur la chose dont la plupart sont concurrentes de celles du maître du sol. La remise en cause de la théorie du double domaine par les juristes humanistes ne conduit pas ces derniers à contester l’étendue du pouvoir du superficiaire. Le concept de droit de superficie connaît en revanche un véritable bouleversement lorsque Wolff affirme, à la fin de l’Époque moderne, que le droit de superficie est un droit de propriété exclusif et absolu. Une même conception du droit de superficie est défendue au XIXe siècle par les premiers commentateurs du Code civil pour offrir une qualification aux différentes pratiques de dissociation juridique du fonds hérités de la coutume d’Ancien Régime. / Following the juridical renaissance of the 12th century, the rediscovery of roman superficies rules initiates a doctrinal reflection about this form of legal dissociation between building and ground. Glossators, followed by commentators and a part of the modern doctrine, differentiate the superficiary’s power over the building and the ground owner’s power over the entire land by describing the first one as a beneficial ownership and the second one as a direct ownership. For these authors, the superficiary’s ownership contains his procedural and substantive rights. Some of them compete ground owner’s rights. By rejecting the concept of dual ownership, humanistic jurists don’t question the scope of the superficiary’s power. However, at the end of Modern Area, Wolff changes the concept of right of superficies by identifying it as an exclusive and absolute ownership. In the 19th century, an identical conception is found in the first commentators of the Napoleonic Code’s doctrine. Indeed, the concept of superficies is used by these jurists to characterize several practices of dissociation between building rights and ground rights which are initially based on Ancien Régime customs.

Text in Afrikaans / This thesis deals with the nature and operation of liens in South African law. Whereas enrichment liens are classified as real rights, debtor creditor liens are not (sometimes they are referred to as personal rights). The South African law of lien is principally founded on Roman Dutch law and is similar to Dutch law before the enactment of the current Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW). In Dutch law the BW specifies which persons have a lien and under what circumstances. In South African law a creditor can establish a lien against an owner who has a duty to perform in terms of an agreement between the parties or, in the absence of such an agreement, on the basis of unjustified enrichment. My research has shown that a lien is not a subjective right but a capacity vested in a creditor by operation of law. It empowers him to retain an owner’s (debtor) thing until the creditor’s claim against him has been discharged. Extra-judicially the lien holder can rely on his lien or he can raise it as a defence against the owner’s rei vindicatio. The categorisation of liens as either enrichment liens, or debtor creditor liens is at the most an indication of the different sources of the creditor’s right to which the lien is accessory. In Dutch law liens are classified as verhaalsrechten on the owner’s estate. These rights (verhaalsrechten) are further classified as specific opschortingsrechten. A lien is therefore a capacity granted to certain creditors by law to retain an owner’s (debtor) thing. Regarding the operation of liens against third parties (derdenwerking), Dutch law distinguishes between a third party with an older right to the thing and a third party with a later right to the thing. In South African case law derdewerking (real operation) of liens is often used to explain the fact that the lienholder may, in the absence of an agreement with the owner, retain the owner’s thing until his claim against the owner has been discharged. In South African law a lien is a defence to the owner’s rei vindicatio. Reliance on real operation (derdewerking) is often a means of explaining that a lien exists against an owner with whom the creditor had no agreement. Real operation, however, refers to the question against whom other than the owner the lien may be enforced once its existence has been established. A lien can be enforced against the creditors of the owner (debtor), the curator of the debtor’s insolvent estate, heirs, mortgagees and servitude holders. In Dutch law the BW grants preference to liens. Owing to the particular provisions of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 liens in South African law enjoy preference above other secured creditors of the insolvent owner (debtor). / Hierdie proefskrif handel oor die aard en werking van retensieregte in die Suid- Afrikaanse reg. Verrykingsretensieregte word algemeen as saaklike regte bestempel en skuldeiser-skuldenaar-retensieregte nie. Laasgenoemde word soms as persoonlike regte tipeer. Die Suid-Afrikaanse reg insake retensieregte is hoofsaaklik op die Romeins-Hollandse reg geskoei en stem in ‘n groot mate ooreen met die posisie in die Nederlandse reg voor die inwerkingtreding van die huidige Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW). In die Nederlandse reg bepaal die BW uitdruklik watter persone in watter omstandighede ‘n retensiereg het. In die Suid-Afrikaanse reg kan ‘n skuldeiser ‘n retensiereg vestig teen ‘n eienaar wat prestasiepligtig is op grond van ‘n ooreenkoms met die skuldeiser of, in die afwesigheid van ‘n ooreenkoms, op grond van verryking. My navorsing toon dat ‘n retensiereg nie ‘n subjektiewe reg is nie, maar ‘n terughoudingsbevoegdheid wat deur regswerking totstandkom. Dit stel die skuldeiser in staat om die eienaar (skuldenaar) se saak te hou totdat die eienaar voldoen aan die vorderingsreg wat die skuldeiser teen hom het. Die retensiereghouer kan buitegeregtelik daarop steun, of dit as ‘n verweer teen die eienaar se rei vindicatio aanwend. Die kategorisering van retensieregte in skuldeiser-skuldenaar-retensieregte en verrykingsretensieregte is hoogstens aanduidend van die verskillende ontstaansbronne van die vorderingsreg waartoe die retensiereg aksessoor is. In die Nederlandse reg word retensieregte in die BW as verhaalsregte op die eienaar se boedel geklassifiseer. Hierdie verhaalsregte word uitdruklik as besondere opskortingsregte getipeer. ‘n Retensiereg is dus ‘n terughoudingsbevoegdheid wat deur die objektiewe reg aan sekere skuldeisers verleen word. Ten aansien van die derdewerking van retensieregte tref die Nederlandse reg ‘n onderskeid tussen ‘n derde met ‘n later reg op die saak en ‘n derde met ‘n ouer reg op die saak. In die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak word “derdewerking” dikwels aangewend om te verklaar waarom die retensiereghouer ‘n eienaar se saak mag terughou totdat hy vergoed is vir uitgawes wat hy aan die eienaar se saak aangebring het, terwyl hy geen ooreenkoms met die eienaar gehad het nie. In die Suid-Afrikaanse reg is ‘n retensiereg ‘n verweer wat teen die eienaar se rei vindicatio geopper kan word. Die beroep op “derdewerking” is dus dikwels die kapstok om te bepaal of ‘n retensiereg teen die eienaar geopper kan word, terwyl dit eintlik verwys na die afdwingbaarheid van ‘n bestaande retensiereg teen ander persone as die eienaar. ‘n Retensiereg kan teen skuldeisers van die skuldenaar, die kurator van die skuldenaar se insolvente boedel, erfgename, verbandhouers en serwituutgeregtigdes afgedwing word. In die Nederlandse reg verleen die BW voorkeur aan retensieregte. Vanweë die besondere bepalings in die Insolvensiewet 24 van 1936 geniet retensieregte in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg ook voorkeur bo ander versekerde skuldeisers van die insolvente eienaar (skuldenaar). / Private Law / LL.D.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:29:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Blikstein.pdf: 1236700 bytes, checksum: 2b2d8b392471f88d084e140f209e4bbf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-10-23 / The present paper is purposed to analyze and discuss the real right to habitation and its application in hereditary succession, such as established in our current legal system, by means of analysis of the legal rules on the subject. Inserted in such purpose, the present discussion will explore the subject with an analysis of the Brazilian and foreign legislation, aimed to address the utility and the limits of the real right to habitation applied to the successional law, specially after modifications brought up by the current Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure. In addition to the doctrinal analysis, this paper will bring to light the most recent decisions from our courts of law, challenging the subject from its various facets. The proposed subject is approached in five chapters: the formation and evolution of the Brazilian family; general aspects of real rights; the real right to habitation, its concept and legislative evolution, as well as its view under the foreign law; overview of the current Brazilian successional law; and, finally, a contention with the relevant themes involving the real right to habitation in the hereditary succession. This way, this paper will aim to challenge the main points of the theme, which generate innumerous judicial conflicts, always taking into consideration that, observing the legal form, the formation and maintenance of the family must be the most important and protected social institutions / O presente trabalho tem por finalidade analisar e discutir o direito real de habitação e sua aplicação na sucessão hereditária, tal como se coloca em nosso ordenamento jurídico atual, por intermédio da análise dos ditames legais previstos sobre o tema. Inserida em tal objetivo, a presente discussão reside na exploração do tema por meio da análise da legislação brasileira e estrangeira a ele concernente, visando discutir a utilidade e os limites do direito real de habitação aplicado ao direito sucessório, principalmente, após as alterações trazidas pelo atual Código Civil Brasileiro. Além da análise doutrinária, buscouse trazer as mais atuais decisões de nossos tribunais, enfrentando o tema em seus vários aspectos. O tema proposto é desenvolvido em cinco capítulos: formação e evolução da família brasileira; aspectos gerais dos direitos reais; direito real de habitação, seu conceito e evolução legislativa, bem como visão no direito estrangeiro; uma visão geral do atual direito sucessório brasileiro e, por fim, o enfrentamento dos temas relevantes que envolvem o direito real de habitação na sucessão hereditária. Dessa forma, procura-se abarcar, aqui, o enfrentamento dos principais pontos controversos do tema, que geram inúmeros conflitos judiciais, considerando sempre que, respeitada a forma legal, a formação e a manutenção da família devem ser os mais importantes e protegidos institutos sociais

Face aux limites d’un modèle social fondé sur la propriété absolue, l’usufruit, défini comme un droit de jouissance temporaire sur la chose d’autrui, apparaît aujourd’hui comme un outil fondamentalement utile. C’est aussi un droit en pleine expansion, comme en témoigne la diversification croissante de ses applications. Le quasi-usufruit, l’usufruit successif, l’usufruit temporaire, conditionnel, éventuel mais aussi l’usufruit des créances, des droits sociaux, des droits de propriété intellectuelle ou des universalités de fait sont autant d’exemples d’un usufruit que l’on peut dire « atypique » en raison de ses particularismes de régime. Ce sont ces mécanismes que la présente étude se propose d’étudier. Plus précisément, il s’agit de déterminer si les usufruits spéciaux peuvent ou non se concilier avec le modèle classique de l’usufruit, autrement dit, si une définition et un régime communs demeurent possibles. La démarche suppose alors de trancher la controverse toujours vive de la définition de l’usufruit en un démembrement de la propriété, et, ce faisant, d’apporter des solutions aux insuffisances bien connues des règles classiques de l’usufruit, telles que l’absence de relations personnelles entre les parties, et de manière générale, leur séparation trop stricte dans l’exercice de l’usufruit. De ce point de vue, la réflexion sur les usufruits atypiques crée l’occasion de repenser l’institution entière, et apparaît comme la source d’un potentiel renouvellement. / In the face of the limits of a social model organization based on absolute property rights, the right of usufruct (usufruit), which can be defined as a temporary right of use on another individual’s property, appears nowadays as fundamental tool. Usufruct is also a thriving tool, as evidenced by the growing diversification of its implementations. In this regard, the rise of atypical forms of usufruct – usufruct rights that differ substantially from the traditional form and regime of usufruct – is particularly striking. Quasi-usufruct (also known as irregular usufruct), successive usufruct, temporary, conditional or potential usufruct, as well as usufruct on debts, shares, and intellectual property rights are just examples of this booming phenomenon. They are the subject of this research. More precisely, this research seeks to determine whether such atypical rights of usufruct may be accommodated to the more traditional form of usufruct. In other word, the question is whether a characterization and legal regime common to both traditional and atypical forms of usufruct can be achieved. Therefore, this study aims at resolving past debates over the characterization of usufruct as a breaking-up of property rights and at providing remedies to the well-known insufficiencies in the traditional legal framework of usufruct rights, such as the absence of interpersonal relations between the parties, and more generally, their strict dissociation in the actual exercise of the usufruct right. In this perspective, this research on the atypical forms of usufruct is the occasion to fully rethink this legal institution, and opens the way for its prospective renewal.

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures de l'Université de Montréal en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en Droit (L.L.D.) et à l'Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3" / La propriété des créances est une notion controversée dans les systèmes juridiques romanogermaniques. Pourtant, le mouvement vers la dématérialisation des richesses conduit à envisager l'alliance de la propriété et de la créance, déjà reconnue par le biais du langage. Tant l'histoire que l'économie semblent converger vers la reconnaissance de la nature de bien des créances. Admettre cette nature ne suffit plus: encore faut-il en tirer la conséquence qui s'impose en termes d'objet de la propriété. C'est ce que semble avoir fait le récent Code civil du Québec. Tout autant que la propriété matérielle, la propriété des créances a prétention à la technicité. Longtemps cachée sous le manteau de la titularité, la propriété des créances n'a pas une nature distincte de celle de la propriété des corps. Simplement, de même que le régime juridique de la propriété s'adapte aux biens meubles ou immeubles qui en sont l'objet, le régime de la propriété des créances épouse la particularité de l'objet immatériel que sont les biens-créances. / The question as to whether ownership can bear on claims is a controversial one in Romano Germanic legal systems. Yet the on-going trend towards the dematerialisation of wealth invites legal experts to ally ownership and claims much in the same way in which, in ordinary parlance, people are said to own personal rights. Both history and economics would seem to point to a common recognition of the property nature of claims. Yet acknowledging the possibility that ownership bear on claims is no longer enough. The consequences of viewing the object of ownership as extending beyond material things must be recognized more generally. This is what the recent Civil Code of Québec appears to have done. Just as the material conception of ownership rests upon a technical infrastructure of the law of property, so too does the extension of ownership to claims require the elaboration of a technical regime. Traditionally obscured by a theory of titularity of rights, ownership as a means for explaining title to claims has the same juridical nature as ownership of things. Simply stated, ownership adapts to the object to which it attaches. Just as ownership can accommodate both movable and immovable property, so too can it be adapted to accommodate the peculiarities of claims as the object upon which it bears.

Les divisions de la créance ne renvoient qu’aux hypothèses de l’article 1309 du code civil : la division de la créance constituée au profit de plusieurs créanciers et la division de la créance dévolue à une pluralité d’héritiers. Pourtant, le procédé ne doit pas être réduit à ces deux occurrences. Peuvent être identifiées non seulement d’autres divisions de l’objet de la créance, mais également des divisions d’une autre forme, qui consisteraient en une répartition des prérogatives du droit de créance. Suivant un classement des divisions de la créance – division de l’objet de la créance, division des prérogatives du droit de créance –, il faut identifier les mécanismes qui y correspondent et, le cas échéant, établir des rapprochements susceptibles de compléter leur régime. S’agissant des divisions de l’objet de la créance, le modèle de l’article 1309 du Code civil consiste dans l’attribution, par un effet légal, à chacun des créanciers ou des héritiers du créancier d’un droit complet sur une fraction de l’objet de la créance. Au-delà, le modèle peut être reproduit par l’effet de la volonté grâce à des mécanismes – comme la cession partielle de créance – qui permettent de transmettre, par l’effet de la volonté, un droit sur une fraction de l’objet de la créance. S’agissant des divisions des prérogatives de la créance, le modèle réside dans le démembrement du droit de propriété. D’abord, ce modèle s’applique à la créance pour en diviser les prérogatives – avec l’usufruit de la créance ou un droit réel sui generis. Ensuite, se pose la question de l’imitation du modèle, c’est-à-dire de la possibilité de diviser directement les prérogatives du droit de créance. / The divisions of the credit-claim refer only to the hypotheses of article 1309 of the French Civil Code : the division of the credit-claim to the benefit of multiple creditors and the division of the credit-claim transferred to multiple heirs. However this process must not be limited to these two occurrences. Firstly, it is possible to identify other ways to divide the credit-claim’s subject matter. Secondly, the division of a credit-claim may consist in distributing the prerogatives resulting from the credit-claim. Following a typology of the divisions of the credit-claim – divisions of the subject matter of the credit-claim, division of the prerogatives resulting from the credit-claim -, it is necessary to identify the corresponding notions and, where appropriate, to suggest how their regimes can be perfected accordingly.As far as the divisions of the credit-claim’s subject matter are concerned, the way they are modelled on article 1309 of the Civil Code consists in conferring, through an effect of the legislation, to each creditor or to each creditor’s heir a full right on a fraction of the credit-claim’s subject matter. This initial model can be expanded, as it can be replicate through the effects of will, thanks to notions such as the partial assignment of the credit-claim which enable the transfer, through the effects of individual will, of right on a fraction of the credit-claim’s subject matter.As for the divisions of the prerogatives attached to the credit-claim, the archetypal reference is the dismemberment of ownership. Firstly, this archetype applies to the credit-claim in order to divide its prerogatives – with the usufruct of the credit-claim or a sui generis real right. Secondly, the question is whether it is possible to replicate the model, ie whether it is possible to divide directly the prerogatives of the credit-claim.

La propriété des créances est une notion controversée dans les systèmes juridiques romanogermaniques. Pourtant, le mouvement vers la dématérialisation des richesses conduit à envisager l'alliance de la propriété et de la créance, déjà reconnue par le biais du langage. Tant l'histoire que l'économie semblent converger vers la reconnaissance de la nature de bien des créances. Admettre cette nature ne suffit plus: encore faut-il en tirer la conséquence qui s'impose en termes d'objet de la propriété. C'est ce que semble avoir fait le récent Code civil du Québec. Tout autant que la propriété matérielle, la propriété des créances a prétention à la technicité. Longtemps cachée sous le manteau de la titularité, la propriété des créances n'a pas une nature distincte de celle de la propriété des corps. Simplement, de même que le régime juridique de la propriété s'adapte aux biens meubles ou immeubles qui en sont l'objet, le régime de la propriété des créances épouse la particularité de l'objet immatériel que sont les biens-créances. / The question as to whether ownership can bear on claims is a controversial one in Romano Germanic legal systems. Yet the on-going trend towards the dematerialisation of wealth invites legal experts to ally ownership and claims much in the same way in which, in ordinary parlance, people are said to own personal rights. Both history and economics would seem to point to a common recognition of the property nature of claims. Yet acknowledging the possibility that ownership bear on claims is no longer enough. The consequences of viewing the object of ownership as extending beyond material things must be recognized more generally. This is what the recent Civil Code of Québec appears to have done. Just as the material conception of ownership rests upon a technical infrastructure of the law of property, so too does the extension of ownership to claims require the elaboration of a technical regime. Traditionally obscured by a theory of titularity of rights, ownership as a means for explaining title to claims has the same juridical nature as ownership of things. Simply stated, ownership adapts to the object to which it attaches. Just as ownership can accommodate both movable and immovable property, so too can it be adapted to accommodate the peculiarities of claims as the object upon which it bears. / "Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures de l'Université de Montréal en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en Droit (L.L.D.) et à l'Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3"

Text in Afrikaans / In hierdie verhandeling ontleed ek die oproeping van ʼn verband op ʼn onroerende saak in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Indien ʼn verbandskuldenaar wanpresteer, kan die verbandskuldeiser sy beperkte saaklike reg afdwing deur die verband op te roep ten einde die uitstaande skuld te delg. Om dit te bereik, word die sekerheidsobjek op ʼn eksekusieverkoping te gelde gemaak, nadat die regte prosedure gevolg is. Die oproepingsproses is in die laaste dekade ingrypend verander, grotendeels as gevolg van artikel 26 van die Grondwet, 1996, en artikels 129 en 130 van die National Credit Act 34 van 2005. Die volgende stadiums in die oproepingsproses word onderskei: die voorverhoorprosedure; jurisdiksiebepaling; die hofprosedure; beslaglegging en die eksekusieverkoping. Wetgewing en regspraak het onlangs ingrypende veranderings ten aansien van die voorverhoorprosedure en die hofprosedure teweeggebring. Alhoewel die oproepingsproses tans bevredigend deur wetgewing en in die regspraak gereël word, is daar nog verontrustende aspekte van eksekusieverkopings wat die wetgewer se aandag verdien. / In this dissertation I analyse the calling up of a mortgage bond over immovable property under South-African law. If a mortgagor defaults, the mortgagee can enforce his limited real right by calling up the mortgage bond to satisfy the outstanding debt. To accomplish this, the secured property will be sold at an execution sale, after the correct procedure has been followed. Over the past decade, foreclosure proceedings have undergone significant changes, largely owing to section 26 of the Constitution, 1996, and sections 129 and 130 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. The following stages in the foreclosure process are identified: pre-trial debt enforcement procedure; determination of jurisdiction; court procedure; attachment and execution sale. Both the pre-trial debt enforcement procedure and the court procedure have recently been substantially amended by legislation and case law. Although legislation and case law currently regulate the foreclosure process satisfactorily, some disturbing aspects of execution sales remain and these deserve the legislator’s attention. / Private Law / LL.M.