Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiza Helena Hilgert.pdf: 1771003 bytes, checksum: d233af4b5522e8037e9714337eecb337 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-04 / Think ethics is not the same as conjecture rules, regulations, prescribed values, established standards and stereotyped behaviors. At least it's not that the description of the human condition conceived by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, through his phenomenological ontology allows support. The ontological ethics is not limited to dogmatic and regulatory fields, Sartre operates a deconstruction of the metaphysical foundations: remove models, fixed behaviors, prototypes, archetypes, gods, concomitantly, transcends all attempts to assert the good and evil with based on an substrate absolute extreme, like the nature or essence. The moral ontology we describe here, using mainly the works of Sartre's period - so called metaphysical, has the freedom as its foundation and its greatest value, is therefore a theory of ambiguity, like the human condition. It must be understood freedom in this sense, not as a mere human attribute, but on the ontological way, as a fundamental structure of man. To found the values, actions and choices consistently with the human condition, the traditional moral laws based on rational or universal rules should be suspected. The ontological ethics that we want to bring up is like a large building whose foundation is the notion of freedom and built on it are the conceptions of man and world. The main work in which such building may be appreciated, and justify under which our research was published in 1943, entitled Being and Nothingness, it found a detailed and thorough analysis of the human condition, allowing a find out a kind of ethics consistent with the human reality in the situation. The notion of freedom in Sartre's phenomenological analysis, it is not, however, the only aspect of ethics, it comes with responsibility, authenticity, engagement and relationship with others. / Pensar a ética não é o mesmo que conjeturar normas, regras, valores prescritos, padrões estabelecidos e comportamentos estereotipados. Pelo menos não é assim que a descrição da condição humana elaborada pelo filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre, por meio da sua ontologia fenomenológica, permite sustentar. A ética de cunho existencialista não se limita aos âmbitos dogmático e regulador, ao contrário, Sartre opera uma desconstrução dos fundamentos metafísicos: remove modelos, comportamentos fixos, protótipos, arquétipos, deuses; concomitantemente, transcende todas as tentativas de asseverar o bem e o mal com base em um substrato absoluto, extremo, como a natureza ou a essência. A ontologia moral que descrevemos aqui, utilizando-nos principalmente das obras sartrianas do período assim chamado metafísico, tem a liberdade como seu fundamento e seu maior valor; é, pois, uma teoria da ambiguidade, tal qual a condição humana. Há que se entender a liberdade, nesse sentido, não como mero atributo humano, mas no âmbito ontológico, como estrutura fundamental do homem. Para fundamentar os valores, as ações e as escolhas de modo coerente com a condição humana, a moral tradicional baseada em leis racionais ou regras universais deve ser posta em xeque. A ética ontológica que pretendemos trazer à tona é como um grande edifício cujo alicerce é a noção de liberdade e sobre ela são construídas as concepções de homem e de mundo. A principal obra em que tal edificação pode ser apreciada e, sob a qual concentramos nossa pesquisa, foi publicada em 1943, intitula-se O ser e o nada, nela encontramos uma pormenorizada e aprofundada análise da condição humana, permitindo vislumbrar um tipo de ética condizente à realidade humana em situação. A noção de liberdade, na análise fenomenológica de Sartre, não é, contudo, o único aspecto da eticidade, acompanha-a a responsabilidade, a autenticidade, o engajamento e a relação com os outros.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tiago Soares dos Santos.pdf: 762145 bytes, checksum: c8c3ac6c08fc144847709a1ce4987547 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-21 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The problem that motivated us in the preparation of this study was to answer the question: how does the appearance of the world and how to become aware of such an appearance? Problem that Sartre and became the maximum of existentialism where the existence precedes the essence. We`ll try, in the course of our work, presenting the arguments used by Sartre that justify such affirmation and check if, in fact, it is possible to agree with an existential philosophy along the sartrianos lines. For that, we`ll see the phenomenological method that will assist us in the reflection on the fundamental structures of mundane appearance, central theme present in the husserliana phenomenology and sartriana`s foundation. This appearance will reveal the human reality as emanating from the most intimate of be; this human reality will be described in phenomenological philosophy of Sartre as consciousness, which conceptualizes as intentionality. Being intentionality is to take the constant motion of transcendence, that is, the exit of yourself. So it is necessary to expel everything there is or inhabits the consciousness. Making empty consciousness or translucent, requires that we understand the consciousness. Being conscious is to exist and the question of existence arises immediately with the human reality that asks about your way of being in the world. We will approach the existential problems of consciousness and the need for recognition of the same existence from reflexivity. In this way, we will develop how consciousness exists immediately, this is, how the consciousness appears intended to the objects of the world, how if seizes, first as a way thoughtless as a phenomenon of world. This mundane phenomenon that reveals the consciousness and is, at the same time, revealed by it. In this way, the appearances of world and consciousness occur simultaneously and interdependent. This concurrency between world and consciousness are the poles of the same phenomenon. It is the monism of the phenomenon that is constituted of these two realities of being, that is, the object appeared the In-himself and the consciousness - the To-himself - are constituent parts of the same reality that cannot be seized separately. The existence, although unique, is paradoxically, constituted of two modalities of being. Despite having to recognize these two modalities to be as amalgamated, we can only recognize them from a long journey argumentative of phenomenological reflection, once we can only recognize the existence of the world and consciousness from the phenomenological process of reflexivity. In other words, we can only know what already exists since the knowledge doesn´t have itself the creative force or the power to confer being what is not yet or does not exist. Thus, the knowledge or the reflection are fundamental to the development of phenomenology, although this same phenomenology requires the recognition of something prior or immediate that precedes it and enables your cognitive achievement. / O problema que nos motivou na elaboração desse trabalho foi responder à questão: como ocorre o aparecimento do mundo e como se torna consciente de tal aparecimento? Problema posto por Sartre e que se tornou a máxima do existencialismo onde a existência precede a essência. Intentaremos, no curso de nosso trabalho, apresentar os argumentos utilizados por Sartre que justificam tal afirmação e verificar se, de fato, é possível concordar com uma filosofia existencial nos moldes sartrianos. Para tanto, valer-nos-emos do método fenomenológico, que nos auxiliará na reflexão sobre as estruturas fundamentais do aparecimento mundano, tema central presente na fenomenologia husserliana e alicerce da sartriana. Tal aparecimento revelará a realidade humana como emanada do mais íntimo do ser; essa realidade humana será descrita na filosofia fenomenológica de Sartre como consciência, que se conceitua como intencionalidade. Ser intencionalidade é assumir o constante movimento de transcendência, isto é, de saída de si. Por isso, faz-se necessário que se expulse tudo o que há ou habita a consciência. Tornando a consciência vazia ou translúcida, exige-se que nós compreendamos a consciência. Ser consciente é existir e a questão da existência surge imediatamente com a realidade humana que indaga sobre seu modo de ser no mundo. Abordaremos a problemática existencial da consciência e a necessidade do reconhecimento dessa mesma existência a partir da reflexividade. Desse modo, apresentaremos como a consciência existe imediatamente, isto é, como a consciência aparece intencionada aos objetos do mundo, como se apreende, primeiramente de modo irrefletido como um fenômeno do mundo. Esse fenômeno mundano que revela a consciência e é, ao mesmo tempo, revelado por ela. Assim, os aparecimentos do mundo e da consciência ocorrem de modo simultâneo e interdependente. Essa simultaneidade entre mundo e consciência são polos de um mesmo fenômeno. É o monismo do fenômeno que se constitui dessas duas realidades do ser, ou seja, o objeto aparecido o Em-si e a consciência o Para-si são partes constituintes de uma mesma realidade que não podem ser apreendidas isoladamente. A existência, apesar de única, é paradoxalmente, constituída de duas modalidades de ser. Apesar de ter de reconhecer essas duas modalidades de ser como amalgamadas, só podemos reconhecê-las a partir de um longo percurso argumentativo da reflexão fenomenológica, pois só podemos reconhecer a existência do mundo e da consciência a partir do processo fenomenológico da reflexividade. Em outros termos, só podemos conhecer aquilo que já existe visto que o conhecimento não tem em si a força criadora ou o poder de conferir ser àquilo que ainda não é ou não existe. Assim, o conhecimento ou a reflexão são fundamentais para o desenvolvimento da fenomenologia, embora essa mesma fenomenologia exija o reconhecimento de algo prévio ou imediato que o precede e possibilita sua realização cognitiva.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Between his first philosophical works and his last, Jean-Paul Sartre radically changed his philosophical outlook. The reasons for this change can be found in European history and Sartre's detailed study of twentieth-century protest movements. Between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s, French intellectuals began an intensive period of introspection, examining the complex relationship between History and social justice. Sartre and the group of intellectuals associated with him combined to fight against Stalinism while searching for a new theory of political action. This thesis discusses the abrupt termination of the ethical project that Sartre proposed to base on his original phenomenological examinations, and discusses his and Simone de Beauvoir's first attempts to construct an Existentialist ethic. Sartre changed from being an Existentialist to a Marxist to finally, late in life, abandoning Marxism in favour of a never well-defined philosophy. But in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, the last of his serious philosophical works, he responded to his ex-friends's critiques in the light of his study of Eastern European history, particularly, the Revolution in Hungary. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

La philosophie classique va trouver chez Sartre, malgré les prétentions les plus révolutionnaires de ce dernier, son plus grand défenseur. S'il faut parler, à propos de Descartes, d'un centrement "cartésien" du sujet, et ce, en pleine révolution Copernici enne, il importe de comprendre que Sartre va redoubler, par sa théorie de l'intentionnelité, l'effet de centrement opéré par Descartes, lui aussi en pleine époque de décentrements. En effet, à l'instar de Descartes qui assure la primauté ontologique de la conscience contre le malin génie, le Dieu trompeur, la folie et le rêve, Sartre va réassurer la primauté ontologique d'un être qui , dorénavant, n'est que "pour-soi", et ce, contre tout déterminisme, qu'il soit d'ordre psychanalytique, sociologi que, économique ou autre. Par sa théorie du néant, Sartre ne fait au fond qu'infi ni ti ser la substance cartésienne à un degré d'être qui manque justement de tout ce qu'il faut pour "être". Ainsi, cet être ne saurait être déterminé autrement que par une reprise intentionnelle. Par là, et bien qu'il évacue de la conscience toute représentation pour laisser ouvert le vide stratégique qu'est le néant, Sartre n'en garde pas moins toute sa portée à la pensée représentât!ve, dans la mesure justement où le substrat de la Représentation, à savoir le Sujet, est maintenu intact, comme est demeurée intacte la théorie de l'adéquation qui assure que le connaissant "n'ajoute rien à la nature du connu". En ce sens, dans la mesure où l'ordre des valeurs prime sur l'ordre du réel , il nous faut parler, sur le plan épistémologique, du cartésianisme de Sartre. Sartre demeure un penseur pré-critique et ce, jusqu'au tout dernier tome de son étude sur Flaubert. Il faudra attendre le transcendantalisme kantien, la constitution philosophique de la finitude, pour que le sujet cartésien soit véritablement ébranlé et le régime de l'adaequatio bouleversé, par le schématisme notamment. Nous voulons dire par là, et d'une manière plus générale, que la révolution copernicienne opérée par Kant constitue le seuil de notre modernité. l'épistémè structurale y trouve ses premiers fondements, ceux justement que Sartre va chercher à contourner. La philosophie du sujet se voit chez Kant retirer tout privilège. On ne retrouvera donc pas, comme chez le penseur de Koenisberg, d'"assomption du sujet" comme on a trop souvent l'habitude de le répéter, mais bien, comme le diront Lacoue-Labarthe et Nancy, son "exténuation". La subjectivité transcendantale ne doit pas être soumise à une lecture cartésienne. Il nous est apparu que par le transcendantalisme se trouve ouverte une problématique du sens en dehors de la pensée représentative, le sens comme "production de sens”. C'est là, dans ce qui nous semble constituer une "théorie générale des productions" (Deleuze), que la pensée structurale trouve son unité la plus profonde, désinvestissant le sujet libre, conscient et volontaire ainsi que le régime classique de l 'adaequa t i o. Ainsi, sur un même sol, ou si l'on préfère, dans un même espace, vont converger des penseurs aussi différents que Foucault, Deleuze, Lévi-Strauss, Bourdieu, Faye, Althusser... Nous croyons, en effet, que le "recours" au transcendanta l i sme kantien permet d'éclairer, comme le montre J. Petitot, d'un regard nouveau les apories constitutives des sciences de l'homme en leur caractère structural et dynamique, à condition d'admettre que l'anthropologie kantienne qui constitue la première grande représentation de l'homme, fonctionne aussi comme son désinvestissement systématique. Le sujet kantien répondant à l'exigence première de sa philosophie est "problématique". A fortiori, nous ne saurions retrouver chez Kant, après la première Critique, quelque retour en force de la théologie. Celle-ci se verra, comme le sujet, transcendantalisée. seront soumis au règne d'une analysis situs. Di eu et l'homme Dès lors, le sens devra répondre à des exigences topologiques et relationnelles. Kant a ouvert une époque, la nôtre.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the highly moral ethic of social duty and responsibility which animates the work of Alejo Carpentier. In order to examine this theme, I have studied, in particular, the following six novels: ‘El reino de este mundo', Los pasos perdidos', ‘El acoso', El siglo de las luces', ‘El recurso del método', and ‘La consagración de la primavera'. In the Introduction, I have investigated the various philosophical questions raised by the concept of responsibility : the debate about freewill and determinism has been examined, and the Existentialist philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre has been chosen as the most helpful in an investigation of Carpentier's theory of responsibility, due to a great coincidence of thought between the two writers. The protagonists of the novels in question have been grouped according to various distinguishing tendencies or characteristics, and have been analysed in the light of the Sartrian concepts of good and bad faith. These groupings are as follows: “the deluded intellectual”, “two tyrants”, “the lesson of experience”, and “the committed individual”. The success, or failure, of these characters, in matching up to the goals of self-transcendence and responsible commitment posed by Carpentier has been charted throughout Chapters One to Four, and deductions have been made about the various forms of bad faith in which the characters indulge. The conclusions that I have drawn from this detailed investigation of characters in good and bad faith are, firstly, that Carpentier sees man's goal in life as the attainment of self-knowledge and the honest acceptance of responsibility for the self : once this state of good faith has been achieved, man is able to commit himself to the never-ending struggle for the improvement of the social situation. Acceptance of responsibility for the self is vital, in Carpentier's canon, for without such acceptance, positive commitment is impossible. Secondly, I have concluded that, according to Carpentier, commitment is an inevitable part of life, and that Carpentier's goal, then, is that we should actively commit ourselves to a positive cause through recognition of our responsibility for ourselves and our society, rather than tacitly accept the status quo through a passive or deterministic attitude.

The thesis inquires into the theme of political judgement and aims to rethink it from the perspective of twentieth-century philosophies of existence. It seeks to take up the contemporary challenge of political judgement that remains inadequately addressed within recent theorizing: how, given the modern breakdown of metaphysical absolutes, to reinvigorate the human capacity for political judgement as a practical activity able to confront the ambiguous, plural and complex character of our postfoundational world. Against this background, the thesis aspires to reclaim the distinctly historical orientation of twentieth-century existentialism, in particular the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus and Hannah Arendt. It draws on their aesthetic sensibility to resuscitate the human judging ability in its worldly ambiguity and point towards an account of political judgement capable of facing up to the challenges of our plural and uncertain political reality. Retrieving their vigilant assumption of the situated, worldly condition of human political existence and the attendant perplexity of judging politically, the aim of the thesis is to suggest how the existentialists' insights can be brought to bear on contemporary problematics of political judgement that seem to elude the grasp of abstract standards and predetermined yardsticks.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andre Constantino Yazbek.pdf: 1846038 bytes, checksum: 4879975cb6a894c46e8361976cd9e195 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-30 / École Normale Supérieure / In the French scenery of the 1960s and 1970s decades, Foucault is one of the most expressive persons to criticize the philosophical modernity . Since his complementary thesis on Kant´s Anthropology (1961), sustained mainly on the reinstatement of the Nietzschean démarche, the author will consider urgent the task of putting a full stop to the proliferation of the questions about the man . Jean-Paul Sartre in his turn seems to represent at that time the antithesis of the Foucaultian project: his Critique of Dialectical Reason inaugurates the 1960s decade with an effort to reinstate the dialecticity of the subject itself, considering it as an irreducible element to the intelligibility of history. Thus, acknowledging dialectics as the living logic of action , Sartre intends that the man and his action be rediscovered in the core of marxism itself and the Sartrean ontology which started with Being and Nothingness (1943) is submitted to the need of establishing the foundations of an anthropology in the field of the individual´s practical historialization . Starting from the antagonism represented by the concurrent projects of Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault in the context of the sixties , this work intends to revisit the trajectory of both authors in order to outline the choices and dilemmas (political and theoretical) of two different generations of French contemporary philosophy. To the resolute Sartrean humanism with its indelible centrality of subject will correspond Foucault´s attitude of equal resolute antihumanism . Thus, Sartre´s existentialism translated by Foucault as a methaphysics of subjectiveness will find its most incisive challenge in the Foucaultian theme of the death of man place of convergence of a generation which could be called (not without mistakes) of post-existentialist / No panorama francês das décadas de 1960 e 1970, Foucault é um das figuras mais representativas da crítica à modernidade filosófica . Desde sua tese complementar sobre a Antropologia de Kant (1961), apoiando-se sobretudo na recuperação da démarche nietzschiana, o autor há de considerar urgente a tarefa de colocar um ponto final na proliferação da interrogação sobre o homem . Jean-Paul Sartre, por seu turno, parece representar à época a antítese do projeto foucaultiano: sua Crítica da razão dialética inaugura a década de 1960 com um esforço de recuperação da dialeticidade do próprio sujeito , tomando-o como elemento irredutível para a inteligibilidade da história. Assim, reconhecendo a dialética como a lógica viva da ação , Sartre pretende que o homem e seu agir sejam redescobertos no próprio cerne do marxismo e a ontologia sartriana, cuja base remonta a O ser e o nada (1943), se vê remetida à necessidade de fundamentação de uma antropologia no âmbito da historialização prática do indivíduo. Partindo do antagonismo representado pelos projetos concorrentes de Jean-Paul Sartre e Michel Foucault no horizonte dos sixties , este trabalho pretende revisitar a trajetória dos dois autores a fim de delinear as opções e os dilemas (teóricos e políticos) de duas gerações distintas da filosofia contemporânea francesa. Ao decido humanismo sartriano com sua indelével centralidade do sujeito corresponderá uma atitude de não menos decidido anti-humanismo por parte de Foucault. Nesta medida, o existencialismo de Sartre, traduzido por Foucault em termos de uma metafísica da subjetividade , encontrará seu desafio mais incisivo no tema foucaultiano da morte do homem lugar de convergência de uma geração que se poderia chamar (não sem equívocos) de pós-existencialista

O presente estudo propõe-se ao levantamento das relações intertextuais tantas vezes apontadas, porém quase nunca aprofundadas por nossa crítica literária entre o filósofo existencialista Jean-Paul Sartre e o romancista brasileiro Carlos Heitor Cony. Em seu conjunto, o trabalho baseia-se em dois planos: no primeiro, são criteriosamente assinaladas as semelhanças temáticas e, eventualmente, formais da prosa ficcional de ambos, tendo por objetos de estudo os seus respectivos romances de estreia: A náusea e O ventre; no segundo, o mais relevante para meus atuais propósitos, acentua-se a investigação das diferenças, sobretudo estilísticas, da literatura conyana em relação à do pensador francês. Portanto, em sentido mais amplo, o trabalho trata-se de uma ampla reflexão acerca do processo de apropriação antropofágica na linha oswaldiana de alguns dos típicos temas existencialistas de Sartre e de sua adaptação por meio de um estilo que denota traços individuais cujas características são a ironia cortante, o humor sarcástico e algum lirismo por parte de Cony, do que decorre um inusitado acariocamento do Existencialismo sartriano. Dentro dos limites formais deste tipo de estudo, são ainda referidos diversos outros textos filosóficos e literários destes intelectuais em uma tentativa de corte transversal o mais elucidativo possível de suas obras. / The present study intends to inquire the intertextual relations – often pointed, though almost never deepened by our literary criticism – among the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre and the Brazilian novelist Carlos Heitor Cony. In its whole, the study is based upon two levels: in the first one, the thematic and occasionally formal similitudes in the fictional prose of both authors are criterioulsy shown, taking as objects their respective first novels: The Nausea and The Womb. In the second level, which is the most relevant among my purposes at this moment, there is an emphasis on the differences, mainly stylistic, of Cony’s literature in relation to the one by the French philosopher. Therefore, in a larger sense, this study is about a broad reflection regarding the anthropophagical appropriation in the oswaldian line of some of the typical sartrean existentialistic themes, and its adaptation through a style that denotes individual traces whose characteristics are acid irony, sarcastic sense of humor and some lyricism by Cony – from which flows an unexpected tropical and loose philosophical vision (in the carioca style) of the sartrean existentialism. Within the formal limits of this kind of research, many other philosophical and literary texts from these scholars are also referred to, planned as a transversal cut which intends to be able of elucidating as much as possible from their work.

In this dissertation I explain the transition from modernism to postmodernism through the study of the French existentialist novel. I follow theories that demonstrate that the latter owes its success to historiographic metafiction. By setting off the aporias that deeply penetrate modern novels, I demonstrate the obsolescence of the prototype of the realist novel and I explain the impasses towards which the project of a committed literature lead, inscribed in the line of realism and aimed at an almost direct relation with society and history through the mediation of art between 1945 and 1955 in France. / On one hand I consider literature as an object which can be described by the methodologies of history. On the other hand I suggest an analysis of the historicity of the text that is constituted by the dynamic system generated by the interaction, the interdependence, and the correlation of the poetic and aesthetic parameters and the factors of the historical context. My aim is to set off the poetic and aesthetic mecanism of stability and of transformation of literary creation according to the dynamic relation between the vector of the project associated to realism and the one of the prototype associated to the novel. I think that late modernism produces paradoxical configurations of the novel because it is the period in which the project of realism becomes lapsed and the prototype of the realist novel becomes dilapidated. / Among the works that are exemplary of the tension between fiction and history and between project and prototype in the framework of the representation of reality and of the inscription of history in novels, I identified Albert Camus' La Peste, Simone de Beauvoir's Les Mandarins and Jean-Paul Sartre's Les Chemins de la liberte . I conclude that the enterprise of committed literature was an aporias because it was generated from the impoverishment of the project of realism and the obsolescence of the prototype of the novel. Later literature was extricated, firstly, by the radically and extremely metafictional writing of the Nouveau Roman and, secondly, it was changed by postmodern historiographic metafiction. The crisis of history and of the writing of history was solved by works in which there is the acknowledgement and the use of sophisticated mediations to evoke and inscribe history in different ways.