The system of government in modern democratic states can be categorized as presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary depending on its relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. This relationship is known as the separation of powers and is often regulated by a written constitution. While there are many studies explaining the ideal system, there are few researches made as to whether the states correspond with their theoretical ideals. This study aims at explaining the theories of Giovanni Sartori regarding these three different systems of government and thus creating an ideal for each system. With the help of case studies of three different states representing each system the study analyses as to whether the states of each system correspond with its ideals. The states chosen for this purpose is Australia as a representative of the parlamentaristic state, France as a semi-presidential system and USA which is a presidential system. All three of them are using a bicameral legislature and have a written constitution. The study aims to analyse the systems through a comparative method using a qualitative text analysis of the material used. The results of this study shows that while the states at large resembles its ideal, there are some deviations. Australia and the United States of America fulfills Sartoris three criterias for their respective system, while France deviates from a majority of its ideal criterias as a hybrid semi-presidential system.

I challenge the common assumption in the literature that executives' powers vis-à-vis each other can change solely as the result of the norms and practices consequential of institutional change. I argue instead that a fixed institutional design can also generate changes in power distribution, through informal rules, norms, and practices of an institution, without necessitating formal or constitutional transformation. I contribute to both the literature on institutional change and the literature on democratic regimes by providing a systematic assessment of the factors that explain why there are shifts in the power distribution between political executives in semi-presidential regimes. I propose to test the key factors of power variation proposed in the literature on the power relationship between presidents and prime ministers, through two major studies, France's Fifth Republic and post-1993 Ukraine, and three suggestive studies of Finland, post-1993 Russia, and post-1990 Poland.This study tests those three set of theoretical explanations through historical analysis and develop a model explaining the causes of changes in the power relationship between presidents and prime ministers in semi-presidential regimes. More precisely, I try to assess the importance of the institutional design in semi-presidential regimes versus the impact of non-institutional factors, highlighting the role of the specific national context (partisan politics, non-institutional factors) in shaping political practice between political executives.The examination of institutional practice through the lens of the power relationship between political executives in the semi-presidential regimes demonstrates that this claim needs to be revisited. Theoretically, the results of the historical analysis support historical, sociological, and normative institutionalist theories, which have stressed the need to go beyond orthodox institutionalist theories. Globally, results show the theoretical need to capture the political, social, international, and economic context in order to define and predict the power distribution between political actors in semi-presidential regimes. This study highlights the need to dismiss the claim that institutional unpredictability is solely observed in unstable country and showcases the complex dynamic that (a) institutions adapt to their political environment, while (b) the political environment adapts to the institutions.

Diploma thesis attempts to apply an actualized concept of semi-presidential regime of Matthew Shugart on concrete cases of countries where the role of president has weakened over the course of last 30 years (Finland), and where the role of president has conversely grown up (Iceland). Theoretical part of the study presents the thoughts of the main actors of the semi-presidentialism debate and political-systems debate in general from the 1970s till current times. A special regard is being put forward on the conflict between legalist approach of system classifications according to written laws, and behavioralist approach of classifications through the degree of actually exercised power of individual political figures in real time. Practical part of the study follows a long-term evolution of a political system of the two selected Scandinavian republics, whose categorizations have been disputed in the academic literature. Hence a (non)utility of the semi-presidentialism theory is demonstrated exactly on the examples of Finland and Iceland. On the basis of such built-up frame, the author concludes the work by a hypothesis explaining a gradual rise or decline of power of the head of state according to internal and external political factors.

This thesis deals with the topic of semi-presidential systems. As the title suggests, semi-presidential modes oscillate somewhere on the border between parliamentarism and presidentialism. Considering the fact that even the scholars have no consensus how to define this term, the whole study is conceived as a comparison of the opinions of prominent Czech as well as international constitutional lawyers and political scientists. Nowadays the necessity to define the semi-presidential model clearly becomes important because there has been a lengthy discussion after implementation of new constitutional phenomenon in the Czech Republic (the direct election of the head of the state) about how it affected the constitutional system of the state. Both the public and many prominent experts have the opinion that it is the direct presidential election that has changed the constitutional system of the Czech Republic from a purely parliamentary model to a semi- presidential model or at least, it significantly leads to it. The objectives of this study are modest. Since the number of mutually different definitions of this system from the perspective of many constitutional lawyers and political scientists is really large, it was impossible to cover such a broad topic completely, therefore this work is devoted to the...

As attention of scholars shift from perils of presidentialism to perils of semipresidentialism in the recent decades, French style of cohabitation power sharing mode in the executive merits our endeavor to understand the micro-dynamics that is embedded in it. It includes how it emerged, how it was practiced and what consequences it produced. Such effort, if wisely applied, can probably be helpful in slowing down the rate of political system breakdown in many of the newly emerged democratic systems that emulate the French model. After an introduction to the blackbox of French cohabitation, the remainder of the dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the existing literature on French cohabitation. Chapter 3 introduces the interpretive paradigm of qualitative research that is employed to analyze data and to facilitate theory building. In the 4th theoretical discussion chapter, three elements of practice theory approach ¡V temporality, duality of structure and unanticipated consequences are elaborated respectively. The three elements correspond to answer three research questions comprising how cohabitation emerged, how it was practiced and what kinds of consequences it produced. Chapter 5 to 8 display findings to the questions. They unravel for us other faces of French cohabitation which can be an active outcome of rationalization, a dynamic generator and a collective inevitable self-deception. Chapter 9 concludes by delineating theoretical and practical contribution of the dissertation.

Presidential power and constitutional issues are at the very core of recent popular upheavals in the former Soviet republics, as demonstrated by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and similar protests in Georgia in 2003 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. After the demise of the Soviet Union, these countries opted for a particular form of semi-presidentialism, here referred to as president-parliamentary. This dissertation deals with president-parliamentary systems, as well as with the other form of semi-presidentialism, namely premier-presidentialism. The study examines a typical feature of semi-presidentialism, i.e. intra-executive conflicts between the president and the prime minister/cabinet, by analysing the pattern, institutional triggers, and implications of such conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, the choice of semi-presidentialism and differences in transitional context and constitutional building are accounted for. The following countries are specifically dealt with: Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, and Romania, Russia and Ukraine. The study’s empirical base is a mixture of data derived from literature, reports, review of constitutional documents, as well as from an expert survey conducted among analysts with an expert knowledge on the countries under scrutiny. The results suggest that both actor-oriented and historical-institutional factors have to be considered in order to understand why so many post-communist countries ended up with semi-presidentialism, and why there is such a sharp divide between Central Europe and the (non-Baltic) former Soviet republics with regard to the choice of semi-presidential type. The pattern of intra-executive struggles reveals that conflicts were somewhat more recurrent in the early period following the transition, but persist as a frequently occurring phenomenon throughout the post-communist period. The most common type of conflict has revolved around division of powers within the executive branch. As for triggers of conflict, the study suggests that certain institutional factors, such as electoral concurrence and party system fragmentation, have been important. Regarding the management of conflict, and the options available to the conflicting parties, the analysis indicates that the constitutional courts have played an important role as conflict mediators, and that attempts of changing the constitution, and using public addresses are options preferred by the presidents. Finally, the analysis shows that intra-executive conflict is associated with cabinet instability. A case study example also illustrates how the president-parliamentary framework can be related to policy ineffectiveness. The study finally concludes that premier-presidential systems have great governance potential provided that the party systems develop and consolidate. The conclusions regarding the president-parliamentary system are less encouraging, and it is argued that the adoption of this system is an important factor in relation to the failed democratisation in many post-Soviet countries.

The current French president has more possibilities to strengthen his position within the political system of the Fifth republic than his predecessors before the year 2000. This is the conclusion of this paper. At the turn of the millennium, French citizens have approved in a referendum the reduction of presidential term from seven to five years. In addition french prime minister initiated the change of the electoral calendar. Thanks to these reforms the probability that the system freezes in the period of cohabitation decreased significantly. In that context, this paper examines in what extend the role of the president became more important and how the last three french heads of state (Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande) managed to behave within this new constitutional settlement. According to the results of this study, the president got wider possibilities especially in the field of practical execution of his mandate. It is because he can be more certain that the parliamentary majority will support him during his whole five year term. This means that the constitutional reform in 2000 (and next revisions in 2007 and 2008) made the political system clearer and it also stabilized the electoral calendar. Additionally, if an ambitious politician with the will of concentrating big amount of power only in his own...

共黨國家雖為一黨專政，但在最高領導層常形成具有二元領導的意涵的集體領導。二元領導體制是有兩位行政領導人的體制；由於二元領導體制符合許多政治狀況的需要，全世界有四分之一以上的國家採取二元領導體制，其中多為半總統制。本文認為東歐後共國家普遍形成半總統制的原因，在於共黨統治時期採取二元領導，以使統治菁英的集體領導得以鞏固。在此二元領導體制下，黨書記通常主管黨務、軍事，總理主管行政、經濟。 本文的重點在於第三章第二、三節的分析。第二節首先從黨內權力制衡的需要分析，指出共黨國家在初期的強人政治或單一領導之後，制度的要求與交易上的精英集體的利益極大化，共同促成一種展現為國家與黨的領導人和行政領導人的分立的二元領導體制。其後從權力繼承制度化與幹部年輕化的重要性進行分析，指出共黨國家二元領導體制要走向成熟，必須破除領導職務終身制。 在第三章第三節，本文引入國際政治學結構現實主義的觀點，強調權力結構的「二元」穩定性，同時分析共黨國家領導層的職務分配可能性，將之區分為單一領導、典型二元領導、非典型二元領導、多元領導等類型，並以蘇聯與中國大陸的政治菁英的職務分配作為範例加以介紹，說明典型二元領導是共黨國家領導體制的趨勢。 在此分析之後，本文在第四章分析蘇聯的領導體制變化，在第五章分析中共的職務分配趨勢。本文結論認為，中共幹部年輕化的制度壓力，使中共現任軍委主席江澤民必須盡快退休，而依據本文對典型二元領導體制的建構與利弊分析，中共政治菁英的共識將是讓胡錦濤接任中央軍委主席職務。倘若中共政局果真如此發展，則中共的典型二元領導將進一步強化。此種趨勢的進一步發展，將使中共民主化後傾向於採取半總統制。

監察制度（control system）是民主體制中重要的監督機制，主要的功能是監督行政和保障人權，隨著第三波民主化的發展，從一九八０年代開始，監察使制度（ombudsman system）快速擴散至全世界，形成一股「監察風潮」（Ombudsmania）。在民主國家中，我國與芬蘭都是實施監察制度較悠久的國家，僅次於瑞典。無獨有偶，兩國都在一九九０年至二０００年進行一連串的憲政改革，修憲後我國政府體制從修正式的內閣制（Parliamentarism）轉變為半總統制（Semi-Presidentialism），而芬蘭則從典型的半總統制傾向議會內閣制。同時在憲政改革的過程中，兩國的監察制度也都有許多的變革。 本文是從權力分立原則（Doctrine of Separation of Powers）、有限政府（Limited Government）和第四權（The Fourth Branch of Power）概念等監察理論作為法理基礎，並以法制研究途徑（Legal-Institutional Approach）和新制度主義（New Institutionalism）作為分析架構，從靜態的法制層面和動態的運作層面，探討我國的監察制度和芬蘭的國會監察使制度，以及兩國在二０００年憲政改革之後的運作情況，以瞭解兩國制度之特色及優劣，並且針對中、芬兩國基本國情、監察制度的基本差異、制度與制度變遷、實務運作與案件、實施成效等幾個面向來作分析比較，剖析其間之異同及其原因。 再者，本文也根據國際性比較與芬蘭國會監察使制度之優點和成功經驗，歸納出監察制度實施成功之條件，包括：（一）監察使「權威」（authority）的建立。（二）具備獨立性、中立性和專業性的特性。（三）健全的國家廉政體系。（四）國會的支持與配合。（五）政治人物對監察使和監察制度的尊重。（六）監察使與外界建立良好的互動關係。並進一步評估我國現行監察制度之問題，主要有下列幾項：（一）形式獨立但實質獨立性不足。（二）監察院的權威未建立。（三）部分監委人選不適任。（四）監察院的功能有待提升。（五）缺乏行銷以及與外界互動不足。 最後，筆者針對以上缺失，分別從監察院的定位、組織規模、監委選任、特殊監察使的設立、監察院的職權、監察院的預算、人權保障、與外界互動、對監委的監督等幾個面向，提出具體改革之建議。 / The control system is an important mechanism in democracy to supervise administration and to protect human rights. Since 1980, with the development of the third wave democratization, the ombudsman system rapidly disseminate to all parts of world, forming the phenomenon of “Ombudsmania”. Among the democratic countries, the control system has been carried out for long in both ROC and Finland, only shorter than Sweden Coincidently, both countries underwent a series of constitutional reform during 1990 to 2000. Thereafter, ROC transformed from the revised Parliamentarism to the Semi-Presidentialism, while Finland turned from the classical Semi-Presidentialism to the parliamentarism. The control systems of both countries have also changed a lot during the constitutional reform. Based on the control theories including concepts of Doctrine of Separation of Powers, Limited Government, and The Fourth Branch of Power as the legal basis, this article utilized the Legal-Institutional Approach and the analysis constructs of New Institutionalism to explore the ROC’s control system and parliamentary ombudsman system of Finland, as well as their operation after the post-constitutional reform in 2000, from the static legislative level and the dynamic operational level. This provided understanding of the characteristics and evaluations of the systems in both countries. Moreover, we focused on the aspects of the essential differences in cultures and in the control systems, the evolution of the systems, the functioning, the cases, and their outcomes to analyze the reasons for the differences between the two systems. Furthermore, based on the international comparison and the success experience in parliamentary ombudsman of Finland, the conditions required for successful practice of the control system was involved: (1) establishment of the authority of the ombudsman, (2) the independent, neutral, and professional characteristics, (3) The national integrity system, (4) the support and cooperation of the parliament, (5) The respect of the politicians to the ombudsman and to the control system, and (6) The well-established interaction between the ombudsman and the outside. Further evaluation found the major problems in the present control system in ROC, including (1) lack of the substantial independence, (2) not established authority, (3) the incapability of some Control Yuan members, (4) the necessity to improve the functions of the Control Yuan, (5) the deficiency of marketing and of interaction with the outside. Finally, for the weakness mentioned above, I proposed the concrete recommendation for reformation, from the aspects of the position of the Control Yuan, the dimension of the organization, the election of the committee members, the establishment of specific Ombudsman, the powers and the budgets for the Control Yuan, the protection of human rights, the interactions with the outside, and the administrations of the committee members.