L’apparition de l’arme nucléaire et son utilisation par les Américains en 1945 sur les villes japonaises d’Hiroshima et de Nagasaki ont été assez largement comprises en Occident comme marquant la fin des guerres chaudes directes et l’entrée du monde dans des guerres froides indirectes et totales. Dès les années 1950, le sentiment s’est fait jour au sein des milieux militaires occidentaux que l’âge nucléaire nous éloigne, au moins partiellement, des conceptions stratégiques élaborées dans le cadre de la tradition clausewitzienne. De même, les revers que connaissent les armées occidentales au cours des guerres de décolonisation ont pu amener les stratèges de l’époque à s’interroger sur le bien-fondé de leurs réflexions sur l’action. Mais, plus que tout, la récente guerre contre le terrorisme, où ces mêmes armées suréquipées sont tenues en échec par un adversaire irrégulier qui évite la confrontation directe et cherche à user l’ennemi, sans qu’on puisse espérer jamais en venir totalement à bout, semble mettre carrément en question les présupposés mêmes de la « science militaire ». Par contraste avec l’impasse où les élaborations conceptuelles des Machiavel, des Clausewitz et, plus récemment, des John von Neumann, auraient conduit l’Occident, la tradition chinoise de réflexion sur l’action est perçue, dans cette même partie du globe, comme plus adaptée aux nouvelles conditions du monde contemporain. Beaucoup sont persuadés que se trouvent chez le théoricien chinois du Ve siècle avant J.-C. Sun Zi un certain nombre de solutions pour triompher infailliblement dans toutes les situations conflictuelles du monde actuel. À travers l’examen des grands textes par lesquels traditions occidentale et chinoise de réflexion sur l’action se sont construites, l’étude s’emploie à rétablir un équilibre, et si possible une certaine objectivité dans la façon de concevoir et d’estimer celles-ci. Elle dénonce certaines illusions – dont l’illusion idéaliste – dont sont parfois victimes ceux que fascine la tradition chinoise, et souligne en particulier que les choses tangibles tels que les territoires, les machines de guerre, la puissance de feu, ne sont pas entièrement relativisées par rapport à la connaissance, à l’information ou aux aspects plus ou moins virtuels de la guerre. En mettant en évidence les dynamismes qui structurent chacune des deux cultures stratégiques, l’étude montre surtout que la volonté de hiérarchiser celles-ci est vaine. / The invention of the nuclear weapon and its use by the United States in 1945 on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have generally been considered by Western countries as a shifting from direct hot war to indirect and total cold war. From the Fifties onward, there has been a growing feeling among Western military circles that the nuclear age strays, at least partially, from the strategic conceptions developed in the wake of the Clausewitzian tradition. Likewise, the setbacks experienced by Western armies during wars of decolonization led strategists back then to question the validity of their reflection on action. But most of all, the recent war on terrorism led by countries whose over-equipped armies are held at bay by an irregular adversary avoiding direct confrontation, and wearing down the enemy leaving no hope of a total elimination seems to throw into question the presuppositions of military science. Contrary to the dead-end where the conceptual elaborations of Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and more recently, John von Neumann, and their followers, would have led Western countries, the Chinese tradition of reflection on action is perceived, in this same part of the world, as more adapted to the new conditions of the modern world. Many among them are convinced that they can find in the writings of a 5th century BC Chinese theoretician, Sun Zi, a certain number of solutions to prevail unerringly in any given conflictual situation in the world. Basing itself on the study of great writings through which oriental and occidental traditions upon reflection on action have been built, this study strives to re-establish a balance, and if possible, a certain objectivity in its approach to conceive and estimate this reflection. This study also denounces certain illusions, among which include the idealistic illusion, sometimes affecting thinkers fascinated by Chinese tradition, and particularly stresses the fact that tangible things such as territories, war machines and fire power are not entirely relativized in relation to knowledge, information, or aspects of war more or less virtual. By highlighting the dynamisms structuring the two strategic cultures, this study shows above all that trying to organize them into a hierarchy is pointless.

Theorists of military effectiveness have, through the course of time, developed principles explaining ways in which victory is efficiently enabled in battle. However, as a result of technological developments as well as a lack of empirical research, the principle of concentration is now questioned in terms of its explanatory value when applied in the context of modern naval warfare. Its questioning finds even more foundation in light of the fact that it still has a place in naval doctrines. This study therefore aims to examine whether the fundamental basics of the principle are applicable as a concept leading to success in modern naval operations where missiles are used as the main source of weaponry. Thus, are theories on concentration of force, formed by Sun Zi, Antonie- Henri Jomini and Alfred Thayer Mahan, used to create a theoretical framework which then functions as an analytical tool in analysing the Israeli success in 1973 and the Argentine failure in 1982. Accordingly, the result of this analysis offers convincing evidence for the principle of concentration in terms of its continued applicability in modern naval warfare in spite of environmental changes caused by technology. However, more research is needed if further conclusions are to be drawn in terms of generalizability.

The principle of war, surprise, has long been criticized for being imprecise and in need of interpretation. Some believe it is because of this ambiguity that the principle has survived in military doctrine. The purpose of the study is thereby to empirically test the principle of surprise to investigate its validity in modern naval warfare. Due to the lack of precision in doctrine, the surprise has been interpreted into an analytical instrument based on the compiled thoughts written by theoreticians; Sun Zi, Carl Von Clausewitz, Raoul Castex and Milan Vego. The analytical instrument aims to identify whether criteria for surprise are represented or not in a context of successful surprise. This was achieved through a two-case study based on a qualitative text analysis of the methods used by the Sea Tigers of Sri Lanka and the attack on ARA General Belgrano during the Falklands War. The study shows that all the criteria were met in some way in both cases and that the military principal surprise is valid as a principle of war in modern naval warfare. Further research is recommended to investigate more cases and not to limit the research to a tactical level.

清朝光緒年間在佛教都市敦煌莫高窟中發現多量的古文獻寫本，其中就有俗文學類的 講唱文學－後來所謂的變文。依其內容題材區分。可大別為講經與講史兩種。本論文 及在變文的兩類中，研究其中講史一類而以董永變文、舜子變文、伍子胥變文等三篇 的主題及其相關問題作為研究範圍。 茲謹扼要簡述各章內容，大要如後： 第一章 緒論：本章分別先述研究動機。目的及其範圍，然後弔陳研究內容要旨與方 法。 第二章 董永變文之研究：本章計分八節，第一節、第二節研究「孝」與佛教有關的 問題；第三節敘述董永變卜的內容概要；第四節研究孝子董永傳的流傳經過；第五節 以至第七節下分別研究董永變文的構成三大主體：賣身故事、神婚故事、天上訪母故 事。第八節是索董永變文中所反映的宗教性，這也可以說關於主題本質的研究。 第三章 舜子變文之研究：本章計分六節。第一節以探討舜子變文的內容為主；第二節研究變 文中的民間傳承色彩；第三節研究舜子帝王故事；第四節是孝子舜子出息發跡故事； 第五節研究繼母虐待繼子故事；第六節計分二目。 分別是探討「本土民間信仰」與「佛教思想」。 第四章 伍子胥變文之研究：本章計分四節。第一節伍子胥傳說的來源及演變所探討 的分別是：伍子胥的傳說。伍子胥變文內容概要、伍子胥變文與史傳的差異；第二節 復仇觀念的分析。分別探討血屬復仇與其社會觀念、伍子胥與豫讓復仇譚、伍子胥變 文入物形象與民眾思想感情；第三節民間信仰的研究；第四節由藥名詩的問答、典故 的的引用、兵法知識皂表現等以明伍子胥變文的文學藝術。 第五章 結論：簡述董永變文、舜子變文、伍子胥變文等三篇的主題及其相關的諸問 題。

The ability to fight is, according to Swedish Armed Forces Doctrine (MilitärstrategiskDoktrin), depending upon the physical component, the conceptual component and themoral component.The purpose of this thesis is to examine in what way the Swedish doctrine is based onthe theories on war and war fighting by Sun Zi, Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine Henri deJomini and Mao Tse-tung.I have found that the Swedish doctrine is based on those theories.However, the Swedish doctrine needs to be developed in order to better explain therelation between the three components. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 03-05

In the 1940s, Sweden adopted a policy known as Det fria kriget (approximately translated to The Free War) which was a conceptualization of a war in which its homeland had suffered a major invasion by a malignant and far stronger opponent. Det fria kriget remains, to this day, mostly a set of instructions outlining how the military were to reorganize itself, at that point, to uphold the nations military resilience. This paper compares, contrasts, and discusses established conceptualizations of guerrilla warfare along the traditions of Sun Tzu, Lenin, Mao, and Che Guevara and concludes that Det fria kriget is in fact a conceptualization of Swedish guerrilla warfare. This paper calls to action a deeper understanding of the tradition and how it might have changed up until today, if it is to serve the nation’s interests come tomorrow as well.