Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The problem of this dissertation is to ascertain to what extent the philosophy of Georg W. F. Hegel is influential in the formulation of the philosophy of education of William Torrey Harris. The term 'influence' is used in three different ways: First, in the straightforward sense in which Harris makes specific mention that an idea which he accepts was the direct result of his exposure to Hegel. Second, when an idea of Hegel's is accepted in toto by Harris and there is no evidence that Harris obtained the idea from any other source. Third, when an idea of Hegel's leads Harris to modify or expand it to such an extent that the idea can no longer be strictly called Hegelian. The most frequent use of the term is in the two former senses rather than in the latter problematic sense. On the basis of an examination of Harris' own intellectual and philosophical development, this work suggests that the primary area of Hegel's influence on Harris is axiological. Harris utilizes the Hegelian notion of freedom as the central notion in his philosophy of education. Underlying this notion of freedom is the category of causality, which, when viewed under the category of the understanding implies mechanistic determinism but, when viewed from the level of reason implies self-determination which is non-mechanistic. However, Harris' analysis of freedom is not exhausted by an "abstract justification," to use Hegel's term. Both Hegel and Harris insist that abstract or metaphysical freedom must be made concrete in the institutional life of the state. At this point, Harris' discussion of the major institutions of society, i.e., the family, civil society, and the state, are almost totally Hegelian. The relation of education to the state then becomes clear: Harris defines education as the process by which the individual becomes ethical--a definition which Harris takes to be originally Hegel's. The school is conceived of as that institution which enables the individual to become self-estranged or self-alienated, a necessary characteristic in the development of the ethical life. For Harris as well as Hegel the self is initially characterized as selfish. However, this quality must be overcome in order that the individual may become ethical i.e., an effective member of the state. For Harris, the central notion of an educational philosophy must be grounded in philosophy itself. However, educational philosophy also has the responsibility to formulate the means by which the philosophical objective may be implemented. For example, using Hegelian terms, Harris insists that the elementary school operates at the level of representation, the secondary school at the level of understanding, and the college at the level of reason. These three levels of education correspond generally to Hegel's categories of being, essence, and notion. However, the main function of the school is to see that the will and the intellect are trained so that they will enhance the freedom of the person. Thus, the elementary school may emphasize the training of the will, but not to the point where it would ignore the training of the intellect. On the other hand, various traditional subjects, especially the humanities, afford the student the opportunity to study the history of the intellect and the will: for example, a history of man's actions is a study of the will, while the history of philosophy is an examination of man's intellectual attempt to come to understand reality. If the school were successful in enabling the student to find truth and to act in accordance with truth, then the goal of education would be realized; that is, the student would have turned his formal or abstract freedom into substantial or concrete freedom. Harris' philosophical and educational views are critically examined on five counts: His notion of freedom, his ideas on the various levels of knowing and their relationship to education, his notion of the relationship of the self to institutional arrangements, his theory of the relationship between the school and other institutions, and finally his views on the relationship between philosophy and philosophy of education. In conclusion, it is suggested that Harris' contribution to educational philosophy lies not in the construction of a new perspective, but in the application of the Hegelian philosophy to the problem of education. / 2031-01-01

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El propòsit principal d'aquesta tesi és analitzar críticament l'antropologia filosòfica de Charles Taylor.A la primera part abordem qüestions preliminars: les fonts, els fonaments teòrics i els elements metodològics del seu pensament.A la segona part elaborem la seva teoria de la identitat. Això implica: (1) donar compte de la relació inextricable entre el jo de la persona i la seva orientació moral, i (2) per mitjà d'arguments transcendentals, articular una ontologia que determini els trets perennes de la naturalesa humana.Una ontologia de la identitat exigeix l'articulació de les continuïtats i discontinuïtats entre els animals humans i no humans. És a dir, una filosofia de la biologia que aporti les intuïcions de l'aristotelisme al post-darwinisme. En línia amb Adaslair MacIntyre, intentem completar les aportacions realitzades per Taylor en el context de la seva filosofia de l'acció.D'altra banda, identifiquem alguns dels trets distintius de l'agent humà (lingüisticitat, propòsit i dialogicitat), i abordem els desafiaments de (1) les versions que radicalitzen les conseqüències de la contingència del subjecte i (2) els reduccionisme que prosperen entre els filòsofs analítics. Per això hem confrontat a les interpretacions de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche i Freud, i a la posició quasi-budista de Parfit, l'hermenèutica forta de Charles Taylor i Paul Ricoeur.A la tercera part, estudiem la dimensió històrica de la identitat humana. Això implica assenyalar les peculiaritats del anthropos modern. Per això, a més de contraposar al jo modern la versió premoderna de la nostra comuna humanitat, hem hagut d'enfrontar a la interpretació de Taylor sobre el sentit de les mutacions cosmovisionales, antropològiques i ètiques de la modernitat, les interpretacions que a aquestes mutacions concedeixen autors com Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre i Jürgen Habermas. / El propósito principal de esta tesis es analizar críticamente la antropología filosófica de Charles Taylor. En la primera parte abordamos cuestiones preliminares: las fuentes, los fundamentos teóricos y los elementos metodológicos de su pensamiento. En la segunda parte elaboramos su teoría de la identidad. Eso implica: (1) dar cuenta de la relación inextricable entre el yo de la persona y su orientación moral; y (2) por medio de argumentos trascendentales, articular una ontología que determine los rasgos perennes de la naturaleza humana. Una ontología de la identidad exige la articulación de las continuidades y discontinuidades entre los animales humanos y no humanos. Es decir, una filosofía de la biología que aporte las intuiciones del aristotelismo al post-darwinismo. En línea con Adaslair MacIntyre, intentamos completar los aportes realizados por Taylor en el contexto de su filosofía de la acción. Por otro lado, identificamos algunos de los rasgos distintivos del agente humano (lingüisticidad, propósito y dialogicidad); y abordamos los desafíos de (1) las versiones que radicalizan las consecuencias de la contingencia del sujeto y (2) los reduccionismos que prosperan entre los filósofos analíticos. Para ello hemos confrontado a las interpretaciones de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche y Freud, y a la posición cuasi-budista de Parfit, con la hermenéutica fuerte de Charles Taylor y Paul Ricoeur.En la tercera parte, estudiamos la dimensión histórica de la identidad humana. Eso implica señalar las peculiaridades del anthropos moderno. Para ello, además de contraponer al yo moderno la versión premoderna de nuestra común humanidad, hemos tenido que enfrentar a la interpretación de Taylor sobre el sentido de las mutaciones cosmovisionales, antropológicas y éticas de la modernidad, las interpretaciones que a éstas mutaciones conceden autores como Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre y Jürgen Habermas. / The main purpose of this thesis is to critically analyze the philosophical anthropology of Charles Taylor.The first part deals with preliminary issues: the sources, the theoretical and methodological elements of his thought.In the second part we elaborate his theory of identity. This implies: (1) to account for the inextricable relationship between the self of the person and his moral orientation, and (2) by means of transcendental arguments, to articulate an ontology that determines the perennial features of human nature.An ontology of identity requires the articulation of the continuities and discontinuities between human and nonhuman animals. That is, a philosophy of biology which provides insights from Aristotelianism to post-Darwinism. In line with Adaslair MacIntyre, we try to complete the contributions made by Taylor in the context of his philosophy of action.On the other hand, we identify some of the distinctive features of human agency (language, purpose and dialogue) and tackle the challenges of (1) versions that radicalized the consequences of the contingency of the subject and (2) the reductionism that thrive among the analytical philosophers. So we confront the interpretations of Richard Rorty about Nietzsche and Freud, and the quasi-Buddhism of Parfit, with the strong hermeneutics of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur.In the third part, we study the historical dimension of human identity. That means pointing out the peculiarities of the modern anthropos. Therefore, in addition to contrast the modern self with the premodern version of our common humanity, we confront Taylor's interpretation of the meaning of the cosmological, anthropological and ethical mutations of modernity, with the interpretations that authors as Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair MaIntyre offer about these mutations.