The Air Power theories of today are often written from a superior air force perspective where the overall focus is on the offensive nature of Air Power. Very little is spoken about Air Power and its defensive role as well as the inferior states opportunities against superior opponents. A state that successfully has used Air Power through history is Israel. During both the Six Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur in 1973, Israel faced superior opponents consisting of a coalition of Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Despite Israel being the initially inferior state during both wars, they managed to gain initiative against the superior Arab states. This study will set the Air Power theories of Philip S Meilinger to a test through a validation process against two cases, the Six Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur in 1973. The aim is to analyse the Israeli air force during these two wars. The main goal is to try to explain how inferior states can succeed against superior opponents through Air Power. The result of the study demonstrates that an inferior state has the opportunity to achieve success through Air Power against superior opponents. The analyses of Meilingers theories indicates that high readiness, early employment of forces, use of Air Powers psychological effect and timing constitutes successful factors in gaining initiative. An additional important factor for achieving success through these variables is highly relevant intelligence.

There are different ways to understand warfare. Some see it as an artform, some as a science. For hundreds of years writers and theorists have tried to explain war in terms of principles such as initiative, surprise, and simplicity. These principles are sometimes distilled into maxims that try to define the most meaningful, crucial rules of war. This essay examines naval writer Wayne P. Huhges’s maxim “attack effectively first”. The somewhat self-evident concept of attacking effectively first leading to naval victory is tested and discussed. Hughes has developed three factors that he sees as essential in achieving the maxim, firepower, scouting and command and control (C2). The factors are analyzed and applied to the Yom Kippur war to investigate their meaning and value. The results of the analysis show that the factors are necessary to attack effectively first. However more research is required to evaluate how other factors can contribute and if the maxim is relevant in other maritime warfare cases.

<p>The topic of this essay is the strategic importance of the <em>Golan Heights</em> during the period <em>1967-1973, </em>specifically targeting the following<em> </em>questions;</p><p>-          <em>Why were the heights strategically important</em>?</p><p>-          <em>What are the gains of either of the states in controlling the Golan Heights?</em></p><p>A theoretical framework based on Jerker Widén´s and Jan Ångström´s <em>Militärteorins grunder</em> (The fundamentals in Military Theory) and its chapter regarding the strategic context will be used as an analytical framework.</p><p>The framework has been applied on the specific conditions of the Golan Heights during a given and limited period of time; stretching from 1967 to 1973, however, the study will <em>not</em> deal with the <em>war of attrition</em> in 1970 as the impact on the Golan Heights and the surrounding geographical strategically important area was limited if at all. The two wars waged during this particular time are used in an attempt to give a somewhat objective picture of the strategic importance of the area.</p><p>The conclusions are that the importance of the Golan heights during the selected period was significant as the Golan Heights provided a “strategic lock” both ways and provides a favourable area to deploy artillery, intelligence and surveillance sensors.</p> / <p>Denna uppsats behandlar främst de grundläggande teorierna kring strategi applicerade på referensobjektet Golanhöjderna under åren 1967-1973.</p><p>Syftet är att svara på frågorna:</p><p><em>Varför var höjderna viktiga ur ett strategiskt perspektiv?</em></p><p><em>Vilka fördelar vinner endera</em> <em>staten på att besitta dem?</em></p><p>Tidsrymden har valts med tanke på att det är under denna tid som de häftigaste striderna ägde rum på detta specifika terrängavsnitt. Utnötningskriget 1970 berörs ej då det inte berörde terrängavsnittet. De parter som behandlas är Israel och Syrien då dessa gränsar till varandra runt Golanhöjderna.</p><p>De bägge parternas planer och mål under stridigheterna kommer att analyseras enligt en deskriptivt-analyserande metod och även till viss del jämföras vad avser deras avsikter och önskade slutläge.</p><p>Den teoretiska referensramen, vilken skall fungera som ett analysverktyg, består huvudsakligen av sex belysande aspekter som tillsammans kan beskriva den strategiska bilden, hämtade ur Jerker Widéns och Jan Ångströms bok <em>Militärteorins grunder</em>. Utöver dessa sex aspekter kommer även manöverkrig, linjaritet samt rysk krigskonst att beskrivas. Dessa operationaliseras sedan på referensobjektet och leder fram till en diskussion som sedan mynnar ut i ett antal slutsatser.</p><p>De slutsatser som har dragits är att Golanhöjderna har en strategisk vikt i området 1967-1973 då de fungerade som ett ”strategiskt lås” för bägge sidor samt att höjderna var värdefulla ur underrättelse-/spaningshänseende.</p>

The topic of this essay is the strategic importance of the Golan Heights during the period 1967-1973, specifically targeting the following questions; -          Why were the heights strategically important? -          What are the gains of either of the states in controlling the Golan Heights? A theoretical framework based on Jerker Widén´s and Jan Ångström´s Militärteorins grunder (The fundamentals in Military Theory) and its chapter regarding the strategic context will be used as an analytical framework. The framework has been applied on the specific conditions of the Golan Heights during a given and limited period of time; stretching from 1967 to 1973, however, the study will not deal with the war of attrition in 1970 as the impact on the Golan Heights and the surrounding geographical strategically important area was limited if at all. The two wars waged during this particular time are used in an attempt to give a somewhat objective picture of the strategic importance of the area. The conclusions are that the importance of the Golan heights during the selected period was significant as the Golan Heights provided a “strategic lock” both ways and provides a favourable area to deploy artillery, intelligence and surveillance sensors. / Denna uppsats behandlar främst de grundläggande teorierna kring strategi applicerade på referensobjektet Golanhöjderna under åren 1967-1973. Syftet är att svara på frågorna: Varför var höjderna viktiga ur ett strategiskt perspektiv? Vilka fördelar vinner endera staten på att besitta dem? Tidsrymden har valts med tanke på att det är under denna tid som de häftigaste striderna ägde rum på detta specifika terrängavsnitt. Utnötningskriget 1970 berörs ej då det inte berörde terrängavsnittet. De parter som behandlas är Israel och Syrien då dessa gränsar till varandra runt Golanhöjderna. De bägge parternas planer och mål under stridigheterna kommer att analyseras enligt en deskriptivt-analyserande metod och även till viss del jämföras vad avser deras avsikter och önskade slutläge. Den teoretiska referensramen, vilken skall fungera som ett analysverktyg, består huvudsakligen av sex belysande aspekter som tillsammans kan beskriva den strategiska bilden, hämtade ur Jerker Widéns och Jan Ångströms bok Militärteorins grunder. Utöver dessa sex aspekter kommer även manöverkrig, linjaritet samt rysk krigskonst att beskrivas. Dessa operationaliseras sedan på referensobjektet och leder fram till en diskussion som sedan mynnar ut i ett antal slutsatser. De slutsatser som har dragits är att Golanhöjderna har en strategisk vikt i området 1967-1973 då de fungerade som ett ”strategiskt lås” för bägge sidor samt att höjderna var värdefulla ur underrättelse-/spaningshänseende.

The principles of war have been questioned for a long time. Many scientists and military officers believe that they are too wide-ranging, contradictory or even invalid. Nonetheless, the principles of war have been institutionalised in several military doctrines and are used in military education. The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the principles of war can explain the outcome of modern maritime warfare. Since the principles of war cannot be regarded as one theory, Liddell Hart’s theory of the principles of war is chosen for this analysis. Using a case study method, the Battle of Baltim in the Yom Kippur War and the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano in the battle of the Falklands Islands are analysed against the theory. Although Liddell Hart’s theory was developed by analysing land warfare, the principles of war are regarded as universal and generally applicable and therefore may be used for analysing maritime warfare. The result of the analysis shows that Liddell Hart’s principles of war can explain the outcome of modern maritime warfare. The principlessecurity, mobility, concentration and surprise are observed in both cases to varying degrees and they are significant in explaining the outcome of the event. Even though Liddell Hart’s theory can explain the outcome, it is shown that the principle of mobility rarely will be fully achieved in submarine operations because of the lack of self-defence systems against enemy weapons.

A trend in modern warfare is to conduct war both conventionally and unconventionally. This modern era sets high demands on conventional forces to face the contemporary threat. Most of the modern conventional forces conduct war through maneuver warfare and uses the practice of combined arms to organize and fight, but is the method of combined arms still a valid method? This study examines Robert Leonhard’s theory of combined arms in the Yom Kippur war 1973 and during the American Thunder Runs in Baghdad 2003. The research question that this study is trying to answer is how the combined arms theory can explain the tactical success in the two cases. Previous studies about the theory explains how it could be understood, not how it is used. The theory encompasses three principles which is applied to the two cases to allow a structured analysis. The results show that both the Israelis and the Americans use the combined arms theory to achieve tactical success. What the analysis also shows is that the theory is not the only element that achieved success, but also technical advantage, moral and experience made an impact on the outcome of the cases.

Syftet med studien är att undersöka tre sekventiella teoriers förklaringskraft kring taktisk framgång vid defensiva operationer. Inom krigsvetenskapen är enigheten stor om att manöverkrigföring är den främsta metoden för en mindre armé som vill besegra en större motståndare i ett konventionellt krig. Teorin kring manöverkrigföring är dock offensivt inriktad och en oförsiktig tolkning kan leda till en övertro på möjligheten att snabbt nå avgörande resultat. Denna studie undersöker därför på vilket sätt manöverkrigföring kan leda till framgång vid defensiva operationer. Studien genomförs som en fallstudie med kongruensanalys av tre konkurrerande teorier som alla tar utgångspunkt i manöverkrigföring. Teorierna utgörs av Collins dynamiska modell, Biddles moderna system samt Thunholm och Henåkers idealmodell. Fallet som undersöks är Israels försvar av Golanhöjderna den 6-22 oktober 1973. Genom kongruensanalys med en konkurrerande ansats kan teorierna antingen stärkas eller försvagas vilket pekar på i vilken grad dessa kan användas vid analys, planering och genomförande av taktik. Resultatet av studien visar att Collins teori har högst kongruens med fallet samtidigt som denna typ av sekventiella modeller har begränsad användbarhet vid planering och genomförande av taktik. Resultatet pekar på att officerare och soldaters motivation samt kompetens på lägre taktisk nivå kan ha större påverkan på taktisk framgång än val av direkt eller indirekt metod. Dessutom visar studien på att fiendens organisatoriska sammanbrott kan uppnås genom en sekvens av försvar-motanfall-försvar och inte enbart som en följd av försvar-motanfall-exploatering.

This thesis examines how the use of combined arms according to Robert Leonhards theory can explain the military success on the tactical level of war in two historical cases. Previous studies focus mainly on how combined arms shall be understood and how it shall be used and not how combined arms has contributed to military success. This thesis uses a theory testing case study to examine how combined arms contributed to the military success of the Israeli forces in the Yom Kippur-war and to that of American forces in  Operation Desert Storm.   The analysis is based on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the analysis shows that both the Israeli forces and the American forces used the different principles of combined arms. The analysis also showed that the use of combined arms created military success at the tactical level of the different wars, but combined arms cannot by itself explain the military success as the technical advantages, moral and educational level also had a significant impact on the outcome.

Recent aggressions and geopolitical insecurities in the Baltic region have made it necessary for the Swedish armed forces to change their focus from an international defense policy to a territorial defense strategy. This change focuses mainly on strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Swedish armed Forces by reshaping the brigade structures with a focus on combined arms warfare in conjunction to maneuver warfare. Current doctrine and manuals show a lack in combined arms concerning its contribution to tactical success as well as its origin. As such a question whether tactical success can be explained with combined arms has been raised. This thesis aims to examine if Robert R Leonhard’s theory on combined arms can explain success at a tactical level during Operation Desert Storm and the Yom Kippur war and the analysis focuses on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the study shows that the theory can partly explain success at a tactical level in both cases. But further studies must be conducted on the subject in order to increase the theories explanatory power.

Henry Kissinger is considered to be one of the most influential diplomats of U.S. history. During the decade he spent directing the U.S. foreign affairs from one of the top level positions, he achieved many important successes. His power extended far beyond the normal competence of the secretary of state. His personal skills, which were an important asset in obtaining such an influential position, combined with the complicated internal political situation in the United States. At the time Kissinger entered the Middle East conflict as an important actor, the Nixon Administration fought against charges connected with the Watergate affair and the president consequently had little time and energz to devote to the foreign policy. Henry Kissinger could thus became the creator of American diplomacy and its main representative. The documents about the Yom Kippur War and the U.S. engagement in the region, which were declassified much later and which this thesis make use of, show that the real power of Henry Kissinger was much broader than widely believed.