From Introduction: Upon first reading the writings of both Pascal and Baudelaire, one cannot help being struck by a sensation of awe at the penetrating insight into the human condition possessed by both writers. A further exploration of the realms of Pascalian and Baudelairian thought considerably strengthens this initial reaction into a recognition that both authors were men of equal moral and spiritual intensity. Despite their outward differences, both sought to attain a deep understanding of human nature, but without attempting to offer any excuses on behalf of man. Furthermore, the two writers employ an identical term to describe the condition of humanity: "ennui". Although the word exists in the writings of contemporaries of both Pascal and Baudelaire, no other author makes such full, unique and significant use of ennui. As this thesis will hopefully prove, Baudelaire was indeed directly and positively influenced by Pascal. However, it is not our intention to concentrate upon such an influence; rather, we wish to indicate the parallels and development of the theme of ennui, so central to each man's outlook, in their respective writings. Evidently, it would be beyond the boundaries of this thesis if we were to try to analyse closely the entire creative output of Pascal and Baudelaire; and so, although their other works will act as points of reference, the two books which are generally regarded as their masterpieces will be used as the basis of the unfinished Christian "Apologie" which was projected by Pascal, now known as the Pensées (1670), and Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal (1857 and 1861)

In “Bodies of Wisdom,” I reassert the primacy of the body in the philosophical practices of two early modern French authors, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), whose writings have been associated with the ancient tradition of “philosophy as a way of life.” Harkening back to the Classical understanding of philosophy as a form of medicine, these authors’ works rely a good deal on somatic and/or medical terminology to describe states of the soul and philosophical practices more generally. While there exists a wide body of literature that addresses the medical analogy in Hellenistic philosophers, few commentators have ventured to read the analogy literally, and none thus far have done so for authors of the early modern period. In this dissertation, I reclaim the literal relationship between medicine and philosophy by examining instances in both authors where descriptions of health and illness can be read both metaphorically (“spiritually”) and literally (“somatically”). Philosophy is not just like medicine in that it seeks to bring about individual well-being; it is medicine in the fullest sense, because the exercises intended to bring about well-being must pass through the body in order to give lasting shape to the life of the practitioner. Many scholars have acknowledged Pascal’s inheritance of Montaigne’s moderate skepticism, and as one of history’s most astute – and sometimes acerbic – readers of Montaigne, Pascal was uniquely poised to highlight those aspects of Montaigne’s philosophy that attenuated the reader’s belief in the power of human reason. This meant that for both authors, there had to be some more reliable alternative to the reasoning mind to arrive at an understanding of truth. The body, it turns out, served just such a purpose. Although Montaigne and Pascal had very different purposes in writing the Essais and the Pensées, respectively, I show how a mutual concern for empirical certainty amidst the tenuousness of philosophical and religious opinion precipitated a return to bodily experience, as the most viable means of knowing the self and the world. Despite the widespread conception of the early modern period as one of “thoroughgoing” – and one might say, Cartesian – dualism between body and mind, I argue that Montaigne and Pascal are evidence of a countertrend: their writings suggest that we cannot think our way to philosophical virtue; we must enact that virtue through our bodies, using them as tools for interpretation and modification of our internal states. I thereby call into question a distinction that is commonly made between somatic techniques, on the one hand, and spiritual exercises, on the other, in much of the literature on philosophy as a way of life. The implications of this are far-reaching: if the suffering that philosophy purports to treat is at once spiritual and somatic, then the “spiritual” exercises designed to address this suffering also borrow a great deal from the soma, and should be advertised as such. Further, if spiritual health is indeed contingent on our relationship to the soma, then the classic definition of philosophy as a “spiritual” practice (namely, one associated with the logos) needs to be expanded to include the material and/or somatic dimensions of the discipline. Although I try to provide a clear roadmap for how these authors go about spiritual healing, I recognize that the trajectory to spiritual health is seldom very direct. Surely, we can find examples of somatic exercises that appear to have a predictable effect on the mind and, inversely, spiritual exercises that yield positive physical results. However, the process of effecting change and training for virtue is almost never unidirectional. The constant trafficking between body and mind, evidenced most abundantly by the passions, belies a much less tidy relationship between the two faculties. To describe this relationship, I rely both on early modern medical therapeutics and on Pierre Bourdieu’s twentieth-century conception of habitus. Viewed through the lens of habitus, the practice of philosophy can be conceived as a process of embodiment, wherein the practitioner appropriates and accommodates in a bodily way the virtues traditionally aligned with the good life—before realizing that, as habitus, he or she is always, already well-adapted to the good and thus endowed with a certain form of health from the beginning.

Ce travail montre l\'unité de l\'oeuvre de Pascal dans ce qui concerne la « comparabilité des incomparables » : la comparaison, langagière ou mathématique, qui se fait entre des choses qui ne pourraient pas en principe être rapprochées. Il s\'agit de faire une approche historique et linguistique pour poser des questions philosophiques par rapport à la comparaison, notamment sur le rôle de principe que l\'infini y joue selon Pascal. Nous identifions la comparaison des incomparables sous trois formes. La première partie de ce travail est consacrée à formuler une forme rhétorique d\'analogie que nous nommons l\'« analogie de disproportion » (nous inspirant de Secretan 1998). Si l\'analogie est généralement dite faire une comparaison entre deux rapports, chacun desquels existe entre des choses homogènes, l\'analogie de disproportion permet en revanche de montrer une ressemblance entre des rapports d\'hétérogénéité, entre des disproportions ou entre des distances infinies : deux choses sont aussi différentes entre elles que deux autres. Pascal étant un auteur qui souligne surtout les disproportions, nous montrons qu\'il compare ces disproportions, notamment pour délimiter à l\'homme ce qu\'il ne peut pas connaître parfaitement. La deuxième partie analyse la pratique mathématique de Pascal « en poids, nombre et mesure » : il s\'agit de montrer que dans la méthode des indivisibles des Lettres de A. Dettonville, dans le Traité du triangle arithmétique et dans la comparaison du courbe et du droit, toujours l\'infini (ou plutôt l\'indéfini) intervient comme un facteur qui permet la comparabilité de ce qui semblait être incomparable. La troisième partie fait une discussion proprement philosophique sur l\'infiniment petit et l\'infiniment grand, prenant en compte la pratique mathématique de Pascal analysée dans la deuxième partie. Il est question de discuter sur la nature des « indivisibles », des « différences » et des « distances infinies ». Nous proposons que l\'« infini » dans la pratique mathématique de Pascal relève plutôt de l\'« indéfini », reliant cela à une distinction entre le sens absolu et le sens relatif des mots. Une exception dans la pratique mathématique de Pascal est la géométrie projective, où il faut accepter des éléments à distance infinie. La « rencontre » des deux infinis, finalement, permet de montrer la réciprocité de l\'infini de grandeur et de l\'infini de petitesse. Une discussion est faite à ce propos, reliant la proportion inverse entre les deux infinis à la grandeur et la petitesse de l\'homme et au caractère paradoxal de certaines vérités selon Pascal, lesquelles sont résolues dans la personne du Christ. On conclut que Pascal propose non pas une connaissance directe de l\'infini, mais plutôt une approche à la relation que l\'homme, être fini, possède avec l\'infini. / Este trabalho mostra a unidade da obra de Pascal no que diz respeito à comparabilidade dos incomparáveis : a comparação, linguística ou matemática, que é feita entre coisas que não poderiam, em princípio, ser aproximadas. Trata-se de fazer uma abordagem histórica e linguística para colocar questões filosóficas sobre a comparação, em particular sobre o papel fundamental que o infinito desempenha de acordo com Pascal. Identificamos a comparação de incomparáveis sob três formas. A primeira parte deste trabalho é dedicada à formulação de uma forma de analogia retórica que chamamos de analogia de desproporção (inspirada por Secretan 1998). Se geralmente se diz que a analogia faz uma comparação entre duas relações, cada uma das quais existe entre coisas homogêneas, a analogia da desproporção torna possível, por outro lado, mostrar uma semelhança entre relações de heterogeneidade, entre desproporções ou entre distâncias infinitas : duas coisas são tão diferentes entre si quanto duas outras. Pascal sendo um autor que enfatiza as desproporções acima de tudo, mostramos que ele compara as desproporções, em especial para delimitar o que o homem não conhece perfeitamente. A segunda parte analisa a prática matemática de Pascal em peso, número e medida : trata-se de mostrar que no método dos indivisíveis das Cartas de A. Dettonville, no Tratado do triângulo aritmético e na comparação das linhas curvas e retas, sempre o infinito (ou melhor, o indefinido) intervém como um fator que permite a comparabilidade do que parecia incomparável. A terceira parte faz uma discussão filosófica sobre o infinitamente pequeno e o infinitamente grande, levando em consideração a prática matemática de Pascal analisada na segunda parte. Discutimos a natureza dos indivisíveis, diferenças e distâncias infinitas. Propomos que o infinito na prática matemática de Pascal é melhor compreendido como um indefinido, ligando-o a uma distinção entre o significado absoluto e o significado relativo das palavras. Uma exceção na prática matemática de Pascal é a geometria projetiva, onde devemos aceitar elementos a distância infinita. O encontro dos dois infinitos, finalmente, permite mostrar a reciprocidade do infinito de grandeza e do infinito de pequenez. Uma discussão é feita sobre este assunto, ligando a proporção inversa entre os dois infinitos à grandeza e à pequenez do homem, e ao caráter paradoxal de certas verdades de acordo com Pascal, as quais são resolvidas na pessoa de Jesus Cristo. Concluímos que Pascal traz do infinito não um conhecimento direto, mas uma abordagem da relação que o homem, ser finito, tem com o infinito.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-01-30Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:13:59Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 calcado_t_me_mar.pdf: 352595 bytes, checksum: 71b0c85b1f1ea3a36982732b65387957 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Friedrich Nietzsche e Blaise Pascal tiveram suas vidas marcadas pela dor. O sofrimento físico e, conseqüentemente, o psíquico, não impediram que esses dois pensadores afirmassem a vida em sua totalidade. Tanto em Nietzsche como em Pascal não se encontra uma negação da doença. Pelo contrário, ambos assumiram a debilidade para empreender uma discussão sobre o valor do sofrimento. Apesar de partirem de princípios diferentes, esses pensadores re-significaram seu itinerário intelectual afirmando a importância da enfermidade para a valoração da vida. A afirmação da vida em sua totalidade como propõe a filosofia nietzscheana encontra na doença pela qual passou o autor o eixo de sua constituição e auto-afirmação diante do contexto no qual estava inserido. Em Nietzsche, a relação estabelecida com a dor faz com que ela lhe seja um instrumento precioso de transgressão e afirmação de si. Em Pascal, o sofrimento físico oriundo da enfermidade é analisado em vista de uma antropologia pessimista marcada pela queda original. Ao encontrar-se debilitado, Pascal consegue desviar suas atenções dos divertimentos que o prendiam ao mundo e que o distraiam do encontro consigo e com sua própria natureza. O sentido que Pascal encontra ao sofrimento se dá à luz dos benefícios que ele traz, pois aproxima o pecador de Deus na medida em que o primeiro se recolhe junto a si e às próprias misérias. Na dor, Pascal compreende a sua natureza e sua vida em vista da Paixão redentora de Cristo. Analisar o sentido da doença e do sofrimento por ela causado na vida desses dois pensadores implica a compreensão da própria existência e de sua afirmação, seja ela de alegrias ou de dores. Viver, nessa perspectiva, implica descobrir as potencialidades da própria humanidade e reconhecer no sofrimento não um mal em si, mas sinal para o desenvolvimento das próprias possibilidades. / Friedrich Nietzsche and Blaise Pascal’s lives were strongly fulfilled with pain. The physical suffering and, consequently, the psychic, did two block that those two philosophers could live their lives entirely. Either in Nietzsche and Pascal’s lives we find no denying for the disease. On the opposite, both of them assumed their weakness to undertake a quarrel about the worth of suffering. Besides of having different principles of thinking, those two philosophers remade ther intellectual way of thinking affirming the importance of the sickness to show the value of life. The affirmation of life in its totality as Nietzsche’s philosophy proposal is found in the disease by which the author came through the axis of its constitution and self-affirmation facing the context in which it was inserted. In Nietzsche, the fixed relation with the pain shows a precious tool for trespass and self affirmation. In Pascal, the physical suffering from the sickness is analyzed by the sight of a negative anthropology market by the original fall. Finding himself weak, Pascal is able to turn aside his attention from the entertainment which hold him to the world and also distracted him from having an encounter to himself and his self nature. The meaning that Pascal finds to the suffering is the result of the clearness of the benefits that it comes along, because it brings the sinner next to God as the first one retires to himself and to his own mercy. In pain, Pascal understands his self nature and his own life seeing the Redemptory Passion of Christ. Analyzing the meaning of the sickness and also as a cause of the suffering inside of those two philosophers’ lives imply the understanding of the own existence and its affirmation, which could be made by happiness or pain. Living, in this way of thought, implies to find out the potentiality of the humanity and to recognize the suffering not as the... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)

Endeavoring to invigorate a Pascalian approach to Christian persuasion, this dissertation asks: How might the doctrine of the imago Dei strengthen Pascal’s anthropological argument? The central claim is that the doctrine of the imago Dei strengthens Pascal's anthropological argument by supplying greater detail to the explanation stage and accounts for more instances of humans’ paradoxical condition. Chapter 1 demonstrates the need for this study. Even though Pascal’s method appears to be a formidable tool for Christian apologists in a postmodern culture, it has received surprisingly little attention and clarity in apologetic literature. Moreover, no efforts have been made to strengthen his anthropological argument by correlating it with insights from the doctrine of the imago Dei. Chapter 2 reveals that the anthropological theme within Pascal’s Pensées may be properly understood as a three-stage abductive argument consisting of data (instances of humans’ paradoxical behavior), explanation (Christian anthropology), and elimination (other religions or worldviews fail to explain the human condition). Chapter 3 surveys the history of interpretation of the doctrine of the imago Dei. Despite their many differences, interpreters generally agree that (1) imagedness means that humans are ontologically constituted for a relationship with God, but that (2) human sin conflicts with their God-oriented constitution. Chapter 4 presents six propositions about imagedness. These propositions support the observation that imagedness and sinfulness conspire to render the human condition paradoxical: humans are self-opposing. Chapter 5 applies this understanding of the imago Dei to the explanatory stage of Pascal’s anthropological argument, showing that the doctrine of the imago Dei provides a finer level of detail and explains more instances of humans’ paradoxical condition. Chapter 6 shows that the Christiformic journeys of Augustine, C. S. Lewis, and Jonathan Edwards represent flesh-and-blood instances of Scripture’s portrait of Christiformic image-bearers. These instances supply evidence that the doctrine of the imago Dei plausibly explains the human condition. Thus, they also strengthen Pascal’s anthropological argument. Chapter 7 explains two larger aims of this dissertation: to contribute toward a broader vision of Christian persuasion and to exemplify how the disciplines of apologetics and biblical theology can be powerful allies.

Resumo: Na medida em que Pascal descreve a sua noção de ordem social a justiça é um tema que recebe um tratamento especial por esse pensador cristão do século XVII. Ele suspeita que a nossa justiça vigente não possua, de fato, uma substancialidade justa e se empenha em demonstrar como a força e a imaginação são as verdadeiras potências criadoras da nossa frágil justiça. Mas se uma justiça produzida pelo esforço conjunto da força e da imaginação é a que regula as relações na ordem social o que houve com aquela justiça universal e verdadeira? A resposta de Pascal é que simplesmente não a temos mais. Embora ainda conserve em sua filosofia aquele conceito de justiça universal, ele não tem mais nenhum efeito na sociedade dos homens. Esse fenômeno extraordinário que é o da ordem social se deixar regular por uma justiça meramente estabelecida que não guarda mais nenhuma relação com a justiça universal revela um traço sintomático da natureza humana que encontra explicação no paradoxo que constitui a sua atual condição. Desse modo, Pascal ao tratar do tema da justiça na ordem social não está preocupado tanto em estabelecer o seu estatuto ontológico nem mesmo sua possibilidade fática, mas sim, em apontar, a partir desse tema, a condição paradoxal do homem no mundo. Essa parece ser a tese mais fundamental que situa no horizonte dos temas tratados no interior dos Pensamentos entre os quais, se inclui a justiça.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000444817-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 1034918 bytes, checksum: a40e08be13651d0902c3eac955647895 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Pascal’s theory of faith involves a constant conflict between, on the one hand, the craving of a created being for an eternal state of glory and, on the other, the present state of sin wherein this creature finds himself abandoned to his own resources. In the absence of grace, man wants and does nothing that could actually approximate him to God, but continues enclosed in himself; whereas the influence of grace dispenses human being from deciding between the good and the bad use of it, leading man to desire and act according to God’s will without expecting any reward for it. Although the relationship between God and man might be described in these terms, Pascal does not so restrict his thinking. On the contrary, the Jansenist philosopher searches for the manifestation of sin through all orders of human constitution, that is, body, intellect and will, showing what are the new forms of desiring, deciding and behaving of a being who no longer possesses a clear and sound view of God’s and his own nature. Pascal thereafter tries to understand the role of grace in face of human confusion with his misery and endurance. This study attempts to answer what, according to Pascal, is the status of faith in human life. For such, the relation between the three human constitutive orders, both in state of sin and in state of grace, needs to be elaborated on, with an emphasis on the order of will in manifestations of pride and charity. This investigation is deepened through an enquiry not only into the sinner and the convert, but especially into those undergoing a conversion process. / A teoria da fé de Pascal envolve um constante conflito entre, de um lado, os anseios de um ser criado para um eterno estado de glória e, de outro, o atual estado de pecado desse mesmo ser largado às suas próprias forças. Neste estado, o homem sem auxílio da graça nada faz e nada quer que o aproxime verdadeiramente de Deus, mas segue encerrando-se em si mesmo, ao passo que a atuação da graça dispensa a decisão humana acerca de seu bom ou mau uso, levando o homem a desejar e fazer a vontade de Deus sem qualquer legítima pretensão de mérito. Apesar, porém, da relação entre homem e Deus poder ser descrita em tais termos, Pascal não limita assim seu pensamento. Ao contrário, o jansenista busca dar conta da manifestação do pecado em todos os níveis da constituição humana, isto é, em nível do corpo, em nível do intelecto e em nível da vontade, mostrando quais as novas formas de desejar, deliberar e se comportar de um ser que não possui mais uma visão clara e justa da natureza e de si mesmo e de Deus. Feito isso, busca compreender a atuação da graça justamente face à confusão humana, com suas angústias e resistências. A pergunta que buscaremos responder ao longo deste trabalho é seguinte: para Pascal, qual o estatuto da fé na vida do homem? Para tanto, será necessário compreender a relação das três ordens em pecado e também em estado de graça, enfatizando a ordem da vontade, nas manifestações de orgulho e caridade. Todavia, procuraremos aprofundar a questão investigando não apenas o pecador e o convertido, mas principalmente aquele que está se convertendo.

Orientador: Francisaco Foot Hardman / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-19T18:49:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bastos_GlauciaSoares_M.pdf: 4883415 bytes, checksum: 19b136695561da68b4207d30fe4fce63 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1994 / Resumo: Análise dos diversos percursos discursivos que se articulam em torno da ausência de uma obra e da passagem de seu autor a personagem,traçados a partir do que foi publicado na imprensa e na literatura sobre Febrônio Índio do Brasil, desde sua prisão em 1927 / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Teoria Literaria / Mestre em Letras

This dissertation examines the way the Pythagorean conception of the incommensurable structures the assertions of subjective agency in Blaise Pascal’s Pensées (1670), Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), and Alain Badiou’s Being and Event (1988). The Pythagoreans coined the term “incommensurable,” alogos, to describe magnitudes that cannot emerge within a specific system of signification. Across three chapters, I extend the Pythagorean understanding of the incommensurable into the areas of philosophy, religious studies, and mathematics in order to posit the fundamental instability at the core of subjective agency. Moving from Thomas S. Kuhn’s failure to define the incommensurable logically in his Structures of Scientific Revolutions, I argue that such a conception of the incommensurable must be understood as fundamentally faith-based. Given the fact that the incommensurable cannot emerge into signification, its existence must be posited on faith. Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Badiou each move from a faith-based assertion of the incommensurable to offer a conception of subjective agency within a specific system of signification. Thus, against the work of Bonaventura Cavalieri and Evangelista Torricelli, Pascal refigures the incommensurably infinite to establish a heterodox subjective agency within Augustinian faith-by-grace; Kierkegaard manages to navigate the incommensurability of direct communication and personal faith by effacing his pseudonym Johannes Climacus; and Alain Badiou relies on the incommensurable “event” to imagine the possibility the subject’s calling into being of the new. In each of these three texts, the incommensurable functions to guarantee the possibility of subject agency within a specific system of signification.

[pt] A tese Viagens modernistas: Europa e Brasil sob a ótica de António de Alcântara Machado, Blaise Cendrars e Oswald de Andrade parte da leitura comparada de três obras literárias publicadas durante a década de 1920, Pathé-Baby (1926), de António de Alcântara Machado; Pau Brasil (1925), de Oswald de Andrade; e Feuilles de route (primeiramente dividida em três partes editadas entre 1924 e 1928, Le Formose, São Paulo e Inédites, e reunidas pelo autor em 1944), de Blaise Cendrars (escritor suíço de expressão francófona). Tendo por premissa três eixos temáticos que aproximam tais obras – a saber, as vanguardas históricas, a viagem e o olhar do autor-viajante –, a tese aponta como a literatura de viagem e o olhar sobre o outro se modificaram com o advento das vanguardas e se estrutura, assim, a partir de três questões principais suscitadas pela leitura do corpus literário. Primeiramente, investiga em que medida os referidos textos contribuem para a solidificação do projeto modernista brasileiro, ao trazer para a cena de vanguarda, eminentemente urbana, a poesia e a crônica de viagem. Em seguida, elucida as maneiras pelas quais se trava o diálogo entre a modernidade europeia presenciada por Alcântara Machado – e trazida a nós também por Blaise Cendrars – e o passado colonial brasileiro que Oswald desvela em seu ritual antropofágico de construção da vanguarda artística brasileira. Por fim, analisa em que medida se pode considerar Pau Brasil e Feuilles de route obras espelhadas, simétricas, em que a paisagem e a história do Brasil guiam o olhar e a pena de ambos os poetas, permitindo lê-las como obras contínuas, como uma espécie de guia poético de uma viagem que, zarpando da Europa, adentra o Brasil e a ela retorna. Além disso, uma vez que tal leitura é feita à luz tanto de teorias sobre literatura de viagem como dos estudos culturais, também se discutem outros aspectos como discursos de identidade e alteridade, cosmopolitismo, experiência urbana, e intermidialidade. / [en] Modernist Journeys: Europe and Brazil from the Perspective of António de Alcântara Machado, Blaise Cendrars and Oswald de Andrade is a thesis that starts from the comparative reading of three literary works published during the 1920s, Pathé-Baby (1926) by António de Alcântara Machado; Pau Brasil (1925), by Oswald de Andrade; and Feuilles de route (first divided in three parts, edited between 1924 and 1928, Le Formose,São Paulo and Inédites, and later collected by the author in 1944), by Blaise Cendrars (Swiss writer of French-speaking expression). Having as its premise three thematic axes that approximate such works – namely, the historical vanguards, the journey and the traveling author s point of view –, the thesis points out how the travel literature and the look on the other have changed with the advent of the vanguards and is thus structured on the basis of three main questions raised by the reading of the literary corpus. Firstly, it investigates to what extent these texts contribute to the solidification of the Brazilian modernist project, by bringing poetry and travel chronicles to the vanguard scene, eminently urban. It then elucidates the ways in which the dialogue between the European modernity witnessed by Alcântara Machado – and brought to us by Blaise Cendrars – and the Brazilian colonial past that Oswald reveals in his anthropophagic ritual of building the Brazilian artistic vanguard, is elucidated. Finally, it analyzes the extent to which one can consider Pau Brasil and Feuilles de route mirrored, symmetrical works, in which the landscape and the history of Brazil guide the eyes and the pen of both poets, allowing them to read them as continuous works, as a kind of poetic guide of a journey that, starting from Europe, enters Brazil and returns to it. Moreover, since such a reading is made in light of both theories on travel literature and cultural studies, other aspects such as discourses of identity and otherness, cosmopolitanism, urban experience, and intermediality are also discussed. / [fr] La thèse Voyages modernistes : l Europe et le Brésil dans la perspective de António de Alcântara Machado, Blaise Cendrars et Oswald de Andrade part de la lecture comparative de trois oeuvres littéraires publiées au cours des années 1920, Pathé-Baby (1926), de António de Alcântara Machado ; Pau Brasil (1925), de Oswald de Andrade ; et de Feuilles de route (au début divisée en trois parties éditées entre 1924 et 1928, Le Formose, São Paulo et Inédites, et réunies par l auteur en 1944), de Blaise Cendrars. À partir de trois thèmes principaux qui amènent ces oeuvres – à savoir, les avant-gardes historiques, le voyage et le regard de l auteur-voyageur –, la thèse démontre comment la littérature de voyage et le regard de l autre ont changé avec l arrivée des avant-gardes et se construit, ainsi, à partir de trois questions principales soulevées par la lecture du corpus littéraire. Tout d abord, cette thèse examine dans quelle mesure ces textes contribuent à la solidification du projet moderniste brésilien, en portant la poésie et la chronique de voyage à la scène de l avant-garde, éminemment urbaine. Ensuite, elle élucide les façons par lesquelles se donne le dialogue entre la modernité européenne témoignée par Machado – et aussi apportée à nous par Blaise Cendrars – et le passé colonial brésilien, lequel Oswald révèle dans son rituel cannibale de construction de l avant-garde artistique brésilienne. Enfin, elle analyse dans quelle mesure Pau Brasil et Feuilles de route peuvent être considérés des oeuvres en miroir, symétriques, où le paysage et l histoire du Brésil guident le regard et l écriture de ces poètes, ce qui permet de les lire comme des oeuvres continues, une sorte de guide poétique de voyage qui part de l Europe vers le Brésil et à elle retourne. En outre, une telle lecture étant faite à la lumière des deux théories sur la littérature de voyage et les études culturelles, d autres aspects tels que les discours d identité et d altérité, le cosmopolitisme, l expérience urbaine et l intermédialité sont également discutés.