The objective of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is to provide useful information to the users of financial statements to assist in making economic decisions. To be useful, information has to be relevant and reliable, but the reliability of information suffers when the guidelines for the reporting of specific issues are not clear and managerial discretion arises. Write-offs are one of those accounting issues that are regularly related to earnings management. By now it is seen as common knowledge that write-offs, especially those on goodwill, do not reflect declines in asset value; rather, they are used as a device to manipulate financial reports. However, there is a striking lack of grounded theoretical research that can confirm this assessment. The aim of this dissertation is to provide valuable analytical and empirical insights on fixed asset write-offs under IFRS. In a first step, the practical implementation of IAS 36 in Europe has to be analyzed, which is best done empirically. Based on the findings from these empirical surveys, the most substantial questions remaining are subject to an in-depth analytical discussion. Since IAS 36 entails different measurement issues that have their origins in finance theory, this dissertation also aims to introduce some basic techniques from theoretical finance to accounting research. Lastly, as the analyses presented in this dissertation do not cover all open questions on fixed asset write-offs, the author hopes to encourage further research on this important topic.:1. Analytical and Empirical Analyses on Fixed Asset Write-Offsffs: An Overview... 1 2. Determinants of the Write-Off Decision under IFRS: Evidence from Germany... 20 3. What Drives Companies? An Analysis of Fixed Asset Write-Offs in Europe in the Context of Different Institutional Settings... 60 4. A Critical Analysis of the Requirements of IAS 36 - A Pre-Tax CAPM?... 134 5. A New Perspective on Fixed Asset Write-Offs - When is Earnings Management Optimal... 166

År 2005 infördes ett nytt regelverk inom redovisning för hantering av den immateriella tillgången goodwill vid namn IAS 36, som innebär att goodwill ska prövas för nedskrivning varje år. En nedskrivningsprövning ska upptäcka om en tillgångs redovisade värde inte längre överensstämmer med verkligt värde. Att värdena inte överensstämmer sker på bred skala under en ekonomisk kris. Regelverket har upptäckts tillåta en grad av subjektivitet som kan ge upphov till earnings management, manipulering av redovisade siffror, vilket är ett globalt problem och en viktig fråga inom etiken för finansiell redovisning. Syftet med den här studien är därför att undersöka nedskrivningen av goodwill hos ett urval av svenska börsnoterade företag under de två senaste stora ekonomiska kriserna, finanskrisen 2008–2009 och covidkrisen 2020 samt undersöka om det finns tecken på earnings management genom goodwillnedskrivningar. Författarna tillämpar en kvantitativ metod och en deduktiv ansats och ett antal anova-test samt t-test har utförts. Resultatet visar att det inte finns någon signifikant skillnad mellan företags beteende när det gäller nedskrivningar av goodwill mellan de två undersökta kriserna, och att det sker få nedskrivningar. Dessutom tyder resultatet på att det finns ett möjligt tecken på earnings management genom goodwillnedskrivning. / In 2005, a new regulatory system in accounting for handling the intangible asset goodwill, called IAS 36, came into effect, which means that goodwill should be tested for impairment annually. An impairment test must detect if an asset's reported value no longer corresponds to fair value. That the values do not correspond occurs on a wide scale during an economic crisis. The regulations have been found to allow a degree of subjectivity which can give rise to earnings management, the manipulation of reported figures, which is a global problem and an important issue in financial accounting ethics. The purpose of this study is therefore to investigate the impairment of goodwill in a selection of Swedish listed companies during the two most recent major economic crises, the financial crisis 2008-2009 and the covid crisis 2020, and see if there are signs of earnings management through goodwill write-offs. The authors use a quantitative method and have had a deductive approach. A number of t-tests and anova tests have been performed. The result shows that there is no significant difference between companies' behavior in terms of impairment of goodwill between the two investigated crises, and that there are few goodwill write-offs. In addition, the result suggests that there is a possible sign of earnings management through goodwill impairment.

Goodwill utgör idag 16,5 procent av svenska noterade företags totala tillgångar. Trenden är ökande och i vissa fall överstiger goodwill det egna kapitalet. Att goodwill utgör en så stor del, innebär en risk då nedskrivningar av goodwill slår direkt mot eget kapital. Turerna och diskussionerna om goodwill har varit många och är idag ett hett ämne inom redovisningsbranschen. Redovisningsforskare är tudelade om goodwill ska redovisas som en tillgång eller inte. Vissa menar att goodwill inte passar in på definitionen av en tillgång, samtidigt hävdar andra forskare att goodwill kan innehålla komponenter som inte är lönsamhetsdrivande. Dessutom visar ytterligare forskning att goodwill används som ett verktyg för resultatmanipulation. Studier i bland annat England, Tyskland och USA visar dock att goodwill tenderar att generera avkastning och styrker därmed argumenten för att goodwill är en vinstdrivande tillgång. Inga tidigare studier har specifikt studerat den svenska marknaden om hur goodwill påverkar lönsamhet, vilket är i fokus i den här studien. Syftet med studien är att förbättra kunskapen om goodwill genom att undersöka om det går att identifiera goodwill som en vinstgenererande tillgång. För att svara på syftet haren kvantitativ undersökning genomförts där 106 företag på Large Cap och Mid Cap har studerats mellan 2010-2013, för att se om företag med goodwill har bättre lönsamhet än företag utan goodwill. Det övergripande resultatet i studien är att företag med goodwill har bättre lönsamhet än företag utan goodwill. Detta resultat är också helt i linje med vad tidig tidigare forskning funnit i andra länder. Dock visar studiens resultat att det inte finns ett signifikant samband mellan goodwill och lönsamhet när enbart Mid Cap-företagen studeras. Storleken på företag kan eventuellt ha en betydelse för om goodwill är en vinstgenererande tillgång eller inte. Vidare har studien också undersökt om det är så att företag som redan är lönsamma, förvärvar mer och därmed också ökar sin goodwillpost mer än andra företag. Studiens resultat kan dock inte bekräfta detta förhållande då det inte finns ett signifikant samband. / Goodwill represents 16.5 percent of Swedish listed companies' total assets. The trend is increasing, and in some cases exceeds the goodwill equity. Goodwill represents such a large part, implies a risk since amortization of goodwill strikes directly against equity. The discussions about goodwill have been many and has been a hot topic in the accounting industry. Accounting Researchers are dual of goodwill shall be recognized as an asset or not. Some argue that goodwill does not fit the definition of an asset, others argue that goodwill may contain components that not contributes to profitability. Furthermore, other research found that goodwill is used as a tool for earnings manipulation. Studies in Great Britain, Germany and the USA show that goodwill tends to generate returns and supporting the case for goodwill is a rent generating asset. No previous research has specifically studied the Swedish market and how goodwill affects profitability, which is the focus of this paper. The purpose of this paper is to improve the knowledge of goodwill by examining whether it is possible to identify goodwill as a rent generating asset. In relation to the purpose of this paper, a quantitative survey conducted in which 106 companies on the Large Cap and Mid Cap has been studied 2010-2013, to see if company with goodwill has better profitability than companies without goodwill. The main result of this paper is that companies with goodwill have better profitability than companies without goodwill. This result is also consistent with earlier research in other countries. However, this paper result shows that there is no significant correlation between goodwill and profitability when only the Mid Cap companies are analyzed. The size of the company may be of importance on whether goodwill is a rent generating asset or not. Furthermore, this paper also examined if companies that are already profitable, acquires more and consequently increases their goodwill more than other companies. This paper results cannot confirm this fact since there is no significant correlation.

När IFRS 3 gavs ut 2005 innebar detta att företag årligen skall pröva nedskrivningsbehovet enligt IAS 36 och överge den gamla avskrivningsmetoden. Detta innebar att företagsledare nu skulle bedöma huruvida det fanns ett nedskrivningsbehov för företagets goodwill, och bedömningen företagsledare skall utföra enligt IAS 36 medför subjektivitet och således även godtycke. Det subjektiva utrymmet kan användas av företagsledare för att manipulera resultatet opportunistiskt, något som kan påverkas av företagsledares löneincitamen, b.la. från aktier, och karaktärsdrag. Resultaten i tidigare forskning är inte enhetliga gällande sambandet mellan aktieinnehav hos verkställande direktörer och goodwillnedskrivning, samtidigt som könet ser ut att spelar roll då tidigare studier visar att kvinnor tenderar att använda mer konservativ redovisning och justerar resultatet i lägre omfattning. Studiens syfte är således att undersöka om vd:ns aktierelaterade löneincitament påverkar goodwillnedskrivning, samt huruvida vd:ns kön har en modererande effekt på sambandet. En kvantitativ metod tillämpas i studien, där data inhämtas manuellt från företags årsredovisningar och genom Refinitiv under perioden 2016–2021. Studiens resultat visar ett positivt samband mellan aktieinnehavet hos verkställande direktörer och goodwillnedskrivningar. Vidare påvisar resultatet i studien dessutom ett förstärkande positivt samband när vd:ns kön inkluderas som modererande variabel för storleken på goodwillnedskrivningen, däremot visar studien ett insignifikant resultat gällande beslutet att skriva ned goodwill när vd:ns kön inkluderas som modererande variabel. / When IFRS 3 was issued in 2005, this meant that companies must annually test the need for impairment according to IAS 36 and abandon the old depreciation method. This meant that company managers would now assess whether there was a need to write down the company's goodwill, and the assessment that company managers must perform according to IAS 36 entails subjectivity and thus also discretion. The subjective space can be used by company managers to manipulate the result opportunistically, something that can be influenced by company managers' salary incentives, i.a. from stocks, and character traits. The results in previous research are not uniform regarding the relationship between shareholdings of managing directors and goodwill write-downs, while gender appears to play a role as previous studies show that women tend to use more conservative accounting and adjust the results to a lesser extent. The purpose of the study is thus to investigate whether the CEO's share-related incentives affect goodwill impairment, and whether the CEO's gender has a moderating effect on the relationship. A quantitative method is applied in the study, where data is collected manually from companies' annual reports and through Refinitiv during the period 2016–2021. The results of the study show a positive relationship between the shareholding of CEOs and goodwill write-downs. Furthermore, the results in the study also demonstrate a reinforcing positive relationship when the CEO's gender is included as a moderating variable for the size of the goodwill write-down, in contrast, the study shows an insignificant result regarding the decision to write down goodwill when the CEO's gender is included as a moderating variable.

This thesis comprises three research essays. The study documents empirical evidence around the research themes by analysing a sample of the UK’s listed non-financial firms from 2005 to 2018. It applied panel data analysis (fixed or random effects) techniques and the potential endogeneity issue is controlled by using the two-step system, GMM. Earnings-management research holds that manipulating a firm's real activities is more damaging to its long-term growth and value than accruals manipulation. Therefore, by building on agency theory and emphasising board monitoring, first essay investigates the role of independent directors’ tenure and connection to several boards in controlling real earnings management (REM). This study finds that independent directors elected to board before appointment of current CEO are negatively associated with the level of REM. Furthermore, this research provides evidence that REM is higher in those firms whose INDs are connected to several boards at a time. Though economically insignificant in most of the models, this research also shows that the association between INDs’ tenure and REM varies with the phases of their tenure. Directors in the early stage of their tenure are observed as being less effective in controlling REM. However, as INDs’ tenure grows, they employ better oversight over management's conduct, thereby reducing REM. Contrary to this, the extended tenure of INDs is associated with higher REM. These results collectively suggest that the board monitoring role protects the stakes of shareholders/stakeholders by constraining REM; when INDs are free from the influence of CEO, they are not over-committed due to their presence on several boards, and they have moderate board tenure which is neither too short nor too long. Furthermore, drawing on collective contributions and group performance perspectives, second essay explores the role of board diversity in the firm’s R&D investment decisions. Additionally, building on a fault-line argument about a team's demographic attributes, the current research decomposes the impact of demographic and cognitive diversity on R&D spending. The research observes a positive relationship between board diversity and the level of R&D spending. Moreover, this research documents that cognitive diversity is positively associated with R&D investment. However, demographic diversity has an insignificant relationship with firms’ spending on R&D projects. Further, this study confirms that demographic diversity negatively moderates the relationship between cognitive diversity and R&D investment. These results suggest that the board's attributes as a group carry the significance to influence the decisions having strategic importance. The findings on the sub-dimensions of board diversity imply that board functional/cognitive diversity is more relevant to corporate decisions and outcomes than is demographic diversity. Based on the monitoring perspective (agency theory) and resource provision view (resource dependency theory), third essay investigates the role of independent directors’ specific attributes in the corporate propensity to R&D investment. The study documents a positive association between INDs’ moderate (median) tenure and the firm’s spending on R&D projects, but early and extended tenure is observed as being insignificant. INDs with a presence on three or fewer boards are observed to promote R&D investment. However, INDs sitting on more than three boards negatively affect the firm’s propensity to invest in R&D initiatives. Financially expert INDs are negatively associated with corporate R&D investments, suggesting that such directors may resist funding these projects beyond optimal risk level because of their expertise. These results suggest that INDs’ monitoring and advising competence improves as they spend time on the firm’s board, but that extended tenure is counterproductive as it impairs INDs’ impartiality. Furthermore, INDs’ capital (resources) accruing from connection to multiple boards is only beneficial for the firm’s strategic decisions if their monitoring role is not compromised because of their over-commitment (busyness). / Mirpur University of Science and Technology (MUST)

För att uppnå större harmonisering mellan länder och förenkla jämförelser mellan företag har ett antal internationella standarder för finansiell rapportering upprättats. Den senaste IFRS- standarden, IFRS 3, gavs ut år 2004 och infördes i Europa år 2005, vilket innebar att börsnoterade företag bland annat i Sverige skulle följa standarden när de upprättar sin koncernredovisning. I och med den nya standarden infördes nya regler för nedskrivning av goodwill som innebar att årliga avskrivningar ersattes med regelbundna tester för nedskrivning. Eftersom genomförande av nedskrivning i stor utsträckning är beroende av subjektiva bedömningar, uppstår möjligheten för företagsledningar att påverka den finansiella rapporteringen till sin egen fördel. Syftet i föreliggande studie är att utreda vilka faktorer som påverkar företagsledningen i sin bedömning vid nedskrivning av goodwill. Föreliggande studie har använt kvantitativ metod och en deduktiv ansats. Datainsamlingen baserades på årsredovisningar från börsnoterade företag i large cap på Stockholmsbörsen OMX Nasdaq under perioden 2011-2014. Denna studies resultat har visat att det råder ett signifikant positivt samband mellan (1) byte av VD, (2) svaga resultat och nedskrivning av goodwill. Detta ger stöd till att det under vissa förhållanden finns incitament för företagsledningen att påverka redovisningen på ett sätt som inte nödvändigtvis avspeglar den verkliga finansiella situationen i företaget. Det är viktigt för företags intressenter och revisorer att ha kännedom om vilka incitament som kan föranleda påverkan av redovisningen. / In order to achieve greater harmonization between countries and facilitate comparisons between companies, a number of international financial reporting standards have been established. The recent IFRS standard, IFRS 3 was released in 2004 and was introduced in Europe in 2005, which meant that listed companies in Sweden would follow the standard when they prepare their consolidated accounts. With the new standard, new rules for the impairment of goodwill were introduced that replaced annual depreciation with regular testing for impairment. Since the implementation of the write-down is largely dependent on subjective judgments, the possibility arises that management manipulate financial reporting to their own advantage. The aim of the present study is to investigate the factors that influence the company management in assessing the impairment of goodwill. This study uses quantitative methods and has a deductive approach. The data collection is based on the annual reports of listed companies in the large cap on the OMX Nasdaq Stockholm Exchange during the period 2011-2014. The results in the study have shown that there is a significant positive relationship between (1) the replacement of the CEO, (2) weak earnings and impairment of goodwill. This supports that under certain conditions there is an incentive for management to manipulate accounting numbers in a way that does not necessarily reflect the real financial situation of the company. It is important for the company's stakeholders and auditors to have knowledge of what incentives can influence preparation of financial statements.

Titel: A Game of Nods and Winks - En studie om faktorer som påverkar svenska börsbolagsanvändning av resultatmanipulering Bakgrund: Resultatmanipulering är att omdiskuterat ämne i Europa såväl som i USA.Resultatmanipulering har konstaterats frekvent användas i svenska bolag. Vi frågar oss vilkabakomliggande faktorer kan påverka mängden av resultatmanipulation. Syfte: Studiens syfte avser att förklara hur analytikers prognoser och andelen kvinnligastyrelseledamöter påverkar resultatmanipuleringen i svenska noterade bolag. Metod: En tvärsnittsstudie med en deduktiv ansats genomförs där teorier testats viahypotesprövning. Teorierna Positiv redovisningsteori, Agentteori, Prospect theory och Critical Mass theory avser att behandla de incitament som ligger till grund förresultatmanipulering. Urvalet består av Stockholmsbörsens Large, Mid, Small Cap bolagunder åren 2012 till 2016. Slutsatser: Resultatet påvisar att företag har en stark vilja nå analytikers prognoser samt atten hög andel kvinnliga styrelseledamöter har en negativ påverkan på företagets vilja atttillämpa resultatmanipulering. Vi kan i studien även visa en interaktionseffekt mellan de tvåfaktorerna. / Title: A Game of Nods and Winks - A study on underlying factors that affect the use of Earnings management in Swedish public companies Background: Earnings management is a subject of discussion in Europe as well in the United States. Earnings management has been found to be frequently used in Swedish companies. We ask ourselves what the underlying factors are and how can they affect the amount of Earnings management. Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to investigate how analysts’ forecasts and a high proportion of female board members affects how public Swedish companies manage their earnings through Earnings management. Method: A quantitative cross-sectional study with a deductive approach are performed and theories constitutes the basis for our hypothesis. The theories; Positive accounting theory, Agency theory, Prospect theory and Critical Mass theory intends to deal with the incentives behind Earnings management. The observation period is 2012 to 2016 and consists of companies from the Stockholm stock exchange market. Conclusions: The result concludes that companies have strong incentives to reach analysts’ forecasts and that a high percentage of female representation on the board have a negatively impact on company’s willingness to manage their earnings. In the study, we can also detect an interaction effect between the two variables.

本論文為關於營利與非營利機構之營運管理策略之兩篇理論性質的文章。 第一篇文章旨在探討營利機構之實質盈餘管理策略。本研究檢驗在產品市場競爭下，公司如何透過實質盈餘管理策略來滿足盈餘目標之要求以及公司之實質盈餘管理動機會如何影響市場競爭對手之行為。本文考慮一個兩期非合作之R&D競爭寡占模型。本文假設存在資訊不對稱；具有私人資訊的廠商為追求獲利最大亦或追求盈餘目標達成兩種類型。本文透過完美貝氏均衡 (perfect Bayesian equilibrium) 解出分離均衡 (separating equilibrium) 與混和均衡 (hybrid equilibrium)。 本研究指出追求獲利最大類型之廠商可以藉由影響競爭對手之猜測來進一步左右追求盈餘目標達成類型之目標達成之可能性。在分離均衡中，當外在成本衝擊未超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商無誘因藉由R&D 投資水準之提升來規避負向成本衝擊以影響市場對手猜測並且進一步提升其產品市場競爭力。因此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標無法達成。 在混和均衡中，當外在成本衝擊超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商有誘因採取混合策略以誤導市場對手之猜測;該類型之廠商可以藉由部分模仿盈餘目標達成類型之R&D 投資策略以混淆競爭對手之信念並且提升其產品產出、獲利水準。在此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標能夠達成。本研究之結果有別於傳統R&D盈餘管理實證文獻中，公司內部當局有誘因透過R&D支出的減少用以滿足公司短期之盈餘目標 (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005) 。本研究指出公司可以藉由R&D 投資水準之提升，以創造“cookie jar” 並且有助於公司獲利提升與盈餘目標之達成。此外，本研究與盈餘奇異現象之實證研究 (earnings kinky) 結論一致: 公司可以藉由盈餘管理策略來達成盈餘目標，但是盈餘目標之達成不盡然是透過盈餘管理策略 (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003)。 第二篇文章旨在探討非營利機構提供非獲利性質服務之策略性之影響。本研究指出非獲利性質服務之提供不僅有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升，相對於營利機構。當所有權與經營權分離時，若市場需求彈性為不具彈性時，非獲利性質服務之提供對非營利機構之經理人而言，可以做為一個策略工具藉以促使該機構之所有人提供一個於獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。此外，隨著非獲利性質服務之外生價格的提升，當非營利性質服務之外生價格的提升對於非營利機構之所有人與經理人利益衝突影響之間接效果大於對獲利性質服務價格影響之直接效果時，非營利機構之所有人仍然會提供一個獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。這會有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升。 / This dissertation consists of two theoretical studies on the operation strategies of for-profit and non-profit firms. Chapter 1 addresses how firms use real earnings management to meet or beat their earnings targets, and how this influences sequential product market competition. We study this issue in a two-period non-cooperative R&D competition with one-sided asymmetric information in which the informed firm could be either the maximizing type or the target-meeting type (or target-beating). We show that the maximizing type of the informed firm’s R&D investment level could influence rival firm’s conjecture about the informed firm’s type which in term affects the success of meeting or beating the target for the target-meeting type of the informed firm. We find that the privately informed firm can increase its R&D investment in the first period to meet or beat the earnings target. This can help the firm increase profits in a sequential product market competition. More precisely, once the cost uncertainty realized is realized to exceed expectations, the maximizing type of the informed firm could hide its identity by adopting a mixed strategy and setting its R&D investment and output level higher than in the separating equilibrium. Contrary to popular claims that meeting or beating short earnings targets induces an R&D investment reduction (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005), we show that R&D overinvestment can give an opportunity to create some reserves, i.e., a cookie jar, to be used later to earn a higher profit and reach later targets. Our result is also supporting the observation of firms meeting or beating the earnings target, but not necessarily using earnings management (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003). Chapter 2 shows that the provision of not-for profit service would not only give not-for-profit organizations a competitive advantage over for-profit organizations. Under the separation of control and ownership, we illustrate that once market demand is inelastic, the provision of not-for-profit service serves as a strategic device for the manager of a not-for-profit organization and thus induces the owner of a not-for-profit organization to overcompensate his manager regarding the margin of profit. Moreover, as the regulated price of not-for-profit service increases, a not-for-profit organization could still over-compensate his manager in regard to profit, when the indirect effect on increasing preference difference between the owner and manager of the not-for-profit organization dominates the direct effect on market price. Thus, a not-for-profit organization could charge more in for-profit service.

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas / Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-05-21T20:09:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100021.pdf: 1579434 bytes, checksum: 48ff2e28230b8ab64ed6919d82c68a84 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-23T11:37:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100021.pdf: 1579434 bytes, checksum: 48ff2e28230b8ab64ed6919d82c68a84 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-23T11:39:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100021.pdf: 1579434 bytes, checksum: 48ff2e28230b8ab64ed6919d82c68a84 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-23T12:18:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100021.pdf: 1579434 bytes, checksum: 48ff2e28230b8ab64ed6919d82c68a84 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-15 / This study investigates the dynamics of earnings management of Brazilian companies previously to their going private operations in the period of 1999 from 2009. Three main issues are investigated: the type of operation (LBO or Acquisition), the periods in which occur significant manipulation and the legislation change in 2001, which main goal was to cohibit the abusive rebuying of shares by the companies that wanted to go private prior to the going-private operation. The sample is composed of 132 companies that went private from 1999 to 2009 and the data were quarterly collected ranging five years. We found evidence that the sample firms manipulated their earnings approximately two years before going private. Also, some results show that there are differences in the direction of earnings management depending on the type of public-to-private operation: LBOs firms tended to manage their earnings up, as well as the companies that were acquired by their controlling firms, while the other acquisitions showed signs of downward manipulations. Finally, we found evidence that the legislation change in 2001 not only might have changed the pattern of firm´s manipulation but has also increased earnings management right after its effective date. / Esse trabalho investiga a dinâmica da manipulação de resultados de empresas brasileiras que fecharam o capital no período de 1999 a 2009. Dentre os fatores investigados estão o tipo de fechamento (OPA, aquisição, aquisição por controladoras), o período de manipulação e a mudança que a Lei nº 10.303/2001 (cujo objetivo era coibir o fechamento branco de capital) teria sobre o gerenciamento. A amostra utilizada é composta de 132 empresas que realizaram o fechamento no período citado, sendo o ciclo de dados coletado para cada empresa de vinte trimestres. Foram achados indícios de que essas empresas manipularam seus ganhos aproximadamente dois anos antes de seu fechamento. Além disso, foram encontradas evidências de diferença de direção de manipulação para os tipos de fechamento: empresas cujos fechamentos ocorreram através de OPA, assim como as que sofreram aquisição por suas controladoras, tenderiam a manipular seus ganhos para baixo, enquanto que as demais aquisições se caracterizariam por terem seus resultados adulterados para cima. Por fim, foram achados indícios de que a Lei nº 10.303/2001 tenha alterado o comportamento de manipulação contábil das empresas e de que houve um aumento de manipulação logo em seguida à sua vigência.

As a response to the financial crisis of 2008 the IASB and the FASB developed IFRS 9 and ASC 326, respectively. These accounting regulations are supposed to increase reporting transparency and promote financial stability by determining the calculation and recognition of loan loss provisions. However, previous literature has brought up concerns that loan loss provisions can negatively impact the lending activity in banks. If that was the case, they would negatively affect the amount of capital available in an economy and thereby threaten financial stability and economic growth especially during times of economic downturns. To shed light on this topic, this thesis investigates the relationship between loan loss provisions and lending activity in banks applying IFRS and US GAAP. The thesis provides practical as well as theoretical implications as it discusses the findings in a practical context and relates it to relevant theories.  The dataset utilized includes empirical data from Q1 2020 until Q4 2022 and covers 330 banks from 38 countries. The data was gathered from Refinitiv´s Eikon database as well as from the International Monetary Fund. It was then statistically analyzed by conducting different kinds of statistical inference. All methods applied are of a quantitative nature and the underlying methodology is positivist. The results of this thesis suggest that loan loss provisions under IFRS 9 are on average higher than under ASC 326. Further, it was found that loan loss provisions under IFRS 9 exhibit a statistically significant negative relationship with lending activity. In contrast, this relationship was found to be insignificant under ASC 326. Together, these findings suggest that higher loan loss provisions have a negative effect on lending activity. It is concluded that the impairment model of IFRS 9 might compromise financial stability by limiting lending activities during times of economic turmoil.  Additionally, due to the increased room for managerial judgment under IFRS 9 it is theorized that the higher loan loss provisions can be the result of earnings management. Loan loss provisions under IFRS 9 could thus be more supported by Agency theory. On the other hand, ASC 326 offers less room for managerial discretion and could be more supported by Stewardship theory. This thesis also suggests topics for potential future research. The knowledge about loan loss provisions and their effects on lending activity could be extended by using different variables in the regression model. Additionally, a longer timeframe as well as other accounting standards could be investigated. Furthermore, the effects of loan loss provisions on loan quality and risk management in banks are in need of further examination. Lastly, the capital requirements of Basel III and their impact on procyclicality should be researched.