In recent decades, the use of incentive-based reward programs to foster customer loyalty and promote sales has become prevalent in various industries. While these strategies are widely accepted and implemented, there is a significant gap in empirical studies to ascertain their real-world effectiveness. This thesis embarks on a comprehensive examination into the effectiveness of an online business's reward program, utilizing data from the past five years and employing data mining techniques, including RFM (Recency, Frequency, Monetary) model and clustering algorithms; hypothesis tests are employed to further strengthen the drawn conclusions. Contrary to popular theories, the findings reveal that small incentives such as rewards did not induce significant changes in customer purchasing behavior, nor did they effectively boost sales among rewarded customers. A control group of non-rewarded top-class customers showed more robust purchasing patterns. These unexpected results challenge existing beliefs and call for a critical re-evaluation of current practices in sales promotion and customer loyalty. The research underscores the need for empirically grounded strategies, further exploration into alternative loyalty-building methods, and a recognition of the complex realities influencing customer engagement.

The architecture, engineering and construction industry faces challenges when dealing withprocurement contract design and risk-handling. The optimal contracting practices have beenworldwide studied in areas of contract theory which studies how the optimal incentivemechanism (“contracts”) can be designed to encourage the parties to behave more efficiently.The parties usually consist of a principal and an agent, where the principal hires an agent todeliver goods or services. However, the complexity of contract theory calls for a morepracticable approach in an attempt to understand the procurement problem in the industry andincrease knowledge-sharing between projects. The purpose of this study is to propose a model based on contract theory that can be used inpractice to investigate the effects of project endogenous risks in three different types ofprocurement contracts: fixed-price, time and material, and incentive. Thus, this study usesquantitative methods with the aim to explain the current procurement problem in the Swedisharchitecture, engineering, and construction industry, compare theory and practice, andcontribute to knowledge about the linkage between endogenous risks, optimal risk sharing andcontract design. The conclusions from this study are that the current contracting practices in the industry arenot aligned with the optimal contract design described by the theory. The theory in this researchshowed that, given endogenous project risks, the optimal incentives vary in the agent’saversion to risk resulting in a non-monotone relationship between optimal contract power andproject risk. Further, a contract becomes optimal and efficient when cost savings and qualityincentives are aligned. However, the analysis of real-world projects presented no clearrelationship between contract power and project risk, i.e. some projects with fixed-pricecontracts or time and material contracts presented the same risk level. Hence, this researchproposes a method for computing the optimal incentive contract which can be used in manycases where the other two types of contract are currently being used. Based on the theory, theoptimal incentive contract may add valuable benefits for both parties involved since it aims toefficiently share the project risk between them while providing the agent the right incentivesto work more efficiently to reduce costs and deliver high-quality services or goods. / Byggbranschen står inför utmaningar när det gäller kontraktsdesign och riskhantering. Deoptimala upphandlingsmetoderna har studerats över hela världen inom områden avkontraktsteori som i sin tur studerar hur den optimala incitamentsmekanismen ("kontrakt") kanutformas för att uppmuntra parterna att agera mer effektivt. Parterna består vanligtvis av enprincipal och en agent, där principalen anställer en agent för att leverera varor eller tjänster.Men komplexiteten i kontraktsteori kräver ett mer praktiskt tillvägagångssätt i ett försök attbättre förstå upphandlingsproblemet i byggbranschen samt att öka kunskapsutbytet mellanprojekt. Syftet med denna studie är att föreslå en modell baserad på kontraktsteori som kan användas ipraktiken för att undersöka effekter av endogena risker i tre olika typer avupphandlingskontrakt: fastpris, rörligt pris (time and material) och incitament. Denna studieanvänder därmed kvantitativa metoder i syfte att förklara det aktuella upphandlingsproblemeti den svenska byggbranschen, jämföra teori och praktik, och bidra till utökad kunskap omsambandet mellan endogena risker, optimal riskdelning och kontraktsdesign. Slutsatsen från denna studie är att den nuvarande upphandlingspraxisen i branschen inte är ilinje med den optimala kontraktsdesignen som beskrivs av teorin. Teorin i denna studie visaratt, förutsatt endogena projektrisker, så varierar de optimala incitamenten med agentensriskaversion vilket resulterar i ett icke-monoton förhållande mellan optimal kontraktsdesignoch projektrisk. Dessutom blir ett kontrakt optimalt och effektivt när kostnadsbesparingar ochkvalitetsincitament är i linje med varandra. Men analysen av verkliga projekt visar inget tydligtsamband mellan kontraktsdesign och projektrisk, det vill säga en del projekt med fastpris ellerrörligt pris visade sig ha samma risknivå. Därför föreslår denna studie en metod för beräkningav det optimala incitamentet som kan användas i många fall där de andra två typerna avkontrakt för närvarande används. Teorin säger att det optimala incitamentet kan ge värdefullafördelar för de inblandade parterna eftersom det syftar till att på ett effektivt sätt fördelaprojektrisken mellan dem samtidigt som agenten får rätt incitament att arbeta mer effektivt föratt sänka kostnaderna och leverera högkvalitativa tjänster eller varor.

We recently showed that incentive motivation improves the precision of the Approximate Number System (ANS) in young adults. To shed light on the development of incentive motivation, the present study investigated whether this effect and its underlying mechanisms may also be observed in younger samples. Specifically, seven-year-old children (n = 23; 12 girls) and 14-year-old adolescents (n = 30; 15 girls) performed a dot comparison task with monetary reward incentives. Both age groups showed higher accuracy in a reward compared to a neutral condition and, similarly, higher processing efficiency as revealed by the drift rate parameter of the EZ-diffusion model. Furthermore, in line with the Incentive Salience Hypothesis, phasic pupil dilations—indicating the activation of the brain’s salience network—were greater in incentivized trials in both age groups. Together these finding suggest that incentive modulation improves numerosity discrimination in children and adolescents by enhancing the perceptual saliency of numerosity information. However, the observed reward anticipation effects were less pronounced in children relative to adolescents. Furthermore, unlike previous findings regarding young adults, the decision thresholds of children and adolescents were not raised by the monetary reward, which may indicate a more protracted development of incentive regulation of response caution than perceptual evidence accumulation.

Questa tesi include tre capitoli che si concentrano sulle politiche pubbliche e la tutela della salute. Il primo capitolo esamina l’effetto dell’incremento delle aliquote dell’IVA su alcune bevande sul loro consumo. I risultati dell’analisi empirica suggeriscono che l'aumento dell'aliquota IVA ha ridotto il consumo di alcolici, birra e bevande gassate, mentre l’effetto sul consumo di vino non è statisticamente significativo. Tuttavia, questo risultato generale cambia se si considerano sotto-gruppi di individui. Il secondo capitolo studia l’impatto del salario minimo sulla salute della popolazione cinese. Le stime indicano che i salari minimi reali sono negativamente e significativamente correlati con lo stato di salute della popolazione sia nel breve che nel lungo periodo, un risultato che potrebbe essere spiegato dalle condizioni di lavoro più stressanti conseguenti all’introduzione di un salario minimo più elevato. Infine, il terzo capitolo analizza gli effetti dei meccanismi di incentivazione sui comportamenti degli operatori sanitari del settore delle cure primarie nell’ambito della gestione dell'ipertensione. La nostra indagine empirica suggerisce che gli incentivi finanziari negativi potrebbero motivare gli operatori sanitari a migliorare la qualità dei servizi legati alla gestione dell'ipertensione, mentre né gli incentivi finanziari né diverse modalità di valutazione delle prestazioni sembrano influenzare la qualità dei servizi. / This dissertation includes three chapters which focus on the relationship between public policies and healthcare. The first chapter examines whether tax policy is effective in changing the unhealthy drinking behaviours of individuals. My findings suggest that the VAT rate increase is effective in reducing the consumption of spirits, beer and carbonated beverages, while it is not effective for wine. However, this general result change when looking at sub-groups of individuals. The second chapter studies how real minimum wages affect population health in China. I conclude that real minimum wages are negatively and significantly related to population health, a result which might be explained by the role of more stressful working conditions as a consequence of a higher minimum wage. Finally, the third chapter analyses the effects of incentive mechanisms on the behaviours of primary health workers and the subsequent effects on the quality of hypertension management. The empirical investigation suggests that negative financial incentives could motivate primary health workers and improve the quality of hypertension management. However, neither positive financial incentives nor different modes of performance evaluation are significantly related to the quality of hypertension management.

Les gérants de portefeuille pour compte de tiers sont souvent jugés par leur performance relative à celle d'un portefeuille benchmark. A ce titre, ils sont amenés très fréquemment à utiliser des modèles internes de "risk management" pour contrôler le risque de sous-performer le benchmark. Par ailleurs, ils sont de plus en plus nombreux à adopter une politique de rémunération incitative, en percevant une commission de sur-performance par rapport au benchmark. En effet, cette composante variable de leur rémunération leur permet d'augmenter leur revenu en cas de sur-performance sans contrepartie en cas de sous-performance. Or de telles pratiques ont fait récemment l'objet de nombreuses polémiques : la période récente de crise financière mondiale a fait apparaître certaines carences de plusieurs acteurs financiers en terme de contrôle de risque ainsi que des niveaux de prise de risque et de rémunération jugés excessifs. Cependant, l'étude des implications de ces pratiques reste un thème encore relativement peu exploré dans le cadre de la théorie classique des choix dynamiques de portefeuille en temps continu. Cette thèse analyse, dans ce cadre théorique, les implications de ces pratiques de "benchmarking" sur le comportement d'investissement de l'asset manager. La première partie étudie les propriétés de la stratégie dynamique optimale pour l'asset manager concerné par l'écart entre la rentabilité de son portefeuille et celle d'un benchmark fixe ou stochastique (sur ou sous-performance). Nous considérons plusieurs types d'asset managers, caractérisés par différentes fonctions d'utilité et qui sont soumis à différentes contraintes de risque de sous-performance. Nous montrons en particulier quel est le lien entre les problèmes d'investissement avec prise en compte de l'aversion à la sous-performance et avec contrainte explicite de "risk management". Dans la seconde partie, on s'intéresse à l'asset manager bénéficiant d'une rémunération incitative (frais de gestion variables, bonus de sur-performance ou commission sur encours additionnelle). On étudie, selon la forme de ses incitations financières et son degré d'aversion à la sous-performance, comment sa stratégie d'investissement s'écarte de celle de l'investisseur (ou celle de l'asset manager sans rémunération incitative). Nous montrons que le changement de comportement de l'asset manager peut se traduire soit par une réduction du risque pris par rapport à la stratégie sans incitation financière soit au contraire par une augmentation de celui-ci. Finalement, nous montrons en quoi la présence de contraintes de risque de sous-performance, imposées au gérant ou traduisant son aversion à la sous-performance, peut être bénéfique à l'investisseur donnant mandat de gestion financière. / It is common practice to judge third-party asset managers by looking at their financial performance relative to a benchmark portfolio. For this reason, they often choose to rely on internal risk-management models to control the downside risk of their portfolio relative to the benchmark. Moreover, an increasing number are adopting an incentive-based scheme, by charging an over-performance commission relative to the benchmark. Indeed, including this variable component in their global remuneration allows them to increase their revenue in case of over-performance without any penalty in the event of underperforming the benchmark. However, such practices have recently been at the heart of several polemics: the recent global financial crisis has uncovered some shortcomings in terms of internal risk control as well as excessive risk-taking and compensation levels of several financial players. Nevertheless, it appears that analyzing the impact of these practices remains a relatively new issue in continuous time-dynamic asset allocation theory. This thesis analyses in this theoretical framework the implications of these "benchmarking" practices on the asset manager's investment behavior. The first part examines the properties of the optimal dynamic strategy for the asset manager who is concerned by the difference of return between their portfolio and a fix or stochastic benchmark (over- or under-performance). Several asset manager types are considered, defined by different utility functions and different downside-risk constraints. In particular, the link between investment problems with aversion to under-performance and risk management constraints is shown. In the second part, the case of the asset manager who benefits from an incentive compensation scheme (variable asset management fees, over-performance bonuses or additional commission on asset under management), is investigated. We study how, depending on the choice of financial inventive structure and loss aversion level, the asset manager's strategy differs from that of the investor (or the strategy of the asset manager receiving no incentive remuneration). This study shows that the change in investment behavior of the asset manager can lead to both a reduction in the risk taken relative to the strategy without financial incentives or conversely an increase thereof. Finally we show that the existence of downside risk constraints, imposed on the asset manager or corresponding to their aversion for under-performance, can be beneficial to the investor mandating financial management.

許多企業的經理人一直在尋求有效的政策以促進員工彼此分享知識。在組織中實施激勵知識分享的政策，因為存在著許多的個人與組織的因素，兩者相互作用會影響組織的成員知識分享的行為，政策的效果很難掌握。在實務上，不同的組織激勵的政策或手段的效果，欲通過田野調查或實驗設計來評估政策所帶來效果及對組織成員行為的影響不容易實現。因此，本研究嘗試運用一項新穎的研究策略-代理人基塑模(agent-based modeling)，經由建構一個人造的世界來模擬組織成員知識分享的行為。在這個人造的社會中，研究者考慮了知識分享的報酬、組織成員的行為策略、行為策略的學習與適應機制、不同組織的群體能力水準、互動的網路、知識的選擇模式與不同的組織激勵政策設計等變數，藉以設計相關的實驗。模擬的結果產生了的幾項有趣的發現： (1) 當分享知識的報酬愈高時，代理人知識分享行為會愈多，無論是在那一種的互動網路、群體能力或分享知識的選擇模式的情況之下。(2) 代理人的互動網路是一項重要影響因素，互動網路扮演著知識流通與行為策略學習的管道，它同時會影響個體知識分享的報酬與行為策略的學習。它可能促成不分享的策略的擴散，可能會提升組織激勵的效果，也可能會增強激勵所帶來的副作用。(3) 個體的知識分享與吸收的能力如果存有差異，則能力較好的代理人將會局部地吸引能力較差的互動對象採用他的策略，即使他所用的不是可以獲致最佳報酬策略。(4) 為促進組織成員分享知識，定期審視固定獎勵的作法可以導致比較好的效果，不但可以提升分享知識的行為，也使代理人比較願意採用傾向分享知識的策略，促成組織信任的氣氛。但是，在某些情況下，可能造成反效果。(5) 最後，根據實驗的結果與研究的發現，研究者建構了一個知識分享之組織行為模型，以做為後續實證研究之參考架構。 / Mangers always look for effective policies to prompt knowledge sharing between members in an organization. It is difficult to evaluate the effect of incentive policies for stimulating knowledge sharing because there are many individual and organizational factors. In practice, it is not easy to assess the effects of different incentive policies or methods by the methods of experiment or field investigation. Therefore, a novel research strategy is applied in this study, which is called agent-based modeling. An artificial world was constructed to simulate the knowledge sharing interactions between members in an organization. This study considers some parameters including the payoff of knowledge sharing, the strategies of members, the learning and adaption mechanism of strategies, collective capabilities, interactive network, the selection methods of sharing knowledge and incentive policies to design experiments in the agent-based model. The results of simulations produced some interesting findings: (1) the higher the payoff of sharing knowledge, the more the actions of sharing knowledge is in spite of any kind of interactive networks, collective capabilities, and the selection methods of sharing knowledge. (2) Interactive Network of agents is an important factor, which plays a role of channel of knowledge transition and strategy learning. It simultaneously affects the payoff of knowledge sharing and learning of strategy. It maybe results in the diffusion of strategy of not sharing knowledge, or enhances the effect and side effect brought by incentive policies. (3) Because of difference between agents’ capabilities, agents with better capabilities will locally attract the ones with worse capabilities to learn their strategies, which even are not the best. (4) To enable sharing knowledge between members in an organization, periodic reward will get better results. It does not only increase the action of sharing knowledge, but also make agents to adop the strategies trending toward sharing knowledge. Periodic reward is helpful to form a trustful organization climate. However, in some circumstances, it may get minus effects. (5) Finally, according to experimental results and research findings, an organization behavior model of knowledge sharing has been constructed for the empirical studies in the future.

Biodiversity loss is one of the major environmental threats facing the planet. Incentive-based conservation is one means to reduce human pressure on wildlife by providing economic incentives for resource-dependent people to protect the environment. Marine wildlife tourism is one of the fastest growing tourism sectors globally and is viewed as an important incentive-based approach for achieving marine conservation goals. However, few studies have linked participation in the provisioning of marine wildlife tourism activities with positive social and ecological conservation outcomes. The goal of this dissertation is to provide greater understanding of the conservation value of marine wildlife tourism using whale shark tourism as a case study with a main focus on social conservation outcomes amongst tourism providers. Positive changes in perceptions, attitudes and values towards target species and their environments can be an important element of incentive-based conservation. The study has the following objectives: (1) to assess the status of the global whale shark tourism industry, including types (e.g., captive, non-captive), real and potential impacts, conservation value and management challenges and best practices; (2) to examine the ethics of provisioning whale sharks in Oslob, Philippines, the largest, non-captive viewing site in the world; (3) to determine if working in ecotourism changed the attitudes and behaviours of locals towards whale sharks and the ocean, and if tourism type affects those outcomes; (4) to assess the marine wildlife value orientations of locals working in whale shark tourism to achieve greater understanding of the factors influencing their conservation attitudes and behaviours; (5) to explore the potential long-term impacts of poorly conceived incentive-based conservation projects on social and ecological conservation outcomes; and (6) to re-examine and update the conceptual and theoretical background for wildlife tourism in light of the findings of this study. Methods include a comprehensive literature review, tourist surveys, social media content analysis, and interviews with locals working in whale shark tourism at four sites in the Philippines. Results suggest that marine wildlife tourism can play an important role in changing locals’ attitudes and behaviours towards the focal species and habitat; however, smaller-scale, more established sites had greater conservation value than the mass tourism or failed sites suggesting that small-scale, community-based ecotourism is the best approach to meeting conservation goals of marine wildlife tourism. Yet, few tourism sites meet these standards. Global standards are needed to ensure whale shark tourism activities meet desired conservation goals. Such standards should include management requirements (e.g., licensing, mandatory education program) and interaction guidelines (e.g. minimum viewing distances, limits on the number of swimmers/boats, etc.). The findings also emphasise that economics should not be the only or primary metric used to measure conservation success; rather, the focus should be on assessing a more comprehensive range of social and ecological conservation outcomes of these activities. / Graduate / 2020-04-16

近年來常常聽到有所謂的電子新貴或是網路新貴族，年紀輕輕工作個3∼5年就擁有千萬甚至億元身價，羡煞了工作十幾二十年卻還在與房子貸款奮鬥的勞工朋友，或許他們也有出來創業的念頭，但卻往往承受不了這麼大的風險而作罷，也可能想要跳槽卻提不起勇氣，怕自己的專業已不符時代潮流甚至會淹沒在電子浪潮下，因此常常聽到父執輩朋友談起工作上的不順遂及提不起勁，工作了一輩子皆是為別人賺錢的怨言。因此如何平衡傳統產業及高科技產業之間員工不滿及差距，並能持續維持公司創新及開發的動力，如何設計一套能提高員工向心力、員工工作參與感並增加工作效率的機制就顯得相當重要。 但在討論激勵制度的時候並不能將所有重點皆著墨於股票的發放上，因為台灣分紅制度的實施雖然使得台灣科技快速成長，但也造成股本快速膨脹，如果公司不屬於高成長性的產業，如傳統產業，則分紅制度可能反使公司因盈餘未能趕上股本膨脹的速度而導致產業衰退，國內大部份傳統產業的股票並不能如高科技產業一樣維持在高價位上，且觀察國內傳統產業近幾年來股價的表現中亦發現股價大多數呈現下降的走勢，因此以股票來獎勵員工並不能有效的達到吸引員工及留住公司優秀人才的目的，所以台灣一般傳統產業並不適合以股票為基礎的激勵措施，所以除了以股票做為吸引員工之外，亦可以考慮以現金做為員工的激勵措施。 另外由於國內企業基於全球發展策略的需要，常需於海外設立分據點，所以我們必須了解外國實施已久的股票選擇權制度優劣及執行的機制，才能有效達到激勵員工及創造公司價值，達成公司及員工兩造之間雙贏的局面。由於國內目前並無股票選擇權制度，而股票選擇權制度的優點又能適時彌補現行國內分紅入股制度所產生的缺朱，並能配合國內未來全球發展策略，因此值得我們詳細深入探討分析。 首先本論文藉由瞭解國內相關高科技的激勵制度，對其做深入的探討並分析可能產生的問題，進而引進外國相關的激勵制度，包括利潤分享計畫(profit shaing)及股票選擇權制度(stock option)，其中利潤分享計畫是以現金發放為主，而股票選擇權則是以股票發放為主。本篇論文主要探討各激勵制度使用上的優缺點並於一章節中做模擬試算，文中整理利潤分享計畫共包括六項，如現金利潤分享計畫(cash profit shaing plan)、簡單計畫(Simple plan)、簡化員工退休計畫(Simplifed employee pension plan,SEP)、遞延利潤分享計畫(deferred profit shaing plan)、現金購買計畫(Money-purchaseplan)及40lk，而股票選擇擇權則是以廣泛基礎的股票選擇權為主，另外還介紹以股票為主的員工持股信託(ESOP)、目標利潤計畫(target-benefit plan)及股票紅利計畫(Stock-bonus plan)。 而在可預期的未來國內將會實施股票選擇權制度，因此本論文另以一章節探討股票選擇權並對股票選擇權所產生的問題做分析，例如當員工執行股票選擇權時所產生盈餘及投票權稀釋的問題，公司應如何有效解決；當公司發生合併時股票選擇權應如何調整；當股市下跌股票選擇權發生價外時公司應如何解決。本論文對上述問題提出有效的解決替代方案，並對各問題做一詳細的探討分析，並於最後附錄的部份納入公司執行激勵制度時所應考量的事項。最後希望未來相關激勵制度推行時，本論文能提供相關資訊使得員工及公司能有所助益。

論文提要 論文名稱：新制度經濟學對當代行政改革之啟示 頁數：335 校（院）所組別：國立政治大學公共行政系碩士班 提要別：八十七學年第二學期碩士學位論文提要 研究生：謝俊義 提要內容： 指導教授：孫本初博士 自一九九三年美國高爾副總統的『國家績效評估報告』（Al Gore Report of the National Performance Review）明確呼籲建立「師法企業的政府」（business-like entreneurial government），於是政府再造（reinventing government）的風潮引起全球大規模的行政改革運動，儼然成為當代世界各國政府謀求提昇政府效率的救世主；在學術界對這些名詞的爭辯，逐漸以新公共管理(New Public Management,NPM)一詞來整合。在這一波的行政改革運動是以經濟市場理論作為政治與行政關係的區分模型，究其本質乃是受到公共選擇理論、主要代理人理論以及交易成本經濟學假定的強烈影響。新制度主義在近幾年受到社會科學家廣泛的重視，在國際關係、比較公共政策、健保政策、歐洲共同體的決策與整合、公共行政等社會科學領域中廣泛的被應用，本論文主要是將「新制度主義帶進入行政改革」（Bringing New Institutionalism back in Administrative Reform）的分析之中。 本論文的研究目的即欲以新制度主義的經濟學途徑來分析市場導向的行政改革，試圖釐清下列幾個主題： 1.區分新制度主義各個途徑的差異，並藉此釐清新制度經濟學的理論意涵。 2.以市場與層級節制間的關係來探討效率導向的行政改革。 3.從對官僚體制的挑戰、消費者主權、制度性的績效與誘因策略以及制度的選擇等四個構面來分析行政改革的制度效率面。 4.本文欲以制度的變遷、公部門的集體行動、行政改革制度的多元弔詭、制度的設計以及認知的轉向等制度分析面向，解析效率為導向的行政改革運動所可能存在的問題。 5.透過以上的分析提出新制度主義經濟學對行政改革的啟示及優缺點，並進而對新制度主義的未來提出建議。 本論文認為要重建公共行政的價值應立基於公共行政對社會服務的價值與回應性，而非解構官僚體系（debureaucratization）或授權（deregulation），如何使得政府運作更有價值，組織具有創造力、回應力與責任，這是現代化政府的要務。以新制度經濟學來探討組織理論的關係，如果忽略了關鍵性的組織機制如權力、認同與協調，在解釋組織與市場間的關係是不夠完全；因此，必須以組織目標、結合組織認同、物質報酬以及監督來激勵員工的需求，對於制度角色的認知不能僅是化約為「硬性市場界限」(hard market constraints)與「軟性官僚界限」(soft bureaucratic constraints)的兩極化發展，而是採取多元化制度的發展。此外，筆者在研究過程中發現新制度主義到目前為止亦僅是各學科對於舊制度論的反省與修正，對於這個領域還存有許多分歧，嚴謹地說，並不算是學科的典範，如果這個領域要欲在社會科學的社群中能尋求認同與突破，必須在方法論與理論基礎上能有所共識，以及建立學術的對話機制。 目 錄 第壹章 緒 論-------------------------------------------------------------1-1 第一節 研究動機與目的------------------------------------------------1-1 第二節 研究方法與範圍------------------------------------------------1-6 第三節 相關名詞背景闡述---------------------------------------------1-11 第四節 研究流程與架構------------------------------------------------1-19 第貳章 相關文獻檢閱---------------------------------------------------2-1 第一節 新制度主義的興起---------------------------------------------2-1 第二節 新制度經濟學---------------------------------------------------2-20 第三節 新制度經濟學與新公共管理---------------------------------2-37 第四節 市場與層級節制------------------------------------------------2-55 第參章 制度的效率面---------------------------------------------------3-1 第一節 官僚體系的挑戰--------------------------------------------------3-1 第二節 消費者（顧客）主權--------------------------------------------3-19 第三節 制度性績效與誘因策略-----------------------------------------3-33 第四節 制度的策略性選擇-----------------------------------------------3-49 第肆章 制度的分析-------------------------------------------------------4-1 第一節 從組織重組到政府再造-----------------------------------------4-1 第二節 公部門的集體行動-----------------------------------------------4-22 第三節 行政改革制度的多元弔詭--------------------------------------4-41 第四節 制度的設計--------------------------------------------------------4-60 第五節 認知的轉向--------------------------------------------------------4-79 第伍章 綜合研究發現與建議--------------------------------------------5-1 第一節 新制度經濟學對行政改革之啟示-----------------------------5-1 第二節 新制度主義的批判與策進--------------------------------------5-17 參考書目---------------------------------------------------------------------註1 中文參考書目--------------------------------------------------------------註1 英文參考書目--------------------------------------------------------------註5 圖表目錄 壹、圖目錄 圖1-1：研究架構圖------------------------------------------------------------1-19 圖1-2：研究流程---- ----------------------------------------------------------1-20 圖2-1：交易成本架------------------------------------------------------------2-29 圖4-1：財貨的分類------------------------------------------------------------4-27 貳、表目錄 表1-1：國內新制度主義相關博碩士論文檢閱---------------------------1-8 表2-1：新舊制度論之差------------------------------------------------------2-3 表2-2：新制度主義各個途徑異同處---------------------------------------2-5 表2-3：新制度主義相關學派表徵------------------------------------------2-6 表2-4：新制度經濟學的多重面---------------------------------------------2-33 表2-5：對傳統公共行政學說的四項批判---------------------------------2-42 表2-6：新公共管理的學理基------------------------------------------------2-45 表2-7：新公共管理的四項模型---------------------------------------------2-49 表2-8：公共行政的研究途---------------------------------------------------2-52 表2-9：市場、層級節制與網路的特徵------------------------------------2-55 表2-10：組織的模式：市場、層級節制與區----------------------------2-70 表3-1：公私關係與服務傳遞的公民與顧客導向模型------------------3-23 表3-2：組織結構設計的方---------------------------------------------------3-58 表3-3：B.Guy Peters的四種治理模------------------------------------------3-58 表3-3：公部門改革的目的與手段------------------------------------------3-62 表3-4：策略與結果------------------------------------------------------------3-63 表4-1：二十世紀迄今美國總統設立行政改革委員會及計畫一覽---4-9 表4-2：我國政府遷台後行政改革的歷史演進---------------------------4-13 表4-3：維持長期共同集合資源制度設計的原則------------------------4-33 表4-4：承諾的兩種觀點：組織行為與理性選擇------------------------4-39 表4-5：轉換公部門的五項基因---------------------------------------------4-71 表4-6：制度設計的種類與方法---------------------------------------------4-76 表5-1：理性選擇學派與社會詮釋觀點的差異---------------------------5-23 表5-2：新制度主義的核心---------------------------------------------------5-27 表5-3：三種新制度主義型式的比較---------------------------------------5-29

本文考慮當資訊不對稱下的逆向選擇問題存在時,如何遵循Myerson(1979)提出的揭露原則 (the revelation principle)來設計一套具備誘因相容性 (incentive compatibility)的存款保險契約,契約中的自有資本比率為要保機構的自我選擇變數 (self-selection variable),而保險費則為存保公司用來控制要保機構決策行為的控制變數(control var iable),依此可以建立一套自我選擇機能(self-selection mechanism),來促使要保機構誠實揭其風險類型的私有訊息(private information),進而將要保機構依風險高低正確分類,徹底解決訊息不對稱下的逆向選擇問題。