Os estudos a respeito do funcionamento do Congresso brasileiro não deixariam dúvidas: os trabalhos no interior da arena legislativa são organizados em termos partidários. Os atores políticos raramente conseguem agir individualmente. Partidos políticos estruturam e viabilizam a atuação dos parlamentares. Contudo, a despeito deste acordo sobre a importância dos partidos, haveria um momento específico do processo político em que os parlamentares conseguiriam agir individualmente, sem sofrer os constrangimentos dos partidos políticos: na alteração do orçamento. Seria esse o momento ideal para que os parlamentares ajam informados exclusivamente por seu interesse individual. Seria este também o momento oportuno para que o Executivo negocie com os parlamentares para obter o apoio que necessita para aprovar matérias. Os partidos sairiam de cena e o parlamentar individual viria para o centro do palco. Esse trabalho, no entanto, segue na contramão dessa vertente argumentativa e buscará mostrar como até nesse momento de atuação individual, a presença dos partidos políticos não apenas pode ser detectada, como ainda se mostra crucial. O objetivo geral aqui será o de mostrar como os parlamentares atuam por meio de seus partidos políticos ao promoverem alterações no orçamento. / The literature on the decision-making process in the Brazilian Congress asserts that partisanship is the main factor organizing the legislative arena. Brazilian legislators are rarely able to act individually (i.e. without the support and authorization of their party leaders). However, in spite of this agreement on the importance of the parties, part of the literature also states that members of congress have the ability to operate without suffering the constraints of political parties in amending the budget bill introduced by the Executive at this crucial moment of the legislative process. Individual interests should show up exactly at this crucial moment of the legislative process. Moreover, the budget-making process should configure an excellent opportunity for the Executive to negotiate with legislators in order to obtain support for its own policy agenda. By this argument parties are absent and legislators, as individuals, would come to the center of the stage. My work, however, goes against this perspective and seeks to show the reasons why even when one should expect individual behavior, political parties show their strength and importance. My overall goal is to demonstrate that, against the expectations, partisanship matters for the budget-making process in Brazil.

Os estudos a respeito do funcionamento do Congresso brasileiro não deixariam dúvidas: os trabalhos no interior da arena legislativa são organizados em termos partidários. Os atores políticos raramente conseguem agir individualmente. Partidos políticos estruturam e viabilizam a atuação dos parlamentares. Contudo, a despeito deste acordo sobre a importância dos partidos, haveria um momento específico do processo político em que os parlamentares conseguiriam agir individualmente, sem sofrer os constrangimentos dos partidos políticos: na alteração do orçamento. Seria esse o momento ideal para que os parlamentares ajam informados exclusivamente por seu interesse individual. Seria este também o momento oportuno para que o Executivo negocie com os parlamentares para obter o apoio que necessita para aprovar matérias. Os partidos sairiam de cena e o parlamentar individual viria para o centro do palco. Esse trabalho, no entanto, segue na contramão dessa vertente argumentativa e buscará mostrar como até nesse momento de atuação individual, a presença dos partidos políticos não apenas pode ser detectada, como ainda se mostra crucial. O objetivo geral aqui será o de mostrar como os parlamentares atuam por meio de seus partidos políticos ao promoverem alterações no orçamento. / The literature on the decision-making process in the Brazilian Congress asserts that partisanship is the main factor organizing the legislative arena. Brazilian legislators are rarely able to act individually (i.e. without the support and authorization of their party leaders). However, in spite of this agreement on the importance of the parties, part of the literature also states that members of congress have the ability to operate without suffering the constraints of political parties in amending the budget bill introduced by the Executive at this crucial moment of the legislative process. Individual interests should show up exactly at this crucial moment of the legislative process. Moreover, the budget-making process should configure an excellent opportunity for the Executive to negotiate with legislators in order to obtain support for its own policy agenda. By this argument parties are absent and legislators, as individuals, would come to the center of the stage. My work, however, goes against this perspective and seeks to show the reasons why even when one should expect individual behavior, political parties show their strength and importance. My overall goal is to demonstrate that, against the expectations, partisanship matters for the budget-making process in Brazil.

<p>The aim of this thesis is to use a power perspective to describe the workers’ struggle for co-determination in the Swedish labour market during the period 1890–1939. The study explores how trade unions in general attempted to limit article 23, which asserted employers’ control over hiring and dismissal. At the same time the study clarifies differences in union power between various groups of workers. The prevalent historical view regarding the distribution of power in the labour market is thus questioned.</p><p>The study shows that workers were not powerless before the Saltsjöbaden agreement in 1938. In certain areas workers, through their unions, already at the beginning of the 20th century had fairly good possibilities of influencing both hiring and dismissal. Collective agreements that were entered into before the defeat of the workers in the great conflict in the Swedish labour market in 1909, as well as collective agreements signed during the 1920s and 1930s, can make both the Saltsjöbaden agreement and present-day regulations look “hostile to workers”. In collective agreements workers achieved considerable limitations of employers’ arbitrary freedom to hire and dismiss workers. Certain unions could control their labour market efficiently by means of a labour exchange of their own. The development, however, varied over time and between different trade unions. Business cycles generally influenced how much power unions could exert. Access to power resources and other conditions varied between different workers’ groups. While some attained considerable power over hiring and dismissal, others had no possibilities of taking part in decision-making.</p>

The aim of this thesis is to use a power perspective to describe the workers’ struggle for co-determination in the Swedish labour market during the period 1890–1939. The study explores how trade unions in general attempted to limit article 23, which asserted employers’ control over hiring and dismissal. At the same time the study clarifies differences in union power between various groups of workers. The prevalent historical view regarding the distribution of power in the labour market is thus questioned. The study shows that workers were not powerless before the Saltsjöbaden agreement in 1938. In certain areas workers, through their unions, already at the beginning of the 20th century had fairly good possibilities of influencing both hiring and dismissal. Collective agreements that were entered into before the defeat of the workers in the great conflict in the Swedish labour market in 1909, as well as collective agreements signed during the 1920s and 1930s, can make both the Saltsjöbaden agreement and present-day regulations look “hostile to workers”. In collective agreements workers achieved considerable limitations of employers’ arbitrary freedom to hire and dismiss workers. Certain unions could control their labour market efficiently by means of a labour exchange of their own. The development, however, varied over time and between different trade unions. Business cycles generally influenced how much power unions could exert. Access to power resources and other conditions varied between different workers’ groups. While some attained considerable power over hiring and dismissal, others had no possibilities of taking part in decision-making.

Notre dissertation investigue les actions individuelles et légales de contestation des discriminations raciales ou ethniques par ses victimes, objet rarement étudié en psychologie sociale. Alors que les actions collectives s’inscrivent dans un cadre des relations intergroupes, nos études montrent que les actions individuelles restent plutôt dans le cadre de relations perçues endogroupales par les acteurs qui contestent les discriminations. Les implications en termes d’identité sociale dans ce type d’action sont différentes et nous postulons qu’une catégorisation à un niveau supra-ordonné (ex. comme membre de la société hôte ou être humain) facilite l’entreprise des actions individuelles de contestation des discriminations par la voie légale. L’égalitarisme qui rend saillant ce niveau de catégorisation supra-ordonné, et en tant que croyance qui délégitime le statut désavantagé des individus stigmatisés, faciliterait la remise en question du statu quo en augmentant la perception de la discrimination ainsi que la tendance à s’engager dans des actions de lutte contre les discriminations par la voie légale. De plus, motivés par des démarches qui rentabilisent le rapport coûts-bénéfices, les individus portés par l’égalitarisme et qui perçoivent la discrimination s’engageraient plus facilement dans des actions de contestation lorsqu’ils pensent qu’ils peuvent le faire au bénéfice de la collectivité plutôt que dans leur propre intérêt uniquement. D’autre part, l’entreprise d’actions contre les discriminations par la voie légale nécessite une connaissance relative de ces lois qui fonctionnent comme des normes injonctives indiquant aux individus ce qui est admis ou non en société (ex. caractère interdit de la discrimination). Une source experte (ex. organisme de lutte contre le racisme) qui véhicule ce type de normes injonctives anti-racistes serait particulièrement influente dans l’entreprise d’actions légales pour lutter contre les discriminations. / Doctorat en Sciences Psychologiques et de l'éducation / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Le débat maintenant ancien que mènent les juristes français autour de l'action de groupe est marqué par une contradiction importante : alors que les class actions américaines, systématiquement évoquées, semblent exercer une influence déterminante sur leurs réflexions, elles restent largement méconnues. Suscitant l'espoir autant que la crainte, l'exemple des class actions peut expliquer à la fois l'arrivée de l'action de groupe dans l'ordre juridique français, les hésitations législatives et doctrinales qui l'ont précédée et les défauts qui affectent tant les textes entrés en vigueur que ceux encore en projet. D'un côté, l'intérêt porté en France aux class actions est l'expression d"une insatisfaction à l'égard du droit français, particulièrement du droit de la responsabilité civile. Les class actions sont alors envisagées comme une solution possible à un problème donné, à savoir l'absence en droit français d'un outil efficace pour appréhender les situations dans lesquelles un grand nombre de personnes subit des dommages individuels rattachables à un fait unique (ou une série de faits identiques). De l'autre, le mécanisme sur lequel les class actions s'appuient suscite fréquemment la perplexité, voire l'hostilité. Reposant sur une présomption de consentement de la part des membres du groupe représentés (« opt-out »), elles seraient contraires aux règles traditionnelles de la procédure civile française, réputée éminemment individualiste. Le rôle central confié aux avocats américains encouragerait en outre les actions illégitimes sans bénéfice réel pour les personnes représentées. Dans cette perspective, un examen approfondi des conditions historiques dans lesquelles les class actions sont apparues aux États-Unis et des règles qui les encadrent, confronté à l'étude de l'ensemble des actions pour autrui existant en droit français, est le moyen de vérifier la légitimité des espoirs et des craintes qui structurent le débat français. Ses enseignements, nombreux, permettent de proposer une vue d'ensemble des principes cardinaux d'organisation des actions de groupe dans l'optique de la construction d'un régime efficace, quelle que soit la tradition juridique concernée. La pertinence de cette approche reste entière au regard des limites sérieuses qui caractérisent l'action de groupe introduite en France en 2014. En premier lieu, la comparaison des droits français et américain révèle la très grande diversité des schémas procéduraux envisageables, en fonction des demandes formulées dans le cadre de ces actions et des buts assignés à la procédure envisagée, qui dérivent eux-mêmes souvent des fonctions réparatrices, compensatoires ou punitives attribuées au droit de la responsabilité civile. En second lieu, il relativise le caractère exceptionnel de la présomption de consentement tout en confirmant que l'efficacité des actions de groupe dépend pour une large part des conditions dans lesquelles est défini le groupe de personnes qui subit les effets de la décision de fond rendue à l'issue de la procédure. En troisième lieu, il fait apparaître l'importance de la dimension économique de ces actions. Dans la mesure où elles permettent la défense des intérêts individuels d'autrui, elles exigent une prise en compte de la réalité des incitations et des moyens propres à chaque acteur de la procédure, notamment celui qui l'initie. / The French debate on collective actions is characterised by a central contradiction: while US class actions almost systematically serve as the starting point of discussions among French lawyers, they remain widely unknown to them. Being a reason for hope, admiration as well as fear, the American model of class actions can explain why the introduction of collective actions in French law was decided, why it was delayed for so long, and the many flaws of the resulting legislation.