Confronté à des atteintes massives et lucratives, le droit de la propriété intellectuelle est protégé par des réseaux de normes répressives, formant la matière pénale. Le droit pénal, droit traditionnel de protection des autres droits, forme un réseau composé de règles pénales, tant substantielles que formelles, spécifiques au droit de la propriété intellectuelle, et de certaines infractions contre les biens, du livre troisième du code pénal. Ces normes se heurtent à plusieurs écueils. Le droit pénal de la propriété intellectuelle appréhende difficilement le caractère massif ou transfrontalier des infractions et si les incriminations du code pénal peuvent s’inscrire dans les vides répressifs laissés par celui-ci, leur adaptation aux biens incorporels non rivaux bouleverse les équilibres. D’une part, cette adaptation est réalisée pour leur application aux informations, sans considération de leur caractère appropriable, ce qui affaiblit l’intérêt du droit de la propriété intellectuelle. D’autre part, ces infractions entrent en concours avec celles spécifiques au droit de la propriété intellectuelle. Ineffectif, le droit pénal de la propriété intellectuelle subit, aussi, la dépénalisation judiciaire de ce droit. Ignorant l’indispensable réforme de ce droit pénal, le législateur a créé de nouveaux réseaux répressifs. Si le droit administratif répressif, mis en œuvre par l’HADOPI, pouvait constituer une alternative pertinente au droit pénal, pour la lutte contre la massification des infractions au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins sur Internet, l’attribution des sanctions au juge répressif en a réduit l’attrait. A l’aune de la jurisprudence de la CEDH, les normes civiles répressives, applicables au droit de la propriété intellectuelle, forment un réseau rival du droit pénal, dont les effets systémiques imposent de réfléchir au dessein de la frontière entre les responsabilités civile et pénale. La matière pénale de la propriété intellectuelle, née de la dilatation de la répression, est donc constituée de normes pénales, dont seules celles du code pénal apparaissent effectives, d’un droit administratif à la fonction répressive altérée et d’un droit civil répressif inefficace. Protection défaillante d’un droit affaibli, elle doit être restructurée. Une cohérence peut être instaurée par son organisation autour du droit de propriété, dont émane le droit de la propriété intellectuelle. La création d’un droit pénal de la propriété pourrait ainsi conférer une protection efficace au droit de la propriété intellectuelle, complétée par des normes répressives spécifiques. / The intellectual property rights, which are confronted with massive, lucrative infringements, are protected by several networks of repressive norms that constitute criminal matters. Penal law, a traditional body of law for the protection of the other forms of law, constitute the first network. It is composed of criminal law rules, both substantive and procedural, which are specific to intellectual property law, and certain property offences from Book III of the French Penal Code. These norms encounter several obstacles. This criminal law applied to intellectual property has difficulty grasping the massive or cross-border nature of infringements. Although offences under the French Penal Code may occur in the punitive legal vacuum left by this body of law, their adaptation to non-rival intangible assets upsets balances. On the one hand, this adaptation is effected by applying them to information without taking account of their appropriable nature, thereby weakening the benefits of intellectual property law. On the other hand, these offences compete with offences that are specific to intellectual property law. Penal law, which is ineffective, has also been subject to the judicial decriminalization of intellectual property law. Overlooking the pressing need to reform such criminal law applied to intellectual property, legislators have created new repressive networks. Whereas repressive administrative law, as implemented by HADOPI, could offer a relevant alternative to the massification of infringements of copyright and related rights on the Internet, allowing judges exercising criminal jurisdiction to impose sanctions has diminished its appeal. In the light of the ECHR’s case-law, repressive civil law forms a rival network to penal law, but its ineffectiveness with regard to intellectual property law and its systemic effects force us to reflect on the purpose for the boundary between civil and criminal liability. Criminal matters, which stem from the expansion of judicial repression, are thus comprised of criminal norms, of which only those of the French Penal Code appear effective, of administrative law with an altered repressive function, and of ineffective repressive civil law. Since the protection of a weakened right turned out to be defective, it must be restructured. Consistency can be achieved by organizing it around property law which is the origin of intellectual property law. Using this approach, creating penal law applied to property could offer effective protection for intellectual property rights, supplemented by specific repressive norms.

This dissertation is a historical evaluation of the movement of the English courts from the doctrine of pith and marrow to the Catnic test in the determination of non-textual infringement of patents. It considers how and why the doctrine was replaced with the Catnic test. It concludes that this movement occurred as a result of the adoption by a group of judges of literalism in the construction of patents while another group dissented and maintained the correct application of the doctrine. Although the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords initially approved the literalist approach, they, after realising its untennability, adopted the dissenters’ approach, but, ultimately, adopted the Catnic test in which features of the dissenters’ approach were included. The dissertation concludes that the doctrine of pith and marrow, correctly applied, should have been retained as the Catnic test creates uncertainty and confusion. / Mercantile Law / LL. M.

Notre étude cherche à démontrer pourquoi les agents économiques sont incités à enfreindre le droit de la concurrence. Le choix de l’infraction dépend de l’avantage retiré du manquement comparé au coût subi. La notion de « faute lucrative » illustre parfaitement l’espoir d’un lucre tiré du manquement à la loi. L’économie comportementale nous enseigne cependant que les déterminants de la conformité au droit sont autres que la recherche du profit. Selon cette discipline, l’incitation – c’est-à-dire la motivation principale de l’agent qui fait le choix d’enfreindre la loi – est détachée d’un calcul coût-avantage. L’agent économique est sujet à des « biais cognitifs » : le défaut d’information disponible ne lui permet pas de faire toujours le choix susceptible de maximiser son intérêt. Appliquée au droit de la concurrence, la théorie de l’agent rationnel, fût-elle critiquable, reste néanmoins la plus pertinente pour examiner la dissuasion car elle permet de comparer la règle de droit à un « prix » qui pèse sur le choix d’enfreindre la loi. L’influence des règles juridiques comme un ensemble de normes incitatives ou dissuasives qui influencent le comportement des agents sur le marché est moins pris en compte par l’économie comportementale qui se concentre davantage sur les biais cognitifs des agents.L'agent économique rationnel qui entend retirer un profit de son manquement peut spéculer sur les multiples failles propres au droit de la concurrence, lesquelles affaiblissent le risque juridique de l’infraction. Deux limites fondamentales affectent la dissuasion : d’une part, celles relatives à l’effectivité des règles de concurrence. La probabilité, pour le fautif, d’échapper à l’application du droit génère des infractions « rentables ». D’autre part, celles relatives à l’efficacité des règles de concurrence favorisent aussi la conservation des gains illicites retirés du manquement, car la sanction imposée par le déclenchement de l’action publique et/ou privée n’est pas adaptée à la dissuasion du comportement déviant.Ces limites concernent aussi bien l’application de l’action publique que l’application de l’action privée en réparation. La fonction dissuasive du « private enforcement » est limitée en l’absence de dommages-intérêts confiscatoires. De même, les vices congénitaux à la loi Hamon paralysent la portée dissuasive de l’action de groupe. S’agissant de l’action publique, le développement des ententes algorithmiques et la spécificité des marchés numériques compliquent le travail de détection des autorités de concurrence. Même en cas de détection, la sanction appliquée à l’agent économique semble sous-dissuasive car, comme le démontre notre étude empirique, l’amende et/ou les dommages-intérêts imposés sont souvent inférieurs aux gains retirés des infractions de concurrence.Par ailleurs, le faible risque pénal pesant sur les dirigeants responsables de pratiques illicites affaiblit la dissuasion, car ceux-ci forment aussi des calculs sur l’avantage qu’ils ont personnellement à tirer du manquement à la loi. Il ressort de nos travaux que la création d’un test de légitimité de l’emprisonnement permet de répondre à la question de savoir, pour chaque type d’infraction de concurrence, si la prison est ou non une peine légitime.En somme, l’étude propose la construction d’un régime dissuasif par étapes, visant à renforcer à la fois l’effectivité et l’efficacité des règles de concurrence. Considérant que l’agent économique opère des prédictions sur le droit applicable, il faut non seulement faire en sorte que le droit de la concurrence s’applique effectivement, c’est-à-dire que le contrevenant soit confronté aux coûts de sa violation, mais efficacement, ce qui signifie que le coût du manquement doit être supérieur à son éventuel bénéfice. / This study explores the reasons why economic agents are likely to break the rules of competition law. This paper demonstrates that main reasons are related to a cost-benefit calculation, also known as the concept of “lucrative infringement”. Our results are conflicting with the findings of behavioural economics, which reject the theory of cost-benefit calculations incentives and argues that economic agents are subject to “cognitive biases”. However, the theory of the rational agent, despite its limitations, remains the most relevant for assessing the competition law ability to deter anticompetitive practices because it compares the rule of law to a "price" that weighs on the choice to break the law. The influence of legal rules as a set of incentive or deterrent norms that influences agents' behaviour on the market is less considered by behavioural economics that focuses more on agents' cognitive biases.Economic agents are rational and look for a “lucrative infringement”. They speculate on the multiple loopholes of competition law, which weakens the legal risk of the infringement. In this regard, two fundamental limits affect deterrence: on the one hand, the low probability of getting caught which generates “lucrative faults,” and on the other hand, the retention of all unlawful gains derived from the infringement.These limits concern both the application of public and private enforcement. First, the dissuasive function of "private enforcement" is limited by the absence of confiscatory damages. Similarly, the restrictive standard of proof to admit a collective class action hinders its dissuasive nature. When it comes to enforcement, the development of algorithmic cartels and the specificity of digital markets reduce competition authorities’ ability to detect illegal practices. Even when they manage to detect such practices, the sanction applied to the economic agent seems under-dissuasive. As our empirical study shows, fines and/or compensatory damages imposed are often lower than the benefit derived from the infringement.In addition, deterrence is weakened by the absence of criminal punishments for business leaders who have coordinated anticompetitive practices. This study demonstrates that they also make calculations about the benefit they may derive from violating the law. Our study develops a “legitimacy test of imprisonment” to provide an answer to the question of when imprisonment is a legitimate penalty.This study builds a step-by-step deterrent legal regime to daunt anticompetitive practices. Deterrence requires a twofold analysis on the application of competition law and the adequacy of sanctions to deter anticompetitive conducts. It is necessary not only to make competition law effective, i.e. that no infringer can escape with the costs of its violation, but also – to achieve an adequate level of deterrence – that fines and/or compensatory damages exceed any potential gains that may be expected from the infringement.

Angesichts der zunehmenden Häufigkeit von Rechtsstreiten über musikalische Urheberrechtverletzungen, bei denen es um Millionenbeträge geht, scheinen Musiktheoretiker*innen gute Voraussetzungen mitzubringen, ihre esoterische Ausbildung für einen ausgesprochen praktischen Zweck einsetzen zu können, nämlich in Form sachlicher Expertise innerhalb einer “forensischen Musikforschung”, die “grundlegende Ähnlichkeiten” (substantial similarities, so der juristische Terminus) zwischen musikalischen Werken einschätzt. Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit einem kürzlichen derartigen Fall, “Skidmore v. Zeppelin et al.”, der aus dem Vorwurf entstand, dass der Beginn von Led Zeppelins Stairway to Heaven (1971) auf jenem von Taurus (1968) der Band Spirit beruhe. Die “grundlegende Ähnlichkeit” hierbei umfasst die absteigende Harmoniefolge der eröffnenden akustischen Gitarre, ein Ausschnitt aus einer Lamentobassfigur von der Tonika A fallend bis zum F (die Dominante E erscheint in einer oberen Stimme), eine Variante des Drooping-Modells im Rock. Nach einer Diskussion relevanter Details des Rechtsstreits, stelle ich kurz einen Abschnitt aus der Geschichte der Drooping-Figur im Rock vor, als Querschnitt berühmter Aufnahmen in den Jahren unmittelbar vor Led Zeppelins Platte. Mein Ziel ist es dabei nicht, den Rechtsstreit “Skidmore v. Zeppelin et al.” zu lösen, sondern vielmehr die entscheidenden Aspekte dieses Falls zu erhellen und die Rolle, die Musikologen in ihrer Bestimmung eingenommen haben. Abschließend argumentiere ich dafür, dass Musiktheoretiker_innen verstärkte Anstrengungen unternehmen sollten, um sich im Bereich der forensischen Musikforschung einzubringen, zum Wohle nicht nur der Gerichtsverfahren, sondern auch der Musiktheorie selbst, einer akademischen Disziplin, die in historischer Sicht selbst von ihren engsten Geschwisterfächern isoliert war, von der allgemeinen Öffentlichkeit gar nicht zu reden. / In light of the growing prevalence of multimillion-dollar musical copyright infringement litigation, music theorists seem positioned to use their esoteric training for a decidedly practical purpose: as an informed presence within “forensic musicology,” the practice of evaluating “substantial similarities” (the legal term) between musical works. This article examines a recent example of such litigation, “Skidmore v. Zeppelin et al.”, involving the accusation that the opening of Led Zeppelin’s Stairway to Heaven (1971) is based on Taurus (1968) by the band Spirit. The “substantial similarity” in question involves the opening acoustic-guitar descents, a partial lamento bass figure sinking from tonic A down to F (the dominant E appearing in an upper voice), a version of rock’s “drooping” schema. After discussing relevant details of the case, I briefly outline some of the history of rock’s drooping figure across multiple prominent recordings in the years immediately before Led Zeppelin’s record. My aim is not to solve the issues of “Skidmore v. Zeppelin et al.” but rather to shed light on what the issues in fact are in this particular case, and what role music scholars have played in their determination. In the end, I advocate that music theorists make a concerted effort to involve themselves in forensic musicology, to the benefit not only of the lawsuits but also of the profession of music theory itself, an academic discipline historically isolated from even its closest musicological siblings, let alone the general public.

No description available.

懲罰性賠償金為英美法傳統下之制度，其目的在於以超越實際損害數額之賠償金，制裁主觀惡性程度特別重大之侵權人，與一般用以填補損害之補償性賠償金有本質上之差異。昔日多適用於被害人尊嚴遭嚴重侵犯之案件，然隨現代經濟社會之發展，亦漸用於處罰公司法人、制裁經濟犯罪。 我國侵權行為法主要繼受德國之體系，以損害填補為原則，故僅於特定領域之立法中承認懲罰性賠償金制度。現行專利法採取懲罰性賠償金之立法例，而目前經濟部之修法草案則擬廢除。 本研究首先介紹美國法發展趨勢、實務重要案例與晚近之專利改革法案，歸納其趨勢為「嚴格限制故意侵權之構成、提高專利權人舉證責任、限縮懲罰性賠償金之適用範圍」；其次，以實證方式分析台灣智慧財產法院歷年相關之判決結果，認為實務運作有「大多數請求懲罰性賠償金之案例，連侵權責任都尚未構成，有請求浮濫、逼迫被告和解之嫌」、「法院認定侵權人故意，實質上往往僅論及侵權人『知悉系爭專利存在』即可，相較於現行法標準實過於寬鬆」；最後，綜合美國法發展趨勢、我國實務情形、懲罰性賠償金功能論與法律經濟分析觀點，認為我國尚不宜廢除專利侵權懲罰性賠償金制度，惟應將其限縮適用於「搭便車」與「專利有效性毋需再確認」之故意侵權情形，以降低社會研發成本、賦與從事研發者挑戰垃圾專利之機會，方切合專利法促進研發之本旨。 / Punitive damages, a traditional system under the common law, aims to sanction those infringers having substantially subjective malice by awarding enhanced damages beyond the actual damages. It is naturally different from compensatory damages. Punitive damages were originally used to dealing with serious violations of the victims’ dignity of the cases. With the development of economic society, this system was gradually used to punishing corporations and sanctioning economic crimes. Since Taiwanese tort laws are mainly inherited from German laws, which only permit plaintiffs claiming for compensatory damages. Punitive damages were only adopted in several specific kinds of tort laws, as in the patent law. However, the provision of punitive damages was revoked in the current patent reform act drafted by Ministry of Economic Affairs. This study starts out by introducing the trend of American law, the essential practical cases, and the recent patent reform acts. It concludes the trend to have the following three characteristics: 1. Strictly limit the constitution of willful infringement; 2. Increase patentee’s burden of proof; and 3. Restrict the scope of awarding punitive damages. The study then empirically analyzes the related judgments of Taiwan Intellectual Property Count over the years. It finds that in majority of the cases claiming punitive damages, most plaintiffs can even not to prove that defendants have infringed their patents, yet force defendants to settle. Also, the court in Taiwan usually award patentees punitive damages loosely only if they can prove that infringers had known the existence of the patent . This phenomenon makes the standard in practice not strict as the standard in law. Lastly, this study sums up the aspects from the development trend of American patent law, current practice in Taiwan, the theory of punitive damages function, and economic analysis of law, and finds that it would be inappropriate to revoke the provision of punitive damages in patent infringement cases. This study suggests that punitive damages should be awarded only in two types of willful infringement: 1. when the defendant is a “free rider, or 2. when the validity of the patent need not be challenged anymore. This way, it may lower the cost of research and development, give developers more chance to challenge junk patents, and finally reach the purpose of patent law – encourage innovation.

智慧財產案件審理法第16條揭示當事人抗辯智慧財產權有應撤銷、廢止之原因者，法院應就其主張或抗辯有無理由自為判斷，不適用相關法律停止訴訟程序之規定。前項情形，法院認有撤銷之原因時，智慧財產權人於該民事訴訟中不得對於他造主張權利。上開規定之意旨在於使同一智慧財產權所生之紛爭得於同一訴訟程序中一次解決，以對智慧財產權作有效保護。 依據上開規定，專利有效性之議題即可能為專利侵權訴訟程序及舉發程序所審理。兩程序審理之情形下，專利有效性之認定即可能會因對同一證據事實有不同見解而使認定結果產生歧異（嚴格定義下之判決歧異）或因證據/請求權基礎之不同而產生歧異（假性之判決歧異）。 民事法院和行政機關/法院於發明、新型及新式樣專利對專利有效性具兩歧認定之比例分別為所有抗辯專利有效性案件之6.8%、16%及12%。具歧異認定之案件中約有8%係因對同一證據之處理方式不同。約66%之案件係起因於呈送之證據有別及主張之撤銷理由不同，而此歧異認定或可於後續程序化解。另約有8%歧異認定之案件係因智慧局之見解受到先前經濟部對該見解之拘束，此分歧認定之結果或需藉由救濟程序才得化解。又約有16%具歧異認定之案件係因民事法院非以舉發程序中構成「舉發成立」之要件審酌系爭專利是否具撤銷事由，此歧異認定之結果尚需仰賴救濟程序始得化解。 民事法院倘非以舉發成立要件審酌專利有效性，則其審酌範疇可能涵蓋：得據以舉發事由、未達得據以舉發標準之事由、專利法及施行細則中得據以使申請案不予專利或不受理之事由。而有違誠信原則之事由亦可能受到審查，使系爭專利有不可執行之虞。倘民事訴訟有效性抗辯得涵蓋上開事由，則可預見本質不良但被智慧局誤准之專利將有去除之途徑，公眾利益即得以維護；專利申請人於申請過程中較可能考慮遵循誠信原則；且專利糾紛得以完全於一訴訟程序一併解決。專利環境或可能朝優質化、誠信化及效率化發展。於此架構下，侵權訴訟專利有效性抗辯機制及舉發程序之雙軌制審理即各有實質存在意義。 專利權人於台灣侵權訴訟具專利有效性抗辯案件之勝訴比約10%；敗訴案件中，發明、新型及新式樣專利被認定具無效事由之比例約為48%、65%及40%。審理法施行以來，舉發申請案之案件量約僅減少6%至7%，或隱含專利侵權訴訟不僅未於一定程度取代舉發制度更可能因而使當事人必需同時面對侵權訴訟與舉發程序雙軌戰場之處境。 審理法第16條之施行加快民事訴訟審結速度，達到迅速實現訴訟當事人權利保護之立法目的。而專利權所生之紛爭於同一訴訟程序中一次解決之目的，依檢驗角度之不同而有截然不同之結果，因此或可說未全然達到紛爭一次解決之立法目的。 / Article 16 of Intellectual Property Case Adjunction Act in Taiwan reveals that when a party claims or defends that an intellectual property right shall be cancelled, the court shall decide based on the merit of the case and the relevant laws concerning the stay of an action shall not apply.　Under the circumstances in the preceding paragraph, the holder of the intellectual property right shall not claim any rights during the civil action against the opposing party where the court has recognized the grounds for cancellation of the intellectual property right. The main purpose of the article is to solve the disputes over Intellectual Property Right in one litigation proceeding so as to protect the intellectual property right effectively. According to said article, the validity issue of a patent may be dealt with under civil litigation and invalidation proceedings. Under the circumstances, the decisions on the validity issue of a patent may be diverged due to different perceptions on the same evidence/fact (defined in this article as “actual decision divergence”) or different submitted evidences or instituted grounds (defined in this article as “fake decision divergence”). With respect to invention, utility model, and design patents, about 6.8%, 16% and 12% of cases with invalidity defense respectively had decision divergence between civil court and administrative organization/court. Among patents with decision divergence, around 8% of the patents were due to different perceptions of the same evidence. About 66% of the patents were deemed differently due to different evidences and instituted grounds. This discrepancy may be resolved in subsequent proceedings. Around 8% of the patents having divergent decisions were resulted from that the opinion of Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (TIPO) is confined by that in a previous administrative action issued by its superior organization, the Board of Appeal. This discrepancy may need to be resolved through a remedial procedure. Approximately 16% of the patents were determined differently because the civil court adopted different standards for initiating an invalidation action. This type of discrepancy may only be resolved through a remedial procedure. When the civil court uses its own standards in determining the validity issue of the patent in question, the scope of judicial review might include: the grounds of invalidation proceedings, the grounds of invalidation proceedings with loosened standards, the grounds attributed to a patent being rejected or an application to be inacceptable to TIPO based on Patent Act or the Enforcement Rules of Patent Act. In addition, inequitable conduct might also be reviewed. Under the circumstances, defective patents have a chance to be removed, a duty of candor and good faith would be more likely to be followed during prosecution; patent disputes are able to be reviewed entirely in one proceeding. It is expected that the quality of the patent system would be improved. Moreover, either the invalidity defense mechanism in infringement litigation, or the invalidation proceeding serves its own purpose. For patent infringement cases with invalidity defense, plaintiffs won about 10% of the cases. Among the cases lost by plaintiffs, the patent at issue deemed by civil court as invalid accounted for about 48%, 65% and 40% for invention, utility model and design patents respectively. Since the IP Case Adjudication Act took effect, the number of invalidation cases has decreased about 6-7%, which might indicate that the invalidity defense mechanism in infringement litigation does not replace the invalidation proceeding. The regulation of Article 16 of IP Case Adjudication Act speeds up civil proceedings indicating that the legislative purpose of providing effective protection to parties in IP litigation may be realized. However, the legislative purpose of solving patent disputes in one proceeding may not be achieved fully as the test results vary on the basis of different evaluation criteria.

自美國聯邦巡迴上訴法院於一九九八年State Street Bank一案，肯認商業方法軟體得為法定之專利標的後，全球之金融業、電腦業與網路公司莫不尋求以專利作為保護其商業方法之武器，商業方法專利申請之案件遂絡繹而來。惟商業方法軟體是否得為專利之標的，至今美國學界仍有爭議而見解不一，日本專利局係採與美國專利局相同之立場，然歐洲專利局目前似仍採否定見解。對此一議題，我國已有相當文獻討論，並均採肯定之見解。惟並未對何以可專利性之理由詳予闡述，至於專利侵害之問題，亦未就我國法深入分析。 本文擬自比較法之觀點，分析美國實務運作及學界之論述、歐洲發明專利公約及專利局實務之見解、日本法之規定與特許廳之意見，汲取其中之經驗與見解以為借鏡。第二章首先就商業方法軟體加以定義，並探究現今商業方法軟體之架構及其特殊性，以作為專利標的適格性分析之基礎。第三章分析商業方法軟體之施以專利保護，對產業與實務造成之影響。包括實務所面臨的困難﹙如先前技術資料庫之建立、審查人員之訓練、法院面臨之困難等﹚，及我國軟體產業應如何調適。第四章係探討商業方法軟體之專利標的適格性分析，依次分析美國法之規定與學說實務之見解、歐洲專利公約與專利局之立場、日本特許法之規定與特許廳之態度，以及國內學說實務之見解，並由我國專利法之立法意旨與商業方法軟體架構之特殊性，論述商業方法軟體在現今軟體發展之架構下，應非發明專利保護之標的，另亦就我國智慧財產局所公布之「電腦軟體相關發明專利審查基準」，加以探討並提出個人淺見，並摘錄智慧財產局已核准若干商業方法軟體專利之個案，加以分析。第五章自發明專利保護要件之觀點，探究商業方法軟體專利保護之問題。第六章則自美國法之觀點，分析商業方法軟體於網際網路上，所發生之跨國界專利侵害問題，並試從國際私法之角度，處理此類問題。最後，於第七章提出個人對商業方法軟體專利之淺見，並就我國現行專利制度提出未來保護方向之建議，以為結論。

Le droit procédural de l’action en contrefaçon de brevet d’invention n’est pas un droit autonome. En effet, si l’action en contrefaçon de brevet dépend majoritairement de règles procédurales qui lui sont propres, elle repose également sur une multitude de règles appartenant à des systèmes normatifs plus généraux, tels que, notamment, le droit judiciaire privé, le droit des biens, le droit des contrats, ou encore les droits fondamentaux. L’instance en contrefaçon de brevet, qui relève pour sa part essentiellement du droit judiciaire privé général, intègre un certain nombre de règles spécifiques qui lui confèrent ainsi une physionomie originale. Seule l’étude des rapports existant entre ces différents systèmes normatifs, à chaque étape de l’action et de l’instance, permet de clarifier les aspects procéduraux de l’action en contrefaçon de brevet d’invention et de sécuriser les justiciables dans l’exercice de leurs droits. / The procedural law of patent infringement action is not an autonomous law. Indeed, if patent infringement action largely depends on its own procedural rules, it also relies on a multitude of rules belonging to more general normative systems, such as, in particular, the private judicial law, property law, contract law, or human rights. The patent infringement proceedings, which fundamentaly depends on private judicial law, integrates some specific rules, which thus give it a unique legal physionomy. Only the study of the relationship between these different normative systems at each stage of both the action and the proceedings, clarifies the procedural aspects of the action of patent infringement and secure as well as protecting litigants while exercizing their rights.

專利保險可分為「專利侵權責任保險」及「專利訴訟費用保險」。狹義之專利訴訟費用保險係指為專利權人、專屬被授權人、或經明確受託訴權之非專屬被授權人等規劃之保險。該些被保險人欲請求專利侵權損害賠償時，得向保險人請求給付律師費、訴訟費用或仲裁費用；惟有實務保單條款約定保險人得請求分配被保險人受領之損害賠償金，此約定是否能通過我國公序良俗條款之檢驗，不無疑義。至於專利侵權責任保險，係為潛在侵權人所規劃之保險。此類保險之承保範圍雖及於侵權損害賠償，但就我國保險法制而言，其實務保單條款仍有許多調整空間。其中最主要者，係被保險人所為確認專利無效等請求所生費用，於實務保單中受保險金額之限制；然其既具有損害避免或減輕之性質，於我國保險法，不僅保險人有償還責任，其償還數額與賠償金額合計即使超過保險金額，仍應償還。