C’est au tournant des années 1990 que Paul Ricœur s’est intéressé à Théorie de la justice de John Rawls. Tout en étant fondamentalement en accord avec la valeur morale, déontologique et politique des principes de justice de Rawls, Ricœur s’oppose à l’approche « purement procédurale » de la justice pour les institutions telle qu’elle se développe à l’aide de l’interprétation rawlsienne de la théorie du contrat social. Si l’approche déontologique de la justice comme équité priorise une conception formelle de la justice pour les institutions, elle ne peut toutefois pas, selon Ricœur, s’affranchir des fondements téléologiques qui justifient la formulation et le choix rationnel des principes rawlsiens. En reprenant l’argumentaire de Théorie de la justice, Ricœur relève la dépendance de la procédure formelle de Rawls à une série de présupposés éthiques fondamentaux qui justifient téléologiquement la rationalité des principes. Ces présuppositions ne mettent pas en ruine la position de Rawls, au contraire, ils relèvent d’une circularité « naturelle » propre à la problématique de la distribution des biens sociaux (justice distributive), indispensable à l’élaboration d’une conception politique de la justice et à l’intelligence démocratique du contrat social. Contre la démonstration empirique de la procédure formelle de la « position originelle » sous le « voile d’ignorance » à partir de laquelle devrait résulter le choix rationnel et unanime des principes de justice, Ricœur propose de rétablir la primauté du sens de la justice pour le sujet de droit/contractant. Sans réfuter la priorité déontologique des principes de justice pour les institutions, Ricœur veut rétablir la valeur éthique de la justice pour les individus à partir d’une herméneutique du soi et d’une anthropologie philosophique qui posent le besoin de l’institution au sein même de la constitution du sujet à « vivre une vie bonne, avec et pour autrui, dans des institutions justes ». / At the turn of the 1990s, Paul Ricœur became interested in John Rawls' Theory of Justice. While fundamentally agreeing with the moral, deontological, and political value of Rawls' principles of justice, Ricœur opposes the "purely procedural" approach to justice for institutions as developed through Rawls' interpretation of social contract theory. If the deontological approach to justice as equity prioritizes a formal conception of justice for institutions, it cannot, however, according to Ricœur, break free from the teleological foundations that justify the formulation and rational choice of Rawlsian principles. Returning to the argument of Theory of Justice, Ricœur identifies the dependence of Rawls' formal procedure based on a series of fundamental ethical presuppositions that teleologically justify the rationality of the principles. These presuppositions do not undermine Rawls' position; on the contrary, they are part of a "natural" circularity specific to the issue of the distribution of social goods (distributive justice), a process which is indispensable in the elaboration of a political conception of justice and in the democratic understanding of the social contract. Against the empirical demonstration of the formal procedure of the "original position" under the "veil of ignorance" from which the rational and unanimous choice of the principles of justice should result, Ricœur proposes to re-establish the primacy of the sense of justice for those subjected to law/contractors. Without refuting the deontological priority of principles of justice for institutions, Ricœur aspires to restore the ethical value of justice for individuals from a hermeneutic of the self and a philosophical anthropology that posits the need for the institution within the very constitution of the subject to "live a good life, with and for others, in just institutions”.

This thesis examines Robert Nozick’s critique of John Rawls’s theory of justice, focusing on the Chamberlain Argument as a challenging example in their debate. The Chamberlain Argument illustrates the tension between Rawls’s theory, which aims to distribute resources according to a certain pattern for social benefit, and its implications on individual freedom. Nozick argues that such patterned theories infringe upon individual liberty by coercively redistributing resources. Through analysis of patterned theory, it becomes evident, Nozick claims, that such frameworks prioritize specific distributions over individual liberty. I find that Nozick made a valid point in his objection to Rawls. However, I consider that the problem of patterned theories represented by Nozick in his critique of Rawls, is rooted in the first principle, not in the second. I assert that there is much more literature on Rawls’s second principle, but much less on his first principle. To address Nozick’s critique, this thesis proposes a modification to Rawls’s first principle, emphasizing self-respect as a foundational value. By reconceptualizing liberty within the Rawlsian framework, this thesis aims to fortify it against objections like the Chamberlain Argument, ultimately enhancing its coherence and theoretical robustness. For this reason, the research question is as follows: How can the Rawlsian theory overcome the Chamberlain argument? The one thesis I will pursue is that Rawls’s two principles can be immune to Nozick’s Chamberlain Argument, when the first principle is modified according to the priority of rights over liberty. To do so, the goal is to defend a Rawlsian pattern theory of justice. Firstly, I show that the first principle should be grounded on the priority of the rights instead of the good of the person. By reconceptualizing the concept of self-respect, I show that Rawls’s first principle is mainly focused on a negative concept of liberty, which I modify to a positive concept through what I call reciprocal self-respect. Secondly, I formulate responses to Nozick’s Chamberlain Argument and argue that social justice requires a holistic view of the society, not only as individuals, but also as collective and common. This view emphasizes the interdependency of individuals in a society, which presupposes duties of reciprocal self-respect, chosen rationally in the original position behind the veil of ignorance. Thus, Chamberlain would never have been able to make profits and succeed without society, infrastructure, opportunities and hotbed for success and self-determination.

Comment peut-on concilier le respect des droits à la liberté des membres des générations futures et présentes ? Agir en faveur des premiers ne doit pas se faire aux dépens des seconds. Selon nous, la garantie pour tous de pouvoir développer et concevoir une conception spécifique de la vie bonne suppose de privilégier l'objectif d'une justice sociale globale dans le temps présent pour ainsi transmettre à la postérité un monde plus juste. Nous indiquons en premier lieu en quoi les générations qui se succèdent sur Terre ont des devoirs envers celles qui les suivront dans le temps, mais également pourquoi nos actes ne reflètent pas la reconnaissance de tels devoirs. Nous nous interrogeons ensuite sur le contenu du monde à transmettre en conformité avec ces devoirs. Il incombe aux générations de préserver autant que possible l'environnement naturel et d'édifier un environnement politique et social suffisant. Cela requiert la constitution d'une épargne intergénérationnelle au cours d'une phase limitée, suivie d'une phase de croisière dans laquelle l'accumulation doit être stoppée. Mais les efforts pour cette épargne et les ressources générées par celle-ci sont à répartir équitablement au sein et entre les générations : ce point est l'objet de notre troisième partie. Nous montrons que les efforts demandés à chacun au sein de la phase d'accumulation devraient dépendre de l'environnement dont disposent les individus, tandis que les ressources produites sont à redistribuer en priorité aux contemporains les plus démunis. Une telle préférence sociale pour le présent ne va pas à l'encontre des droits des individus futurs : elle permet au contraire de limiter la perpétuation, de génération en génération, des inégalités intragénérationnelles et de favoriser le respect de leurs droits par les individus qui vivent dans le temps présent. / How can we reconcile the respect to liberty rights of members of future and current generations? Act in favour of the former should not be at the expense of the latter. According to us, the guaranty for all to be able to develop and conceive a specific conception of the good life involves favouring the objective of global social justice in the present time, and so transmitting to posterity a fairer world. We show first how the succeeding generations on Earth have duties to those who follow in time, but also why our acts do not reflect the recognition of such duties. Then we wonder about the content of the World to transmit in compliance with these duties. Generations bear the responsibility to preserve as much as possible the natural environment and to edify a sufficient political and social environment. This requires the constitution of an intergenerational savings during a limited phase, followed by a steady-state phase in which the accumulation must be stopped. But efforts to the savings and resources generated by it have to be distributed fairly within and between generations: this is the subject of our third part. We show that efforts required to everyone during the accumulation phase should depend on the environment available to individuals, while produced resources have to be redistributed primarily to the most disadvantaged contemporaries. Such a social time preference does not run counter the rights of future individuals: it allows instead to limit the perpetuation of intra-generational inequalities from generation to generation and to promote the respect of their rights by individuals living at the present time.

This thesis provides a critical examination of John Rawls’s political philosophy as it relates to international justice and human rights, Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness has made an enormous impact on contemporary political and ethical theory, yet it has been criticized by some for failing to address the extra-domestic aspects of social justice, including universal human rights. In Chapter One I describe the theoryof.rights, developed in the social contract tradition and how this theory has influenced the modern discourse of human rights. In Chapter Two I discuss Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, the basic rights and liberties, and the idea of political liberalism. In Chapter Three 1 analyze Rawls’s account of international justice and argue that it fails to uphold the same rigorous principles of justice as found in his account of domestic justice. Finally, in Chapter Four l discuss Rawls’s more recent attempts to theorize international justice and human rights, I conclude that Rawls is not justified in limiting the set of human rights available to persons in different societies, and that this limitation is an unnecessary feature of his theory of justice. In contrast 1 argue for a more cosmopolitan system of social justice that is strongly normative and grounded in Rawlsian ideal theory. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV). / Nos recherches ont pour point de départ le constat d’un manque de dialogue entre trois philosophies politiques du XXe siècle nous provenant des États-Unis alors même que cet État devrait être le chef de file et un modèle d’ouverture en matière de réflexion sur la démocratie libérale. Les trois philosophies politiques en question sont celles de John Rawls, de Richard Rorty et de Leo Strauss. Nous avons donc procédé à l’amorce d’un dialogue en mettant en relation les idées des trois auteurs sur les grands thèmes de la vérité, de l’histoire, des dimensions de l’homme et des principes démocratiques, et avons fait un effort supplémentaire de rapprochement en montrant le rapport de chacun à onze dualismes classiques liés à ces quatre thèmes. Ces dualismes sont des oppositions binaires habituellement vénérables qui classent et divisent deux ordres de réalité. Avec ce langage commun des dualismes classiques, les obstacles aux rapprochements dus aux jeux de langage ou aux vocabulaires trop particuliers des trois auteurs sont tombés. Nous montrons d’abord qu’aucun vainqueur clair ne ressort de notre confrontation, mais qu’il y a moyen de porter un jugement sur les trois auteurs en fonction de critères non controversés (cohérence, complexité ou nuances, capacité à réfuter les deux autres). Ensuite, une confrontation et un dialogue directs des trois positions permettent de les faire s’exprimer sur les mêmes enjeux et de dégager des conclusions d’intérêt général dépassant le débat d’auteurs. Ces conclusions montrent quel genre de compromis peut être trouvé entre les principes de vérité et d’histoire, approuvent le projet de résoudre les tensions dans la vision de l’homme, en particulier entre les sphères publiques et privées, mais rappellent l’importance du point de vue ancien sur les principes repris par la démocratie (liberté, égalité, justice), ne serait-ce que pour faire contrepoids à la tendance générale. Ultimement, nous montrons comment de cette confrontation peut se dégager le programme pour la philosophie politique de vivre dans une tension féconde entre critique (prémoderne) et confiance (moderne), ainsi que la nécessité réaffirmée de poursuivre les efforts de dialogue pour rendre notre pensée digne de l’idée de la démocratie libérale. / Our study stems from the awareness that three twentieth-century political philosophies emanating from the United States have not partaken in any serious dialogue, even though this country should be a leader and model of openness regarding the topic of liberal democracy. The three political philosophies in question are those of John Rawls, Richard Rorty and Leo Strauss. Consequently, we have initiated a dialogue by confronting the ideas of these three thinkers on matters concerning truth, history, the dimensions of man, and democratic principles, having furthered this effort by highlighting the opinion of each on eleven classical dualisms related to these four matters. These dualisms are binary oppositions, generally venerable, which classify and divide two orders of reality. Using the common language of classical dualisms allowed us to overcome the obstacles due to the particular language game or vocabulary of each. In the first place, we show that if no real victor emerges from our confrontation, it is possible to judge each of the thinkers according to non contentious criteria (consistency, complexity or subtlety, capacity to refute the other positions). Then we illustrate that the direct confrontation through dialogue allows each of the three positions to express itself on the same issues and leads one to conclusions regarding matters beyond simple exegetic analysis. These conclusions show what kind of compromise is possible between the principles of truth and history. They support the project of resolving the tensions in our understanding of man, in particular, between the public and private spheres. Finally, they remind us of the importance of the ancient view of democratic principles (freedom, equality, justice), if only to counterbalance the current overwhelming trend. Ultimately, we explain how this confrontation can lead to a program for a political philosophy which balances the claims of (premodern) criticism and (modern) confidence, as well as restates the importance of continuing the dialogue in order that our thought be worthy of the idea of liberal democracy.

La publication de Théorie de la justice par John Rawls en 1971 a apporté un nouvel élan à la philosophie politique. Plusieurs commentaires et critiques de ce livre ont ainsi nourri la réflexion sur la question de la justice sociale dans son application à l’échelle mondiale. Dans ce livre, l’auteur a démontré entre autres que la démocratie libérale permet aux citoyens ayant diverses conceptions du bien, conceptions religieuses, philosophiques ou morales, souvent incompatibles et irréconciliables, d’avoir par ailleurs une conception politique de la rectitude morale et de la justice comme fondement de la structure de base de leur société. Ceci permet alors de soutenir l’unité politique et sociale de cette structure sur une base rationnelle et raisonnable. Par la suite, dans The Law of Peoples, Rawls a présenté un autre projet, celui d’étendre cette conception à la ‘Société des peuples’ qui, pour lui, est une idéalisation du regroupement des peuples qui respectent les idéaux et les principes du ‘Droit des peuples’ dans leurs relations mutuelles, le ‘Droit des peuples’ étant, pour Rawls, une conception politique particulière de la rectitude morale et de la justice qui s’applique aux principes et aux normes du droit et des usages internationaux. Ce projet de Rawls est, comme il l’a nommé lui-même, une utopie réaliste. Partant de cette dernière comme d’un prétexte, notre étude s’inscrit dans un champ de recherche particulier de la philosophie politique, à savoir l’éthique des relations internationales. Elle se veut une contribution à l’élaboration d’une réflexion normative portant sur les principes fondamentaux de justice dans l’ordre international tel qu’il se présente dans les institutions qui l’incarnent aujourd’hui encore, comme le système des Nations Unies, et sur les conséquences de cet ordre dans l’intégration des pays de la région africaine des Grands Lacs. D’où ces questions : Qu’est-ce que l’utopie rawlsienne change-t-elle à l’ordre mondial actuel? Ses principes fondent-ils une éthique susceptible d’améliorer les relations internationales? Quelle serait la place des pays africains, et plus spécialement ceux de la région des Grands Lacs, dans l’ordre mondial inhérent à ce projet? Les réponses à ces questions déterminent ce qui pourrait être considéré comme l’éthique de la gouvernance démocratique globale et les structures pouvant l’incarner. / The publishing of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls in 1971 brought a new impetus to political philosophy. Several comments and critical analyses of this book have thus provided food for thought on the issue of social justice in its application on a world scale. In this book, the author has demonstrated, among other things, that liberal democracy allows citizens with different conceptions of good – whether religious, philosophical or moral – often incompatible and irreconcilable, to have, otherwise, a political conception of moral rectitude and justice as the foundation of the basic structure of their society. This allows to support the political and social unity of this basic structure on a rational and reasonable basis. Subsequently, in his book The Law of Peoples, Rawls presented another project, that of extending that concept to the “Society of Peoples” which, for him, is an idealization of the regrouping of those people who respect the ideals and principles of the Law of peoples in their mutual relations, the “Law of peoples” being, for him, a particular political conception of moral rectitude and justice that is applicable to principles and standards of international law and customs. This project, as Rawls called it himself, is a realistic utopia. Based on the latter as an excuse, our study is in keeping with a particular field of research in political philosophy – namely, the ethics of international relations. It is intended as a contribution to the development of a normative reflection on the fundamental principles of justice in the international order as it is found in the institutions that still embody it nowadays – such as the United Nations Organization – and on the consequences of that order in the integration of the countries of the African region of the Great Lakes. This raises questions such as: What changes does the rawlsian utopia bring to the current world order? Are its principles the basis for an ethic susceptible of improving international relations? What would be the role of African countries, particularly those of the Great Lakes, in the world order inherent in this project? The answers to these questions determine what could be considered the ethics of global democratic governance and the structures which embody it.

What happens to social democracy when the working class declines? The aim of this study is to examine ideological changes in The Swedish Social Democratic Party, in particular the party’s ideological changes regarding liberty. The material consists of 300 government bills equally divided over the parliamentary sessions of 1974, 1990/91 and 2005/06, in all of which The Social Democratic Party held office. Using the theoretical framework Two Concepts of Liberty, I found that an increasingly amount of bills draws on the idea of negative freedom. However, the result also shows that bills that draws on negative freedom subsequently decreases in favour of bills that draws on positive freedom, suggesting that the ideological changes regarding liberty in The Swedish Social Democracy Party are nonlinear rather than moving straightforward.

<p>Debate over Intellectual Property Rights ‘IPRs’ particularly patent and copyrights is mainly on forward-looking industries in computer software. As part of a trade deal reached in 1994, the member nations of the World Trade Organisation must adhere to a global agreement known as TRIPS, for the Trade- Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights.</p><p>This study is to analyse the ethical conception of Intellectual Property Rights and in particular its implications on the developing countries in relation to TRIPS. The approach will be to analyse a broad philosophical theories of property to see if there is any justification for a software program to be treated as private property and also argue base on John Rawls two principles of justice in relation to TRIPS Agreement. Some reflections will be put on the use of open-source software by less developing countries.</p><p>From the study it was asserted that, strong IPRs protection would hinder technological transfer and indigenous learning activities in the early stage of industrialisation when learning takes place through reverse engineering. And policy makers should consider differentiation in terms of the level of economic and industrial development, if protection and enforcement of IPRs is intended to enhance technological development.</p>

Compelling research in international relations and international political economy on global warming suggests that one part of any meaningful effort to radically reverse current trends of increasing green house gas (GHG) emissions is shared policies among states that generate costs for such emissions in many if not most of the world’s regions. Effectively employing such policies involves gaining much more extensive global commitments and developing much stronger compliance mechanism than those currently found in the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, global warming raises the prospect that we need a global form of political authority that could coordinate the actions of states in order to address this environmental threat. This in turn suggests that any serious effort to mitigate climate change will entail new limits on the sovereignty of states. In this book I focus on the normative question of whether or not we have clear moral reasons to bind ourselves together in such a supranational form of political association. I argue that one can employ familiar liberal arguments for the moral legitimacy of political order at the state level to show that we do have a duty to support such a global political project. Even if one adopts the premises employed by the most influential forms of liberal scepticism to the ideas of global political and distributive justice, such as those advanced by John Rawls and Thomas Nagel, it is clear that the threat of global warming has expanded the scope of justice. We now have a global and demanding duty of justice to create the political conditions that would allow us to collectively address our impact on the Earth’s atmosphere.

Debate over Intellectual Property Rights ‘IPRs’ particularly patent and copyrights is mainly on forward-looking industries in computer software. As part of a trade deal reached in 1994, the member nations of the World Trade Organisation must adhere to a global agreement known as TRIPS, for the Trade- Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights. This study is to analyse the ethical conception of Intellectual Property Rights and in particular its implications on the developing countries in relation to TRIPS. The approach will be to analyse a broad philosophical theories of property to see if there is any justification for a software program to be treated as private property and also argue base on John Rawls two principles of justice in relation to TRIPS Agreement. Some reflections will be put on the use of open-source software by less developing countries. From the study it was asserted that, strong IPRs protection would hinder technological transfer and indigenous learning activities in the early stage of industrialisation when learning takes place through reverse engineering. And policy makers should consider differentiation in terms of the level of economic and industrial development, if protection and enforcement of IPRs is intended to enhance technological development.