Investigative powers of Congress is the Congress to obtain the required information, the tool found the truth. Due to the need for legislative decision-making rational, and rational legislative decision-making need to use the logic of scientific method, to take an objective view of the decision for seeking truth from facts, there is no investigative powers, Congress is that the lack of information, difficult to discover the truth of a disadvantage, unable to make the right decisions , will not be able to carry out its terms of reference on the role of function. Compared to democracy in the world's major countries of the development of the investigative power of Congress, the Legislative Yuan may exercise certain power of investigation in 2004 until the beginning by the J.Y. Interpretation No.585 to explain the right of access to the survey. Representative democracies, the United Kingdom is one of the first use of the investigative power of Congress, the United States Department of the investigative power of Congress to develop the most complete system, also the most frequent use of the country, a democratic country by the major development of the investigative power of Congress, know that the investigative power of Congress to essential for Congress to support legislative power, Congress is also an important weapon supervision. However, the exercise of legislative power on behalf of the people in our country of the Legislative Yuan in the future can indeed play with investigative powers to supervise the executive, legislative and other auxiliary functions, there is the establishment of a sound depends on the right of Congress to investigate the mode of operation. In this paper, since the right of Congress to investigate the meaning and nature of the legal basis of the investigative power of Congress to explore the principle behind the system and principles. At the same time by the Democratic National Congress representative survey Overview of the implementation of the right to introduce a system to explore the rights of the Legislative Yuan to investigate the nature and the status quo, the existing access to the Legislative Yuan of the operation of the right to study the document, which on my development of the investigative power of Congress to amend the law. In this study, data collection through literature, the light of our constitutional system with a foreign legal system, and finally developed the following recommendations: 1.The Legislative Yuan investigative power system should be the rule of law, and clearly defined the scope of the exercise of investigative powers, to avoid violation of other constitutional organs of the terms of reference. 2. The introduction of a small number of right( Minderheitsenquete) - in order to learn from the German system. 3. In addition to the exercise of law in the Legislative Yuan to develop terms of reference "of the exercise of investigative powers," a chapter, the new legislation is still to be a peremptory norm of "public hearing", "testimony" of the relevant provisions. 4. Addition of "contempt of Congress" of norms. 5. Be added to a breach of confidentiality provided for the punishment. 6. The Legislative Yuan investigative powers should be fine with more force. 7. Should be determined by the local councils the right to access provisions.

本文之目的在探討我國立法院預算審議制度實務運作現況以及改革方向。以立法院審議九十二年度中央政府總預算案程序為經，相關審議法律規範為緯，分析探討預算審議制度、過程及結果。首先經由預算審議制度之理論及相關文獻進行探討，接著分析我國預算審議制度及實際運作情形，並以主要民主國家美國、日本及英國預算審議制度作探討與比較，最後依據對學者與專家深度訪談意見之彙總分析，提出檢討及強化立法院預算審議制度之建議。結果發現現行立法院預算審議制度之缺失：□委員會未建立資深專業制；□黨團協商存有組成門檻過低，無法反映各政黨在院會的代表性、延擱總預算案審議之時程、黨團協商紀錄只有結論而無過程致立法原意難以查考、黨團協商代表未貫徹利益迴避原則、黨團協商結論凌駕委員會之決定，致損害委員會之預算專業審查功能；□立法委員質詢偏離預算審查議題；□審查預算案未掌握審查重點及審查方式；□全院各委員會聯席會議審議預算功能不彰；□預算委員會委員游走各委員會參與預算審查之表決，影響專業預算審查；□預算審查之專業幕僚單位，有待強化；□預算書編製不夠詳實，預算資訊不夠公開與透明化，影響預算審議效率；□未能如期完成總預算案審議，影響預算執行進度。爰針對缺失提供下列建議：強化委員會專業預算審查機制，以強化其專業性及權威性；立法院預算審議要掌握預算重點；取消全院各委員會聯席會，以增加委員會審查時間；黨團協商機制之改進；強化專業的預算審查幕僚機構；預算編製內容應清晰詳實，預算資訊要公開透明；公開真實政府債務資訊，積極面對並處理。 / This paper is to study the current budget approval system and its possible reform in the Legislative Yuan, ROC. The budget approval system, process and outcomes were analyzed based on the 2003 Government Budgetary and related regulations.The assessments and enhancement suggestions to the budget approval system in the Legislative Yuan of ROC were based on the in depth study of public budgeting theories and literatures on the ROC’s current budget approval system and practice , on the comparative analysis of the budget approval systems of USA , Japan and the United Kingdom and interview with the scholars and budget professions. Some shortcomings of the budget approval system in the Legislative Yuan of ROC were found out. First , the committees don’t build up the seniority professional system. Secondly , the negotiation among different parties has some defects : the low threshold of the negotiation results in unequal representatives of different parties ; the slow process of the negotiation delays the budget approval timetable ; it’s hard to trace the purposes of legislation since it only includes conclusions with no records of discussion process ; the negotiation representatives do not avoid the interests conflicts ; and the conclusion of the negotiation can exceed the decisions made by the committees , damaging the professional function of the committee’s budget approval. Thirdly , the interpellations of the legislators are not related to the issues of the budget approval. Fourthly , the legislators do not dominate the main points and the methods of the budget approval. Fifthly , the function of the Joint Session of All Committees doesn’t perform well. Sixthly , the legislators of the Budget and Final Accounts Committee engage in the budget approval votes of other committees , and it will influence the professional image of the legislators. Seventhly , the professional staff department of the budget approval need to be expanded and enhanced. Eighthly , the budget approval process can be more effective if the budget books are more detailed and the related information is more public. Finally , the delay of the budget approval timetable will impact the execution gradation of the budget. Possible suggestions to overcome the shortcomings are presented as follows : The professional mechanism and the authority of the committees’ budget approval need to be strengthened. The Legislative Yuan should be able to catch up the key points of the budget in the process of the budget approval. The Joint Session of All Committees should be cancelled so that the committees can have enough time to proceed the budget approval. The mechanism of the negotiation among different parties should be improved. The staff department of the professional budget approval should be expanded and its function should be enhanced. The contents of the budget books should be clear and detailed and the information of the budget should be public. Finally , the government should proclaim the real information of the government debts and handle it more aggressively.

過去對於國會中政黨的研究，多限於探討政黨體制的制度面，或偏重於從國會議員的角度闡述政黨對國會議員行為的影響力，本研究則是試圖突顯政黨身為動態立法過程中的重要政治行動者，必須採取各種行動與策略，整合自身成員的力量，與他黨進行立法聯合互動，以達成特定目標。 本研究主張政黨在進行各種立法聯合時，乃以其選民基礎及其在特定議題上的立場為主要考量，同時在面對實際立法情境時，亦須將因政黨本身資源有限所導致的立法限制，及政黨為表現善意或獲取自身利益而與其他政黨進行立法交換等因素一併加以考量，如此方能更精準地推估立法聯合的可能情況，並完整地描繪出政黨在多元動態的立法過程中所扮演的政治行動者角色。研究結果顯示，政黨在各類法案上確實受上述因素影響而出現不同的立法聯合狀態，如：大陸定位問題類法案即因其涉及的選民基礎及特定議題相當明確，而每呈國新兩黨與民進黨對立的局面。 本研究以政黨的選民基礎與在特定議題上的立場此兩項政黨的基本考量，連結政黨在選舉中的競爭態勢與其在國會中的立法聯合表現，彌補過去研究較少論及國會中政黨競爭的缺憾，有助於對政黨競爭互動的實際情況進行更全面、連貫且深入的瞭解與詮釋。 / Most previous studies on congressional parties concentrate either on institutions of party system, or on the effects that a party could have on individual legislators' behavior, predominantly from the legislators' aspect. However, this research aims to emphasize that the parties are the important political actors in the dynamic legislative process, during which they must adopt some valid actions and strategies, integrate their members' strength, and form legislative coalitions with other parties in order to reach particular political goals. When parties form legislative coalitions, they must consider their bases of constituents and their positions in particular issues. At the same time, they must consider the legislative restrictions caused by their limited resources and the possible legislative exchange with other parties in order to show their benevolence or to accomplish their self-interest goals. The author strongly believes that this is an appropriate method through which people may get a whole picture of the role that the parties play in the complex and dynamic legislative process. The research findings show that the bill categories influenced by the factors stated above as to have different styles of legislative coalitions. For instance, when a bill concerning the status of China is raised, the legislative coalition of the KMT, aligning with the New Party, against the DPP is ineluctable, because their bases of constituents and their positions in particular issues are clear and definite. This research is based on two major considerations of the parties：their bases of constituents and their positions in particular issues. The research furthermore uses these two considerations to connect competitive circumstances of parties in the elections and the legislative coalitions in the legislature. It may help to unravel and interpret the real situations of party competition completely, coherently, and profoundly.

none

本研究約有五萬字，共分為研究動機、文獻探討、研究方法、資料分析與結論等五章 。 研究動機源自於曾參與觀察三家電視台國會記者採訪過程，禸感於立法院第七十九期 的議事多元化，而不知電視媒介的處理方式是否因應改變。 文獻探討是以「媒介建構社會事實」及「訊息來源人物的新聞處理」此兩個概念作為 衍伸。落實到研究問題則為： １．不同屬性的立委之間。不同屬性立委與官員之間、及總體立委與官員之間，其電 視新聞議題及新聞處理方式有何不同？ ２．不同屬性的立委之間。不同屬性立委與官員之間、及總體立委與官員之間，其電 視新聞處理方式比對客觀事實有何不同？ 本研究以系統分層間隔抽樣，分析三台自２月２４日至７月１７日期間之立法院院會 及委員會新聞，共計有１１７天，以出現在新聞中直接或間接說話的訊息來源人物（ 立委與官員）作為分析單位，新聞內容再比對立法院公報及新聞稿的記錄，以了解其 間的差異。

本研究之對象為立法院委員會的召集委員，利用文獻分析法、深入訪談法及內容分析法，深入探討召集委員設定委員會議程的過程及其挑戰與限制。同時分析影響召集委員議程設定之因素為何？ 研究結果發現制度因素、政黨因素、委員會因素、選區因素和個人因素皆會影響召集委員設定委員會議程的偏好，其中政黨因素更是最重要的影響因素。透過統計模型檢證後可知執政黨召集委員較傾向設定立法議程，反之在野黨召集委員則傾向設定監督議程。此外，不論任何政黨的召集委員都傾向設定本身政黨的立法議程。執政黨和在野黨召集委員設定監督議程的偏好也有所不同。同時召集委員的議程設定存在著政黨聯盟的可能性，以藍綠為分野的政黨聯盟較個別政黨更具解釋力。 而且召集委員也會因為所處的委員會性質不同而產生不同的議程設定偏好。如在法案供給量較高的委員會，召集委員會較傾向設定立法議程特別是的本黨立法議程和定期性業務報告此類的監督議程。 在選區因素上，相較於區域召集委員，不分區召集委員較傾向設定立法議程，同時也會因個人理念與其他同聯盟的召集委員進行合作，而非純粹從政黨標籤去考量。但是執政黨的不分區召集委員仍然較傾向設定所屬政黨或聯盟的立法議程。而在監督議程上則較偏好業務報告和專題報告。 在個人因素上，相對於女性，男性召集委員較傾向設定監督議程，對於本身政黨的立法議程較不忠誠。而新任召集委員為求提升知名度對於引起媒體注意的監督議程如業務報告和專題報告較為熱衷。最後相對於低教育程度召集委員，高教育程度召集委員不僅較傾向設定立法議程，還會與其他同聯盟的召集委員進行合作。

本研究從我國立法院中院會與常設委員會之間政黨組成結構的角度出發，試圖探討兩者之間組成差異的程度以及方向對於法條審查所造成的影響。本文假設委員會與院會之間的政黨組成差異若越大，則委員會對於法案的審查結果在院會遭到修正的情況將越為明顯。研究結果顯示，在第三屆中政黨組成差異比例越大的委員會，其審查通過的法條在院會所遭到的修正程度越小，而院會多數黨若在審查委員會席次過半，則有助於減緩審查通過的條文在院會遭到修正的情況。另一方面，由於委員會組成方式改變導致院會與委員會之間的組成依政黨比例為原則，因此第六屆的部分在研究中主要僅提供參考，其中政黨組成差異比例與多數黨是否在委員會中過半皆並不對法條審查造成任何影響，而將兩屆資料合併分析則是如同第三屆所呈現的結果。換言之，本文對於院會與委員會政黨組成差異對於法案修正影響的研究假設並未能得到經驗上的支持。 / This research takes its departure from observing different percentage of party constitution between floor and standing committees in Legislative Yuan, and tries to examine how the difference affects the process and consequence of bill amendments. The main hypothesis of this research is that higher different percentage of party constitution will result in higher degree of bill amendment on the floor. Empirical evidence shows that in the third term, higher different percentage of party constitution in a committee results in lower degree of floor amendment. Nevertheless, when the majority party comes to enjoy more than a majority in a committee, lower degree of bill amendments is found. On the other hand, because the method to compose committees changed, the proportion of parties in floor and committees was similar in the sixth term. So, the data of the sixth term is just for reference; the different percentage of party constitution and majority party’s seat advantage in committees do not impact the extent of floor amendments. The combination of the third and sixth term also shows the same result with the third term. In other words, the hypothesis regarding different percentage of party constitution is not supported by empirical data.

Abstract This thesis focuses on the oversight mechanism used by congress to supervise the intelligence department, mainly through examining the historical development of the oversight mechanism that the U.S. Congress uses over the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, as well as evaluating the mechanism¡¦s successes and failures, in order to find a suitable direction for establishing an oversight mechanism for our country¡¦s Legislative Yuan over the National Security Agency, NSA. First of all, the inceptive backgrounds and historical developments of the CIA and the NSA are introduced. After establishing an understanding of the special backgrounds and developments of the two agencies, the writer, using the Institutional Process Theory, analyzes and discusses how the U.S. Congress¡¦ oversight mechanism over the CIA has progressed, thereby determining the key to the successes and failures of the U.S. Congress¡¦ intelligence oversight mechanism. Having analyzed the intelligence oversight mechanism of the U.S. Congress, the writer brings up suggestions as to how our country¡¦s Legislative Yuan can develop an oversight mechanism over the NSA in the future. Lastly, from these discussions, the writer addresses the contributions, propositions, and limitations of this research and hopes that these research and discussions can assist the Legislative Yuan in institutionalizing a comprehensive intelligence oversight mechanism over the NSA.

¡iabract¡j From the past to the present, we can find no matter mass media, public opinion, and even the government party and opposition party is in support of neutrality of the Speaker, nevertheless, it had been unable to accomplish the purpose in past decade. What we see is endless arguments, as often as there is election of the premier of legislative yuan or bill battle. Hence, the author thinks there is a gap between our subjective expectation and objective reality about neutrality of the premier of legislative yuan, otherwise why we can¡¦t put neutrality of the premier of legislative yuan into practice for a long time. So this text thinks whether the premier of legislative yuan should be development toward neutralization, it is worth to discuss. It is necessary to inspect the possibility of neutral development for the premier of legislative yuan. In this article, we define the meaning of neutrality of the Speaker includes three levels, such as neutrality of agenda, neutrality of political party and neutrality of electoral district, etc., and under the prerequisite of these three meaning, the Speaker acted multiple roles including congress chairman, legislative chief, representatives of political party, representatives of electoral district and coordinator, etc. And some of them are useful to neutrality; some of them are conflict and contradictive to neutrality. Further, these roles would be influenced by the historical background, political culture, constitutional government system, political party, electoral system, and parliamentary norm and convention. So from this point of view, we observe experience of foreign the Speaker and inspect key factor influencing role of the Speaker. At the same time, we also explored key factor influencing role of the premier of legislative yuan, and compared with both, to present useful and unfavorable conditions about neutrality. Eventually, according to these conditions, we analyze the possibility of neutral development for the premier of legislative yuan, and make the relevant suggestions. We find out something in the course of studying. At first, our government trends towards presidential government in constitutional government system, the administration and legislation is split, it is useful to strengthen orientation of representatives of political party of the premier of legislative yuan. Secondly, if the premier of legislative yuan wants to be the Speaker, he has to rely on the strength of the political party in election, it makes the premier of legislative yuan cant¡¦t keep neutrality. Finally, the establishment of legislative yuan is very short, norm and conventions that it is useful to neutrality is not formed, such as the Speaker withdrawing from the political party or setting up several vice speakers to share agenda resources. And this also makes neutral development of the premier of legislative yuan more and more difficult. So we get a clear understanding of our current institutional reality, it is unfavorable to neutrality of the premier of legislative yuan. Consequently, we should develop towards the American type of the Speaker, to strengthen authority of the premier of legislative yuan, to make him lead the political party and integrate the legislative to restrict the executive power, to improve the entity of the whole legislative yuan. Key word: the premier of legislative yuan, the Speaker , neutrality of the Speaker , neutrality of agenda , neutrality of political party , neutrality of electoral district, Constitutional government system , political party , electoral system , parliamentary norm and convention

我國之政治文化從早期之臣屬型轉變為參與型，政治體制由威權體制轉型為民主體制，在民主化的過程中，立法院之結構與功能產生極大的變化，從以前「行政院之立法局」，成為今日全國政治運作的中心，復經六次修憲之結果，立法院集所有職權於一身，為民主國家實質的國會。 立法委員係在眾多優秀之候選人之中，經過選舉之洗禮產生，其專業素養、品德修養理應有超於常人之標準。惟揆諸今日之立法院，立法委員之表現似乎違背了多數選民之期待。有鑑於此，立法院於民國八十八年一月十二日，三讀通過了國會改革五大法案，之後復經歷次修正，期能改善目前議事效率與品質低落之窘境。 國會議事運作之失調，並非一朝一夕所造成，而是有其歷史性結構的因素。然時至今日，立法院的生態與以前大不相同，民國八十九年的總統大選亦首度出現政黨輪替的情形，惟國會的議事運作並未隨著民主政治的進步而改變過去非體制內之抗爭，反而有過之而無不及。 議事運作的過程中所產生之諸多問題，大多繫於利益之糾葛，近年來雖已陸續通過國會改革五大法案、公職人員財產申報法、公職人員利益衝突迴避法等規範公職人員倫理的法律，惟拘束力並不彰顯。因此，本研究經深度訪談、參與觀察及蒐集國內、外相關文獻，探討立法院議事運作失調之原因，並提出擬提昇立法品質與效率之方式，應從強化立法院內部之自律機制、公權力制衡與社會之監督三個面向，型塑國會倫理，始能為國會改革帶來新契機。同時，亦能建立我國立法問政之優良典範。 / The political culture of our country transformed from feudalism to participation, and the political system from autocracy to democracy. In the process of getting democratic, the structure and function of Legislative Yuan has altered dramatically. It used to be Legislative Bureau under the Executive Yuan, but now, it has become headquarter of national political operation. After the six constitutional amendments, Legislative Yuan has been literally the all-in-one congress in a democratic state. Legislators are elites with outstanding professional knowledge and morality, chosen out of a number of brilliant participants. On the other hand, though, the incumbent ones in the Legislative Yuan seem to let the voters down. To pull up this declination, the Legislative Yuan passed 5 major acts on congressional innovation after 3rd reading on January 12th, 1999, and several amendments following that, hoping to improve the inefficiency and low quality. The malfunction of Legislative Yuan didn’t start from yesterday but with historical background. Till now, the environment in it has been so different from before. The first rotation of ruling party took place in 2000, but this improvement in democracy made the working of congressional agenda have even more conflicts inside the framework. Most problems derived from the process of agenda processing can find its root in the tangle of benefit. Though the major acts on congressional innovation, the law of official’s property exposure, and the law to prevent official’s benefit conflict, that help regulate the virtues of officials, had been passed respectively, the binding force is not strong enough and obvious. Therefore, on the basis of interview, observation, and collection of the domestic and foreign document, this research will discuss the reasons leading to the malfunction of Legislative Yuan and come up with the quality and efficiency resolution, which is strengthen the self-control inside the structure, the balance of public power, and the monitor of the whole society. To bring a new opportunity for revolution in our congress, we have to mold the congressional ethics, and then a terrific well-function Legislative system can be built as well.