The Tamil Tigers were one of the most organized, focused, and influential organizations in Asian politics during the last three decades. Throughout the existence of the organization, the goal of the LTTE was to establish a separate Tamil state – Tamil Eelam - comprising the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka where Tamil-speaking populations were dense. The Sri Lankan civil war, which ended in May of 2009, claimed tens of thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of thousands of residents, and impeded the economic well-being of Sri Lanka. This thesis employs the operational code analysis as a way to better understand the character, behaviour, and norms of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. An additional purpose of this thesis is to test the utility of this model in the case of a terrorist organization such as the LTTE. The Operational Code Analysis framework was premiered by Nathan Leites in his two-part study of the Bolshevik Party, and was subsequently revived and re-imagined by a number of academics. The iteration of the Operational Code framework used in this thesis is a qualitative analysis which is comprised of ten questions: five ‘philosophical’ and five ‘instrumental’. This examination reveals that while this model has much to offer in analyzing this terrorist organization, it is in some ways a flawed method of exposition. However, the model produces unexpected insights about the stated beliefs of the LTTE.

The Swedish Armed Forces tend to ask themselves if it is sufficiently multinational interoperablefor participation in international operations. An equally valid question today should be whether theSwedish Armed Forces are sufficiently nationally / internally interoperable, between their branchesof service, to be able to conduct independent operations based on the joint warfare theory.The lack of ability to joint warfare in the armed forces in general and the Swedish Armed Forcesspecially constitutes the essay´s fundamental problem. By using Codners and Sjöbloms custominteroperability theory, the Swedish Armed Forces documents were analyzed to highlight anyweaknesses related to joint warfare and national interoperability between Ground and Air Forces.The survey shows weaknesses linked to the custom theory and Swedish Armed Forces governingdocuments. The ability of a national interoperability is limited between Ground and Air Forcestoday, mostly because of weaknesses in the Swedish Armed Forces strategic concept which doesnot describe the importance of joint warfare at all levels sufficiently. This leads to deficienciesreflected in doctrines, regulations, technology, techniques and exercises. Lack of common documents,techniques, methods and exercises in turn affects armed services understanding of theirdifferent backgrounds and unique perspectives. The result will therefore be low national interoperabilityamong the armed services.

This thesis examines the applicability of culminations theory in a guerrilla context. In battle, a crucial factor is to assess who has superior strength. Culmination theory is a central concept in conventional warfare, could the same theory support the analysis of guerrilla warfare?Previous research tends to focus on the results of guerrilla wars. By using the concept of culmination this research attempts to determine, by assessing the battle, whether the guerrilla reached the point of culmination and by that evaluate the applicability of culmination theory in guerrilla warfare.The research design consists of a two-case study to analyse the LTTE and Daesh and thereby highlight culmination theory’s applicability on guerrillas. Written documents are used as sources of empirical data for the two-case study. The result of the survey shows that LTTE and Daesh reached their defensive point of culmination and that culmination theory is generalizable in a similar guerrilla context.

The classic theories about naval warfare is something that still influence warfare and naval theories today. In a world that changes so does the warfare, which shows a more asymmetrical character than before. Power asymmetry between actors is something to take into account today, but the history revealse unexpectadly that the weaker actor often stands as the winner. Is the theories of naval warfare that is influenced by a era of decisive battle still valid? Not only has the power asymmetry changed in time but so has the actors, not seldom the weaker actor is of a irregular character in todays naval warfare.The question here is if a theory influenced by theories created for regular conventional forces can explain the war- fare an asymmetric irregular actor carries? The issue this study address is Geoffrey Till ́s theory about Sea Denial and how that can explain the Sea tiger’s warfare against the Sri Lankan navy in the civil war of Sri Lanka. The result of the study shows that Tills theory can explain an irregular asymmetrical con- flict and also confirms that for a weak actor this could be warfare of success.

No / Throughout much of the 25-year Sri Lankan conflict, attention has focused on the confrontation between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. The views of the country¿s Muslims, who are 8 per cent of the population and see themselves as a separate ethnic group, have largely been ignored. Understanding their role in the conflict and addressing their political aspirations are vital if there is to be a lasting peace settlement. Muslims need to be part of any renewed peace process but with both the government and LTTE intent on continuing the conflict, more immediate steps should be taken to ensure their security and political involvement. These include control of the Karuna faction, more responsive local and national government, improved human rights mechanisms and a serious political strategy that recognises minority concerns in the east. At least one third of Muslims live in the conflict-affected north and east and thus have a significant interest in the outcome of the war. They have often suffered serious hardship, particularly at the hands of the Tamil rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since 1990 Muslims have been the victims of ethnic cleansing, massacres and forced displacement by the insurgents. The 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) was a disappointment to many Muslims. They had no independent representation at the peace talks, and many feared that any agreement that gave the LTTE exclusive control of the north and east, even in a federal arrangement, would be seriously detrimental to their own interests. Despite talks between Muslim leaders and the LTTE, they continued to suffer violent attacks. Since the resumption of large-scale military action in mid-2006, Muslims have again been caught up in the fighting in the east. Dozens have been killed and thousands displaced. They have also come into conflict with a new, pro-government Tamil paramilitary group, the Karuna faction. Memories of LTTE oppression are still fresh, and rancorous disputes with Tamils over land and resources remain potent in the east. Muslim political leaders have often been divided, representing different historical experiences and geographical realities as well as personal and political differences. Muslims in the east and north ¿ who have been fundamentally affected by the conflict ¿ often have very different views from those who live in the south among the Sinhalese. Nevertheless, there is consensus on some key issues and a desire to develop a more united approach to the conflict. Muslims have never resorted to armed rebellion to assert their political position, although some have worked with the security forces, and a few were members of early Tamil militant groups. Fears of an armed movement emerging among Muslims, perhaps with a facade of Islamist ideology, have been present since the early 1990s, but most have remained committed to channelling their frustrations through the political process and negotiating with the government and Tamil militants at different times. There is no guarantee that this commitment to non-violence will continue, particularly given the frustration noticeable among younger Muslims in the Eastern province. In some areas there are Muslim armed groups but they are small and not a major security threat. Fears of armed Islamist movements emerging seem to be exaggerated, often for political ends. Small gangs have been engaged in semi-criminal activities and intra-religious disputes, but there is a danger they will take on a role in inter-communal disputes if the conflict continues to impinge upon the security of co-religionists. There is increasing interest among some Muslims in more fundamentalist versions of Islam, and there have been violent clashes between ultra-orthodox and Sufi movements. This kind of violence remains limited and most Muslims show considerable tolerance to other sects and other faiths. Nevertheless, the conflict is at least partly responsible for some Muslims channelling their frustrations and identity issues into religious disputes. Muslim peace proposals have tended to be reactive, dependent on the politics of the major Tamil and Sinhalese parties. Muslim autonomous areas in the east are being pursued but seem unlikely to be accepted by the present government. Muslims are concerned about Colombo¿s plans for development and governance in the east, which have not involved meaningful consultation with ethnic minorities and do not seem to include significant devolution of powers to local communities. In the longer term, only a full political settlement of the conflict can allow historical injustices against the Muslims to be addressed and begin a process of reconciliation. The LTTE, in particular, needs to revisit the history of its dealings with the Muslims if it is to gain any credibility in a future peace process in which the Muslims are involved. Only an equitable settlement, in which Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim community concerns are adequately addressed, can really contain the growing disillusionment among a new generation of Sri Lankan Muslims.

The principle of war, surprise, has long been criticized for being imprecise and in need of interpretation. Some believe it is because of this ambiguity that the principle has survived in military doctrine. The purpose of the study is thereby to empirically test the principle of surprise to investigate its validity in modern naval warfare. Due to the lack of precision in doctrine, the surprise has been interpreted into an analytical instrument based on the compiled thoughts written by theoreticians; Sun Zi, Carl Von Clausewitz, Raoul Castex and Milan Vego. The analytical instrument aims to identify whether criteria for surprise are represented or not in a context of successful surprise. This was achieved through a two-case study based on a qualitative text analysis of the methods used by the Sea Tigers of Sri Lanka and the attack on ARA General Belgrano during the Falklands War. The study shows that all the criteria were met in some way in both cases and that the military principal surprise is valid as a principle of war in modern naval warfare. Further research is recommended to investigate more cases and not to limit the research to a tactical level.

Alors que la mobilisation de la diaspora tamoule pendant la guerre civile sri lankaise (1983-2009) a été amplement discutée et analysée, peu de chercheurs se sont penchés sur la mobilisation de la diaspora tamoule après 2009. Pourtant, cette mobilisation d’après-guerre présente une rupture importante avec le discours d’indépendance du Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) prédominant pendant la guerre civile sri lankaise, rupture qui s’illustre, entre autres, par l’émergence d’un discours de reconnaissance du génocide. Comment expliquer ce changement de discours? L’objectif de ce mémoire est d’exposer le recadrage des actions collectives de la diaspora tamoule depuis 2009, pour ensuite expliquer comment et pourquoi nous l’observons. Pour ce faire, nous retraçons le discours de cinq acteurs collectifs en matière d’indépendance et de génocide, tel que rapporté par le site web diasporique, Tamilnet.com. Les acteurs collectifs à l’étude sont les suivants : le Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), le Global Tamil Forum (GTF), le Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), Tamils Against Genocide (TAG) et le National Council of Canadian Tamils (NCCT). Notre démarche, qui consiste en une analyse de cadrage, à la fois quantitative et qualitative, nous amène à remettre en question la relation causale entre la fenêtre d’opportunité et le recadrage. En revanche, nous démontrons que le recadrage des actions collectives de la diaspora tamoule depuis 2009 s’explique par l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs collectifs, eux-mêmes porteurs d’un nouveau discours. L’apparition de ces nouveaux acteurs collectifs médiate ainsi la relation entre la fenêtre d’opportunité et le recadrage. / While previous studies have focused on Tamil diaspora mobilization during Sri Lanka’s civil war (1983-2009), post-war Tamil mobilization within the diaspora remains largely understudied. However, this post-war mobilization is characterized by the emergence of a new discourse on the recognition of the Tamil genocide and represents a major break with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’s discourse on Tamil Eelam independence. How can we explain this shift in discourse? This research outlines the reframing of collective actions organized within the Tamil diaspora since 2009 and provides an explanation as to why such reframing is taking place. We focus on five collective actors, namely the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), the Transnational Governement of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), Tamils Against Genocide (TAG) and the National Council of Canadian Tamils (NCCT). We deconstruct their discourse pertaining to Tamil independence and Tamil genocide using Tamilnet.com, an online news portal. Using a quantitative and qualitative frame analysis approach, we challenge the causal relationship between opportunity window and reframing. Conversely, our results show that the reframing of Tamil collective actions in the diaspora since 2009 is due to the emergence of new collective actors, bearers of a new discourse on the recognition of genocide. We then suggest that the emergence of new collective actors mediates the relationship between opportunity window and reframing.

The thoughts and theories regarding the command of the sea were written down during the last century. In the aftermath of WW2, marine strategists were less comfortable about using the phrase command of the sea which now seemed to be too absolutist in tone. This resulted in a new phrase which had a less ambitious tone the phrase control of the sea became more acceptable and even though the main difference is that control of the sea is applicable under a certain time and place, the main thought is still the same.   The question then that should be asked is: are these old theories regarding the battle of the seas still applicable today? The battlefield has certainly changed since then, particularly regarding the development of military technology but also regarding what kind of foe the navies of today meet.   This is the issue that this paper aims to address by studying the civil war in Sri Lanka with focus on what took place between the Sri Lankan navy and the sea tigers of LTTE. The study will be done by using Geoffrey Tills theories about control of the sea as a lens and a means to decipher what occurred during this time.   This study shows that the theory of control of the sea played a part of the Sri Lankan navy’s ability to defeat the sea tigers and by doing so contributed to ending of the almost three century long conflict.

Superficial information of the civil wars in Aceh, Indonesia and Sri Lanka creates the idea that both conflicts were in similar situations when they were hit by the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. It thus seems surprising that in the wake of the tsunami, the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia signed a peace agreement, while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Government of Sri Lanka returned to war. This thesis aims to explore what factors related to the tsunami contributed to this difference and whether rational choice theory can serve as an explanation for this difference. In order to find out, I conducted a qualitative comparative case study though the analysis of secondary documents. The results suggest that the factors that contributed to the difference can be divided into four broad themes: (1) the timing of the tsunami and thus the pre-disaster context; (2) the geographical situation and with that, the military impact; (3) the types of guerilla groups, including their abilities to rule, their access to financial capital and their strategic; (4) the role of the international community, which can be further divided into firstly, the geopolitical relevance of these countries, and secondly, internationalization, community engagement and separating the tsunami and conflict. I believe that rational choice theory explains the difference in outcome between the two conflicts very well. This theory assumes that people, given the circumstances, and in view of all the possible options, will act in line with the option that is expected to satisfy them most and minimize their losses. Applying this theory to the case studies of Aceh and Sri Lanka following the tsunami, it was appealing for the Free Aceh Movement to settle, but this was not the case for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. As a result, the former chose to sign a peace agreement with the Government of Indonesia, whereas the latter chose to continue its fight against the Government of Sri Lanka.

In this thesis, I argue that discourses of victimhood, victory, and xenophobia underpin both Sinhalese and Tamil nationalist and religious fundamentalist movements. Ethnic discourse has allowed citizens to affirm collective ideals in the face of disparate experiences, reclaim power and autonomy in contexts of fundamental instability, but has also deepened ethnic divides in the post-war era. In the first chapter, I argue that mutually exclusive narratives of victimhood lie at the root of ethnic solitudes, and provide barriers to mechanisms of transitional justice and memorialization. The second chapter includes an analysis of the politicization of mythic figures and events from the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahāvaṃsa in nationalist discourses of victory, supremacy, and legacy. Finally, in the third chapter, I explore the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) rhetoric and symbolism, and contend that a xenophobic discourse of terrorism has been imposed and transferred from Tamil to Muslim minorities. Ultimately, these discourses prevent Sri Lankans from embracing a multi-ethnic and multi-religious nationality, and hinder efforts at transitional justice. By shedding light on the discourses underlying popular nationalist movements, I hope to promote understanding and further post-war reconciliation between ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)