金融海嘯提供我們一個深刻的教訓，因為危機前信貸過度增長伴隨著大量的系統風險，最後導致景氣反轉時銀行業龐大損失。而這些損失將動搖整個金融體系，並引發了一連串的惡性循環(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision , BCBS ,2010a, 2010b)；若依循過往個別審慎監理((Microprudential regulation)原則，將無法察覺背後隱藏的系統風險。因此目前趨勢是將以個別(Micro)與總體審慎監理原則(macro)並重，針對能夠影響整體市場金融穩定風險來源而詳加監管，同時透過規範與監理措施適度的降低系統風險，最終達到金融穩定的目的。IMF、BIS以及FSB(2009)針對G20制定的金融機構、市場與工具的指導文件(Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments)中，認為有效控制系統風險是現階段政策監理最重要的主軸之一。所謂系統風險是指能影響金融機構所持有的部位以及對於實體經濟存在嚴重負面影響的風險來源；此總體風險將存在負外部性而非個別審慎監理的風險因子。 因此本文由兩篇宏觀審慎監管框架文章所構成的研究，分別針對市場流動性風險和信用風險的因子。透過非流動性賣權與逆景氣資本緩衝（CCB）買權來分析和評價兩種新的監管框架。第一篇論文的主要概念是討論市場流動性風險因子，雖然當前銀行監管的重點是資金流動性風險，如新巴塞爾協議三 (Basel III)的流動性風險覆蓋率（LCR）和淨穩定資金比率（NSFR），但金融機構實際上也同時面臨資金和市場流動性之間的高度順週期效應，導致流動性螺旋，並威脅到金融穩定。因此，本文提出一個市場流動性，系統性風險和宏觀審慎監理分析框架來填補這一空白。 與Drehmann和Juselius（2013B）的實證研究結果比較，我們發現利用6個月歷史波動度建構的非流動性選擇權是最有效的提前預警指標（EWIS），且符合穩定政策結構和最小監管成本。此外在三個子樣本和嚴重危機時期亦能同樣保持預警的穩健性。因此如果金融機構能透過預警減少金融機構投資種類、行業、交易對手與大額暴險的集中度時，將可以由危機發生後被動式轉變成危機發生前主動式的風險管理，將符合總體審慎監理定義：能影響所有而非單一的金融機構，以及有效控制破壞總體市場產生的系統風險。 在第二篇文章中，我們專注於信用風險監管框架的避險，即Basel III的逆景氣資本緩衝(CCB)。這個新穎的監理視角將鼓勵銀行在危機前的信貸繁榮時期增加資本緩衝，而非在危機後接受援助或者增加昂貴的資本。據美國聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）統計，2014年第1季全美的存款機構風險加權資產為10.27兆美金；如果最高的逆景氣資本緩衝被應用到這些銀行，將有2570億美金的資本不得不額外注資。因此本文設計了一個新的買權來符合CCB的監管框架，建立提前資本防禦措施來減輕系統性風險和整體銀行業不穩定。首先發現這款買權將能在順境時注入資本，即更低的潛在違約風險與信貸寬鬆時期，進而抵禦未來發生的金融危機。我們的建議也符合Basel III的目標，在危機前2至5年協助銀行取得資本保護。最重要的是，CCB買權可以透過提前取得資本形成一個“減震器”，舒緩隨後而來經濟衰退的壓力達到降低銀行資本順週期性目標；此外還提供了一個對於銀行過度冒險行為的抗衡力量，成為一個“自動穩定器”來達到宏觀審慎監理目標。 / Financial tsunami offered a profound lesson as the pre-crisis excessive credit growth was accompanied by huge systemic risks that ultimately led to the reversal of economy and huge losses of the banking sector. Such losses will shake the entire financial system and trigger a series of vicious cycles (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BCBS, 2010a , 2010b ); the hidden systemic risk may not be observed if we follow the previous principles of micro prudential regulation. The guidance formulated by G20 to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets and instruments (IMF, BIS, and FSB, 2009) analyzes that the main issue of prior micro prudential regulation is that every financial institution’s incentive is to manage its own return-risk tradeoff but not necessarily manage the stability for the financial system as a whole. Consequently, the macroprudential regulation focusing on shocks originating outside the financial system can control the negative externalities of systemic risk rather than micro prudential regulation. This dissertation consists of two essays on the macro prudential framework of market liquidity risk and credit risk factor. We introduce, analyze, and value two new regulation frameworks via an illiquidity put option and a CCB call option respectively. The main concept of first essay is to discuss the macro prudential framework of market liquidity risk factor. Although the current banking regulation focuses on systemic funding liquidity risk such as Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) of Basel III, financial institutions would actually have highly procyclical effects between funding and market liquidity at the same time, leading to liquidity spirals and threatening to financial stability. We therefore propose a market liquidity, systemic risk and macroregulation analysis framework in Taiwan's capital market to fill this gap. Comparison with the Drehmann and Juselius' empirical study (2013b), we find that illiquidity options by using 6-month historical volatility and forecasting short-term stock declines are effective early warning indicators (EWIs) having most stable policy structures and minimal regulation costs. Applying AUC macroregulation criteria, we show this illiquidity measure is also maintained fairly robustness in different intervals, e.g. during three sub-samples and serious crisis periods. If financial institutions can diversify the concentration of portfolios varieties, industries, and counterparty before crises by using EWIs, the passive risk taking can be converted into the active risk management. It is necessary to prepare the market liquidity and macroregulation framework in advance. In the second essay, we focus the hedging product for credit risk factors, i.e. countercyclical capital buffer (CCB). This purpose of countercyclical capital buffer standards is to encourage banks to increase capital buffers in credit good times that can be used in the future stress. According to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the risk-weighted assets of U.S. depository institutions were $10.27trillion dollars in 2014:Q1. If the maximum CCB is applied to these banks, an additional US$257 billion of equity capital will have to be raised. Hence, we design a new option to establish the capital defenses meeting CCB framework and then mitigating systemic risk and banking instability in advance. We show this product injects capital in good times i.e., lower credit risk and more credit expansion, to weather the future financial crisis. Our proposal also complies with the goal of Basel III to obtain capital in 2 to 5 years prior to crises. Most importantly, the CCB option can provide protection with additional capital to act as a "shock absorber" reducing a procyclicality problem in the subsequent downturn. Besides, this type of option also offers a countervailing force to excessive risk-taking behaviors to act as an "automatic stabilizer" for reaching macroprudential goals.

Studi condotti sulla crisi finanziaria del 2007-09 e la recessione economica hanno evidenziato l’inadeguatezza delle teorie predominanti e la loro inefficacia nel proporre adeguate soluzioni di policy. La presenza di moneta bancaria nell’economia e di un sistema finanziario caratterizzato da innovazione finanziaria e speculazione modificano profondamente la natura stessa del processo di credit creation. Una nuova prospettiva sulla relazione tra finanza e crescita economica necessita essere sviluppata cercando di colmare le lacune esistenti tra New Growth Theory e Evolutionary Theory, come J.A. Schumpeter (1934) e altri studiosi hanno evidenziato. I fattori strutturali sono alla base della persistente instabilita` finanziaria nell’economia. Questo studio tenta di spiegare l’ipotesi che sta alla base dell’intera analisi circa il passaggio avutosi nell'impianto strutturale dell'economia da un virtuous cycle ad un bad cycle, e dimostrare l’esistenza di cio` che definiamo wealth trap, la quale e` ipotizzata essere conseguenza di un sistema finanziario tecnologicamente avanzato, ma non socialmente avanzato. Un modello non lineare ad Agenti (AMB) chiamato BFSE (Based-line Financial System Economy) mostra , tramite la sperimentazione sul modello ICEACE(Erlingsson et al., 2011), evidenze sulla centralita` del sistema finanziario e dell’esistenza del bad cycle. Una discussione sulle macroprudential policies e le politiche strutturali e` introdotta. / Studies of the 2007-09 credit crisis and the resulting recession have revealed the inadequacy of the predominant theoretical frameworks and their failure to propose adequate policy solutions. The presence in the economy of bank money and a financial system characterized by financial innovation and speculation changes the nature of credit creation. As J.A. Schumpeter (1934) and others scholars have recognized, a new perspective on the financial-growth relationship needs to be developed by filling the gaps in New Growth Theory and Evolutionary Theory - two Sons of Schumpeter - and in some way combining them. Structural factors are at the bottom of the persistence of the financial instability in the economy. The goal of this research is to explain the main hypothesis of the historical passage of the economy from a virtuous to a bad cycle and to show the existence of the wealth trap, which is a consequence of a high-technologically advanced financial system within the economic system. A non-linear ABM (Agent Based Model) called BFSE provides, through experimentation using ICEACE model (Erlingsson et al., 2011), interesting evidences of the centrality of the financial system and the bad cycle. Macroprudential and structural policies are introduced.

Recent episodes of financial instability have motivated researchers as well as policy makers to intensify research on financial stability. This thesis contributes to current research and policy discussion by elaborating and empirically testing methodologies, which can be used to measure financial sector vulnerabilities and identify potential risks for financial stability. It further focuses on the link between real and the financial sector as well as possible implications of household financial distress on the aggregate economy. Together with the proposed framework we provide the survey of the current literature on these topics as well as the empirical results. We argue in favour of stress testing methodologies covering the key risks on banks' balance sheets. These frameworks can also be used for emerging markets where data availability is typically limited. It is shown that due to high volatility of credit growth in emerging economies, the static approach assuming constant balance sheet items is not very appropriate. Furthermore, the feedback effect between the financial sector and the real economy might play an important role under certain assumptions, and therefore it should be taken into account by policy makers. This effect can also emerge in the real sector itself as potential instability can...

本文的研究目的為，在一個包含銀行部門的動態隨機一般均衡模型的架構中，探討流動性覆蓋比率限制在利率的信用管道中所扮演的角色以及其對政體經濟的影響為何。在銀行的資產配置決策內生的情形下，加入流動性覆蓋比率的限制，透過放款的勞動成本與抵押品價值來刻畫金融摩擦；本文發現當經濟體系遭受生產與放款的外生衝擊時，流動性覆蓋比率的限制會增強政策利率的信用管道效果，並且相較於無流動性覆蓋比率限制之模型而言，具流動性覆蓋比率限制的模型，其銀行資產配置的變動幅度與金融摩擦的程度皆較大。 / The main purpose of this paper is to explore the role of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) in the credit channel and how it influences the overall economy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with banking sector. Commercial banks endogenously choose their optimal portfolio of assets under the liquidity coverage ratio restriction. On the other hand, we describe the financial friction through the labor cost of making loans and collateral value. We find that when the economy is exposed to exogenous shocks in production and lending, the liquidity coverage ratio will enhance the effect of credit channel. Compared with the model with no LCR restriction, the degree of change of the bank asset allocation and the financial friction are larger in the model with LCR restriction.

No description available.

Pour le superviseur, une approche historique de la banque permet de mieux assimiler ses modes de fonctionnement. Elle sert aussi à mieux comprendre pourquoi ses acteurs, toujours dotés, à raison, de la confiance indispensable au développement des affaires, font preuve parfois d’un sur-optimisme conduisant à leur ruine. La mobilisation du droit : telle est ce qui guide l’action du contrôleur de banque. La dernière crise financière a provoqué une prise de conscience en Europe : l’impossibilité pour chaque pays membre de l’Union d’exercer individuellement une surveillance efficace sans une harmonisation totale. Ainsi est née l’idée puis la construction du MSU. Centralisée à Francfort, la supervision unique est en place depuis le 4 novembre 2014. Mais sa feuille de route porte sur un champ plus diversifiable encore. Par construction, le MSU possède les qualités d’efficacité et de pérennité requises. Mais aura-t-il la volonté de contribuer à la transformation de toute l’Union européenne en zone de supervision optimale ? / For the supervisor, an historical approach of banks allows to better assimilate its ways of functioning. She also serves to better understand why her actors, always endowed of the confidence to develop business, sometimes, show an over-optimism leading to their ruin. The mobilization of the law guides the action of the banking control. The 2007-2008 crisis has provoked awareness in Europe: the impossibility for every member state of the Union to exercise individually an effective supervision without a total harmonization. So was born the construction of the MSU. Located in Frankfurt, the “supervision unique” has been working since November 4th, 2014. But the road map assigned to the supervision a new and more diversifiable field. For sure, the MSU is skilled enough, but is there a will to change the European Union into a “zone de supervision optimale”?

1 Abstract This work deals with the performance of supervision over the financial market and the entities operating in the financial market. Part of the work is devoted to consumer protection in the financial market and compensation systems. Because of the fact that the Czech Republic became a member of the European Union in 2004, this work includes also legislation of regulation and supervision of this level, as this treatment significantly predetermines Czech adjustment. Following questions were examined as an example of protecting the interests of clients of supervised entities: - whether there are any tools to protect the client's interests at the level of supervised entities, - what kind of role the supervisory authority has or may have in relation between a supervised entity and its client, - how are the client's financial interests protected in the event of failure of the supervised entity and whether this protection is de lege lata sufficient. The theoretical part of the work briefly describes the institute of supervision, its assorting and forms. The authority of supervisor is discussed in the next part together with the regulations under which the supervision is conducted. Owing to the fact that the scope of supervisory activity of the Czech National Bank is quite extensive, and the objective of...

Notre thèse consiste à expliquer, en apportant quelques éléments théoriques, les imperfections des stress tests macro-prudentiels d’EBA/BCE, et de proposer une nouvelle méthodologie de leur application ainsi que deux stress tests spécifiques en complément. Nous montrons que les stress tests macro-prudentiels peuvent être non pertinents lorsque les deux hypothèses fondamentales du modèle de base de Gordy-Vasicek utilisé pour évaluer le capital réglementaire des banques en méthodes internes (IRB) dans le cadre du risque de crédit (portefeuille de crédit asymptotiquement granulaire et présence d’une seule source de risque systématique qui est la conjoncture macro-économique), ne sont pas respectées. Premièrement, ils existent des portefeuilles concentrés pour lesquels les macro-stress tests ne sont pas suffisants pour mesurer les pertes potentielles, voire inefficaces si ces portefeuilles impliquent des contreparties non cycliques. Deuxièmement, le risque systématique peut provenir de plusieurs sources ; le modèle actuel à un facteur empêche la répercussion propre des chocs « macro ».Nous proposons un stress test spécifique de crédit qui permet d’appréhender le risque spécifique de crédit d’un portefeuille concentré, et un stress test spécifique de liquidité qui permet de mesurer l’impact des chocs spécifiques de liquidité sur la solvabilité de la banque. Nous proposons aussi une généralisation multifactorielle de la fonction d’évaluation du capital réglementaire en IRB, qui permet d’appliquer les chocs des macro-stress tests sur chaque portefeuille sectoriel, en stressant de façon claire, précise et transparente les facteurs de risque systématique l’impactant. Cette méthodologie permet une répercussion propre de ces chocs sur la probabilité de défaut conditionnelle des contreparties de ces portefeuilles et donc une meilleure évaluation de la charge en capital de la banque. / Our thesis consists in explaining, by bringing some theoretical elements, the imperfections of EBA / BCE macro-prudential stress tests, and proposing a new methodology of their application as well as two specific stress tests in addition. We show that macro-prudential stress tests may be irrelevant when the two basic assumptions of the Gordy-Vasicek core model used to assess banks regulatory capital in internal methods (IRB) in the context of credit risk (asymptotically granular credit portfolio and presence of a single source of systematic risk which is the macroeconomic conjuncture), are not respected. Firstly, they exist concentrated portfolios for which macro-stress tests are not sufficient to measure potential losses or even ineffective in the case where these portfolios involve non-cyclical counterparties. Secondly, systematic risk can come from several sources; the actual one-factor model doesn’t allow a proper repercussion of the “macro” shocks. We propose a specific credit stress test which makes possible to apprehend the specific credit risk of a concentrated portfolio, as well as a specific liquidity stress test which makes possible to measure the impact of liquidity shocks on the bank’s solvency. We also propose a multifactorial generalization of the regulatory capital valuation model in IRB, which allows applying macro-stress tests shocks on each sectorial portfolio, stressing in a clear, precise and transparent way the systematic risk factors impacting it. This methodology allows a proper impact of these shocks on the conditional probability of default of the counterparties of these portfolios and therefore a better evaluation of the capital charge of the bank.