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Ce mémoire de maitrise s’intéresse à l’être-vers-la-mort dans Être et temps de Heidegger afin de montrer dans quelle mesure la pensée heideggérienne de la mort peut être comprise comme une manière d’affirmer la vie. En effet, une réflexion dirigée sur la mort permet à la réalité humaine de se comprendre à partir de la fin, selon sa finitude. C’est une caractéristique de la réalité humaine que d’être toujours « en devenir », la mort étant la possibilité limite qui vient mettre fin à ce caractère de possible. Une telle compréhension de soi permet alors le dévoilement de l’ensemble des possibilités de la vie en vue de la fin. Il s’agit de se comprendre et de comprendre nos possibilités pour ce qu’elles sont, c’est-à-dire finies. Dès lors, leur sens se trouve transformé, voire révélé. L’inauthenticité et l’authenticité sont pour Heidegger les deux façons d’affronter la mort, deux manières de vivre sa finitude. C’est dans l’authenticité que la réalité humaine sera elle-même et pourra vivre dans la pleine conscience de sa finitude. Il reste que la réalité humaine est d’abord et le plus souvent inauthentique. Ce mémoire se proposera donc en un premier temps de présenter ces deux modes d’être et de compréhension de l’être-là de la réalité humaine et accordera, en un deuxième temps, une attention particulière aux concepts d’angoisse et de fuite. La trajectoire suivra celle des paragraphes 46 à 54 d’Être et temps consacrés à l’être-vers-la-mort. La tâche finale sera de montrer en quoi une pensée de la mort permet de voir dans une nouvelle affirmation de la vie la conséquence d’un être-vers-la-mort authentique. / This master’s thesis examines being-towards-death in Heidegger’s Being and Time in order to show to what extent the Heideggerian thought of death can be understood as a way of affirming life. Indeed, a reflection directed towards death allows human reality to be understood from its end, i.e., according to its finitude. It is a characteristic of human reality to always be "in the making", death being the limiting possibility which puts an end to this character of possibility. Such an understanding of oneself then allows the unveiling of the full range of possibilities of life with a view to the end. It is about understanding ourselves and our possibilities for what they are, that is, limited and finite. Consequently, their meaning is transformed, even revealed. Inauthenticity and authenticity are for Heidegger the two ways of facing death, two ways of experiencing one’s finitude. It is in authenticity that human reality will be itself and can live in full awareness of its finitude. On the other hand, human reality is initially inauthentic. This thesis will therefore start by recalling the basic characteristics of these two modes of being and of understanding the being of human reality and will then pay particular attention to the concepts of anxiety and flight. The trajectory will follow that of paragraphs 46 to 54 of Being and Time devoted to Being-towards-death. The final task will be to show how a thought of death makes it possible to see in a new affirmation of life the consequence of an authentic being-towards-death.

This study explores the intersection of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Spanish literature. The study examines the Heideggerian authenticity and inauthenticity of two characters in the literature: Melibea in La Celestina by Fernando de Rojas and Grisóstomo in Don Quijote de la Mancha by Miguel de Cervantes. Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is the ability of the individual to live in the world according to her own desires, outside of the influence of others. Both die by suicide, but Melibea is an authentic character in Heideggerian terms and Grisóstomo is inauthentic. At the end of her life, Melibea has resolved all anxiety into resoluteness and is determined to live life in her own terms. Grisóstomo, however, dies inauthentically, full of anxiety and subject to the will of Others. He never leaves the influence of others to live a life of his own determination.

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This paper considers the way Herbert Marcuse’s re-formulation of the instrumental reason as a technical reason can be understood as an intensification or acceleration of some of the themes presented by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer in The Dialectics of Enlightenment. By reading Marcuse´s The One-Dimensional Man in dialogue with Martin Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, the paper explores a thesis that Marcuse draws on concepts from Heidegger, especially Ge-stell and Bestand, in his notion of the “technical reason” and “technological rationality” to think and think beyond modern technology. By positing modern technology as the focal point of the instrumentalization of reason, Marcuse sheds light of historical and contemporary problems with human thinking. The staging of this conversation with Marcuse and Heidegger that never really took place allows the paper to fully explore and understand Marcuse’s invoking of the aesthetical dimension, as well as his re-appropriation of Freudian terminology, as a model to re-establish negative thinking as a necessary counteraction to the one-dimensional positive thinking that is dominating private and public sphere.

This dissertation is an empirically responsive philosophical exploration into the incorporation of technological tools within a framework comprising the structures of experience laid out in the early phenomenological tradition and an analysis of agency drawing from the analytical tradition. Technological tools have become so deeply integrated in our lives that they function like a part of us, transforming what we feel we can do and even who we are. Although new spaces of autonomous agency have been opened up, since the inner workings of technological tools can remain invisible, we risk diminishing our own capacities. Since we are fundamentally embedded in the world, we cannot understand ourselves without reference to the world and we cannot understand the world without reference to the way we are. The uniqueness involved in our use of technological tools grows out of a more primordial uniqueness that makes technological tool use possible and sets us apart from our closest evolutionary relatives. Several animals extend their physical influence on the environment by means of tools. We humans, however, use tools to extend our cognitive abilities as well. And since the computer is the most universal human tool, which can be put to sensorimotor and cognitive purposes alike, we take the computer to be...

Tato diplomová práce předkládá podrobnou interpretaci koncepce základních nálad v Heideggerově fundamentální ontologii. Postup napříč klíčovými texty (Bytí a čas, Co je Metafyzika? a Základní pojmy metafyziky) sleduje vývoj této koncepce a zachycuje ji v její často přehlížené členitosti. Důraz je proto kladen na odlišné role různých základních nálad a na exkluzivní postavení úzkosti jako "nejzákladnější" základní nálady. Centrální tezí práce je, že úzkost představuje klíč k Heideggerově celkovému pojetí naladěnosti i k výkladu ostatních základních nálad, zejména hluboké nudy. Předvedení úzkosti jako exkluzivní základní nálady zároveň nabízí cestu k samotnému jádru Heideggerova myšlení - k problému bytí. Klíčová slova Martin Heidegger, rozpoložení, základní nálady, Grundstimmungen, latentní úzkost, explicitní úzkost, hluboká nuda, rozumění bytí, bytí jako možnost, nic, každodennost, autenticita, neautenticita Abstract This master thesis offers a detailed interpretation of the concept of fundamental attunements in Heidegger' s fundamental ontology. Progression through the key texts (Being and Time, What is Metaphysics? and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics) retraces the evolution of this concept and captures its often overlooked complex structure. This account emphasizes the different roles of...

The Rights of Nature movement is a quickly growing global phenomenon. However, it is not always obvious what the movement really means. What is its underlying experience? How can its transformative depth be formulated? What is the meaning of this depth? Starting from the ‘Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth’ this essay seeks to elucidate the ontological meaning of these questions through attending to the possible relation of the Rights of Nature movement to Heidegger’s turning toward Parmenides, in the sense of ‘primordial thinker’, or ‘essential thinker’, that is, a thinker who in an essential way thinks the origin as such. This ‘origin’ will be dealt with in relation to the oikos of ecology. In other words ‘essential thinking’ will be brought forward as a thinking that essentially makes possible the mindful awareness of this oikos, this ‘home’, ‘house’, ‘abode’, or ‘place of dwelling’. A chief point of the essay is that an essential experience of this oikos is necessary if the ontological implications of the Rights of Nature movement is to be disclosed.

I offer a cloud of observations about language and art. I will prioritize my questions about how language operates in art, the way it functions within my own studio practice, and locate aesthetic interstices throughout. There will be insights gleaned from the various orderers of order (Lacan, Saussure) and orderers of disorder (Derrida, Agamben), walks in terra-incognita, and even some poetry on my part. I will take this chance to orient myself among different structures and deconstructions that have piledup around language, aesthetics and art.

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