Multi-target incentive contracts are widely observed in practice to stimulate salesforce effort. However, little is known about their effectiveness and the issues involved in designing them. In this thesis, we investigate the incentive contracting problem between a manufacturer and an agent when the realized sales of a product are affected by both the agent's selling effort and the type of the agent. The agent's type is uncertain to the manufacturer, whereas the agent can observe the actual type when exerting her selling effort. Again, this is unobservable by the manufacturer. For contract design problem, we develop a principal-agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We examine the manufacturer's optimal contract parameter decisions employing a single multi-target contract for the agent who can be of different types. Because menu contracts are commonly studied in literature for the adverse selection problem, we also study a menu of single-target contracts; and examine the manufacturer's optimal contract parameter decisions. We then compare the performance between the two types of contract. We arrive at a number of managerial insights regarding the design and the performance of multi-target contract and menu contract.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第22948号 / 経博第623号 / 新制||経||294(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 諸富 徹, 教授 矢野 剛, 教授 劉 徳強 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DFAM

(angl.) The diploma thesis covers placing public orders, which represent a large amount of expenses of the public sector - approximately 14% GDP in the Czech Republic. In detail, it focuses on the area of ICT, which is often mentioned in context with overpriced orders. The goal of the thesis is to analyze processes of placing orders in public sector via comparison and qualitative interviews with adequate respondents. Based on the outcomes of the analysis, there are proposed possible new system solutions. The work also deals with applicability of the Agency theory in this particular area.

In this paper, we explore drivers and mitigators of agency conflicts inherent in the fund manager-fund investor relationship through the lens of the principal-agent model. By engaging in abductive qualitative research, we apply both deductive and inductive inquiry to complement and extend previous literature with insights from parties directly involved in the Swedish mutual fund market. Hence, data is collected from eight semi-structured interviews with four senior fund managers, three institutional investors and one fund investment association, all operating in Sweden. The results of the study show that agency conflicts and mitigators found in previous studied principal-agent settings are also in large part found in the fund manager-fund investor setting in Sweden. However, this study has extended previous research by generating knowledge about drivers and mitigators of agency conflict found in the real world, which have been left unexplored in previous studies.

Share-based incentive programs have become increasingly common in Sweden. At the same time, there is criticism of whether these have a positive effect on companies or not. The programs are intended to solve the so-called principal-agent problem, which arises when the ownership and control in a company are separated. Share-based incentive programs are intended to solve this dilemma by making the employees who participate in the program’s shareholders of the company. This study has examined whether share-based incentive programs benefit the companies’ shareholders. The study investigates this by using a first-difference method, based on the publicly traded companies at Nasdaq Stockholm. The study takes support from the principal-agent theory, the managerial power theory, and other studies within the field. The result from the study shows that there is no significant difference between the companies that use the share-based incentive programs and the companies that do not. Based on this result, it is concluded that share-related incentive programs do not benefit shareholders. / Aktierelaterade incitamentsprogram blir allt vanligare i Sverige. Samtidigt finns det kritik mot huruvida dessa har en positiv effekt för företag eller inte. Programmen är tänkta att lösa det så kallad agentproblemet, som uppstår när ägandet och kontrollen i företag är separerade. Aktierelaterade incitamentsprogram är tänkta att lösa detta dilemma genom att göra de anställda som deltar i programmen till aktieägare i företaget. Denna studie har därför valt att undersöka huruvida aktierelaterade incitamentsprogram gynnar bolagets aktieägare. Studien undersöker detta genom att använda sig av en first-difference metod som baseras på bolagen på Stockholmsbörsen. Studien tar stöd från agentteorin, managerial power teorin samt tidigare forskning inom området. Resultatet från studien visar att det inte finns någon signifikant skillnad mellan bolagen som använder sig av de aktierelaterade incitamentsprogrammen och bolagen som inte använder sig av programmen. Utifrån detta resultat dras slutsatsen att aktierelaterade incitamentsprogram inte gynnar aktieägare.

This study explores the impact of ESG Scores on firm performance and seeks to establish whether the impact increased since the 2008 financial crisis. This is done by performing regressions on ESG Scores, and the respective pillars of Environmental, Social, and Governance, and firm performance, measured as both accounting-based performance, using ROA, and market-based performance, using Tobin’s Q. The study adopts a quantitative approach, utilising a random-effects model to analyse panel data across two sample periods - a pre-crisis period, from 2003-2006, and a post-crisis period, from 2010-2019. In addition, t-tests were performed to see if the impact changed significantly from the pre-crisis to post-crisis period. The study analyses data from 218 firms from the STOXX Europe 600 index, with four smaller sub-samples. The results indicate that ESG Scores have a positive impact on firm performance, with market-based firm performance being significantly correlated both before and after the crisis. Accounting-based performance, however, was only significantly correlated with ESG Scores before the crisis. In addition, the Environmental pillar was positively correlated with both measures of performance before and after the crisis, and the same was true for the Social pillar, except for with post-crisis accounting-based performance. Interestingly, the Governance pillar was not significantly correlated with performance in any of the regressions. Finally, while the average ESG Score among the observed companies increased in the post-crisis period, the impact of ESG performance on firm performance did not change significantly. The results of this study are supportive of the stakeholder theory perspective over the principal-agent theory, and show that ESG performance does indeed positively impact firm performance. Future research could explore whether other events have played a significant role in the rising importance of ESG, or if the results of the present study can be replicated across different time periods and geographical regions.

Studien tog avstamp i revisionsreformen 2010, som har inneburit att företag under satta gränsvärden frivilligt kunde välja revision eller avstå revision. Syftet med studien var att undersöka efterfrågan på revision hos mikrobolag genom en kvantitativ undersökning av dess karaktärsdrag. Teoretiska referensramen består av agentteori, informationsassymetri och intressentteori kopplat till området frivillig revision. Vidare baserades studien på tidigare forskning som undersökt efterfrågan genom karaktärsdrag i andra länder. De karaktärsdrag denna studie fokuserade på är storlek och agentkostnad, företagsrisk, beroendeställning till leverantör och kreditvärdighet. Genom en kvantitativ dokumentär metod samlades data in i form av årsredovisningar genom databasen Retriever Business. Data analyserades därefter genom deskriptiv statistik, Pearssons korrelationsmatris samt binär logistisk regression. Studiens resultat visar att det enbart går att finna signifikanta resultat kopplat till agentkostnader. Det finns en korrelation mellan flertalet variabler dock i regressionen är det endast för agentkostnader som resultatet var signifikant. Utifrån resultatet kunde två hypoteser styrkas och det går att dra slutsatsen att företag som väljer revision har storlek och agentkostnad som gemensam faktor. Företagsrisk, beroendeställning till leverantörer och kreditvärdighet hade inga signifikanta samband påverkar troligtvis inte valet av frivillig regression.

Shortly after the February 2014 Euromaidan revolution which ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia orchestrated a rapid and mostly bloodless annexation of the Crimea. Following the removal of Ukrainian authority from the peninsula, the Kremlin focused simultaneously on legitimizing the annexation via an electoral reform in Crimea and fermenting political unrest in the Donbas. As violence broke out in the Donbas, anti-Ukrainian government militias were formed by defecting Ukrainian security forces members, local volunteers, and volunteers from Russia. The Kremlin provided extensive support for these militias which sometimes even came in the form of direct military intervention by conventional Russian forces. However, the use of state-sponsored militias by Russia is not a new phenomenon. Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation has been relying on militias to help stabilize local security environments, and more recently, achieve foreign security policy objectives in the Near Abroad. By tracking the history of Vostok (East) Battalion during its two distinctly different iterations, first as a militia for the Yamadayev family which operated primarily in Chechnya as well as briefly in South Ossetia and Lebanon and then as separatist formation in Eastern Ukraine, my thesis seeks to examine why Russia uses militias. Using the theoretical frameworks of principle-agent relations and organizational hierarchy, my thesis examines post-Soviet military reforms to contextualize the Kremlin's rationale for utilizing militia groups as well as analyzing the costs and benefits Moscow ultimately incurs when it leverages militias as force projection assets domestically and in the Near Abroad. / Master of Arts / This thesis is an examination of Russia’s relationship with its proxy militias. Proxy militias are paramilitary formations comprised of a mix of civilians and military veterans which states use to carry out acts of coercive violence without having to rely on regular military forces. Specifically, the thesis is divided into two case studies of a unit known as Vostok Battalion. Vostok has existed in two distinctly different iterations; first as a Chechen based militia operating throughout the Caucuses and later as a rebel militia fighting the Ukrainian government in the Donbas region. In both cases, Vostok received support and varying levels of guidance from Russia. The case studies of this thesis are attempting to contextualize why Russia utilizes proxy militias and identify the challenges Russia faces when its ability to control them is degraded.

臺北市勞動檢查處為配合近年來「宣導、檢查、輔導」三合一策略提升防災效能，自民國87年開始將檢查業務部分轉換為「自主管理」模式，並將臺北市的營建工地分級管理，依不同等級有不同的自主檢查頻率，並派員實施不同程度的稽查。 依相關自主管理計畫的規定，若某營造廠加入計畫獲得「優等」或「特優級」的認證標章，除非發生災害、遇專案檢查及市民檢舉等情形外，檢查員不主動前往實施勞動檢查，但仍由機關中技正層級以上人員組成機動小組，不定期以輔導方式實施督導；所以該營造廠只要依規定之檢查流程及制式表格填寫按時回報，就幾乎不受規範所拘束。 但是近年參加自主管理計畫的營造工地發生職業災害的頻率，並未如預期下降，不符機關績效目標；因此，本研究重點在探究勞動檢查運用自主管理政策工具績效不佳的原因，是否這些營造廠的工地在申請獲得「優等」或「特優級」認證後，負責職業安全衛生工作的人員或主管，其責任及權限的移轉後造成行為與態度轉趨鬆懈？ 研究結果發現在實施自主管理計畫後，在營造廠中依不同的層次有不同的結果，部分負責人確實發生了道德風險（Moral Hazard）行為，而負責職業安全衛生工作的人員，礙於利潤及工期等眾多因素，鬆懈了安全衛生工作，部份發生了道德風險行為，致未達組織預設的目標。 / Taipei Labor Inspection Office adopted a strategy that combined advocacy, inspection and counseling to enhance the effectiveness of occupational hazards prevention. Since 1998, it began to change the policy from “inspection strengthening” to “self-management”. With hierarchical management of the construction sites in Taipei according to this strategy, construction sites of different levels have different inspection frequency and different degrees of inspection. In accordance with the self-management program, if an construction site in Taipei who joined this program obtains "excellent" or "Premium Class" certification, unless occupational accident happened, or special inspection project is launched, or citizens report, or other dangerous situations occur, the inspection personnels will not do labor inspection, but will still occasionally provide unscheduled counseling by official chief. As long as the construction company fills out the report form on time according to the program of the standard inspection flow, this company is nearly unregulated. But the occupational accident rate of those sites who applied to self-management program did not fall as expected, it does not achieve the goal as set by official performance indicators; therefore, this study aims to explore the reasons why those sites who obtain "excellent" or "Premium Class" certification, have shown that their behaviors and attitudes toward occupational safety and workers’ health have become more lax after joining the program? This study found that after the implementation of self-management program, moral hazard behaviors occur in different hierarchical levels of organizations. Construction company’s directors do show moral hazard behavior, while those in charge of occupational safety and health work, some do have moral hazard behavior, out of profit motive and time concern of the construction project among many other factors. All together explains why this self-management program does not achieve the goal set by official performance indicators.

政府機關委外執行民意調查已成為民主國家治理的趨勢之一；但民意調查的高度專業性和特殊性質，導致過程中有許多「看不見的黑手」介入的機會，故如何監督、控制民調的品質以確保信效度遂成為一項重要課題。全國各級政府機關中，以台北市在委外執行民調業務上的規定最為公開、完備，不僅訂有專法，更獨步全國成立「民意調查諮詢委員會」，協助各局處在委外執行民調過程中把關調查品質、解決問題。在這種「一個委託人（委託局處）、兩個代理人（執行廠商和民調諮詢委員）」的架構之下，本研究從交易成本理論出發，探討台北市的委託局處在這套委外與審查機制下必須付出的交易成本類型、背後的影響因素、與調查品質之間的關係。 本研究深度訪談5位民調諮詢委員、5個委託局處、研考會和4家執行民調的廠商共17人次，輔以次級資料分析，發現各局處在委外執行民調過程中的作法、程序和重視程度皆不一，付出的交易成本類型眾多，其中的「事前審查成本」、「搜尋廠商成本」、「事後審查成本」、「控制成本」在邏輯關係上較能對應後續之民調品質，其多寡深受「委託局處的重視程度」、「廠商的執行能力」影響。此外，為提昇調查品質，委託局處若付出較多事前成本（包括：事前審查成本和搜尋廠商成本）後能先行把關委託局處的需求與調查規格，且規模比起事後成本（包括控制成本、事後審查成本）來說較為減少許多，對調查品質將有正面影響；若未付出事前審查成本，則需於決標後耗費更多時間、精力與資源才有辦法確保調查品質。 然而，研究結果卻顯示民調諮詢委員會不見得能達到提昇調查品質的目的，仍有執行能力不佳、圖謀不軌的廠商無法達到審查委員的要求而遭到解約。因此，本研究歸納「民調諮詢委員會」兩項主要的缺失，包括未能事前把關調查規格與執行預算之間的合理性，無法克服「逆向選擇」執行廠商的問題；加上定位不明，難以保證可以完全發揮把關之功能與職責，委託局處未必完全依照委員的意見來要求廠商修正，以致淪為無人負責的窘境。 最後，本研究提出主要的政策建議，包括研考會的角色應更加積極、強化，確立民調諮詢委員會的定位，嚴肅思考業界委員協助審查的必要性，民調諮詢委員協助審查調查案的預算編列和招標文件；委託局處需掌握整個流程和民調諮詢委員的功能，顧及調查規格和預算的合理性並不以預算為唯一考量，與民調諮詢委員、執行廠商和研考會保持密切關係。