Den här uppsatsen behandlar svensk väpnad styrka som säkerhetspolitiskt instrument.Trots ett säkerhetspolitiskt alltmer gynnsamt läge syns Sveriges vilja, förmåga och beredskap att använda de resurserFM förfogar över att öka. Vilka är de miljöer och yttre omständigheter där FM: s resurser är avsedda att utnyttjasoch hur?Syftet med uppsatsen är att finna ett mönster som gör det möjligt att formulera stöd för en tänkbar doktrin förinsats med svensk väpnad styrka i internationella insatser. Metoden för detta är att genom en kvalitativ textanalysgranska samtliga insatser som påbörjats efter det kalla krigets slut och fram till idag. Analysverktyget som användshar tagits fram för att granska utrikes- och försvarspolitiska doktriner och tjänar därför uppsatsen syfte väl.Internationella insatser är ett bra uttryck för en praktisk politik. En heltäckande och objektiv bild av en svensksäkerhetspolitisk doktrin kräver analys även av annat underlag.Undersökningen visar att det finns ett mönster i svenskt agerande. Kriser och konflikter i Europa är av strategisktintresse för Sverige medan kriser och konflikter bortom Europas gränser är av moraliskt/ideologiskt intresse förSverige. Ett grundläggande svenskt intresse är respekten för folkrätten och insatser där militärt våld krävs måstebeslutas av FN:s säkerhetsråd. Fredsframtvingande insatser skall ske i specialförband med anställda som står i högberedskap. Insatser med större förband skall ske i ett fredsbevarande syfte med frivilligt rekryterade i lägre beredskapsgradmen med längre uthållighet.En doktrin eller en policy behövs för att ta fram nödvändiga medel. Ad hoc som politisk strategi kräver outtömligaresurser för att kunna skapa många alternativa handlingsmöjligheter. / This thesis deals with using armed forces as an instrument for Swedish security policy. Participationin Peace Support Operations (PSO) under the framework of The United Nations(UN) has been a part of Swedish Foreign Affairs and Security policy since 1948. In 1993, inthe beginning of the post cold-war period, Sweden sent armed forces to a somehow differentPSO in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was in many ways a new kind of PSO acting under chapterVII of the UN Charter using all necessary means to enforce compliance with The UN SecurityCouncil Resolution. Swedish participation in a European crisis was possible due to the newpost cold-war security policy environment. Since 1993, Sweden has participated in PSO underthe command of THE UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union(EU).Post cold war security environment with no foreseeable military threat towards Sweden, hascaused a transformation of the Swedish armed forces. Today, new tasks put an emphasis onparticipation in PSO in close cooperation with other countries and organisations. Sweden hasarmed units on seven days alert to join a multinational PSO within 30 days. This means thatthe preparedness and willingness to use armed forces as an instrument for security policy hasincreased since the cold war ended. Under what conditions should this instrument be used andhow? Is it possible to track a Swedish doctrine for international operations? This inquiryanalyses the use of Swedish armed units in PSO between 1993 and 2004 on a politicalstrategiclevel.The Swedish constitution requires a decision from the parliament when Swedish armed unitsare sent abroad for more then Peace Keeping operations. Due to this fact, the use of armedforces as an instrument is subject to a parliamentary process that gives a lot of paper to analyse.The use of armed units in PSO is a good expression for practical security policy. Eventhough it is not possible to formulate a doctrine only by this inquiry it can be a building blocktogether with other inquiries. It is also worth mentioning that a doctrine like all other analysingtools is a simplification of the reality. The real use of armed forces is influenced by a lotof reasons. It is however useful to know the conditions for using armed forces in order to developthe right means to a certain policy.The tool for this inquiry has been developed by analysing foreign affairs policies and securitypolicies. A doctrine, in short, consists of three parts.The first thing is a description of what values or interests the doctrine is supposed to protect.The willingness of using armed forces needs certain interests to be at stake. What are theSwedish interests and do they have a national or an international dimension?Secondly there needs to be a description of the threats against those values and interests. Thedefinition of security and the threats to this security is in many ways contested. What is theSwedish point of view for using armed forces?Lastly a doctrine should deal with strategies for how to encounter those threats. How shouldthe use of armed units in multinational PSO be used to fulfil political and military objectiveswill therefore be the question in this inquiry?Analysing the use of armed units in PSO gives some guidelines to support the formulation ofa doctrine. The description of threats is the weakest link. This is possibly because of the difficultiesto define security and the threats to this security within the widened security agenda oftoday. This inquiry shows in a way that security and the use of armed forces to support thatsecurity is more than lack of military threats. The prevention of conflicts and crises on the European mainland is of strategic interest forSweden. Even the international law and the respect for The UN are strategic interests. Conflictsand crises in Africa and other places are to be looked upon as of moral/ideological interest.The use of armed forces implies certain risks. If the interests at stake are weak or are not sufficientto take the risk, some decision are strengthened with more or less practical interestssuch as experience for The Armed Forces or the need to show political will. Even an argumenton the need for The UN and The EU to cooperate in PSO is used as a reason for participatingin multinational operations. If Strategic interests are at stake Sweden is willing to usearmed forces for a long duration.Even if all operations have been working under the auspices of chapter VII of the UN charter,not all of them have included Peace Enforcement (PE). This is typical for what is called SecondGeneration Peace Keeping (SGPK). Although PE has been a part of the operation thetasks for Swedish units have been mostly SGPK. There are two major deviations from thispicture. In ISAF in Afghanistan, Swedish units were tasked to strengthen the security aroundKabul. This was more PE than something else. In Operation Artemis in Democratic Republicof Congo (DR Congo) Swedish units were tasked to facilitate the establishment of a UN missionin the eastern part of DR Congo. Also this operation was more PE than something else.The last one was also a EU-led operation. This could be a watershed that points out a newdirection for the use of armed forces in the framework of European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP).The use of armed forces could also be divided in Deterrence, Compellence and Brute Force.Brute Force aims at taking total control of a defined enemy and is not very common in PSO.Deterrence is supposed to prevent crises to arise or arise anew. This could be used as a meanSof prevention or in a peacekeeping situation. PE situation might need strategies for use of violence.Compellence aims to initiate target action or stop target action. The opposing actor canstop the violence by full compliance with the condition that gives the operation legitimacy.For Sweden, this condition must be a UN Security Council Resolution. Even if Swedish unitsonly in Operation Artemis and ISAF have used PE means, this tool is not abandoned. It ishowever significant that those operations were carried out by professional officers withinunits highly specialised.There is in many ways a need for clear policy lines and corresponding necessary means includingmilitary means. This is, if nothing else, the lessons learned of the Balkan crises. TheSwedish participation in PSO since the cold war could very well be the reason for EU expectingSweden to put up a Battle Group. Such a policy needs to be followed by some kind ofdoctrine. Ad hoc as policy strategy is only possible if the means to fulfil that policy allowsalmost endless amount of courses of action. This Inquiry could be a building block for such adoctrine.To conclude, this inquiry shows that small units specialised with high readiness should bedeveloped for use on the European mainland and has PE capabilities. Larger units could beput together for use in SGPK operation globally. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 02-04

Sverige har sagts ha blivit allt säkrare, säkerhetspolitiskt, under 1990-talet. Samtidigt har det, undersamma tid, talats alltmer om ett vidgat säkerhetsbegrepp. Ett sådant skulle kunna innebära enutökad flora av hot och, därmed, en potentiellt ökad osäkerhet. Denna uppsats analyserar hur densvenska riksdagens diskurs avseende statens säkerhet har utvecklats under perioden 1991-2001.Undersökningen består av en kvantitativ och en kvalitativ innehållsanalys av de regeringsförklaringaroch därpå följande partiledardebatter som avgivits under perioden. Den teori dessadokument analyseras utifrån är Buzans, Wævers och de Wildes socialkonstruktivistiska teori omett vidgat säkerhetsbegrepp och säkerhetisering av politiska frågor, ”säkerhetiseringsteorin”.Analysen visar att frågor inom de militära, ekologiska och ekonomiska områdena är säkerhetsmässigtladdade i periodens början, men att dessa områden sedan avsäkerhetiseras alltmer. Frågorinom de politiska och samhälleliga områdena får däremot ökad säkerhetsmässig laddning underperioden. Tre sakfrågor som kan illustrera detta, och som särskilt lyfts fram såsom säkerhetshotunder perioden, framtonar i den kvalitativa delen av analysen: Miljöförstöringen och Kronkriseni periodens början och Rasism/Främlingsfientlighet i dess slut. EU-medlemskapet i periodensmitt visar sig också ha stort säkerhetsmässigt genomslag. Utifrån analysen konstateras att Sverigeunder perioden har blivit säkrare avseende externa och konkreta hot men osäkrare avseende interna,mer abstrakta. Dessa hot och de åtgärder man sätter in emot dem är svårare att kvantifiera,varför Sveriges osäkerhet (eller, mer specifikt: Riksdagens upplevda osäkerhet) ur denna synvinkel,och i motsats till vad som refereras i första meningen ovan, har ökat under perioden.Avslutningsvis diskuteras två möjliga implikationer för tiden efter den studerade:antalet sakfrågor som av statsmakterna betraktas som säkerhetsfrågor kan visa sig öka och,parallellt med detta, svensk säkerhetspolitik kan visa sig få legitimeringsproblem hos folket. / Sweden has been said to have become increasingly safe, security policy-wise, during the 1990s.At the same time there has been an increased focus on a widened security concept, which couldwell mean an enlarged variety of threats and, thus, a potentially larger insecurity. This essayanalyses the evolution of the Swedish Parliament´s discourse on state security during the period1991-2001. The documentary research of the essay is carried out through a quantitative as well asa qualitative content analysis of the government declarations with their successive party leaderdebates from the period. The theoretical framework this analysis is performed within, is thesocial constructivist theory of Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde on a widened security concept and“securitization” of political issues.The analysis shows that issues within the military, ecological and economical sectors aresecurity laden at the beginning of the period but that these sectors are subsequently desecuritized.Issues within the political and societal sectors are on the other hand given an enhanced value,security wise, during the period. Three points of issue illustrating this are specifically pointed outas threats to security during the period and are, consequently, also sifted out in the qualitativepart of the analysis: The environmental pollution and the financial crisis at the beginning of theperiod and racism/xenophobia towards the end of it. The EU membership in the middle of theperiod also manifests itself as having substantial impact on security.Sweden is, in the analysis, shown to have become safer in respect of external and tangiblethreats but increasingly unsafe in respect of internal, more abstract, ones. Since these threats, andthe measures taken against them, are more difficult to quantify, Sweden’s overall security as astate (or, more specifically: the security perceived by the Parliament) from this perspective, andin contradiction to what was referred in the first sentence of this abstract, has de-creased duringthe period.Two possible future implications have, by way of conclusion, been identified:- The amount of issues that the Swedish Government authorities, in explicit terms, regard asthreats to state security may prove to increase as the definition of its reference objects widensfrom the national state and its citizens, and, parallel to this;- Swedish security policy may, for much the same reasons, get problems of legitimacy among itspeople. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

Hensikten med denne oppgaven er å undersøke i hvilken grad Norges energistrategiske betydninghar fått gjennomslag i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk etter den kalde krigen, og hvordan dette kanforklares.Norge er pr 2002 verdens sjette største oljeprodusent, og verdens tredje største oljeeksportør etterSaudi-Arabia og Russland. Norge er dessuten verdens tredje største eksportør av gass i rør, og dennorske gasseksporten utgjorde i år 2001 om lag to prosent av verdens totale gassforbruk.Denne energistrategiske betydningen har tilsynelatende ikke fått noen sentral plass i utformingenav den norske sikkerhetspolitikken, noe som med stor sannsynlighet skyldes at den norskeregjeringen bevisst har valgt å ikke sikkerhetisere den norske petroleumsproduksjonen. / This paper analyses to what extent Norwegian oil- and gas production has influencedNorwegian security policy after the cold war.As of 2002, Norway was the world's sixth largest oil producer, and the world's thirdlargest oil exporting country. Norway is one of the world's major gas producers aswell, and approximately 30% of the European Union's gas imports comes fromNorway, and for some countries as much as 40% is imported from Norway. Thisgives Norway significant influence on the international oil- and gas market.Today, no industrialised country can manage to keep up its industrial production,transport or general welfare without this energy, and there are no substitute productsavailable in the short or long term to replace oil or gas. As a major petroleumproducer, Norway is therefore in a position where it must maintain production evenin times of crisis and conflict in order to keep the European Union’s economiessolvent. Norway itself could also become involved indirectly in conflicts if one of theconflict parties wants to hurt the oil market. Norwegian petroleum installations couldbe attacked by foreign military forces or, more likely, by terrorists. Norway couldeven be faced with international political pressure to control where and when toexport its petroleum. Therefore Norway needs to take this into account whendeveloping its security policy. However, the general impression is that Norway hasn'tdone so, and the question is why.This paper clearly demonstrates that oil- and gas production has not achieved anexplicit and dominant position in Norway’s security policy. To the contrary, it washardly mentioned at all until the dramatic fall of oil prices during the winter of 1997-1998. During 1998 petroleum was widely discussed by the government, by externalagencies and individuals, but in 1999 the subject again disappeared fromgovernmental papers.The most likely explanation seems to be that the Norwegian government thinks thatthe best security policy is to focus as little attention as possible on its petroleumproduction. To defend all installations against a terrorist or military attack would beextremely difficult, and in case of a traditional military attack on Norway, NATOwould be involved anyway. In case of a terrorist seizure of an oil platform, Norwayhas a military unit trained to handle that situation. Further, the risk of anenvironmental catastrophe resulting from a terrorist attack is not as high as it mightseem at first glance. The platforms are constructed to minimize damage from firesand minor explosions, and the wells are equipped with vents to shut off oil leakage incase of emergency. Through incidents during the '70s and '80s, Norway learned thatit can cope with international political pressure by strictly keeping to a commercialpolicy in the trade of petroleum, while limiting political control to the exploitation ofthe resources.All in all, the Norwegian government has developed a security policy that focuses aslittle attention as possible on oil- and gas production, and it has maintained thatpolicy almost uninterrupted through the 1990s. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

Den övergripande frågeställningen i den här undersökningen är den om på vilket sätt realism ochliberalism kom till uttryck i den officiella politiken gentemot Irak under hösten 1990.I uppsatsen framgår att president Bush beskrev det som hände under hösten 1990 genom enkombination av både realistiskt och liberalistiskt färgade skildringar. Här framkommer också attolika sätt att lösa situationen presenterades och att dessa innehade inslag av de bådaidétraditionerna liberalism och realism. På samma sätt påvisas i uppsatsen att presidenten beskrevUSA:s roll utifrån samma typ av blandade argument.Vidare framkommer att Bush i huvudsak förhöll sig till den historiska traditionen avseendeamerikansk utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik men att han på en väsentlig punkt avvek från denna. Iuppsatsen konstateras att President Bush talade om den nya världsordningen, där USA sades ha ettledande ansvar för spridningen och försvaret av demokratisk liberalism globalt.Motivet till varför undersökningen gjorts är att slutsatserna från analysen tydligt har påvisat huramerikansk utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik under förberedelserna för Kuwaitkriget såg ut. Iuppsatsen ges prov på hur hoten mot Amerika utmålades och hur lösandet med olika medel avdessa indikerades, samt vilken roll USA uppfattats ha eller borde ha haft i det internationellasystemet. / The research aim of this study is to answer the question in which way the twopolitical traditions realism and liberalism can be identified in the speeches ofpresident George Bush prior to the first Gulf War in 1991.In focus during the analysis is the thesis provided by Mike Winnerstig in hisdoctoral essay regarding the value of the speech-act as uttered by the presidentof the United States.In order to answer the question, two different ideological traditions arepresented. The first is based on realism and the second on liberalism andidealism. These theoretical perspectives are yhen used as instruments for theanalysis of official presidential speeches regarding the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. Theperspectives are thus defined in terms of threat perceptions, means and the roleof the United States as suggested by the president. It is found that this modelprovides general explanations of how the ideological traditions are utilised inthe official rethoric of the president. By using the speech-act and theideological traditions in this way we are able to draw general and recurrentconclusions about the speeches and the official verbal politics against Iraq.The empirical findings, the qualitative analysis and the arrangement of thefindings reveal that concepts related to both analytical instruments were moreor less equally frequent of the US official position towards Iraq during thecrisis. Further the analysis showed that president Bush remained in line withhistorical american political tradition, but diverged in one important aspectfrom this. In the study it is argued that president Bush spoke of a New WorldOrder where the United States had a leading responsibility för the furtheranceand defense of democratic liberalism on a global scale.An additional analysis comparing president George Bush with former USpresidents also reveal the fact that the speeches of president Bush is in line withthe historical tradition in all but one important facet. He more frequentlyreflects a New World Order not seen in any of the speeches of hispredecessors. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

Amsterdamfördraget som trädde i kraft 1999 hade bland annat som mål att, med unionens svagaagerande på Balkan i minnet, reformera och utveckla den gemensamma utrikes- och säkerhetspolitikenskapad sex år tidigare genom Maastrichtfördraget. Denna uppsats syftar till att analysera de förändringarsom skedde i EU:s aktörskapacitet inom den andra pelaren i samband med Amsterdamfördraget samtpåvisa dessa förändringar i unionens konkreta arbete i ett fall. För detta ändamål används en modell avGunnar Sjöstedt framtagen för värdering av unionen utifrån dess strukturella förutsättningar. Detempiriska materialet utgörs till stor del av unionens officiella dokument och fördragstexter men även förområdet relevant litteratur har använts.Analysen visar på den grundproblematik som råder inom området i form av en intressekonflikt mellangemensamt agerande och medlemsländernas inflytande över förd politik. Uppsatsen lyfter fram tvåförändringar som trots denna konflikt stärkt unionens förutsättningar att agera på det internationellaplanet. Dessa är införandet av befattningen hög representant för den gemensamma utrikes- ochsäkerhetspolitiken samt ökade möjligheter till flexibilitet vid beslutsfattande. Unionens konkreta arbetehar analyseras utifrån dess agerande mot Makedonien. Här visar analysen på ett stärkt engagemang frånunionens sida där den höge representanten med sina resurser spelat en stor roll. Unionens stärkta förmågatill agerande i Makedonien måste anses som en framgång för den gemensamma utvecklingen, dockkvarstår att se om detta går att upprepa i ett större och mer komplext fall. / The Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force 1999 had as one of theobjectives, in light of the European Union’s weak actions in the Balkans, toreform and develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy that was createdsix years earlier through the Maastricht Treaty.The aim of this essay was to analyse the changes in EU’s actor capabilitywithin the second pillar as the Amsterdam Treaty came into force, as well asshowing how these changes influenced the work performed by the EU in oneparticular case. In order to achieve this, a model by Gunnar Sjöstedt was used.The model was developed to evaluate the EU based on its structuralprerequisites. The empirical material used, came, to a large extent, from theEU’s official documents and treaties, but other relevant literature within thefield has been used as well.The analysis identified the fundamental issue within this field, namely, aconflict of interest between the joint action and the member countries´influence on the policies. The essay underlined two changes which havestrengthened the EU´s prerequisites to act at the international level. These arethe appointment of a High Representative for the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy, as well as the creation of increased possibilities for flexibilityin the decision making process. The work of EU was analysed from its actionsin Macedonia which showed a strengthened engagement from its side, wherethe High Representative and its resources have played an important part. TheEU’s strengthened ability to act in Macedonia must be seen as a success for thejoint development. It remains to be seen, however, whether this can be repeatedin a bigger, more complex case. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

Dette arbeidet gransker svensk-norsk sikkerhetspolitisk, forsvarspolitisk og militært samarbeide i perioden 1945 – 2000. Sentralt i oppgaven står også de to lands forhold til EU og NATO. Siden 1949 har Norge vært medlem av NATO, mens Sverige etter den andre verdenskrig fortsatte sin nøytralitetspolitikk. Skjult foregikk det allikevel et militært samarbeide mellom landene, og oppgaven forsøker å svare på om Norge har vært en agent for Sverige i NATO. Med svensk EU-medlemskap og utviklingen av en militær kapasitet for krisehåndtering i EU, er rollene på en måte snudd. Oppgaven forsøker derfor også å svare på om Sverige har tatt på seg rollen som agent for Norge i dette arbeidet innenfor den europeiske unionen.Oppgaven avsluttes med en gjenomgang av mulige områder for fremtidig samarbeide mellom de to land på det sikkerhetspolitiske, forsvarspolitiske og militære området. / This essay focuses on the security-policy, defense-policy and military relations between Norway and Sweden during the period 1945 –2001. One of the main issues in this report is to investigate the two countries’ relations to the European Union and the NATO-alliance. Norway has been a member of NATO since 1949, while Sweden during the Cold War held on to its policy of neutrality. Nevertheless, a secret military cooperation between the two states took place, and this essay tries to find out whether Norway has been an agent for Sweden in its relations with NATO. In 1995 Sweden joined the European Union and has, as a member of the EU, worked hard to create a military crisis-management capability within the union. This signifies that the roles of the two Nordic countries has somewhat changed. Sweden is today a member of the EU, and Norway is not. This report also tries to investigate whether Sweden has taken the role as an agent for Norway in the Common Security and Defense Policy within the EU. I have found out that there has been a close connection between Norway and Sweden during the Cold War. Norway has helped Sweden in its efforts to prepare for western military support, in case of a military crisis or war in the northern parts of Europe. Nevertheless, I cannot characterize Norway as an agent. In the case of Sweden as an agent for Norway, my conclusions are the same: I have not found any evidence that Sweden wants to fill the role as a liaison between Norway and the EU.The third part of this essay focuses on the future, and what possible future relations I can foresee in the defense sector relating the two countries. My conclusions are that there are many functional areas in which the Nordic countries can cooperate, especially within the business of peacekeeping operations. The already existing “Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support” will probably function as the core for future joint military effort and cooperation between Norway and Sweden. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 99-01

Uppsatsen analyserar om perioden 1992-2001 kännetecknades av jämvikt eller förändring avseende Sverigesinternationella engagemang. Syftet med uppsatsen är att belysa hur den svenska inställningen till den internationellatjänsten har utvecklats under perioden 1992-2001.Problemformulering:- Vad kännetecknade perioden 1992-2001 avseende Sveriges internationella engagemang.Som ett led till att finna svar på problemformuleringen kommer jag att använda mig av följande delfrågor:- Vilken var Sveriges ståndpunkt till internationell verksamhet under de tre försvarsbeslutsperioderna 1992-2001?- Vilka avvikelser och likheter mellan perioder kan påvisas?- Vilka större förändringar har skett från Försvarsbeslutet 1992 till regleringsbrevet 2001?Författaren kommer att jämföra den svenska säkerhetspolitiska inställningen vid tiden för tre olika Försvarsbeslut1992, 1996 och 2000 och tillsammans med regleringsbreven från 1994, 1997 och 2001 komma fram till dels vilkenståndpunkt Sverige intog under respektive period och dels vilka likheter och olikheter som finns.Uppsatsens svar på problemställningen och de viktigaste sluts atserna är att:Det har funnits överensstämmelse mellan policydokumenten inom och mellan perioderna. Det finns en tydlig tendenstill utvidgning av Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska intresse, från norra Europa, till internationellt och till globalt. Underperioden skjuts också fokus från Mellanöstern och mellanstatliga konflikter till Europa och inomstatliga konflikter.Det säkerhetspolitiska hotet utökades från att enbart varit militärt till att även gälla global demokrati och hot mot vårtsamhälles funktioner. Det har under hela perioden skett en utökning av Sveriges ambitionsnivå, denna har dock intealltid effektualiserats. Det har under perioden skett en förskjutning från nationell nivå till en acceptans av ett meröverstatligt inflytande.Det finns en tydlig tendens till ökande ambitioner vad avser Försvarsmaktens internationella förmåga, frånfredsbevarande i FN: s regi till fredsframtvingande operationer tillsammans med andra länder. Även om det underperioden skett förändringar så har dessa hela tiden gått i riktning mot ökad internationalisering och det har inte funnitsnågra accentuerade policysvängningar inom den undersökta perioden. Detta talar för att perioden har kännetecknats avett ”jämviktsförhållande”. / The essay will analyse if the period 1992-2001 is characterised by equilibrium or changesbecause of Swedish international involvement. The purpose of the essay is to highlight how theSwedish political attitude has developed during the year 1992-2001.Questions:- What characterised the period 1992-2001 and how did this affect Swedish internationalcommitment?As a way of answering this, it is separated into the following parts:- What point of view did Sweden take during the three defence periods?- What similarities and differences can be shown?- What major changes have occurred between the defence period 1992 and the Letter ofRegulation 2001?The author will compare the Swedish view of security defence policy at the time of threedifferent defence periods 1992, 1996 and 2000, together with the Letter of Regulation from1994, 1997 and 2001. This is done in order to clarify what point of view the Swedishgovernment claimed to have during these periods and what similarities and differences therewere to be found.The result of the questions and the most significant conclusions are as follows:There has been agreement between the policy documents within and between periods. Therehas been a significant tendency to enlarge Sweden’s security interest area from the north ofEurope to the whole of Europe and globally. During the mentioned periods, focus is movedfrom the Middle East and conflicts between states towards Europe and conflicts within states.The security political threat has enlarged from being just a military one to encompassing evenglobal democracy and becoming a threat to our society’s functions. During the entire periodthere has been an enlargement of Sweden’s level of ambition, though it has not always beenfulfilled. During the named period a displacement from national level towards moresupranational influence has occurred.There is a significant tendency towards growing ambitions regarding the Swedish Defenceinternational capacity, from peacekeeping in the name of UN towards peace enforcementoperations together with other countries. Even if changes occurred during the mentionedperiods, these changes have followed the same direction towards increasing internalisation andthere have not been any accentuated policy changes during this era. This is strong evidence thatthe period was characterised by a state of equilibrium. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02

EU bruker stadig mer energi, spesiellt olje og gass, og må stadig øke importen.Organisasjonens egen produksjon er ikke tilstrekkelig til å dekke energibehovet.Russland og Norge er noen av de største eksportlandene av petroleum til EU.Oppgaven er å analysere energipolitikken som EU fører mot Russland og Norge.Som en følge av energipolitikken som EU fører mot disse to landene er detinteressant å se hvilke sikkerhetsmessige konsekvenser/forhold dette eventueltforårsaker innen triangelet EU, Russland og Norge. / European Union consumes increasingly more and energy, particularly oil and gas. Afollowing consequence is larger imports of these sources of energy. The organisationsown production does not satisfy the need of this vital energy.This article will focus on and analyse the EU energy policy towards Russia andNorway. Due to the organisations policy towards these countries, interesting pointsare the following consequences this makes inside the triangle, EU, Russia andNorway / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02

I uppsatsen presenterar författaren hur US Grand Strategy förändrats som en följd avterrorattackerna mot USA den 11 september 2001. Författaren pekar vidare påalternativa utvecklingsmöjligheter för US Grand Strategy och prövar om traditionellaanalysmodeller fortfarande är tillämpliga för att beskriva vägval för amerikanskutrikes och säkerhetspolitik. / This essay aims to highlight possible developments for US Grand Strategy, as a resultof the terror events occurring September 11 2001. To reach this aim I am going topresent how US Grand Strategy has developed since September 11, and I also goingto present the strategy existing today. The aim is also to see if traditional analyticmodelsstill are working to demonstrate alternative US Grand Strategies.The empirical materials that are used in this essay are mostly speeches and documentsfrom people, who are representing the official US foreign and security-policy.For the analytic part in the essay, I have used two different analytic-models todescribe changes in US Grand Strategy. The first one is a model that Alexander Nachthas developed, and that one is described in the summer edition 1995 of WashingtonQuarterly. The second model is the one by Lars Maddox, which are described in “USGrand strategy Alternatives – After the Cold War”.I can establish the fact that US grand Strategy has changed since the attacks againstUS occurred September 11. The strategy today is more firm and unilateral in itscharacter, compared to the strategy dominated the period before September 11, andalso if we compares it with the Clinton-administration strategy.I establish the fact that there is more than one possible way for US grand Strategy todevelop. The development is very depended of how the scenario in the rest of theworld is developing, and especially how the crisis in the Middle East is going todevelop. The most likely as I see it is that US are going to draw nearer to a moremultilateral approach than the approach existing today.Multilateral organizations, coalition-partners and allies are the best and most longtermsolution to increase safety for US.I also notice that the existing analytic-models still are function to describe alternativechoices for US Grand strategies. But there is a need to develop those models, so theybetter mirror and describe the complex world, which foreign and security-policy iscomposed of. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02

I denna uppsats studeras fransk hållning till europeiskt respektive transatlantiskt säkerhetssamarbeteefter kalla kriget. Analysen görs utifrån ett institutionalistiskt perspektiv där en eventuell växelverkanmellan fransk statsstrategi och EU respektive NATO eftersöks. I den valda metoden delas franskstatsstrategi upp i perioder och jämförs med viktigare fördrag (motsv.) inom NATO respektive EUssäkerhetssamarbete. I studien söks också karaktäristiken på fransk säkerhetspolitiks förhållande tilleuropeiskt säkerhetssamarbete.I studien konstateras att Frankrike varit drivande i utvecklingen av EUs säkerhetssamarbete och attden ömsesidiga påverkan mellan EU och fransk strategi verkar ha tilltagit under det senaste decenniet.Vidare konstateras att framgångsrika initiativ verkar vara beroende av en god relation till Tyskland ellerStorbritannien.Frankrike verkar också ha närmat sig NATO-samarbetet fram till 1997 då närmandena verka haavstannat. Genom det ökade deltagandet verkar dock Frankrike ha högre inflytande över NATO-beslutenän tidigare. Ytterligare närmanden synes vara starkt sammanknippade med franska krav på eneuropeisering av NATOs kommandostruktur.Författaren bedömer att fransk strategi syftar till att stärka EU-samarbetet och genom detta etableraen starkare europeisk pelare inom NATO samt att göra NATO till en organisation som suddar ut dengamla blockuppdelningen i Europa. / The aim of this essay is to analyse the French relation to European andTransatlantic co-operation. A theory of institutionalism is used to support analysiswhich focuses on if and how French security policy and EU or NATO treatieseffect each other during the years of 1989-2001.In order to achieve the objective, questions are posed about if and how theFrench relation to European and Transatlantic security co-operation have changedafter the cold war. Questions are also posed about the characteristics of Frenchpolicy towards security co-operation within EU and NATO.The analyse shows that France have played a major role in the EU securityco-operation development and that the French policy and the EU decisions effecton each other is escalating. It also shows that progress within EU security cooperationseems to bee connected to French relations towards Germany and GreatBritain.France also seems to have taken serious steps towards NATO co-operationup to 1997, after which the progress seems to stop. Through the higher degree ofparticipation France has achieved greater influence over NATO decisions thanbefore. Further steps towards NATO co-operation is probably strongly connectedto French demands on a stronger European position within NATO commandstructure.The writer estimates that French strategy aims on strengthening EU securityco-operation and thereby establishing a stronger European pillar within NATO.Further on it may also aim on developing NATO into a pan-Europeanorganisation which prevents a new block division in Europe. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02