Cette recherche porte sur le moment où la philosophie de Francis Hutcheson, dans ses aspects moraux, épistémologiques et juridiques, contribue à élaborer des questionnements et des solutions innovantes et pratiques, pour le traitement des problèmes de la politique moderne. Pour répondre à la question « Qu’est-ce que la politique du sens moral ? », il faut considérer qu’il existe un sens de la moralité naturel, immédiat et involontaire chez chaque individu. Ce sens est le critère de jugement de l’action politique la meilleure, selon deux objectifs : le maintien de la paix et de l’harmonie sociale et la poursuite du bonheur, soit du plus grand bien pour le plus grand nombre. Même si les individus ne peuvent pas toujours agir par le meilleur moyen en vue d’une fin politique et éthique, tous sont aptes à juger de ce qu’il convient de faire. La politique du sens moral considère ainsi 1. Comment l’état de nature est un état de liberté où une sociabilité naturelle est décrite, indépendamment de la création des institutions civiles et politiques et aussi, quelles sont les conditions de retour à un tel état, à partir de l’éducation morale et politique ? Comment la société civile et le gouvernement se mettent en place avec un consentement, soit un artifice. 3. Enfin, comment la protection des droits inaliénables peut être assurée avec le concept de responsabilité politique, impliquant le risque pour sa vie en faveur de l’intérêt commun. / This study focuses on the moment when Francis Hutcheson’s philosophy, in its moral, epistemological and legal aspects, contributes to elaborating questionings and innovative practical solutions to deal with the issues of modern politics. To answer the question “What is the politics of moral sense?”, it must be considered that each individual possesses a natural, immediate and involuntary sense of morality. This moral sense is the criterion of judgement of the best political action depending on two aims: preservation of peace and social harmony; and the pursuit of happiness, that is, the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Even if individuals are not always able to act with the best means for a political and ethical purpose, all are able to judge what should be done. The politics of moral sense considers 1. How the state of nature is a state of liberty where a natural sociability is described, independently of the creation of civil and political institutions; and in parallel, what are the conditions of a return to such a state, based on a moral and political education. 2. How civil society and government are created with trust, or in other words, with an artifice. 3. Finally, how the protection of inalienable rights can be guaranteed with the concept of political responsibility, involving risking one’s life in support of the common interest. / Esta pesquisa se situa onde a filosofia de Francis Hutcheson, nos seus aspectos morais, epistemologicos e juridicos, contribui a elaborar questionamentos e soluçoes inovadoras e prâticas, para o tratamento dos problemas da politica moderna. Para responder à questào « o que é a politica do senso moral ? », deve-se considerar que existe um senso da moralidade natural, imediato e involontârio em cada indivfduo. Este senso é o critério de julgamento da melhor açào politica, segundo dois objetivos : a manutençao da paz e da hannonia social e a persecuçào da felicidade, quai seja o maior bem para o maior nùmero. Mesmo se os individuos nem sempre podem agir pelo melhor meio em vista de um firn politico e ético, todos estào aptos a julgar acerca do que comvém fazer. A politica do senso moral considera assim : 1. Como o estado de natureza é um estado de libertdade, no quai uma sociabilidade natural esta configurada, independentemente da criaçào das instituiçoes civis e politicas e igualmente, quais sào as condiçoes para retorno a tal estado, a partir da educaçào moral e politica. 2. Corno a sociedade civil e o governo ocupam seu lugar com um consentimento, ou seja, um artiffcio. 3. Enfim, como a proteçào dos direitos inalienâveis pode ser assegurada corn o conceito de responsabilidade politica, implicando atTiscar sua vida em favor do interesse comum.

Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. Philosophy

This work deals with the different concepts of justice that are presented by works of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Seeing that they are liberal authors, the first chapter is devoted to liberalism and its forms. Rawls is presented as a supporter of modern liberalism and Nozick is presented as a representative of classical liberalism, concretely libertarianism. The second chapter discusses how both authors describe natural state. The third chapter is devoted to it how Rawls and Nozick talk about conception of liberty. The following chapter describes and compares their theories of justice: justice as fairness and justice as entitlement. The fifth chapter deals with the final reflection on the theories of both authors. There are presented various reactions and interpretations of the mentioned theories. At the same time, there is shown considerable asset of Rawls?s Theory of Justice and Nozick?s Anarchy, State and Utopia which both influenced political-philosophical discussion.

Dissertation in political science, C-level by Niklas Andersson, Spring Semester 2009. Tutor: Arne Larsson “The Treaty of Lisbon – The Defence against Globalization?” In the modern world globalization have undermined the nation-state and left it without the right measurements to adequately deal with the social and economic unrest that follows in its way. The states, built on contract theories, have an obligation to protect its citizens from the state of nature which seems to have failed as globalization has changed the rules. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls to identify the elements of a state and create a modern and ideal contract theory. The treaty shall then be used on the Treaty of Lisbon as it can be seen as a contract between the European states to create an entity in the shape of the European Union with the power to defend Europe from the unrest created by globalization. My question for this was as follows: Is the new treaty for the European Union acceptable as a new social contract according to the social contract theories? During my research the following criteria’s for a social contract was found: 1. A legislative branch 2. An executive branch 3. A judicial branch 4. The Right to taxation 5. A centralized educational system 6. The right to property 7. Equalizing redistribution system 8. The right to leave the contract. The first four is essential in creating a state and are the primary criteria’s for its existence while the other four is determining the character of the state that is created and are therefore not essential in the creation of the state and are consequently secondary criteria’s in a states creation. The answer to the question is no, as the Treaty of Lisbon first of all don’t give the Union the right of taxation on its citizens and secondly, the Union are not given the mandate to act for an educational or an equalizing redistributive system. Without these criteria’s the EU don’t have the possibility to quickly act on its own to deal with urgent problems that rises from the negative aspects of globalization. / Statsvetenskaplig uppsats, C-nivå av Niklas Andersson, Vårterminen 2009. Handledare: Arne Larsson "Lissabonfördraget - Försvaret mot Globaliseringen?" I den moderna världen har globaliseringen underminerat nationalstaten och lämnat dem utan verktyg för att kunna ta hand om den sociala och ekonomiska oron som följer i dess väg på ett adekvat sätt. Staterna, byggda på kontraktsteorierna har en ansvar för att skydda sina medborgare från naturtillståndet, men som nu har misslyckats i och med att globaliseringen ändrat spelreglerna. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka kontraktsteorierna av Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau och John Rawls för att identifiera beståndsdelarna för en stat och utifrån det skapa en modern idealbild av kontraktsteorin. Kontraktet ska sedan jämföras med Lissabonfördraget då de i viss mån kan ses som ett kontrakt mellan Europas stater för att skapa en enhet utifrån den Europeiska Unionen med makten att skydda Europa mot oron skapad av globaliseringen. Min fråga var följande: Är det nya fördraget för den Europeiska Unioen acceptabel som ett nytt socialt ontrat enligt de gamla kontraktseorierna? Under mon undersökning kom jag fram till följande kriterier för ett socialt kontrakt: 1. En lagstiftande instans 2. En verkställande instans 3. En lagstiftande instans 4. Rätten att beskatta 5. Ett centraliserat utbildningssystem 6. Rätten till ägande 7. Utjämnadne omfördelningssystem 8. Rätten att lämna kontraktet. De första fyra är essentiella i skapandet av en stat och de primära kriterierna för dess existens medan de övriga fyra bestämmer karaktäen på staten som skapats och är ärmed inte avgörande och är därmed sekundära kriterier. Svaret till frågan är nej, eftersom Lissabonfördraget först av allt inte ger Unionen möjligheterna till beskattning och för det andra , Unionen har inte fått madatet till att agera för ett utbildningssystem eller omfördelande ujämningssytem. Utan dessa kriterier har inte EU möjligheten att snabbt agera av egen kraft för att ta hand om brådskande problem som uppståt från globaliseringens negativa sidor.

Governmental sovereignty is created and maintained by mutual respect for the rule of law by the government and citizens. To maintain legitimacy, a government must act within the bounds of the contract that created it. Otherwise, the relationship founded by said contract would be nullified, as would the duties and obligations that flow from that relationship. Torture exemplifies an ultra vires act used by the United States to show the consequences of over-extended authority on political legitimacy and the rule of law. Founded on the philosophies of Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and Christine Korsgaard, this research investigates the nature of a government, its authority, and the laws that it must obey. By considering the role of a government as an artificial man or a representative agent, I argue that regardless of the limits or lack thereof for governmental power, the self-interest of a government illegalizes any action that violates its founding documents. If a government does commit such an act, the rule of law is negatively affected, and political legitimacy and authority are damaged. This behavior, when repeated and unamended, will destroy the relationship between the people and their government, diminish the contract, and return the people to a state of nature.

One of the central questions in political theory deals with the nature of rights. What sorts of rights do people possess? How are these rights justified? How ought these rights be reflected and related when seen in political, economic, and social institutions? Following the publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), rights have once again returned to dominate much of contemporary political theory. However, natural law, which was the historical basis of the early Enlightenment theories of rights, is no longer the primary system appealed to when discussing rights. In fact, classical natural law has been all but discarded in most of political theory today. There has also been renewed debate over the nature of public neutrality, and what the relationship ought to be between the public and private sphere. The mainstream view of how our liberties relate to our rights, as well as what kinds of rights we have over our private affairs, has come under fire from a newly emerging political philosophy known as communitarianism. This thesis will present a robust theory of rights that provides a new understanding of the relationship between positive and negative rights through a defense of classical natural law as an ethical foundation for political theory. It will side with the communitarian critics of public neutrality, and offer a practical method of determining when the state is justified in limiting private liberties due to public interest.

Une guerre menée avec des instruments modernes de destruction est-elle encore justifiable ? La théorie marxiste de l'impérialisme épuise-t-elle le problème de la guerre ? Est-il toujours possible, aujourd'hui, face au risque de conflagration universelle, d'écrire une philosophie de l'histoire ? Que peut le droit contre l'état de nature international ? Ces questions traversent l'œuvre d'un juriste et philosophe italien du XXe siècle, Norberto Bobbio. Elles peuvent toutes être considérées comme les corollaires de son angoisse fondamentale devant le problème de la guerre. La recherche présente se propose d'introduire le lecteur de langue française aux thèses internationalistes de Bobbio ; thèses actuellement disséminées dans plusieurs dizaines d'ouvrages, d'essais, d'articles et de cours, dont la plupart n'ont pas encore été traduits. L'éparpillement de ses écrits, néanmoins, n'oblitère pas la possibilité d'un exposé systématique sa pensée, forgée au creuset de la philosophie politique, de l'histoire des idées, de la science politique et de la philosophie du droit. Bobbio est, en effet, l'auteur d'une politique analytique qui s'est donnée pour tâche d'éclaircir les problèmes contemporains à la lumière de concepts tirés aussi bien de la philosophie anglo-saxonne que continentale. Il s'est inscrit dans une tradition qui, à la suite de Kant, Bentham et Saint-Simon, s'est inlassablement employée à penser les conditions du dépassement de l'anarchie internationale. Ainsi, du dialogue ininterrompu avec l'héritage de la pensée politique et juridique, Bobbio a tiré des armes conceptuelles afin de lutter contre les logiques de puissance propres au système international, contre la persistance des justifications traditionnelles de la guerre, et pour le projet fédéraliste de la démocratie mondiale. / Is a war waged with modern instruments of destruction still justifiable ? Does the Marxist theory of imperialism exhaust the issue of war? Is it still possible today, in view of the risk of a universal conflagration, to propose a philosophy of history? What can international law do against the state of nature between nations? These questions pervade the works of 20th century Italian jurist and philosopher, Norberto Bobbio. They can all be considered as corollaries of his fundamental angst in dealing with the problem of war. This research proposes to introduce the French reader to Bobbio’s internationalist theories; theories currently disseminated in scores of books, essays, articles and lectures, most of which have not yet been translated. Nevertheless, the dispersion of his writings does not rule out the possibility of a systematic presentation of his thinking, forged by the amalgamation of political philosophy, the history of ideas, political science and the philosophy of the law. Indeed, Bobbio is the author of an analytical policy which sought to clarify contemporary issues in light of concepts taken from both Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophies. He is part of a tradition which, in the wake of Kant, Bentham and Saint-Simon, has indefatigably endeavored to think of the requirements for surpassing international anarchy. Thus, from the ongoing dialogue between the legacy of political and juridical thought, Bobbio has forged conceptual weapons to fight against the international system’s specific logic of power, against the persistence of the traditional justifications of war, and for the federalist plan of global democracy.