Fruit de négociations longues et ardues, la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer signée en 1982 est sans doute l’un des traités multilatéraux les plus réussis sur le plan international. Pierre angulaire de la Convention, l’attribution du statut de « patrimoine commun de l’humanité » aux fonds marins et leur sous-sol situés au-delà des limites de la juridiction nationale ainsi qu’à leurs ressources a constitué une innovation majeure dans le domaine du droit international. Le succès de la Convention tient notamment au fait qu’elle a établi un cadre institutionnel sans précédent chargé de la mise en œuvre de la Convention et incarné par trois institutions : l’Autorité internationale des fonds marins, la Commission des limites du plateau continental et le Tribunal international du droit de la mer. Dotées de statuts juridiques divers et de compétences différentes, ces institutions fonctionnent depuis l’entrée en vigueur de la Convention en 1994. Vingt-et-un ans après sa fondation, il convient d’examiner ce cadre institutionnel dans son ensemble et d’évaluer sa mise en œuvre pour mieux comprendre le rôle complémentaire des institutions. Cette étude porte un regard critique sur la genèse, la nature, le fonctionnement et la pratique des institutions, et s’attache à les considérer dans leur interaction et leur interdépendance. Identifier les insuffisances institutionnelles et interinstitutionnelles, ainsi que les défis auxquels les institutions sont confrontées est un préalable indispensable à la recherche de solutions efficaces et viables pour surmonter les difficultés rencontrées, à la mise en œuvre harmonieuse de la Convention et à la concrétisation du concept fondamental de patrimoine commun de l’humanité. Dans cette perspective, l’importance du Tribunal dans son rôle de garant de l’intégrité de la Convention et le pouvoir créateur du juge international face aux lacunes conventionnelles méritent une attention toute particulière. / The result of protracted and arduous negotiations, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seasigned in 1982 is undoubtedly one of the most successful multilateral treaties at the international level. The principle of the common heritage of mankind, represented by the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil and their resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, is the cornerstone of the Convention and constituted a major innovation in international law. The success of the Convention lies, in particular, in the establishment of an unprecedented institutional framework, which is incarnated by three institutions: the International Seabed Authority, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. These institutions of diverse legal status are vested with different functions and have been in operation since the entry into force of the Convention in 1994. Twentyone years following its establishment, it is necessary to review this institutional framework as a whole and to assess its implementation in order to better understand the complementary role of the institutions. This study critically examines the genesis, the nature, the functioning and the practice of the institutions throughtheir interaction and their interdependence. Identifying institutional and inter-institutional weaknesses, and the challenges that the institutions face is an indispensable prerequisite for ensuring effective and viablesolutions, the harmonious implementation of the Convention and for giving substance to the principle ofthe common heritage of mankind. In this context, the role of the Tribunal as the guarantor of the integrityof the Convention and the creative power of the international judge merit special attention.

2001年5月29日第11次《聯合國海洋法公約》締約國會議通過SPLOS/72號決定，於1999年5月13日以前對其生效之公約締約國，如欲依《聯合國海洋法公約》第76條規定主張200海里以外之大陸礁層，必須在1999年5月13日起算10年內向聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會提交與其所主張大陸礁層外部界限相關科學及技術佐證資料。由於《聯合國海洋法公約》所定義之大陸礁層外部界限範圍可能超越專屬經濟海域範圍，而大陸礁層不僅是魚類資源較豐富也是漁業活動重要資源地，同時也是海底油氣與礦場等重要自然資源的集中地區。因此，包括我國相鄰之日本、菲律賓、越南、馬來西亞等公約締約國紛紛進行大陸礁層調查來擴展自己國家的海洋權益。至2009年12月止，已有51個延伸大陸礁層外部界限之提案，及44個初步資訊，聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會並已就部分提案作成決議。 日本於2008年11月12日向聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會提出該國延伸大陸礁層外部界限之申請，卻也因此引起中國大陸及韓國對日本提案中以「沖之鳥礁」為基礎劃定超出200海里延伸大陸礁層之主張提出反對意見，質疑「沖之鳥礁」之法律地位及其所能享有的海域管轄空間。本論文爰由《聯合國海洋法公約》第121條「島嶼制度」形成的過程、相關國家實踐及學者見解，以及《聯合國海洋法公約》中「大陸礁層」之相關規範及聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會之組織與運作情形，探討日本的延伸大陸礁層外部界限提案中以「沖之鳥礁」為基礎主張延伸大陸礁層之適法性問題，並分析以聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會作為「沖之鳥礁」法律地位爭端解決途徑之可能性等。研究結果顯示，日本提案以「沖之鳥礁」為基礎主張延伸大陸礁層外部界限不符合《聯合國海洋法公約》第121條第3項規定，但該項規定並未具備有習慣國際法的效力，亦缺乏客觀的認定標準，聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會的場域無法解決「沖之鳥礁」的法律地位爭端，其他沿海國僅能利用聯合國大陸礁層界限委員會中「第三國意見」之機制凸顯爭端的存在，提醒國際社會注意此類島礁的海域管轄空間主張的合理性問題，並應尊重公約所賦予的權利與義務。 / On 29 May 2001, the 11th Meeting of States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adopted the SPLOS/72 Decision regarding the date of commencement of the ten-year period for making submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set out in Article 4 of Annex II to the UNCLOS. It was decided that, in the case of a State Party for which the Convention entered into force before 13 May 1999, the ten-year time period for it to submit the scientific and technical data supporting the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles under Article 76 of the UNCLOS shall be taken to have commenced on 13 May 1999. For quite a few States the outer limits of their continental shelf as defined by the UNCLOS may go beyond the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Besides, continental shelf is abundant in fisheries resources, crude oil, natural gas and minerals. Consequently, the neighboring States of Taiwan, including Japan, the Philippines, Viet Nam, and Malaysia, have already begun their surveys on continental shelf in order to expand their interests hidden in the ocean. As of December of 2009, there have been 51 formal submissions and 44 Preliminary Information delivered to the United Nations. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) has been undertaking the consideration of these submissions and already completed such process for some of them with recommendations. For Japan, the submission to support the outer limits of its extended continental shelf was made on 12 November 2008 to the CLCS. Such submission was challenged by China and Korea whose focus is on the part of extended continental shelf generated by Oki-no-tori Shima. The legal status of Oki-no-tori Shima as being capable of generating EEZ, continental shelf, and extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, is being disputed by the communications from China and Korea. To provide educated comments on such controversy, this thesis will discuss the legislative process of Article 121 of the UNCLOS, namely, the regime of islands. Related state practices and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists will be studied in this connection. The author will also examine the regime of continental shelf under the UNCLOS and the institution of the CLCS. These will pave the way to scrutinize the legality of using Oki-no-tori Shima as the basis to generate extended continental shelf as having been done by Japan in its submission. The author will also explore the feasibility for the CLCS to settle the dispute over the legality of Japanese submission with respect to Oki-no-tori Shima. As shown by research works, the Japanese submission using Oki-no-tori Shima to generate extended continental shelf is inconsistent with Article 121(3) of the UNCLOS. However, the rule as contained in Article 121(3) has not yet been received into customary international law. Also lacking are the objective criteria to decide whether a given rock meets the conditions as stipulated by Article 121(3) or not. The forum of the CLCS is not suitable to settle the dispute over the legality of using Oki-no-tori Shima by Japan to generate extended continental shelf. Other coastal States can only use the forum of the CLCS to demonstrate the legal controversy over this case through sending third party communications to notify the CLCS the existence of dispute and their unwillingness to support the CLCS to consider the Japanese submission with respect to the part of Oki-no-tori Shima. As submitted by this author, the international community should be reminded of the necessity to respect the integrity of the rights and duties enshrined by the UNCLOS. Also worthy of careful scrutiny is the legitimacy of such kinds of exaggerated maritime claims generated by the rock as defined by Article 121(3) of the UNCLOS.

L’évolution du droit international contemporain conduit souvent à poser la question de sa fragmentation. L’existence, dans le droit de la mer, d’une double approche, universelle et régionale, contribue à alimenter ce débat.La présente recherche s’intéresse aux relations, en termes d’interactions, que l’universalisme et le régionalisme entretiennent dans le droit de la mer. Elle tente plus précisément d’en comprendre les mécanismes et les enjeux.Dans un premier temps, l’étude est consacrée à l’analyse des interactions normatives et institutionnelles. Il est observé que le dédoublement de l’ordre des mers est plus apparent que réel, universalisme et régionalisme étant engagés dans des relations montrant leur entrelacement.Dans une seconde phase, l’analyse se tourne vers l’impact de ces interactions, non seulement sur les approches universelle et régionale, mais également sur l’ordre des mers. Il apparaît, en effet, que les relations entre ces deux dynamiques influencent décisivement la gouvernance des espaces marins dans leur ensemble. C’est ce dont rendent compte tant la création que l’application effective des règles chargées d'assurer cette gouvernance internationale. / The evolution of contemporary international law often leads to the question of its fragmentation. The presence, in the Law of the Sea, of both a universal and a regional approach contributes towards nourishing this debate.The present research focuses on the relationships, in terms of interaction, between universalism and regionalism within the Law of the Sea. It attempts especially to understand the mechanisms of these interactions and their stakes.At first, the study is devoted to the analysis of normative and institutional interactions. One can observes that the cleavage of the legal order of the seas is more apparent than real, since universalism and regionalism are engaged in relationships showing their intertwining nature.Secondly, the study is turned towards the impact of these interactions, not only on the universal and regional approaches, but also on the legal order of the Sea. Indeed, it appears that the relations between these two components of the Law of the Sea, influence in a decisive way the governance of the oceans as a whole. This influence can be seen in the creation as well as in the effective application of the rules of this international governance.

La mer Caspienne qui est devenue l’objet du droit international depuis le XVIIIe siècle n’a jamais connu un statut juridique précis. Cet espace dont la nature aquatique fait l’objet de divergence était dominé par l’URSS jusqu’en 1991. Cependant, à la suite de la disparition de l’URSS, la mer Caspienne - désormais entourée de cinq États riverains (Azerbaïdjan, Iran,Kazakhstan, Russie et Turkménistan) – a fait sa réapparition sur la scène internationale, surtout en raison de ses riches ressources naturelles. C’est précisément dans ces conditions que la question de la situation juridique de la mer Caspienne au regard du droit international s’est posée à la fin du XXe siècle. Il convient donc de former un régime juridique de la mer Caspienne adéquat et durable à long terme et de trouver des solutions pour le règlement desdifférends juridiques entre les États caspiens. / The Caspian Sea which has become the object of international law since the eighteenth century has never had a clear legal status. This space of which the aquatic nature is not defined was dominated by the Soviet Union until 1991. However, following the collapse of the USSR, the Caspian Sea - now surrounded by five littoral States (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan) - has re-emerged on the international scene, especially because of its rich natural resources. It is precisely in these circumstances that the question of legal status of the Caspian Sea under international law arose in the late twentieth century. Therefore, it is necessary to form an adequate and sustainable long-term legal regime of theCaspian Sea and to find solutions for the settlement of legal disputes between the Caspian States.

Cette recherche s’attache à l’étude d’une institution britannique, à son rôle et son organisation depuis la fusion, en 1968, du Commonwealth Office et du Foreign Office, jusqu’à l’année 1985.Il s’agit ainsi de voir comment le Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) fonctionne et comment il a su évoluer au gré du temps, du changement de la place de la Grande-Bretagne dans le monde, et des conflits internationaux. Ainsi, on peut se demander quelles influences le contexte a eu sur l’institution en elle-même. Dès lors, une place particulière est accordée à l’Europe, la ‘relation spéciale’ avec les États-Unis et la décolonisation.La politique étrangère britannique semble aujourd’hui être principalement dans les mains du pouvoir politique : du ministre des Affaires étrangères (Foreign Secretary), et du Premier ministre. Quelle place le FCO occupe-t-il alors, et quelles relations entretient-il avec le pouvoir politique ?Il s’agit ainsi de considérer la place du FCO au sein des différents acteurs internes et externes de la politique étrangère britannique en analysant trois cas concrets : une réorganisation interne de l’institution (la fusion de 1968), une gestion de crise (l’indépendance retardée de la Guyane britannique, 1953-1966), et une négociation d’accord en temps de paix (l’échec des négociations de la Convention des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer, 1973-1982).Ce travail de recherche tente ainsi d’offrir une interprétation allant au-delà du fonctionnement interne de l’institution. Il s’agit de mettre en relation le Foreign and Commonwealth Office et le pouvoir politique, et ainsi d’étudier les pouvoirs et influences du FCO tout en s’attachant à des périodes clés à l’orée de changements. / This research work is devoted to the study of a key British institution, its function and its organization, from the merger of the Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Office in 1968, until 1985.Of particular interest is the way the changing role of Britain in the world and international conflicts bear upon the functioning and the evolution of the FCO. The point is to assess to what extent the context influences the institution itself.British foreign policy seems to be mostly determined by the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister. It is therefore well worth gaging what the function of the FCO is, and its relationship with the holders of political power.The role of the FCO as one of the internal and external agents of British foreign policy is assessed here, through three cases: the internal reorganization of the service in 1968, the management of a crisis – the postponements of independence for Guiana from 1953 to 1966, and the failure of a negotiation in peacetime – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1973 to 1982.Beyond the internal functioning of the institution, this research work strives to offer an interpretation of the changes. The relationship between the FCO and the holders of political power, the real power and influence of the FCO are under consideration, in particular during key moments of particular significance for the institution.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.

A diversidade do uso do espaço oceânico e a antiga concepção da “doutrina da liberdade dos mares” forçou uma readequação do ordenamento político-econômico e espacial do ecossistema oceânico. Este redirecionamento, que envolveu o sistema internacional, originou uma nova geopolítica ou uma nova ordem global para o planejamento espacial oceânico, nos termos da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM). Em razão de tais alterações, contextualizar-se-á a história do mar territorial brasileiro, em 1970, e suas implicações políticas nacionais e internacionais. Após, serão averiguadas as coalizões integradas pelo Brasil em uma aparente “batalha diplomática”, que se estendeu além de nove anos, envolveu mais de 130 países e originou um dos tratados mais bem sucedidos da história: a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar. A partir de então, dentre outras conquistas, os Estados Partes garantiram o seu direito legal ao solo e subsolo marinho, mediante submissões para a plataforma continental além das 200 milhas náuticas, definidos no artigo 76 da Convenção. Tal conquista possibilitou aos países em desenvolvimento e a pequenas nações insulares acesso a valiosos recursos naturais, como o petróleo, gás e minerais. Os Estados costeiros, signatários da Convenção, passaram a ter assegurado o direito de reivindicar seu território submerso, ou a plataforma continental estendida, para até 350 milhas náuticas. Com a nova regulamentação, a análise das submissões passou a ser feita pela Comissão de Limites da Plataforma Continental (CLPC), organismo derivado da CNUDM, onde especialistas, selecionados segundo o critério de equidade geográfica, aceitam, modificam ou rejeitam as reivindicações. Demonstrar-se-á procedimentos adotados por Estados costeiros (insulares ou arquipelágicos) ao solicitar a ampliação de seus limites oceânicos, o modo dos especialistas brasileiros trabalharem a ampliação da plataforma continental estendida e de que forma foi feito o planejamento e o gerenciamento em termos políticos, através da Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos do Mar. Finalmente, averiguar-se-á se o Governo do Brasil terá condições de assumir tal responsabilidade, considerando o possível aumento de suas fronteiras e a capacidade do Estado, em termos científicos, tecnológicos e políticos, de internalizar e cumprir os preceitos da Convenção em sua política nacional para o mar. / The diversity of uses of the oceanic space and the old conception of “freedom of the seas doctrine” has compelled an adaptation of the political-economic and spatial legal framework for the oceanic ecosystem. This changing of direction encompassed the international system and has given rise to a new geopolitics for the legal framework of oceanic spaces around the globe, in terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Because of such modifications, this study contextualizes the history of Brazilian territorial sea in 1970 and its political implications, on the national as well as on the international level. After that, it examines the alliances Brazil has formed, engaging in a so called “diplomatic battle”. This process went on for over nine years, comprised more than 130 countries and originated one of the most successful treaties in history: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, the signatory states managed to secure their legal rights over the maritime soil and subsoil by means of submissions for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, as defined by the Convention in its article 76. This achievement was of utmost importance because it enabled developing countries and small island states to access valuable natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals. Every coastal state who has signed the Convention acquired the right to claim its underwater territory or extended continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles from its coast. Due to the new regulations, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) began to undertake the analysis of submissions. This Commission is a body set up by the UNCLOS, in which experts, selected according to the criterion of geographic equity will accept, modify or reject claims. Furthermore, this study aims to account for procedures taken by coastal, insular, and archipelagic states when claiming the extension of its oceanic limits, with the main focus on measures taken by Brazil. More specifically, it intends to explain how Brazilian experts have brought about the expansion of the extended continental shelf and in which way planning and management, in political terms, can be carried out through the Interministerial Commission for Maritime Resources. Ultimately, it will be examined if the Brazilian government is able to assume such responsibility in the face of the growth of its borders and the capability of the state, in scientific, technological and political terms, of incorporating and enforcing the precepts of the Convention in its national policy for the seas.

A diversidade do uso do espaço oceânico e a antiga concepção da “doutrina da liberdade dos mares” forçou uma readequação do ordenamento político-econômico e espacial do ecossistema oceânico. Este redirecionamento, que envolveu o sistema internacional, originou uma nova geopolítica ou uma nova ordem global para o planejamento espacial oceânico, nos termos da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM). Em razão de tais alterações, contextualizar-se-á a história do mar territorial brasileiro, em 1970, e suas implicações políticas nacionais e internacionais. Após, serão averiguadas as coalizões integradas pelo Brasil em uma aparente “batalha diplomática”, que se estendeu além de nove anos, envolveu mais de 130 países e originou um dos tratados mais bem sucedidos da história: a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar. A partir de então, dentre outras conquistas, os Estados Partes garantiram o seu direito legal ao solo e subsolo marinho, mediante submissões para a plataforma continental além das 200 milhas náuticas, definidos no artigo 76 da Convenção. Tal conquista possibilitou aos países em desenvolvimento e a pequenas nações insulares acesso a valiosos recursos naturais, como o petróleo, gás e minerais. Os Estados costeiros, signatários da Convenção, passaram a ter assegurado o direito de reivindicar seu território submerso, ou a plataforma continental estendida, para até 350 milhas náuticas. Com a nova regulamentação, a análise das submissões passou a ser feita pela Comissão de Limites da Plataforma Continental (CLPC), organismo derivado da CNUDM, onde especialistas, selecionados segundo o critério de equidade geográfica, aceitam, modificam ou rejeitam as reivindicações. Demonstrar-se-á procedimentos adotados por Estados costeiros (insulares ou arquipelágicos) ao solicitar a ampliação de seus limites oceânicos, o modo dos especialistas brasileiros trabalharem a ampliação da plataforma continental estendida e de que forma foi feito o planejamento e o gerenciamento em termos políticos, através da Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos do Mar. Finalmente, averiguar-se-á se o Governo do Brasil terá condições de assumir tal responsabilidade, considerando o possível aumento de suas fronteiras e a capacidade do Estado, em termos científicos, tecnológicos e políticos, de internalizar e cumprir os preceitos da Convenção em sua política nacional para o mar. / The diversity of uses of the oceanic space and the old conception of “freedom of the seas doctrine” has compelled an adaptation of the political-economic and spatial legal framework for the oceanic ecosystem. This changing of direction encompassed the international system and has given rise to a new geopolitics for the legal framework of oceanic spaces around the globe, in terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Because of such modifications, this study contextualizes the history of Brazilian territorial sea in 1970 and its political implications, on the national as well as on the international level. After that, it examines the alliances Brazil has formed, engaging in a so called “diplomatic battle”. This process went on for over nine years, comprised more than 130 countries and originated one of the most successful treaties in history: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, the signatory states managed to secure their legal rights over the maritime soil and subsoil by means of submissions for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, as defined by the Convention in its article 76. This achievement was of utmost importance because it enabled developing countries and small island states to access valuable natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals. Every coastal state who has signed the Convention acquired the right to claim its underwater territory or extended continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles from its coast. Due to the new regulations, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) began to undertake the analysis of submissions. This Commission is a body set up by the UNCLOS, in which experts, selected according to the criterion of geographic equity will accept, modify or reject claims. Furthermore, this study aims to account for procedures taken by coastal, insular, and archipelagic states when claiming the extension of its oceanic limits, with the main focus on measures taken by Brazil. More specifically, it intends to explain how Brazilian experts have brought about the expansion of the extended continental shelf and in which way planning and management, in political terms, can be carried out through the Interministerial Commission for Maritime Resources. Ultimately, it will be examined if the Brazilian government is able to assume such responsibility in the face of the growth of its borders and the capability of the state, in scientific, technological and political terms, of incorporating and enforcing the precepts of the Convention in its national policy for the seas.

A diversidade do uso do espaço oceânico e a antiga concepção da “doutrina da liberdade dos mares” forçou uma readequação do ordenamento político-econômico e espacial do ecossistema oceânico. Este redirecionamento, que envolveu o sistema internacional, originou uma nova geopolítica ou uma nova ordem global para o planejamento espacial oceânico, nos termos da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM). Em razão de tais alterações, contextualizar-se-á a história do mar territorial brasileiro, em 1970, e suas implicações políticas nacionais e internacionais. Após, serão averiguadas as coalizões integradas pelo Brasil em uma aparente “batalha diplomática”, que se estendeu além de nove anos, envolveu mais de 130 países e originou um dos tratados mais bem sucedidos da história: a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar. A partir de então, dentre outras conquistas, os Estados Partes garantiram o seu direito legal ao solo e subsolo marinho, mediante submissões para a plataforma continental além das 200 milhas náuticas, definidos no artigo 76 da Convenção. Tal conquista possibilitou aos países em desenvolvimento e a pequenas nações insulares acesso a valiosos recursos naturais, como o petróleo, gás e minerais. Os Estados costeiros, signatários da Convenção, passaram a ter assegurado o direito de reivindicar seu território submerso, ou a plataforma continental estendida, para até 350 milhas náuticas. Com a nova regulamentação, a análise das submissões passou a ser feita pela Comissão de Limites da Plataforma Continental (CLPC), organismo derivado da CNUDM, onde especialistas, selecionados segundo o critério de equidade geográfica, aceitam, modificam ou rejeitam as reivindicações. Demonstrar-se-á procedimentos adotados por Estados costeiros (insulares ou arquipelágicos) ao solicitar a ampliação de seus limites oceânicos, o modo dos especialistas brasileiros trabalharem a ampliação da plataforma continental estendida e de que forma foi feito o planejamento e o gerenciamento em termos políticos, através da Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos do Mar. Finalmente, averiguar-se-á se o Governo do Brasil terá condições de assumir tal responsabilidade, considerando o possível aumento de suas fronteiras e a capacidade do Estado, em termos científicos, tecnológicos e políticos, de internalizar e cumprir os preceitos da Convenção em sua política nacional para o mar. / The diversity of uses of the oceanic space and the old conception of “freedom of the seas doctrine” has compelled an adaptation of the political-economic and spatial legal framework for the oceanic ecosystem. This changing of direction encompassed the international system and has given rise to a new geopolitics for the legal framework of oceanic spaces around the globe, in terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Because of such modifications, this study contextualizes the history of Brazilian territorial sea in 1970 and its political implications, on the national as well as on the international level. After that, it examines the alliances Brazil has formed, engaging in a so called “diplomatic battle”. This process went on for over nine years, comprised more than 130 countries and originated one of the most successful treaties in history: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, the signatory states managed to secure their legal rights over the maritime soil and subsoil by means of submissions for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, as defined by the Convention in its article 76. This achievement was of utmost importance because it enabled developing countries and small island states to access valuable natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals. Every coastal state who has signed the Convention acquired the right to claim its underwater territory or extended continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles from its coast. Due to the new regulations, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) began to undertake the analysis of submissions. This Commission is a body set up by the UNCLOS, in which experts, selected according to the criterion of geographic equity will accept, modify or reject claims. Furthermore, this study aims to account for procedures taken by coastal, insular, and archipelagic states when claiming the extension of its oceanic limits, with the main focus on measures taken by Brazil. More specifically, it intends to explain how Brazilian experts have brought about the expansion of the extended continental shelf and in which way planning and management, in political terms, can be carried out through the Interministerial Commission for Maritime Resources. Ultimately, it will be examined if the Brazilian government is able to assume such responsibility in the face of the growth of its borders and the capability of the state, in scientific, technological and political terms, of incorporating and enforcing the precepts of the Convention in its national policy for the seas.