In this study, I examine the employment effects on average earnings and duration to work during a 45 month period, after receiving social assistance (SA) in October 2019, compared to receiving unemployment insurance (UI) the same month. A distinction is made between two treatment groups; receiving SA in addition to UI (treatment I) and receiving SA (treatment II). Using propensity score matching (PSM), I estimate the average treatment effects on the treated on earnings, as well as duration to work by using the Kaplan-Meier survival estimator with the matched observations. I use newly released Swedish administrative micro level data of individuals’ monthly labour market status (BAS) between 2020-2023, from Statistics Sweden. During this thesis process, where Statistics Sweden allowed me data access, I was allowed an additional year of data, for 2019. Results showed that the inflow of SA recipients in October 2019, on average had 25.5 percent lower earnings between November 2019-July 2023, compared to the inflow of UI recipients the same month. In addition, the inflow of SA recipients in October 2019, on average spent 4 months longer in unemployment, compared to those receiving UI the same month. However, results were insignificant when comparing effects between the inflow of those receiving SA in addition to UI in October 2019 with the inflow of UI recipients the same month. Results for this group were insignificant for both employment outcomes; average earnings and duration to work.

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L’assurance chômage (AC) est un dispositif central des politiques du marché du travail. Une revue de littérature détaille ce que l’on sait de la pertinence et de l’optimalité de ces régimes dans le contexte du marché du travail contemporain. Elle illustre que si la stabilisation de la consommation des chômeurs est le motif générateur de l’AC, peu de travaux ont évalué cet aspect ou les autres effets positifs de l’AC, se focalisant sur les effets pervers du dispositif, notamment l’alea moral des chômeurs, et sur l’optimisation des règles pour les contenir. Dans la dernière décennie, la prise en compte des firmes et de la dynamique économique a rendu la littérature plus fertile pour optimiser les dépensescomme les ressources de l’AC.Les régimes d’AC profitent-ils de ces enseignements ? L’évolution des règles du régime français depuis 50 ans, ainsi que l’extrême diversité de celles en vigueur dans 5 pays incline à douter que ces régimes sont optimaux, surtout si on se limite à l’AC plutôt que de tenir compte de l’ensemble des transferts aux chômeurs pour analyser leurs comportements.La situation du régime français montre que ses fréquentes évolutions n’ont pas résolu ses problèmes. Il a subi, mais aussi stimulé, la récurrence au chômage, au prix d’une pression fiscale accrue et d’une efficacité dégradée pour la majorité des salariés et des firmes. En France comme dans de nombreux autres pays, les ressources de l’AC sont un domaine de réformes délaissé, alors qu’à tous points de vue (équité, incitations, équilibre financier, etc.) les gains potentiels d’une révision de leurs modalités sont plus élevés que ceux à attendre d’un nouvel ajustement marginal des droits. / Unemployment Insurance (UI) is a key labour market policy.A comprehensive survey of UI literature assesses what we know about UI optimality and its relevance regarding present labour market conditions. Despite of being its founding rationale, jobseekers’ consumption smoothing is rarely assessed, as well as other UI gains. In contrast research has long focused on UI adverse effects, namely recipients’ moral hazard, and on benefits optimization to control it. Recent literature better integrates firm and economic dynamics, thus being richer regarding the way UI benefits and financing rules could be more optimal.Do UI regimes build on this knowledge? An historical approach of French UI rules, and up to date descriptions of 5 other UI regimes, show an extreme diversity of UI arrangements, raising doubts about their optimality. Comprehensive analysis of social transfers to unemployed should be preferred to analysis restricted to UI benefits, because less misleading about unemployed real situation and behaviour.An in depth analysis of French UI rules illustrates that numerous reforms didn’t solve structural problems. The regime suffered increasing spending due to labour market changes, but it also stimulated adverse expensive behaviours among specific groups and short term contracts, both leading to heavier taxes and reduced efficiency for the bulk of workers and firms. In France as elsewhere, UI systems’ funding is a forsaken part of reforms. Yet regarding justice, incentives, financial stability, etc. reviewing rules governing resources could be more rewarding than implementing usual UI benefits reforms.

L'éducation est un investissement qui trouve son rendement sur le marché du travail.Cependant, les frictions à l'œuvre sur ce marché affectent aussi bien le niveau que la nature des investissements éducatifs. Dans le même temps, les compétences acquises lors de la scolarité conditionnent le design des institutions du marché du travail.Nous proposons trois chapitres qui examinent chacun une question particulière.Le premier présente un modèle de mismatch sur le marché du travail où le degré d'inadéquation entre travailleurs et emplois est endogène : il dépend des efforts éducatifs (qui réduisent le mismatch) et des investissements technologiques (qui l'augmentent). Nous examinons l'impact de l'incertitude concernant le futur partenaire de travail, de l'hétérogénéité des travailleurs vis-à-vis de leur capacité scolaire, et de l'aversion au risque.Le deuxième construit un modèle d'appariement avec spécialistes et généralistes dans lequel la proportion de spécialistes est endogène. La nature du capital humain détermine le nombre de files d'attentes dans lequel le travailleur peut prospecter ainsi que son rang dans chacune d'elles. L'éducation véhicule plusieurs externalités : les spécialistes favorisent la création d'emplois dans chaque secteur ; les généralistes améliorent l'efficience de la technologie d'appariement mais aggravent le problème de coordination des firmes. Nous calibrons le modèle sur données agrégées pour 20 pays de l'OCDE. L'auto-sélection s'avère toujours inefficace : taxer la formation professionnelle pourrait réduire le taux de chômage de plus d'un point de pourcentage.Le troisième étudie le design de l'assurance chômage dans un contexte où les travailleurs diffèrent quant à la nature de leur capital humain. Nous montrons que selon le scénario retenu pour la gestion de la caisse d'assurance, la proportion de spécialistes peut conduire à diminuer ou accroître le taux de remplacement de l'indemnité chômage optimale. / Education is an investment that has its return on the labor market. However, frictions at work in this market affect both the level and the nature of educational investments. At the same time, the skills gained during schooling time determine the design of labor market institutions.This thesis is made of three chapters examining, each of them examines a particular issue.The first one presents a mismatch model on labor market where the efficiency of the assignment mechanism is endogenous: it depends on educational efforts (which reduce the mismatch) and on technological investments (which increases it). We examine the impact of uncertainty regarding the future work associate, of the worker's heterogeneity toward scholastic ability, and of risk aversion.In the second one we build a two-sector matching model with generalists and specialists, in which the proportion of specialists is endogenous. The nature of human capital determines the number of job queues in which worker can candidates as well as its rank in each of them. Self-selection in education type leads to three main externalities: specialists enhance job creation in each sector; generalists improve the efficiency of the matching technology, but nevertheless exacerbate firm's coordination problems. We calibrate the model on aggregate data for 20 OECD countries. Self-selection is always inefficient: taxing vocational education, to reduce the proportion of specialists down the efficient level, could reduce unemployment rates by more than one point of percentage.The third one studies the unemployment insurance scheme in a context where workers have different kind of human capital. We show that, depending on the scenario chosen for the management of the insurance fund, the proportion of individuals with specific human capital can lead either to a decrease or to an increase of the replacement rate of the optimal unemployment benefit.

[pt] A tese se constitui em três artigos que têm como tema comum a questão de imperfeições no mercado de trabalho. No primeiro artigo se analisa a relação entre rotatividade da força de trabalho e investimento em treinamento quando essas decisões são tomadas em dois períodos e há informação assimétrica sobre o tipo do trabalhador no mercado de trabalho. A principal conclusão do artigo é que não há necessariamente um trade-off entre rotatividade e investimento líquido em treinamento, uma vez que embora em um equilíbrio com rotatividade o investimento corrente venha a ser reduzido, se rotatividade é explicada pela busca de melhores parcerias estas devem induzir maior nível de treinamento no futuro. No segundo artigo, considera-se uma economia onde a habilidade dos trabalhadores é informação privada desses e discute-se um esquema de seguro-desemprego que seja capaz de induzir maior eficiência econômica. A idéia básica é conferir ao seguro-desemprego, que é originalmente um instrumento de transferência, um caráter de sinalização, o que tende a gerar mais eficiência econômica e pode permitir uma redução no custo do governo em prover essa transferência. O terceiro artigo estuda a relação entre distribuição de riqueza e desenvolvimento econômico. A contribuição do artigo é combinar imperfeição no mercado de trabalho (associada à existência de um salário de eficiência) à imperfeição do mercado de crédito dentro de um modelo de escolha ocupacional. A principal conclusão é que dentro do contexto analisado essa imperfeição do mercado de trabalho combinada com perspectiva de mobilidade social ascendente elevada tende a levar a economia a um estado de prosperidade, enquanto que se o mercado de trabalho fosse competitivo um equilíbrio com prosperidade não seria alcançado em casos onde a fração inicial de agentes pobres na economia fosse alta. / [en] The thesis is composed by three articles that are connected by the commom assumption of imperfections in the labor market. In the first article we study the relation between turnover of the labor force and investment in training when these decisions are taken in two periods and there is assimetric information about the type of the worker in the labor market. The main conclusion of the article is that not necessarily there is a trade-off between turnover and liquid investment in training, once although in an equilibrium with turnover the actual investment is reduced, if turnover is explained by the search for better matchings these must induce a greater level of training in the future. In the second article is considered an economy where worker`s ability is private knowledge and is discussed an arrangement of unemployment insurance that could induce more economic efficiency. The basic idea is to incorpotate in the unemployment insurance, originally a transfer instrument, an aspect of signaling, what can improve economic efficiency and can also reduce the cost for the government in providing this transfer. The third article studies the relation between wealth distribution and economic development. The contribution of the article is to match imperfection in the labor market (associated to the existence of an efficiency wage) and imperfection in the credit market in a model of occupational choice. The main conclusion is that into this context this imperfection in the labor market together with the perspective of high ascendent social mobility should conduce the economy to an state of prosperity, while were the labor market competitive an equilibrium of prosperity wouldn`t be reachead in cases when the inicial share of poor agents in the economy were high.

This study deals with the consequences for household economy in connection with unemployment. Various mechanisms that influence the relationship between unemployment and the reception of supplementary benefits are described and analyzed. The labour market, the social insurance system and the adjustment strategies of families are fields of particular interest to this study. The economic systems of support that have developed are dominated by the unemployment insurance. Those, whose unemployment benefits have ceased or who for some other reason are not covered by the insurance, have to resort to supplementary benefits. The differences in level between working, receiving unemployment benefits or supplementary benefits can be described in terms of a scale of income. The aspect of the scale varies strongly between different types of families. The empirical point of reference for this dissertation is the close-down of a pulp industry (Ncb in Köpmanholmen 130 km south of Umeå in the north of Sweden). The development of those made redundant has been studied with regard to reception of supplementary benefits, income and adjustment strategies. Data about income and supplementary benefits were collected from registers at the local tax charge office and the local administration of social services. 83 out of 444 households were interviewed about adjustment strategies. The close-down in question proved to be exceptional in many aspects. The expected "social catastrophe" never occured due to the economic upswing, raised unemployment benefits and ambitious labour market policy efforts, among other things. Only a very small minority of those made redundant have received supplementary benefits after the close-down. This has been the case although many of those made redundant have been removed from the open labour market with a subsequent lowering of their income level. Amongst those made redundant many different patterns of adjustment havè been observed. It appears that those who lack work after a couple of years after the close-down are often characterized by passivity, whereas those who have been employed are often characterized by activity. Finally the variation in patterns of adjustment can be seen as a social policy problem. Judging from the results a combination of the institutional and marginal social policy strategies would be desirable. Reform schemes can be suggested that are based on a wish to supplement the preventive and institutional social policy with selective features where the adjustment strategies of families should provide an important resource potential. / digitalisering@umu

本文探討我國失業保險實施之後，對不同教育程度勞工所得分配之改善程度。利用我國行政院家計收支調查報告、勞工保險統計年報，計算失業者因為失業保險所提供的保障之下，於民國八十八年至九十二年間，其所得的變化，以及整體就業者所得分配改善的效果。 本文依據Moene and Wallerstein (2001)，提出衡量所得重分配概念之指標，利用薪資中位數除以薪資平均數之值來衡量。本文將指標調整為，可支配所得中位數除以可支配所得平均數之值，計算失業保險實施對不同教育程度勞工所得分配改善幅度。 研究結果顯示，未考量失業保險時，所得分配的效果，較平均的為「國中及以下」，其次為「大專及以上」，最後為「高中職」。而失業保險之淨給付，最高者為「國中及以下」、次高者為「高中職」、最後為「大專及以上」這個教育程度的就業人口。「國中及以下」這個教育程度的就業人口，拿到的淨給付是最多的，這呼應了失業保險原先設計的目的即為達成所得分配改善的功能。失業保險實施後的所得分配狀態，「國中及以下」之可支配所得中位數除以可支配所得平均數是最高的，其次為「大專及以上」，最低為「高中職」。所以，失業保險實施，使得「國中及以下」這個較低的教育程度的就業人口，所得重分配的狀況是最好的。這呼應了失業保險原先設計的目的即為達成所得分配改善的功能。 在這三種教育程度下，各年度之所得分配改善的情況。未考量失業保險時，社會所得分配狀態以八十九年較平均，九十一年、九十二年較不平均。淨給付，以九十二年、九十一年較大、八十八年較小。考量失業保險實施後所得分配狀況，以八十八年、八十九年較平均，九十年、九十一年較不平均。所得分配改善的程度而言，皆以九十一年、九十二年改善程度較大，八十八年改善程度較小。

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2008

This thesis comprises three chapters which share an emphasis on the importance of agent heterogeneity in different areas of macroeconomics. The first chapter shows that the introduction of heterogeneous risk aversion into a consumption based asset pricing model with Epstein-Zin preferences allows to replicate several features of stock markets such as the counter-cyclical variation in the equity premium and its predictability from the price dividend ratio. The second chapter complements a Mortensen-Pissarides matching model with individual savings for precautionary reasons in order to analyze the welfare effects of reforming unemployment insurance. Our fully dynamic analysis reveals significant transition costs that static comparisons miss. The third chapter is concerned with optimal capital and labor taxation when agents differ in their wage-wealth ratio. We find that if all agents are to benefit from a reform (vis-à-vis the status quo) capital taxes are abolished only after a long period. / Esta tesis se compone de tres capítulos que enfatizan en la importancia de la heterogeneidad de agentes económicos en distintas áreas de la macroeconomía. El primer capítulo demuestra que la introducción de heterogeneidad en la aversión al riesgo en un modelo de consumption based asset pricing con utilidad de tipo Epstein-Zin permite reproducir algunas regularidades empíricas de los mercados financieros como por ejemplo la variación anticíclica de la prima de riesgo y su previsibilidad a través del cociente precio-dividendos. El segundo capítulo introduce en un modelo de matching tipo Mortensen-Pissarides ahorros precaucionarios con el objetivo de analizar los efectos sobre el bienestar de reformas del seguro de desempleo. Nuestro análisis dinámico revela costes significativos de transición no presentes en comparaciones estáticas. El tercer capítulo investiga la imposición óptima de capital y trabajo cuando los agentes son heterogéneos con respecto a su cociente sueldo-patrimonio. Encontramos que, para que todos los agentes se beneficien de la reforma (respecto al status quo), el impuesto del capital debería eliminarse sólo después de un periodo largo.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This thesis gathered survey data to investigate American willingness to participate in short-time compensation programs and what attributes found in other countries’ programs they find palatable. Because multiple workers in similar states were surveyed online, the data show what various workers need from a short-time compensation program.