Este trabalho é sobre idéia de governo no pensamento político do filósofo moral e do direito, radical político e teórico constitucional inglês Jeremy Bentham (1748- 1832). Após uma breve exposição dos principais temas e questões exploradas, bem como, dos respectivos momentos da sua vida intelectual, argumento a favor de que é possível extrair da crítica política e jurídica de Bentham a Blackstone alguns elementos da sua concepção de governo e visão sobre a política. Argumenta-se a favor de certa convergência entre as posições de Bacon e de Bentham com relação aos projetos de reforma penal, concepção de governo, métodos de investigação e ontologia da política. Também, é explorada a sugestão de que tal convergência pode ser explicada em virtude dos princípios filosóficos similares adotados por ambos. A principal conclusão é a de que a linha de interpretação discutida pode fornecer uma melhor compreensão sobre as conexões entre a variedade de assuntos explorados nos escritos jurídicos-políticos de Bentham. / This work is about the idea of the government in the political thought of the English utilitarian moral and legal philosopher, political radical and constitutional theorist Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). After a brief exposition of the main themes and questions explored by him and the respective moments of his intellectual life, give evidence it is possible to extract from Bentham´s political and juridical criticism to the Blackstone some elements of his government conception and vision about politics. It is argued in favor of some convergence between Bacon´s and Bentham´s positions concerning legal reform projects, government conception, investigation methods, and political ontology; also, the suggestion that it can be explained by their similar philosophical principles is explored. The main conclusion is that the line of the interpretation discussed can provide a better understanding about the connections among the variety of the issues concerning the government theme explored in the Bentham´s juridical-political works.

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-05-27T12:12:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Xana Campos Valerio.pdf: 980095 bytes, checksum: 7f66b4b24af0692af15c7d8e51b51cca (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-27T12:12:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Xana Campos Valerio.pdf: 980095 bytes, checksum: 7f66b4b24af0692af15c7d8e51b51cca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-12 / Nenhuma / A questão da regulamentação ou não das nanotecnologias, com todas as possibilidades revolucionárias que apresentam, perpassa estas duas formas de compreender a tradição e interpretar o mundo da vida: institucionalismo e utilitarismo. Como vertentes pré-compreensivas antagônicas, apontam para a construção de um porvir sob diferentes perspectivas: uma que preconiza a manutenção de uma principiologia constitucional, que num Estado Democrático de Direito, deveria guiar o agir dos sujeitos, fazendo parte do movimento em que acontecemos e acontece o mundo, onde Constituição Dirigente e Estado Democrático de Direito constituiriam correlatos necessários. Outra, que apregoa autoridade epistêmica aos diversos sistemas sociais autopoiéticos, que se desligando um pouco dos mecanismos Estatais, determinariam o que é permitido ou proibido para si, com base na sua linguagem operacional, com destaque para a econômica, independentemente do Direito Estatal. Esta segunda postura pré-compreensiva dá vida e coloca em movimento a ideologia utilitarista que se porta como um preconceito que direciona a ação legislativa e barra qualquer tentativa de regulamentação e de informação quanto aos riscos e malefícios que podem advir da nanotecnologia. Os cidadãos brasileiros são submetidos à situação de cobaias da nanotecnologia e são mantidos numa condição estratégica de desinformação, num distanciamento do compromisso democrático pela formação humana. Dá-se concreção a uma postura legislativa inautêntica, posto que afastada da principiologia constitucional, como ideal de vida boa autorizado pela Constituição de 1988. Defende-se uma postura discursiva, dentro da tradição constitucional e da crítica da ideologia utilitarista, de que todo progresso é potencialmente destrutivo, a não ser que seja reduzido a um curso ordeiro da natureza e das relações homeostáticas entre os cidadãos. E essa ordenação somente a vertente institucionalista é capaz de proporcionar, uma vez que não compartilha das insinceridades características do utilitarismo. Assim, somente promessas sinceras são capazes de legitimar o futuro tal como se põe em expectativa na Carta Magna. As insinceridades utilitaristas podem ser postas em perspectiva dentro do agir comunicativo habermasiano, com a explicitação da racionalidade compreensiva desviada dos trilhos constitucionais, pode ser reconduzida a estes por uma pedagogia argumentativa procedida por aqueles que já incorporaram a tradição constitucional ao seu processo vital. Busca-se demonstrar, através de uma reflexão crítica, a razão da incompatibilidade entre o institucionalismo e o utilitarismo e porque este último se afasta das diretrizes constitucionais. / The issue of regulation or not the nanotechnology, with all the revolutionary possibilities its presents, permeates these two ways of understanding the tradition and interpret the life-world: institutionalism and utilitarianism. As antagonistic pre-understanding points of view, points to building a future from different perspectives: one that advocates maintaining a constitutional principle, that a democratic state should guide the action of the subject as part of the movement that happen to and happens the world, where the Constitution Leader and Democratic State constitute related necessary. Another one, that proclaims to the several social systems epistemic authority autopoietic, turning off the mechanisms of State, define what is permitted or forbidden to itself, based on its operational language, with emphasis on economic, regardless of state law. This second pre-understanding posture gives life and sets in motion the utilitarian ideology, that equivalent the preconception, directs the legislative action, and prevents any attempt to regulate the nanotechnology, and also prevents information about the risks and harms that may arise from nanotechnology. Brazilian citizens are subjected to the situation of nanotechnology guinea pig, and are kept in a condition of strategic disinformation, it gives concreteness to an inauthentic legislative stance, since rejected the constitutional principiologia as ideal good life authorized by the 1988 Constitution, particularly in relation to the duty of human formation. Advocates as a discursive stance, within the constitutional tradition and the critique of utilitarian ideology, that all progress is potentially destructive, unless it is reduced to an orderly course of nature and homeostatic relationships among citizens. And this sort only the institutionalist strand is able to provide, since it does not share the characteristics of utilitarianism insincerities. Only sincere promises are able to legitimize the future as put forward in the Magna Carta. Utilitarian insincerities can be put into perspective within the Habermasian communicative act, with the explicit understanding of rationality diverted from the constitutional rails, can be traced back to these in an argumentative pedagogy preceded by those who have already incorporated the constitutional tradition to its vital process, demonstrating through critical reflection, the reason for the incompatibility between institutionalism and utilitarianism and because the latter departs from the constitutional guidelines.

<p>The study argues that implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of immigration as human rights is supported by principle of positive freedom, negative freedom, and equal autonomy. The study endorses a liberal egalitarian perspective by claiming that human right to immigrate promotes equal autonomy. The study also investigates why the principle of immigration as a human right has been dismissed by doctrines within Liberalism. It argues that a state lacks a legitimacy to employ a principle of national self-determination against the immigration issue. Instead, a state has a moral obligation to the protection of a human right to immigrate; it also has a duty to provide equal social rights to the immigrants in compared with those of the citizens.</p>

The study argues that implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of immigration as human rights is supported by principle of positive freedom, negative freedom, and equal autonomy. The study endorses a liberal egalitarian perspective by claiming that human right to immigrate promotes equal autonomy. The study also investigates why the principle of immigration as a human right has been dismissed by doctrines within Liberalism. It argues that a state lacks a legitimacy to employ a principle of national self-determination against the immigration issue. Instead, a state has a moral obligation to the protection of a human right to immigrate; it also has a duty to provide equal social rights to the immigrants in compared with those of the citizens.

<p>Humanitär intervention är ett begrepp inom internationella relationer som väcker många känslor och frågor. Trots att idén om att använda våld för att stoppa brott mot de mänskli-ga rättigheter kan verka attraktivt från ett moraliskt perspektiv, vilket man i århundraden har gjort, har denna praktik varit synnerligen oregelbunden. Detta i hög grad beroende på den ambivalens som finns inför de internationella normer som skall reglera staters använ-dande av militärt våld.</p><p>Synen på humanitära interventioner har ändrats i överensstämmelse med de förändringar som skett inom det internationella systemet. Dessa ändringar har, till viss del, medfört en förändrad syn på de normer som legitimerar användandet av våld inom det internationella samfundet.</p><p>Humanitära interventioner som begrepp och praktik innehåller många dilemman i vår tid. Detta eftersom det berör traditionella normer av suveränitet och ickeintervention, som är de främsta byggstenarna för det moderna internationella systemet, tillika del av Förenta Na-tionernas (FN) stadgar. Stater är i dag förbjudna att använda militärt våld som ett instru-ment i deras utrikespolitik, förutom i fall av självförsvar eller i kollektiva säkerhetsåtgärder, beslutade av FN:s säkerhetsråd. Det handlar även om att det finns traditionella normer som förbjuder intervention i andra staters interna angelägenheter. Dessutom ska allt militärt våld auktorernas av säkerhetsrådet, som har till uppgift att upprätthålla internationell fred och säkerhet.</p><p>Med detta perspektiv för ögonen, är användandet av våld för att genomdriva internationella humanitära normer, mycket begränsad enligt internationell lag. Detta har i många situatio-ner skapat ett svart hål när det kommer till att stoppa allvarliga förbrytelser mot de mänsk-liga rättigheter, genom internationellt ingripande. Ovanstående har lett till att man börjat diskutera och ifrågasätta traditionella principer som har varit ledande för det internationella samarbetet, vilket i sin tur skulle kunna öppna vägen för vissa interventioner med humani-tära syften.</p><p>Denna diskussion handlar om suveränitet, internationella lag och det handlar om moraliska ställningstaganden. Realismen har under lång tid varit den ledande skolan i internationella relationer och därmed lagt grunden för hur man ska tolka internationella konflikter, krigs-föring och interventioner. På senare tid har Realismen utmanats av andra teoretiska skolor och ställningstaganden som ifrågasätter Realismens förmåga att förklara händelser på den internationella arenan.</p><p>Genom att jämföra Realismens ståndpunkter, gentemot humanitära interventioner, med Utilitarismen och den Kosmopolitiska skolan, har uppsatsen kunnat presentera olika bilder av den problematik som humanitära interventioner idag står inför och därmed måste för-hålla sig till. Igenom att granska konflikten i Rwanda 1994 och Kosovo 1999 har problema-tiken runt humanitära interventioner ytterligare kunnat belysas och diskuteras. Detta har skett genom en kvalitativ textanalys.</p><p>Nyckelord: Humanitär Intervention, Suveränitet, Icke-intervention, Internationell lag, Rea-lism, Kosmopolitanism, Utilitarism, Moral</p> / <p>Humanitarian intervention is a concept within international relations that provoke many diverse feelings and questions. Although the idée too use force in the name of ending crimes against human rights may seem attractive from a moral perspective, its practise has been highly irregular. This is much due to the norms that regulate states use of military force.</p><p>The view on humanitarian interventions has changed in unity with the changes that have appeared within the international system. These changes have, to some extent, brought on a transformation in how we look upon the norms that regulate the use of force within the international community.</p><p>Humanitarian intervention is also a concept and practises that creates many dilemmas in our time. This because it touches and concerns traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, that is not only fundamental building stones for the modern international system, but also a immense part of the structure of the United Nations (UN). States today, are forbidden to use military force as an integrated part of their foreign policy, except in cases of self-defence or collective security measures authorised by the UN Security Council. It is also about customary norms, which declare that states should not interfere in other states internal affaires.</p><p>In the company of the above stated, the use of force to implement humanitarian norms is fairly limited according to international law. This has repeatedly created a gap when it comes to stop serious violations against human rights through international interference. The above stated has led to an intense discussion concerning how traditional principals may have to chance in ways that better can guide international cooperation’s in these matters. This discussion may in turn lead to an opening for some sort of interventions with humanitarian purposes.</p><p>This discussion, furthermore, concerns sovereignty, international law, and it is about morality. Realism has for a long period of time been the leading school in international relations and has laid the ground for how we should interpret international conflicts, war and intervention. Recently, this school has been forced too respond to opposition from some other theoretical schools; questioning Realisms ability to explain activities on the international arena.</p><p>By comparing Realism opinion toward humanitarian interventions, with the Utilitarian and Cosmopolitan school, this thesis has been able to present different pictures describe the complexity of humanitarian interventions. Through analyse of the conflicts taking place in Rwanda 1994 and in Kosovo 1999, the issue of humanitarian intervention has been further scrutinised and discussed. This has been done through a qualitative text analyse.</p><p>Keywords: Humanitarian Intervention, Sovereignty, Non-intervention, International law, Realism, Cosmopolitanism, Utilitarianism, Morality</p>

Animal welfare is a topic subjected to great controversy, mostly within moral philosophy. The moral issue of human behaviour is often dealt with, alongside whether nonhuman animals are eligible certain rights. In our world, how humans behave towards nonhuman animals have fallen into something of political oblivion, which is the departure-point for this research. The essay’s discourse surrounds nonhuman animals’ political and moral status in Sweden, with the aim of drawing conclusions regarding whether they can be said to possess it. This is done through an analysis of ideas, using dimensions as tools, problematizing the Swedish parliamentary parties' views on animal welfare. A better understanding for nonhuman animals’ situation in Sweden has been provided, showing that there is no animal rights mentality tangible, while speciesist and utilitarian attitudes towards nonhuman animals dominate. The analysis show that nonhuman animals in Sweden possess moral status, as the parties agree that nonhuman animals should be spared from unnecessary suffering, and their welfare seems to count in its own right. However, human interests tend to take precedence in most cases, and in the end, nonhuman animals cannot be considered to possess any political status, despite their unmistakable presence in our society.

This paper revisits one of the more frequented stops at the crossroads of politics and morality in contemporary ethical theory, Michael Walzer’s essay “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands.” The aim is to provide a fresh assessment of Walzer’s project, and to evaluate the tenability of its core notion of “dirty hands.” In pursuit of this aim, the effort is made to reopen the paths which take Walzer to his celebrated impasse, from two directions. The first of these resituates Walzer’s analysis in the context of the debate within Anglo-American ethical theory in which it is originally expounded. The second route seeks to recapture the trail of thinkers who guide Walzer to his conclusions from more remote locations in intellectual history, in order to determine the reliability of his intriguing constellation of Machiavelli, Weber and Camus as lodestars. Writing thirty years later, one of Walzer’s friendliest interpreters, Jean Elshtain, in the midst of her enthusiasm for ‘dirty hands,’ renews doubts about his recommendation of “casuistry.” Hints from throughout Walzer’s essay, incompletely elaborated there, are parceled together into closing suggestions as to an alternative approach to so-called ‘dirty hands’ situations. / text

L’inflation a diminué de façon importante dans les pays riches depuis le début des années 80. Cette baisse de l’inflation n’est pas un hasard et peut, en partie, être liée à la mise en place de nouvelles institutions et politiques monétaires. Ce mémoire examine la relation qui existe entre deux de ces institutions, l’indépendance politique et le conservatisme d’une banque centrale, et l’idéal d’égalité économique. Peut-on, demandons-nous, être égalitariste et défendre, à la fois, l’indépendance politique d’une banque centrale et la volonté «conservatrice» de faire de l’inflation une priorité relativement au chômage? Le mémoire se divise en trois grandes parties. Une version crédible de l’égalitarisme économique est d’abord présentée. La relation qui existe entre le phénomène d’inflation et l’égalitarisme est, ensuite, examinée. Une réflexion critique sur les fondements théoriques de l’indépendance politique et du conservatisme est, enfin, développée. Nous concluons que la théorie égalitariste ne permet pas, à elle seule, de déterminer si un modèle particulier de banque centrale est moralement désirable. Pour se porter à la défense d’une banque centrale indépendante et conservatrice, un égalitariste doit adhérer à des prémisses économiques contestées. / Inflation has been decreasing in rich countries since the beggining of the 80’s. The creation of new monetary institutions in the western world is, partly at least, responsible for this fall. This Master’s thesis examines the relation beetween the ideal of economic equality and two important monetary institutions: Central bank conservatism and political independance. Can egalitarians support, I ask, the conservatism and the political independance of a central bank? This work is divided in three parts. We, first, present a credible definition of what egalitarism is. We examine the relation that exists beetween inflation and egalitarianism. Finally, we analyse and criticize the theoretical foundation of political independance and monetary conservatism. We conclude that egalitarianism cannot determinate, by itself, the moral quality of monetary institutions. Egalitarians can defend central bank political independance and conservatism, but to do so they have to accept controversial economic premisses.

L’ambition initiale de Rawls est de présenter une analyse de la justice distributive supérieure à la conception utilitariste, incapable, selon lui, de fournir une base satisfaisante de la justice dans le cadre d’une démocratie. Pour ce faire, Rawls mobilisera, dans son principal ouvrage Théorie de la Justice [1971], des idées empreintes de la philosophie politique et morale anglosaxonne mais également de très nombreux concepts forgés par les économistes. Cet ouvrage devient ainsi une référence incontournable pour la philosophie politique contemporaine mais aussi pour les théories économiques de la justice sociale. Notre thèse se propose de reconstruire la théorie de Rawls dont les études, nombreuses mais morcelées, ont donné lieu à des interprétations très contradictoires. Etudier la pensée de l’auteur à l’aune de l’économie sert à donner une cohérence d’ensemble à la justice comme équité, depuis sa genèse jusqu’à ses derniers développements. Cette méthodologie, en effet, nous permet de montrer qu’au-delà de l’indétermination du principe de différence – qui peut justifier tant une politique ultralibérale qu’une politique inspirée des idéaux socialistes – l’amélioration de la situation des plus défavorisés passe par le dépassement du système capitaliste. Ce système n’est pas à même de répondre aux exigences des principes de justice défendus par Rawls. / Rawls’ first ambition is to present an analysis of social justice superior to utilitarian conception, enable, according to him, to provide a satisfactory account of justice in the context of democracy. In order to do that, Rawls took, in his main book A Theory of Justice [1971], ideas imprinted of moral and political philosophy but also many concepts built by the economists. This work became consequently the reference to contemporary political philosophy and also to economic theory of social justice. Our thesis proposes to reconstruct the theory of Rawls. Indeed many but fragmented researches gave rise to conflicting interpretations of this theory. So studying Rawls’ thought regarding economics allows us tobring an overall consistency to the justice as fairness, from its genesis to its last developments. Our methodology aims to show, that beyond the indetermination of the Difference principle – which can either supply an ultraliberal policy or a policy inspired by socialist ideals – the improvement of the situation of the least advantaged required to go beyond capitalism. This system is enable to answer to the requirements of the principles of justice defended by Rawls.

Political economy played a central role in the construction of the new Republic of Colombia through the influence of Ezequiel Rojas. In his pursuit of theoretical and practical guidance to organize a new society of free individuals pledged to happiness, Rojas looked to political economy for inspiration. However, the sources that Rojas drew on did not belong to the tradition of classical political economy; he based his own approach on other, less traditional sources; namely utilitarianism and ideology. In this text I aim to reconstruct this approach, showing its tensions and contradictions and the way in which Rojas tried to address them through religion. / La economía política jugó un papel importante en la construcción de la nueva República de Colombia en cabeza de Ezequiel Rojas. En busca de elementos teóricos y prácticos para organizar una nueva sociedad de individuos libres y destinados a la felicidad, Rojas buscó en la economía política inspiración. Sin embargo, no era la economía política clásica la que Rojas difundía en sus enseñanzas. Rojas construyó su propia propuesta a partir de tradiciones e influencias menos usuales: el utilitarismo y la ideología. En este texto pretendo reconstruir esa propuesta, mostrando sus tensiones y contradicciones y la manera como Rojas intentó conciliarse recurriendo a la religión.