Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2018-02-15T11:42:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 CarlosAndreMacielPinheiroPereira_DISSERT.pdf: 1299607 bytes, checksum: a9e15627491aa83891cdd91ec4124ef5 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2018-02-16T13:24:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CarlosAndreMacielPinheiroPereira_DISSERT.pdf: 1299607 bytes, checksum: a9e15627491aa83891cdd91ec4124ef5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-16T13:24:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CarlosAndreMacielPinheiroPereira_DISSERT.pdf: 1299607 bytes, checksum: a9e15627491aa83891cdd91ec4124ef5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-07 / A presente disserta??o tem como objetivo analisar a conex?o entre a opini?o p?blica constru?da procedimentalmente, atrav?s do discurso, com a legitimidade e racionalidade da jurisdi??o constitucional. O exame ? feito com m?todo dedutivo, atrav?s de pesquisa qualitativa e vi?s normativo, com apoio bibliogr?fico na obra de J?rgen Habermas, tendo na teoria do agir comunicativo um ponto de partida. No decorrer do estudo s?o feitas considera??es sobre a forma??o da opini?o p?blica no contexto da democracia deliberativa e os seus reflexos na judicatura, tendo no instituto do amicus curiae um canal comunicativo entre sociedade civil e poder judici?rio. Compreende, ainda, que a jurisdi??o tem sua legitimidade condicionada a um modelo procedimental, cuja viga mestra ? a coopera??o dial?gica entre todos os atores processuais envolvidos, sendo esta uma das t?nicas adotadas pelo C?digo de Processo Civil. Ao fim, conclui que o modelo procedimental baseado em J?rgen Habermas ? aplic?vel ao Brasil. / This dissertation aims to analyze the connection between procedurally constructed public opinion, through discourse, with the legitimacy and rationality of constitutional jurisdiction. The study is carried from a deductive method, through qualitative research and normative bias, and bibliographical support on the work of J?rgen Habermas, being the theory of communicative action the starting point. In the course of the study, considerations about the formation of public opinion in the context of deliberative democracy and its reflexes in judicature, being amicus curiae the communicative channel between civil society and the judiciary branch. Comprehends, moreover, that jurisdiction has its legitimacy conditioned to a procedural model, whose crossbeam is the dialogical cooperation between all procedural actors involved, being this one of the tones adopted by the Civil Procedural Law. In the end, it is concluded that the procedural model based in J?rgen Habermas is applied in Brazil.

This research explores the role of public interest litigants in the circulation of arguments among courts regarding the interpretation of fundamental rights. Such circulation is often labeled ‘judicial dialogue’. ‘Public interest litigants’ are here defined as entities (individuals or groups) with no direct interest in the case, who use procedural avenues to participate in the litigation. Despite extensive scholarly attention for judicial dialogue, the necessity for more empirical research devoted to the exchanges among jurisdictions had been stressed. Three jurisdictions with different postures towards cross-citations were chosen for the analysis: the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights and the South African Constitutional Court. Among their vast case law, landmark cases were selected dealing firstly with death penalty or related questions and secondly with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Briefs submitted by public interest litigants to courts were collected and analyzed, mainly to inquire about the identity of the actors involved in the cases, to see whether their briefs contain comparative material and, if they do, to record what sort of references are made and whether they are accompanied by justifications supporting their relevance.The analysis reveals that the briefs contain comparative material. Many public interest litigants can be considered as messengers of this information. They push for the detachment of judicial interpretation from the text at hand and propose a variant of the interpretative exercise in which the mobilized material is not exclusively jurisdiction-bound. The cross-analysis also reveals that, contrary to the picture painted by the literature on the phenomenon, there are actually many comparisons in the broad sense (referring for example to a ‘universal practice’) that are used in a norm-centric way, that is, where the simple mention of a comparative element in the form of a broad reference or the outcome of a foreign case should have weight in the adjudication and not in a reason-centric way, that is, by exposing the reasoning of a foreign judge. The research also hypothesized that the comparative material brought by public interest litigants influences the judges. Analyzing the cases using the process-tracing method allowed to substantiate that briefs are read and established that several comparative references brought by public interest litigants were debated during the oral arguments and found an echo in the judgments (in majority and dissenting opinions). Along with the use of other methods such as interviews of judges, the hypothesis was thus confirmed.Exploring the roles of external actors also enables to supply the literature on judicial dialogue with factual insights regarding the identities of the actors behind the circulation of legal arguments. It was found that, in the United States, the traditional domestic ‘repeat players’ (that is, actors often involved in the litigation) do not clearly embrace a comparative approach while most public interest litigants in Europe and South Africa do. Similarly, the pregnant role of transnational actors is underlined. The analysis suggests an explanation drawn from an aspect of the legal culture in which the public interest litigants evolve and which influences their argumentative strategies: the horizon of the ambient rights discourse: a civil rights discourse, more territorially bounded (and more often found in the U.S. context), is distinguished from a human rights or fundamental rights discourse which entails a more cosmopolitan dimension.The final part of the research explores and discusses the justifications provided by public interest litigants to support the relevance of a comparative approach in the interpretation of rights. The compilation of these justifications allows to confront those provided first hand to the judges with those constructed post facto by the scholarly literature. It reveals the uncertain implications of some of these justifications, in particular the one pointing to the universal nature of the discussed rights and the one invoking the need for consistency among the approaches of jurisdictions.The research thus allows to confirm the hypothesis that public interest litigants play a key role in judicial dialogue. Moreover, it points at further promising researches, and this thesis hopes to draw the attention to often neglected elements, such as the identity and status of the actors bringing comparative information, the forms of citations and the roles assigned to them, the aspects of legal culture that are seldom mentioned in the literature and the implications of the justifications explicitly or implicitly provided for the relevance of comparative material. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

O moderno conceito de democracia não se sustenta apenas sob o pilar único do modelo representativo. O respeito aos direitos fundamentais faz-se elemento imprescindível para o delineamento do Estado Democrático de Direito. Não obstante, a cláusula de que todo poder emana no povo também deve ser revisitada no estágio atual, de modo a contemplar instrumentos da democracia participativa, que devem se imbricar ao processo representativo. Esta ideologia participativa também é sentida perante o Poder Judiciário, com reflexos sensíveis às garantias processuais, mormente ao contraditório. Deste modo, é pela ótica dos princípios irradiados pelo Estado Democrático de Direito que a intervenção do Poder Judiciário no controle das políticas públicas deve ser analisada. Por este paradigma instituído pela Constituição Federal de 1988, torna-se poder-dever do Poder Judiciário, juntamente com as demais funções estatais, concorrer para a efetivação dos objetivos constitucionais, o que representa a possibilidade de deliberação judicial em assuntos de largo espectro político e social. Não há dúvidas de que esta intervenção tem limites, de modo a impedir qualquer invasão indevida do Poder Judiciário em assuntos que, a priori, são de atribuição das demais funções estatais, executiva e legislativa. Por esta razão, torna-se imprescindível definir os parâmetros da atividade jurisdicional no controle das políticas públicas, o que exige o estudo da interpretação constitucional e da discricionariedade administrativa. Para o cumprimento deste mister, a escolha do instrumento processual adequado torna-se condição sine qua non com vistas ao alcance de uma decisão justa. Afastando-se do modelo individualista, o processo coletivo acompanha a evolução do direito material, impulsionado por um contexto dominado pelos valores da solidariedade e do coletivismo. As políticas públicas, compreendidas enquanto método para a distribuição igualitária dos bens comuns, são direcionadas sempre a uma coletividade. Diante disso, a tutela de direitos essencialmente coletivos, é, preferencialmente, a forma mais adequada para o controle das políticas públicas perante o Poder Judiciário, pois a característica da indivisibilidade do direito preserva o valor da isonomia inerente às políticas públicas. Aliados à técnica processual coletiva, estão outros instrumentos que corroboram para a democratização do provimento jurisdicional. O primeiro deles refere-se à análise da representatividade adequada do legitimado coletivo. Em uma abordagem política da representação dos membros ausentes, a proposta é que o órgão julgador possa analisar, no caso concreto, se os interesses sociais foram adequadamente postulados na ação coletiva. Ademais, a realização de audiências públicas durante o curso do processo torna-se um mecanismo de participação popular, evitando-se que o debate sobre as importantes deliberações políticas restrinja-se às partes processuais formais, tornando-o eminentemente técnico. Por fim, a intervenção do amicus curiae nos processos coletivos, que tem como pauta o controle das políticas públicas, qualifica o debate, trazendo importantes vozes da sociedade que, por sua experiência e conhecimento, podem contribuir para uma escorreita deliberação judicial. / The modern democracy concept cannot hold itself under the sole pillar of the representative model. The respect of the fundamental rights becomes a mandatory element for the Democratic State of Rights outlining. Inspite of this, the clause that all power emanates from the people must be taken into consideration in the current stage, so as to contemplate participative democracy instruments that have to conform to the representative process. This participative ideology is also felt in the face of the Judiciary Power, with meaningful reflexes on the processual guarantees, mainly to the principle of an adversarial process. Thus, it is through the optic of the principles irradiated by the Democratic State of Rights that the intervention of the Judiciary Power in the control of public policies must be analyzed. By this model instituted by the Federal Constitution of 1988, it becomes power-duty of the Judiciary Power, together with the other state functions, collaborate for the effetivation of the constitutional aims, which represent the possibility of Judiciary deliberation in matters of wide political and social spectrum. There is no doubt that this intervention has limits, so as to avoid an undue invasion of the Judiciary Power in matters that, a priori, are attribution of the other state functions, as the Executive and Legislative. For this reason, it becomes mandatory to define the parameters of the juridical activities in the control of public politics, which demands the study of the constitucional interpretation and of the administrative discritionarity. To ful-fill this aim, the choice of the proper processual becomes a sine qua non with a view to reaching a fair decision. Getting far from the individualist, the collective process follows the evolution of the material right, moved ahead by a context dominated by the solidarity and collectivism values. Politic public actions, understood as a method for the equal distribution of common wellfare, are always directed for a collectivity. So, the guardianship of essentially collective goods is, preferably, the most adequate form for the control of public policies before the Judiciary Power, for the characteristic of the indivisibility of right will preserve the value of the isonomy inherent to public policies. Together with the processual collective technique, there are other instruments which collaborate for the democratization of the juridical provision. The first of them refers to the analysis of the proper representativity of the legitimate collective. In a political approach of the representation of the absent members, the proposal is that the judging organ may analyze, in the concret case, whether the social interests have been properly postulated in the collective action. Furthermore, the realization of public audiences during the process becomes a mechanism of popular participation, avoiding that the debate about the important politic deliberations is restricted to the processual formal parties, making it become eminently technical. Last, the intervention of the amicus curiae in the collective processes, having as aim the control of public policies, gives quality to the debate, bringing in important voices of society, which, for their experience and knowledge, may contribute for a fair judicial deliberation.

Le règlement des différends forme la clef de voûte du système commercial multilatéral et une contribution sans précédent de l'OMC à la stabilité de l'économie mondiale. Sans un moyen de régler les différends, le système fondé sur des règles ne serait d'aucune utilité car celles-ci ne pourraient pas être appliquées. Cette organisation est dotée de moyens institutionnels et de régulation propres. L'ORD, Organe de règlement des différends, arbitre des différends commerciaux internationaux qui vise à garantir le bon fonctionnement de l'OMC et à la correction des défauts majeurs apparus lors du GATT. Il est aujourd'hui l'un des mécanismes interétatiques parmi les plus actifs sur le plan international.Pourtant, le jeu économique international n'implique pas seulement les États, les acteurs privés, affectés par les actes et les comportements commerciaux, y cherchent à jouer un rôle concret et efficace. Cette étude aborde la question de la possibilité d'intervention des acteurs privés aux procédures de règlement des différends de l'OMC. Elle a pour objet de présenter les formes actuelles d'intervention de ces acteurs au sein de ces procédures et les possibilités d'un renforcement de leur participation au sein de l'OMC.

Submitted by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2012-05-07T20:29:55Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Beatriz Castilho Costa.pdf: 608373 bytes, checksum: 8d0c3f7f4f7780ba1d49be5300dbb9c0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2012-05-07T20:30:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Beatriz Castilho Costa.pdf: 608373 bytes, checksum: 8d0c3f7f4f7780ba1d49be5300dbb9c0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-05-07T20:30:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Beatriz Castilho Costa.pdf: 608373 bytes, checksum: 8d0c3f7f4f7780ba1d49be5300dbb9c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03 / The following research project is being presented to the qualification committee of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas Law School of Rio de Janeiro, as a requirement to obtain a Master’s title in the Judiciary System. The object of this research is the decision making procedure of the Supreme Federal Court, with the specific objective of studying the influence exercised by the Court’s external actors in the decision making of its Ministers. In this problematic, the angle chosen was the analysis of the influence exercised by agents that officially participate in the Supreme Federal Court’s procedures acting as amici curiae in the direct actions of unconstitutionality. The dissertation is structured in 3 (three) sections, in the following manner: the first section makes an introduction of the chosen object and the used methodology, as well as the indicators for carrying out a study on the existence or not of the influence of arguments brought by amicus curiae. The second section addresses a brief description of the concentrated control of constitutionality and the role of amicus curiae in the direct action of unconstitutionality. It also encompasses a study made by Damares Medina, the difference of the present work with the latter, and the studied direct actions of constitutionality The third section brings the analysis of the analysis of data found in the 53 (fifty-three) direct actions of unconstitutionality that were herein studied. Lastly, there is this project’s conclusion. / O projeto de pesquisa ora apresentado à banca de qualificação da Escola de Direito do Rio de Janeiro da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Mestre em Poder Judiciário, situa-se na área de concentração das práticas jurisdicionais de fim. O problema de pesquisa é o processo decisório do Supremo Tribunal Federal, com o objetivo específico de estudar a influência exercida por atores externos ao Tribunal nas decisões de seus Ministros. Dentro desta problemática, o recorte escolhido foi a análise da influência exercida por agentes que participam formalmente dos processos sob a jurisdição do Supremo, atuando como amici curiae nas ações diretas de inconstitucionalidade. A dissertação está estruturada em está estruturado em 3 (três) seções, da seguinte forma: a primeira seção faz uma introdução da problemática escolhida e da metodologia utilizada, assim como os indicadores para a realização da análise da existência ou não da influência dos argumentos trazidos pelo amicus curiae. A segunda seção traz breve descrição acerca do controle concentrado de constitucionalidade e o papel do amicus curiae na ação direta de inconstitucionalidade. Traz, ainda, o estudo feito por Damares Medina, a diferença deste trabalho com relação ao primeiro e as ADI estudadas. A terceira seção traz uma análise do processo decisório nos tribunais e a influência exercida pelo amicus curiae nas decisões majoritárias do Supremo Tribunal Federal, em especial, o caso das ações direta de inconstitucionalidade, bem como a análise dos dados encontrados nas 53 (cinqüenta e três) ADI estudadas. Por fim, tem-se a conclusão deste trabalho.

O moderno conceito de democracia não se sustenta apenas sob o pilar único do modelo representativo. O respeito aos direitos fundamentais faz-se elemento imprescindível para o delineamento do Estado Democrático de Direito. Não obstante, a cláusula de que todo poder emana no povo também deve ser revisitada no estágio atual, de modo a contemplar instrumentos da democracia participativa, que devem se imbricar ao processo representativo. Esta ideologia participativa também é sentida perante o Poder Judiciário, com reflexos sensíveis às garantias processuais, mormente ao contraditório. Deste modo, é pela ótica dos princípios irradiados pelo Estado Democrático de Direito que a intervenção do Poder Judiciário no controle das políticas públicas deve ser analisada. Por este paradigma instituído pela Constituição Federal de 1988, torna-se poder-dever do Poder Judiciário, juntamente com as demais funções estatais, concorrer para a efetivação dos objetivos constitucionais, o que representa a possibilidade de deliberação judicial em assuntos de largo espectro político e social. Não há dúvidas de que esta intervenção tem limites, de modo a impedir qualquer invasão indevida do Poder Judiciário em assuntos que, a priori, são de atribuição das demais funções estatais, executiva e legislativa. Por esta razão, torna-se imprescindível definir os parâmetros da atividade jurisdicional no controle das políticas públicas, o que exige o estudo da interpretação constitucional e da discricionariedade administrativa. Para o cumprimento deste mister, a escolha do instrumento processual adequado torna-se condição sine qua non com vistas ao alcance de uma decisão justa. Afastando-se do modelo individualista, o processo coletivo acompanha a evolução do direito material, impulsionado por um contexto dominado pelos valores da solidariedade e do coletivismo. As políticas públicas, compreendidas enquanto método para a distribuição igualitária dos bens comuns, são direcionadas sempre a uma coletividade. Diante disso, a tutela de direitos essencialmente coletivos, é, preferencialmente, a forma mais adequada para o controle das políticas públicas perante o Poder Judiciário, pois a característica da indivisibilidade do direito preserva o valor da isonomia inerente às políticas públicas. Aliados à técnica processual coletiva, estão outros instrumentos que corroboram para a democratização do provimento jurisdicional. O primeiro deles refere-se à análise da representatividade adequada do legitimado coletivo. Em uma abordagem política da representação dos membros ausentes, a proposta é que o órgão julgador possa analisar, no caso concreto, se os interesses sociais foram adequadamente postulados na ação coletiva. Ademais, a realização de audiências públicas durante o curso do processo torna-se um mecanismo de participação popular, evitando-se que o debate sobre as importantes deliberações políticas restrinja-se às partes processuais formais, tornando-o eminentemente técnico. Por fim, a intervenção do amicus curiae nos processos coletivos, que tem como pauta o controle das políticas públicas, qualifica o debate, trazendo importantes vozes da sociedade que, por sua experiência e conhecimento, podem contribuir para uma escorreita deliberação judicial. / The modern democracy concept cannot hold itself under the sole pillar of the representative model. The respect of the fundamental rights becomes a mandatory element for the Democratic State of Rights outlining. Inspite of this, the clause that all power emanates from the people must be taken into consideration in the current stage, so as to contemplate participative democracy instruments that have to conform to the representative process. This participative ideology is also felt in the face of the Judiciary Power, with meaningful reflexes on the processual guarantees, mainly to the principle of an adversarial process. Thus, it is through the optic of the principles irradiated by the Democratic State of Rights that the intervention of the Judiciary Power in the control of public policies must be analyzed. By this model instituted by the Federal Constitution of 1988, it becomes power-duty of the Judiciary Power, together with the other state functions, collaborate for the effetivation of the constitutional aims, which represent the possibility of Judiciary deliberation in matters of wide political and social spectrum. There is no doubt that this intervention has limits, so as to avoid an undue invasion of the Judiciary Power in matters that, a priori, are attribution of the other state functions, as the Executive and Legislative. For this reason, it becomes mandatory to define the parameters of the juridical activities in the control of public politics, which demands the study of the constitucional interpretation and of the administrative discritionarity. To ful-fill this aim, the choice of the proper processual becomes a sine qua non with a view to reaching a fair decision. Getting far from the individualist, the collective process follows the evolution of the material right, moved ahead by a context dominated by the solidarity and collectivism values. Politic public actions, understood as a method for the equal distribution of common wellfare, are always directed for a collectivity. So, the guardianship of essentially collective goods is, preferably, the most adequate form for the control of public policies before the Judiciary Power, for the characteristic of the indivisibility of right will preserve the value of the isonomy inherent to public policies. Together with the processual collective technique, there are other instruments which collaborate for the democratization of the juridical provision. The first of them refers to the analysis of the proper representativity of the legitimate collective. In a political approach of the representation of the absent members, the proposal is that the judging organ may analyze, in the concret case, whether the social interests have been properly postulated in the collective action. Furthermore, the realization of public audiences during the process becomes a mechanism of popular participation, avoiding that the debate about the important politic deliberations is restricted to the processual formal parties, making it become eminently technical. Last, the intervention of the amicus curiae in the collective processes, having as aim the control of public policies, gives quality to the debate, bringing in important voices of society, which, for their experience and knowledge, may contribute for a fair judicial deliberation.

Why do interest groups participate in state courts of last resort by filing amicus curiae briefs? Are they influential when they do? This dissertation examines these questions using an original survey of organized interests that routinely participate in state supreme courts, as well as data on all amicus curiae briefs and majority opinions in over 14,000 cases decided in all fifty-two state supreme courts for a four year period. I argue that interest groups turn to state judiciaries to achieve the dual goals of influencing policy and organizational maintenance, as amicus briefs can help organized interests achieve both outcomes. Furthermore, I contend that amicus briefs are influential in shaping judicial policy-making through the provision of legally persuasive arguments. The results suggest that interest groups do file amicus briefs to both lobby for their preferred policies and to support their organization's long-term viability. Additionally, the results indicate that organized interests also participate in counteractive lobbying in state courts of last resort by filing amicus briefs to ensure their side is represented and to dull the effect of oppositional amici. The findings also demonstrate support for the influence of amicus briefs on judicial policy-making on state high courts, as amicus briefs can influence the ideological direction of the court's majority opinions. Overall, this research extends our understanding of interest group lobbing in the judiciary and in state policy venues, and provides insight into judicial politics and policy-making on state courts of last resort.

L’arbitrage public international est demeuré un domaine exclusif aux États souverains jusqu’à la fin des années 50, alors que sont apparus les traités bilatéraux relatifs aux investissements (TBI). La principale caractéristique de ces TBI est sans conteste le recours direct de l’investisseur étranger en arbitrage international contre des États récalcitrants, une alternative aux tribunaux locaux souvent inefficaces. Plus récemment, en 1998, l’organe d’appel de l’OMC est allé jusqu’à accepter l’opinion d’amicus curiae dans un différend opposant des États et aujourd’hui, l’admission de ce type d’opinion est expressément prévue dans plusieurs TBI de nouvelle génération. Mais si l’investisseur bénéficie d’un recours devant une instance arbitrale neutre, il en va tout autrement pour la population locale qui se trouve souvent lésée par la présence, sur son territoire, d’investisseurs étrangers. Le droit de présenter une opinion ne peut remplacer le droit de faire valoir une réclamation. Se pose donc la question : est-ce que, dans le contexte actuel du droit de l’investissement international, des tiers (par rapport aux parties signataires de TBI et par rapport aux parties au différend) peuvent prétendre à une voie de recours direct en arbitrage international? Nous sommes d’avis qu’une telle voie de recours est actuellement possible et que le contexte de l’arbitrage relatif à l’investissement constitue un terrain fertile pour la mise en place de ce droit, étant donné la place déjà faite aux investisseurs. Nous verrons que les principales objections à l’admission de tiers à l’arbitrage international peuvent être rejetées. L’objection de l’absence du consentement des parties intéressées tombe quand on constate les nombreux cas d’arbitrage international où la portée du consentement a été étendue pour inclure des non-parties ou encore pour soumettre à l’arbitrage des matières non envisagées au départ. Par ailleurs, l’absence de qualité pour agir en droit international est un problème théorique, car les investisseurs y ont déjà accès malgré l’absence de cette qualité. Reste donc à déterminer quelle pourrait être la base d’un recours en droit substantiel international pour qu’un tiers puisse faire valoir une réclamation. Nous verrons qu’il existe des instruments juridiques et des principes internationaux dont la contravention pourrait très bien engager la responsabilité de l’État ou de l’investisseur fautif, tout comme il est possible de bien circonscrire les critères d’admissibilité des tiers à la procédure d’arbitrage international. / International arbitration has remained an exclusive domain sovereign states until, in the late 50s, came the first bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The main feature of these BITs is undoubtedly the right, granted to investors, to direct international arbitration against recalcitrant States, an alternative to often ineffective local justice. More recently, in 1998, the appellate body of the WTO went to accept the opinion of an independent amicus curiae in a dispute between State members. Today, the admission of such opinions is clearly provided for in several recent BITs. But if investors benefit from a right of action before a neutral international arbitration body, the situation is quite different for the local population, who is often affected by the presence of foreign investors on its territory. The right to submit an opinion cannot replace the right to legal action. This therefore raises one question: in the current context of international investment law, is it possible for third parties (non signatories of BITs and not parties to the dispute) are entitled to a remedy direct international arbitration? We are of the opinion that the answer to this question is: yes. And the context of investment arbitration, because of the right to direct arbitration against States already granted to investors, constitutes a fertile ground for the implementation of this right of action in favour of third parties. The objection based on the absence of the parties’ consent to such right of action has been set aside in many international arbitration cases where the scope of consent has been extended to include non-parties or to submit to arbitration matters not contemplated at first. Also, the objection based on the absence of legal standing of third parties in International Law proves to be theoretical as foreign investors already have access to international justice despite the lack of this quality. There remains to determine what substantial International Law will constitute a valid legal basis for a third party claim. We will see that there exists legal instruments and international principles and that their violation by States or investors may result in the obligation to compensate the prejudice suffered, as well as it is possible to clearly define and indentify who the third parties could be.

L’arbitrage public international est demeuré un domaine exclusif aux États souverains jusqu’à la fin des années 50, alors que sont apparus les traités bilatéraux relatifs aux investissements (TBI). La principale caractéristique de ces TBI est sans conteste le recours direct de l’investisseur étranger en arbitrage international contre des États récalcitrants, une alternative aux tribunaux locaux souvent inefficaces. Plus récemment, en 1998, l’organe d’appel de l’OMC est allé jusqu’à accepter l’opinion d’amicus curiae dans un différend opposant des États et aujourd’hui, l’admission de ce type d’opinion est expressément prévue dans plusieurs TBI de nouvelle génération. Mais si l’investisseur bénéficie d’un recours devant une instance arbitrale neutre, il en va tout autrement pour la population locale qui se trouve souvent lésée par la présence, sur son territoire, d’investisseurs étrangers. Le droit de présenter une opinion ne peut remplacer le droit de faire valoir une réclamation. Se pose donc la question : est-ce que, dans le contexte actuel du droit de l’investissement international, des tiers (par rapport aux parties signataires de TBI et par rapport aux parties au différend) peuvent prétendre à une voie de recours direct en arbitrage international? Nous sommes d’avis qu’une telle voie de recours est actuellement possible et que le contexte de l’arbitrage relatif à l’investissement constitue un terrain fertile pour la mise en place de ce droit, étant donné la place déjà faite aux investisseurs. Nous verrons que les principales objections à l’admission de tiers à l’arbitrage international peuvent être rejetées. L’objection de l’absence du consentement des parties intéressées tombe quand on constate les nombreux cas d’arbitrage international où la portée du consentement a été étendue pour inclure des non-parties ou encore pour soumettre à l’arbitrage des matières non envisagées au départ. Par ailleurs, l’absence de qualité pour agir en droit international est un problème théorique, car les investisseurs y ont déjà accès malgré l’absence de cette qualité. Reste donc à déterminer quelle pourrait être la base d’un recours en droit substantiel international pour qu’un tiers puisse faire valoir une réclamation. Nous verrons qu’il existe des instruments juridiques et des principes internationaux dont la contravention pourrait très bien engager la responsabilité de l’État ou de l’investisseur fautif, tout comme il est possible de bien circonscrire les critères d’admissibilité des tiers à la procédure d’arbitrage international. / International arbitration has remained an exclusive domain sovereign states until, in the late 50s, came the first bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The main feature of these BITs is undoubtedly the right, granted to investors, to direct international arbitration against recalcitrant States, an alternative to often ineffective local justice. More recently, in 1998, the appellate body of the WTO went to accept the opinion of an independent amicus curiae in a dispute between State members. Today, the admission of such opinions is clearly provided for in several recent BITs. But if investors benefit from a right of action before a neutral international arbitration body, the situation is quite different for the local population, who is often affected by the presence of foreign investors on its territory. The right to submit an opinion cannot replace the right to legal action. This therefore raises one question: in the current context of international investment law, is it possible for third parties (non signatories of BITs and not parties to the dispute) are entitled to a remedy direct international arbitration? We are of the opinion that the answer to this question is: yes. And the context of investment arbitration, because of the right to direct arbitration against States already granted to investors, constitutes a fertile ground for the implementation of this right of action in favour of third parties. The objection based on the absence of the parties’ consent to such right of action has been set aside in many international arbitration cases where the scope of consent has been extended to include non-parties or to submit to arbitration matters not contemplated at first. Also, the objection based on the absence of legal standing of third parties in International Law proves to be theoretical as foreign investors already have access to international justice despite the lack of this quality. There remains to determine what substantial International Law will constitute a valid legal basis for a third party claim. We will see that there exists legal instruments and international principles and that their violation by States or investors may result in the obligation to compensate the prejudice suffered, as well as it is possible to clearly define and indentify who the third parties could be.

2001年11月世界貿易組織召開杜哈部長會議，重啟檢討爭端解決規則與程序瞭解書（DSU）之新回合談判，其中「法庭之友」議題頗受注目，已開發國家與開發中國家立場截然不同，幾無共識。DSU之本文與其附件皆未提及「法庭之友」一詞，歷經幾次關鍵性案件之裁決，上訴機構逐漸發展出一套規則，認為DSU第13條、第17.9條與上訴審查作業程序第16(1)條可資引用為小組與上訴機構接受與考慮「法庭之友」書面意見之法律基礎。本文首先從法律面向著手，將現行條文加以適當之解釋，認為目前上開條文之規定並無法為「法庭之友」提供一合理之法律基礎，上訴機構向來有關之裁決並不正確。 本文繼而從政策面向分析，主張未來世界貿易組織應適度突破傳統國際公法之限制，讓公民社會之成員有機會以「法庭之友」的身份，「間接」、「例外」地參與WTO爭端解決程序，以爭取全球民眾對世界貿易組織之支持與認同。為解決「法庭之友」之爭議，世界貿易組織會員應以修正DSU條文或另外做成決議之方式，明確釐清此一高度爭議問題，而非繼續任其模糊不清，徒增紛擾。 / The World Trade Organization (WTO) convened the Doha Ministerial Conference and restarted the review of provisions of Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) in November 2001. Inter alia, the issue of ‘amicus curiae’ was very controversial, opposite positions were raised during the DSB Special Session between the developed countries and developing countries. Since there are no words about amicus curiae in DSU and its annex, the Appellate Body concluded in some Appellate Body reports that Article 13 and 17.9 of DSU and 16(1) of Working Procedures for Appellate Review could be constituted as proper legal basis for Panel and the Appellate Body to accept and consider the amicus curiae briefs. This article starts with interpreting the existing provisions of DSU from the legal perspective, and concludes that the provisions mentioned above could not be regarded as a legal basis to for Panel and the Appellate Body to accept and consider the amicus curiae briefs and therefore, the Appellate Body’s decisions might not be appropriate. This article then suggests from the policy perspective that the WTO release itself from the restriction of traditional international public law in the future, allowing the members of civil society to present their submission in a ‘indirect’ and ‘exceptional’ way by the name of ‘amicus curiae’ in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. At last, it also recommends that the WTO members revise some provisions of DSU or make a decision to solve this controversial problem manifestly, instead of leaving it ambiguous for a long time.