La tesi ha per oggetto l’autotutela amministrativa, specialmente quella c.d. decisoria “spontanea”, ovvero quell’insieme di poteri che consentono all’amministrazione di riesaminare i propri provvedimenti e di rimuoverli a vario titolo.
Di questi poteri si è indagato il fondamento dogmatico e positivo. La questione del fondamento è stata per lunghi anni affrontata dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza in termini totalmente pre-critici e non problematici: l’esistenza di questi poteri era semplicemente scontata e le riflessioni sulla loro base giuridica si esaurivano perlopiù nella constatazione della loro necessità nell’immemore consenso circa la loro ammissibilità. Negli ultimi anni, invece, una parte degli Autori ha disconosciuto la natura implicita e per così dire “originaria” di questi poteri e ne ha perciò patrocinato la stretta riconduzione al principio di legalità: in altre parole, l’annullamento e la revoca non sarebbero affatto conseguenza della c.d. inesauribilità del potere amministrativo – negata da questa dottrina – e sarebbero perciò oggi ammissibili unicamente nei casi e nei modi disciplinati dalle due norme introdotte nella legge sul procedimento nel 2005. Ciò a garanzia della certezza dei rapporti giuridici e del legittimo affidamento dei destinatari dei provvedimenti ampliativi. Secondo un filone ricostruttivo in pare contrastante con il primo, altri Autori hanno inteso valorizzare gli elementi de iure condito a favore della obbligatorietà dell’avvio del procedimento di riesame, auspicandone contemporaneamente la generalizzazione, nell’ottica di una più complessiva trasformazione dell’annullamento d’ufficio in un nuovo istituto ibrido, rispondente alla funzione di alternative dispute risolution system o, se si vuole, di ricorso gerarchico. Per le stesse ragioni, l’istituto dovrebbe perdere il carattere ampiamente discrezionale, in favore di una vincolatezza totale o parziale. Questo secondo “fronte di attacco” alla ricostruzione tradizionale intende offrire soluzione al venir meno del sistema dei controlli di legalità sull’azione amministrativa. Lo studio ha sottoposto a verifica entrambi i filoni evolutivi richiamati, discostandosi dal secondo e, pur accogliendo parte delle argomentazioni ad esso sottostanti, anche dal primo. Quanto alla teoria dell’esauribilità del potere amministrativo, oggetto della prima linea evolutiva, si è ritenuto di condividere le considerazioni circa la tutela dell’affidamento degli interessati e della stabilità dei rapporti giuridici. È parsa tuttavia meglio rispondente alle categorie generali e alle esigenze del sistema (anche sulla base di una visione del diritto amministrativo quale “diritto dei terzi”, per natura volto alla tutela dell’interesse generale e non solo dell’interesse privato particolare coinvolto dall’esercizio del potere) la conservazione della tradizionale inesauribilità del potere, seppur assai mitigata, nella pratica, con riferimento all’esercizio dei poteri di ritiro degli atti favorevoli ai privati il cui affidamento sia concretamente meritevole di tutela. La natura discrezionale dell’annullamento d’ufficio (e della revoca), sottoposta a critica dalla seconda linea evolutiva, viene difesa sia sul piano del diritto positivo e pretorio (attraverso la riconduzione dei principali casi di annullamento c.d. doveroso al modello generale), sia sul piano delle categorie generali, a partire dalla natura dei poteri coinvolti e dall’analisi delle posizioni giuridiche dei soggetti interessati dai procedimenti di secondo grado. / The thesis focuses on the Italian system of so called autoprotection or selfprotection. This expression refers to the powers of public administration to revoke its own acts when deemed necessary to repair a vice of legitimacy or a vice of opportunity, without being bind to resort to the courts. Given the aim of this powers – the same of first grade powers plus a semi-judicial one – they are usually meant by judges and scholars as “widely discretionary”. Furthermore, it has always been believed that the choice to activate the correspondent proceeding is totally free for public administration; consequently, a demand of interested parties does not make binding the start of the procedure, opposite to what happens with administrative appeal proceedings. In recent years ECJ, ECHR and national case law has emboldened the limits to selfredress, making clear that legitimate expectations and the public interest to legal certainty must be taken into consideration and given sufficient protection. Lately, also the Legislator followed, making the annulment and the revocation harder to be put in effect when the first act is favorable to the addressed subject. In such cases, the revocation cannot be ordered for a mere reconsideration of already known circumstances (ius poenitendi) but only if new ones show up. At the same time, ex officio annulment is precluded after 18 months from the issuing of the first act, instead of the previous general limit of a “reasonable time”. On the other hand, the case law has apparently pointed out some hypothesis of mandatory annulment, such as for “anticomunitarian acts” and cost-producing acts. Based on these two orientation, some scholars suggested a global rethinking of the self-protection, its bases and its rules. The study analyzes the case law and the latest legislative reforms, proving that no mandatory annulment exists in the Italian legal system. Therefore, nor the ECJ principle of equivalence nor other principles require that selfredress become generally obliged. The thesis also aims to prove that selfprotection remains a discretionary power, in order to ensure that the contrasting needs (the rule of law on the one hand, and the legal certainty and legitimate expectation on the other hand) can be properly balanced in every decision, according to the Constitutional provision of article 97, which requires that both impartiality and good administration are pursued.

The thesis deals with philosophical aspect of Dzhgchen, which is the core of the Yungdrung Bon traditon. It is very special spiritual tradition because of it's very special nondualistic view of man and universe. First part deals with the history and division of it's teachings and it's Dzogchen lineages. Next part focuses on explanation of differences in views of sutra, tantra and Dzogchen, mainly from the standpoint of the view of base, path, fruit, emptiness, clarity, conscioussness and mind and it's nature. Next part provides translation of the text Twelve little tantras and it's deep explanation. Last part, and most important one, focuses on philosophical examination of some key aspects of Dzogchen, mainly on it's view of autenticity of mindnature. This part also compares Pramenides's fragments with some key points of view of Buddhism and Dzogchen, which may lead to some unexpected conclusions about man's thinking and the problem of it's intentionality.

La France et la Côte d’Ivoire sont deux États qui présentent des similitudes dues principalement à leur passé colonial commun ; mais il s’agit également de deux États qui présentent de nombreuses différences tenant notamment à leur niveau de développement. Si les règles de droit fiscal substantiel au sein de chacun de ces deux États permettent d’étudier les exigences de sécurité juridique et les moyens par lesquels elles sont prises en compte, c’est en réalité la pratique processuelle qui révèle de manière plus substantielle l’effectivité de cette prise en compte. Au demeurant, la problématique de la sécurité juridique n’est bien souvent réduite qu’aux seules exigences d’accessibilité, de stabilité ou de prévisibilité de la norme. Ce qui témoigne au fond d’une approche partielle de l’exigence de sécurité juridique tendant à en limiter l’étude à la qualité formelle et à l’évolution temporelle des actes juridiques. La prise en compte d’une pluralité de systèmes juridiques différents révèle cependant que la notion de sécurité juridique ne ramène pas nécessairement à un contenu univoque. En effet, l’insécurité juridique ne s’exprimant pas toujours en des termes identiques d’un cadre juridique à un autre, la sécurité juridique pourrait se révéler polysémique, voire antinomique, d’un système juridique et fiscal à un autre. Ainsi donc, au-delà de la norme, la sécurité juridique s’applique également au cadre et au système juridique ainsi qu’à la pratique juridique et juridictionnelle. La sécurité juridique apparaît donc, en droit fiscal, comme l’expression de la fiabilité d’un cadre et d’un système juridiques et fiscaux, à travers des normes de qualité offrant une garantie d’accessibilité et d’intelligibilité ainsi que des moyens pour le contribuable de bâtir des prévisions ou donner satisfaction à celles légitimement bâties. En outre, au-delà du cadre imposé par la présente thèse, il convient d’aborder la problématique de la sécurité juridique dans une approche moins restrictive, afin de ne point en occulter les aspects historiques, philosophiques, sociologiques et juridiques essentiels à une étude d’ensemble de la question. / France and Côte d'Ivoire are two countries with similarities mainly due to their common colonial past; but they are also two countries with many differences especially due to their level of development. While the rules of substantive tax law within each of these two countries make it possible to study the requirements of legal certainty and the means whereby they are taken into account, it is actually the procedural practice that reveals more substantively the effectiveness of this consideration. It should also be noted that the issue of legal certainty is often reduced to the only requirements of accessibility, stability or predictability of the standard. This actually reflects a partial approach to the requirements of legal certainty that tends to limit its study to the formal quality and the temporal evolution of legal acts. Taking into account a plurality of different legal systems, however, reveals that the concept of legal certainty does not necessarily lead to an unequivocal content. Indeed, since legal certainty is not always expressed in identical terms from one legal framework to another, legal certainty could prove to be polysemic, or even antinomic, from one legal and fiscal system to another. Thus, beyond the norm, legal certainty also applies to the legal framework and system as well as to the legal and judicial practice. Legal certainty thus, appears in tax law, as an expression of the reliability of a legal and fiscal framework and system, through quality standards, offering a guarantee of accessibility and intelligibility, as well as means for the taxpayer to build predictions or satisfy those legitimately built. Moreover, beyond the framework imposed by the present dissertation, it is important to deal with the problem of legal certainty in a less restrictive way, so as not to obscure the historical, philosophical, sociological and legal aspects essential to a holistic study of the issue.

This historical study analyses the holistic dynamics of Ethiopia, taking into account political, social, economic, cultural, religious, and media development aspects, with a focus on the three most recent governments (1930–2014), in relation to freedom of expression. The analysis indicates that the Feudalist-Imperial system was clearly the extension of centuries-old imperial hegemony which had used religious, cultural and patriotic hegemony to stifle freedom of expression. During the Socialist-Military regime every sphere of society, including acts of expression, were oriented towards the revolution and socialist political ideology. During the current ethnically based so-called Revolutionary-Democratic regime, freedom of expression has been stifled by means of legislation, government and party structures, complex surveillance, and social networks. While the instruments of repression have differed, relatively speaking, from government to government, the extent of repression has remained similar over a number of centuries. Threats to freedom of expression derive from rulers or governments, in which instances they are entrenched through policies, laws and bureaucracies, from religious and cultural hegemonies, from poverty and a related lack of education and access to information, and from conflicts, rivalry and wars. These threats have their origins in three main interrelated causal or determining factors, namely the Certainty–Uncertainty Dilemma, Ethno-Luminary Thought and Narcissism, which together form a pyramid beneath which freedom of expression in Ethiopia has been trapped. This pyramid is identified in the study as the Social Pyramid, or the Pyramid of Repression Instruments, and it in turn gives rise to an overall web of suppression, that is, the Pyramid Trap of Repression. The study concludes that the repression of freedom of expression in Ethiopia is likely to remain intact, insofar as the threats to freedom of expression and the factors giving rise to those threats persist. While limited gains concerning the right to freedom of expression are achieved periodically, these are routinely undone and rolled back, since the Pyramid Trap of Repression is not dismantled. / In hierdie historiese studie word die holistiese dinamika van Etiopië ontleed, met inagneming van politieke, sosiale, ekonomiese, kulturele, religieuse, en media-ontwikkelingsaspekte. Daar word op die drie mees onlangse regerings (1930–2014) gefokus, ten opsigte van vrye meningsuiting. Die ontleding dui daarop dat die feodalisties-imperialistiese stelsel duidelik die uitbreiding van eeue-oue imperialistiese hegemonie was wat religieuse, kulturele en patriotiese hegemonie gebruik het om vrye meningsuiting te onderdruk. Gedurende die sosialisties-militêre regime was elke sfeer van die samelewing, insluitende dade van uitdrukking, georiënteer tot die revolusie en sosialisties-politieke ideologie. Tydens die huidige, etnies gebaseerde sogenaamde revolusionêr-demokratiese regime, is vrye meningsuiting onderdruk deur wetgewing, regering- en partystrukture, komplekse bewaking, en sosiale netwerke. Hoewel die instrumente van onderdrukking relatief gesproke verskil het van regering tot regering, het die mate van onderdrukking oor ʼn aantal eeue heen soortgelyk gebly. Bedreigings vir vrye meningsuiting is afkomstig van heersers of regerings (en in sulke gevalle word hulle beveilig deur beleide, wette en burokrasieë), van religieuse en kulturele hegemonieë, van armoede en ʼn verwante gebrek aan opvoeding en toegang tot inligting, en van konflikte, mededinging en oorloë. Hierdie bedreigings het ontstaan vanweë drie vernaamste kousale of bepalende faktore wat onderling verwant is, naamlik die sekerheid-onsekerheid-dilemma, etno-voorligter-denke en narsisme, wat gesamentlik ʼn piramide vorm waaronder vrye meningsuiting in Etiopië vasgevang is. Hierdie piramide word in die studie as die sosiale piramide, of die piramide van onderdrukkingsinstrumente, geïdentifiseer, en dit lei op sy beurt tot ʼn algehele web van onderdrukking – die piramidelokval van onderdrukking. Die gevolgtrekking van die studie is dat die onderdrukking van vrye meningsuiting in Etiopië waarskynlik onaangeroer gaan bly, so lank as wat die bedreigings vir vrye meningsuiting en die faktore wat tot daardie bedreigings aanleiding gee, onveranderd bly. Hoewel beperkte suksesse van tyd tot tyd behaal word rakende die reg tot vrye meningsuiting, word sulke prestasies dikwels ongedaan gemaak, omdat die piramidelokval van onderdrukking nie afgebreek word nie. / Communication Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Communication)

El trabajo está montado como un intencionado diálogo con los criterios esgrimidos por el Tribunal Constitucional sobre esta materia (desbordamiento material de las leyes de presupuestos) en su ya dilatada jurisprudencia. Su autor defiende una concepción amplia del ámbito material de las leyes de presupuestos. Según esta posición, este tipo de ley debe incluir la materia presupuestaria, pero, como ley que es, puede cobijar otras materias, salvo prohibición constitucional clara al respecto. Esta posición es superadora de la concepción de la ley de presupuestos como ley meramente formal, de suerte que la concibe como una ley plena, emanada de la potestad legislativa del Parlamento, con la fuerza propia de la ley, esto es, no vinculada a la legislación previa y capaz (aunque no siempre idónea, desde la perspectiva de la técnica legislativa) de emprender innovaciones legales.Desde esa postura "amplia" el autor formula propuesta de solución o de mejora frente al desbordamiento material de las leyes de presupuestos. Asimismo tras analizar su problemática específica, plantea posibles soluciones en relación a la práctica de las leyes de acompañamiento. / El treball està muntat com un intencionat diàleg amb els criteris esgrimits pel Tribunal Constitucional sobre aquesta matèria (desbordament material de les lleis de pressupostos) en la seva ja dilatada jurisprudència. El seu autor defensa una concepció àmplia de l'àmbit material de les lleis de pressupostos. Segons aquesta posició, aquest tipus de llei ha d'incloure la matèria pressupostària però, com a llei que és pot acolir altres matèries, excepte prohibició constitucional clara al respecte. Aquesta posició és superadora de la concepció de la llei de pressupostos com a llei merament formal, de manera que la concep com una llei plena, emanada de la potestat legislativa del Parlament, amb la força pròpia de la llei, és a dir, no vinculada a la legislació prèvia i capaç (encara que no sempre idònia, des de la perspectiva de la tècnica legislativa) d'emprendre innovacions legals.Des d'aquesta postura àmplia, l'autor formula proposta de solució o de millora davant del desbordament material de les lleis de pressupostos. Així mateix, després d'analitzar la seva problemàtica específica, planteja possibles solucions en realció a la pràctica de les lleis d'acompanyament. / The analysis is set out as an intentional dialogue with the criteria laid down by the Constitutional Court on this subject (material overflow of state budgets laws) in the course of its extended jurisprudence, In short, the work defends a broad concept of the material scpope of budget laws.

Le retentissement psychologique d’événements sources de responsabilité, quels qu’ils soient – acte de terrorisme, perte d’un être cher, harcèlement moral… – est spécifique du fait de ses caractères protéiforme et invisible. Tout d’abord, le premier d’entre eux tient au fait qu’en matière psychologique tant les atteintes que les souffrances en résultant sont diverses. Ainsi, d’un point de vue lésionnel, certains événements vont s’avérer plus traumatisants que d’autres, principalement ceux au cours desquels le sujet a été confronté à sa propre mort. Concernant la souffrance, un sujet peut tout aussi bien souffrir émotionnellement d’une altération de sa propre intégrité – par exemple physique avec le diagnostic d’une pathologie grave – que d’un tort affectant celle d’un proche (e.g. décès, handicap). Un retentissement qualifié d’invisible ensuite, puisqu’il apparaît bien plus aisé d’identifier une atteinte à l’intégrité physique qu’une atteinte à l’intégrité psychique. De plus, certaines atteintes psychologiques sont totalement insaisissables en raison de leur caractère éminemment diffus. L’objet de cette démonstration est donc de savoir comment le droit de la responsabilité civile va appréhender la victime de ce retentissement psychologique. Sa prise en charge ne pourra être que particulière du fait de l’interaction inévitable entre les sphères juridique et psychologique.Afin de le découvrir sera proposée, dans un premier temps, une conceptualisation de la victime psychologique se fondant sur la réalité psychopathologique. Deux grandes distinctions nourrissent cette réflexion. L’une est de nature juridique ; il s’agit de la distinction du dommage et du préjudice. L’autre est d’origine psychopathologique ; elle oppose le choc émotionnel au traumatisme psychique. Leur entrecroisement permettra d’élaborer différents cas de manifestation de la souffrance psychologique et de dessiner les contours de la qualité de victime. Dans un second temps, au titre de l’indemnisation de la victime psychologique, tant l’appréciation que l’évaluation de ses préjudices seront examinées. Les répercussions du traumatisme psychique voire du choc émotionnel vont parfois être si importantes que l’indemnisation ne pourra se cantonner à la seule souffrance éprouvée. Des conséquences de nature différente, par exemple patrimoniales, devront être prises en considération. À cette fin, une typologie des préjudices de la victime sous analyse mérite d’être mise en place. Des règles d’indemnisation distinctes seront érigées en fonction du préjudice subi. Un préjudice présumé, notamment à partir d’un dommage, ne pourra logiquement être compensé de la même façon que des préjudices non présumables, c’est-à-dire soumis à expertise. En somme, le système d’indemnisation à instaurer se devra d’être en phase avec le système de révélation de la souffrance qui aura été précédemment établi.Ainsi, cette étude se propose de construire un réel statut fondateur de la victime psychologique. Une fois cette notion cardinale intégralement conceptualisée, un régime d’indemnisation s’en inférant sera rationnellement avancé. / The psychological impact of the events, which are the source of responsibility, be they acts of terrorism, loss of a loved one, psychological harassment, is specific to characteristics both protean and invisible. The first among them is due to the fact that in psychological matter injuries and the resulting suffering are both varied. As such, from the injury point of view, certain events will prove to be more traumatizing than others. Principally those during which the subject has been faced with his own death. Concerning suffering, a subject can as well emotionally suffer a change in his own integrity – for example the physical one with a diagnosis of a serious illness – that of a sort damage which affects that of a loved one (e.g. death or handicap). Then, the impact is considered invisible. It appears much more simple indeed, to identify harm to physical integrity as a harm to psychic integrity. More so, certain psychological harms are totally imperceptible by reason of their eminently diffuse characteristic. The object of this demonstration is therefore to know how civil liability law will comprehend the victim of such a psychological impact. Its comprehension will be particular given the inevitable interaction between the judicial and psychological spheres.In order to better understand this, we will first propose a conceptualization of the psychological victim that blends into psychopathological reality. Two major distinctions feed this thought. One is legal nature, which relates to the distinction between prejudice and harm. The other is psychopathological in nature which opposes emotional shock and psychic trauma. Their intertwining allows us to elaborate different cases of manifestation of psychological suffering and define the contours of the qualities of the victim. Secondly, regarding compensation for a psychological victim, both the appreciation and the evaluation of these prejudices will be examined. The repercussions of psychic trauma, or even emotional shock can sometimes be so grave that compensation cannot restrict itself only to the experienced suffering. Consequences of different natures, for example patrimonial ones, must be taken into consideration. To this end, a division of the prejudices of the psychological victim should be put in place. Distinct rules of compensation will be established based on the prejudice endured. A prejudice presumed, originating notably from a harm, cannot logically be compensated in the same fashion as non-presumable prejudices that require a forensic assessment. In short, the system of compensation must be in phase with the system of disclosure of suffering that has been previously established. As a result, this study proposes to construct a true founding status of a psychological victim. Once this principal notion has been completely conceptualized, we can use it to create a rational compensation scheme.

財政援助をコントロールする仕組みは、国によって様々であり、立法的な統制、行政的な統制又は司法的な統制等があるが、本稿では、特に、裁判所による財政支出の統制に焦点を当て、アメリカ合衆国、スペイン及びメキシコ合衆国について検討する。本稿においては、主として、アメリカ合衆国、スペイン及びメキシコ合衆国の裁判所が、私企業に対する財政支出をどのような場合において違憲又は違法とするのか、又はどのような場合において合憲又は適法とするのかということを検討し、これらの国々の裁判所がその結論に到達するために、どのような要件又は判断基準に基づいて、財政支出を統制するのかということについて考察する。 / The mechanisms for controlling fiscal assistance vary from one country to another. Legislative, executive and judicial controls can be mentioned as broad examples of these mechanisms. This research will focus on the judicial control of fiscal expenditure in the United States of America, Spain and Mexico. It primarily examines in which cases financial expenditure on the private sector is declared unconstitutional or illegal and in which situations it is declared constitutional or legal by the American, Spanish and Mexican judiciary. It will also focus on an investigation of the legal requirements for fiscal stimulus, as well as in the judging criteria developed and used by the court of those countries to reach to those conclusions. / 博士(法学) / Doctor of Laws / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University