Die Zeit der Hochindustrialisierung veränderte das Gesicht der Städte in Europa und Nordamerika grundlegend. Ein hohes natürliches Bevölkerungswachstum, ausgeprägte Land-Stadt-Wanderungen gepaart mit einer intensiven baulichen Verdichtung nach innen und außen prägten das Geschehen. Das steigende Arbeitsplatzangebot in der Industrie und dem tertiären Sektor griff tief in die traditionellen Arbeits- und Lebenswelten des Einzelnen ein. Von den Veränderungen war Berlin als Hauptstadt des Deutschen Reiches und eines der wichtigsten Wirtschaftszentren im besonderen betroffen. Ein Stadtteil Berlins, der an der ehemaligen nördlichen Stadtgrenze gelegene Wedding, steht im Mittelpunkt der vorliegenden Dissertation. Dieser Stadtteil zeichnete sich durch eine besonders dynamische Entwicklung aus. Die noch vorhandenen großen Freiflächen wurden innerhalb weniger Jahre in Bauland verwandelt. Großbetriebe der Elektro- und Chemischen Industrie ließen sich im Wedding nieder und bestimmten in zunehmendem Maße den lokalen Arbeitsmarkt. Auf der Grundlage einer Auswertung der Kirchenbücher der lokalen Gemeinden mit insgesamt 95.623 erfaßte Personen konnte für das Untersuchungsgebiet im Zeitraum 1885-1914 der Nachweis erbracht werden, dass selbst innerhalb eines eng umrissenen Stadtgebietes erhebliche sozio-ökonomische und städtebauliche Gegensätze bestanden. Diese Gegensätze werden durch die Zahlen der amtlichen Statistik nur allzu leicht verdeckt, wirken aber in ihrer Konsequenz bis in die Gegenwart nach. Zahlreiche der aktuell zu beobachtenden Problemkomplexe - u.a. eine Arbeitslosenquote von weit über 20 Prozent, Gewerbebrachen und eine überdurchschnittlich starke Konzentration ausländischer Bevölkerungsgruppen - haben demnach ihren Ursprung bereits im Kaiserreich. / The era at the peak of industrialization fundamentally altered the appearance of cities in Europe and North America. A high level of natural population growth and extensive migration movements from rural to urban areas coupled with an intensive architectural expansion to the inside and outside characterized the events. The increasing number of employment opportunities in the industrial and tertiary sectors profoundly interfered with the people’s traditional working and living environments. These changes particularly affected Berlin as the capital city of the German Empire and as one of the most important commercial centers. The Wedding, a city district of Berlin located along the former northern city limit, is at the core of this dissertation. This district stood out through its especially dynamic development. The large undeveloped areas that still existed at the time were transformed into built-up areas within a few years’ time. Large-scale enterprises in the electronic and chemical industries settled down in the Wedding district and took an increasing influence on the local job market. On the basis of an evaluation of church records (from the local Wedding parishes) that altogether contain information on 95,623 people, this study of the time period from 1885 to 1914 demonstrates the existence of significant socio-economic and urban developmental contrasts recognizable even within a narrowly defined city area (such as the Wedding district). These contrasts are all too easily concealed by the numbers of official statistical data, yet their consequences continue to produce an after-effect, even in the presence. An unemployment rate of well above 20 percent, widespread unoccupied commercial infrastructure, and a significantly above-average concentration of foreign population groups is among numerous currently recognizable problem clusters that already originated in the time of the German Empire.

In this analysis, I estimate the impact of the changing relative size of the adult male population, classified by age and education groups, on the earnings of employed males living in 502 Brazilian local labor markets during four time periods between 1970 and 2000. The effects of shifts in the age distribution of the working age population have been studied in relation to the effect of the baby-boom generation on the earnings of different cohorts in the United States. However, the question has received little attention in the context of the countries in Asia and Latin America, which are now experiencing substantial shifts in their age-education distributions. Taking advantage of the huge variation across Brazilian local labor markets, the models in this research suggest that age-education groups are not perfect substitutes, so that own-cohort-education size depresses earnings, as expected by the theory. Compositional shifts are influential, attesting that this approach represents a fruitful way of studying this central problem in economic development, going beyond the effects normally analyzed by formal labor market equations. / text

儒家思想長期影響了臺灣的性別角色以及家庭價值觀。然而儘管儒家思想持續影響， 生育率仍下降至低於人口替代率，晚婚或不婚，男性與女性就讀大學的百分比幾乎相等而職場上與公家機關的女性比例亦有提升。其中一個解釋的角度便是台灣也正跟隨歐洲的腳步，歷經第二次人口轉型。如果台灣的人口轉型是與歐陸價值體系的轉型有所關連，那麼台灣女性勢必可以從中得到更大的自由去選擇他們的人生道路以及達到性別平等。本研究的目的便是企圖找到與此論點相關的證據以及探討這種人口轉型對於女性有什麼意義。我將運用「多元邏輯式回歸方法」(multinomial logistic regression)來分析1985到2015年之間問卷的交叉數據(cross-sectional data)以及2011年由中研院主導的台灣社會變遷調查計畫中所做的家庭調查，試圖在價值導向與家庭型態當中找出潛在關聯性。在回歸分析法當中，證據不足以顯示台灣正在歷經第二次人口轉型，然則，這些證據卻足以證明台灣社會當中的價值轉變。除了數據分析，本論文也試圖融合對台灣女性的深入訪談進行研究，探討伴侶型態與不同生命歷程選擇的成因和影響。訪問數據顯示一部份的社群確實正在經歷人口轉型，其餘則不然。再者，這些女性描述了在追求自我的路途上，職場與家庭之間做出平衡的困難。最後，本研究總結台灣的性別平等之路仍須更多努力。 / Confucianism has long influenced gender roles and family values in Taiwan. Yet despite Confucianism’s continued influence, fertility rates have dropped below replacement level, marriage is being postponed or rejected, percentages of men and women attending university are roughly equal, and women’s participation in the workforce and the government has increased. One proposed explanation is that Taiwan is following in the footsteps of Europe and undergoing the Second Demographic Transition. If Taiwan’s demographic changes were connected to similar value shifts as in Europe, women in Taiwan would benefit from greater freedom to choose their own life course and greater gender equality. This research sought to determine if there is evidence to support that Taiwan is undergoing the Second Demographic Transition and what the implications are for women. Cross-sectional data from 1985 and 2015 general questionnaires and the 2011 family questionnaire of the Taiwan Social Change Survey was analyzed for a potential link between value orientation and household type using multinomial logistic regression. In regression analyses, evidence did not support that Taiwanese society as a whole is experiencing the SDT, though evidence did support value shift over time. Survey data was supplemented with in-depth interviews with Taiwanese women to determine the reasons behind and impact of their union formation and life course choices. Interview data suggested that some sectors of society are undergoing the SDT while others are not. Furthermore, women reported gender equality and difficulty balancing their work and family life as barriers to following their desired life courses. Finally, this research concludes that further efforts are required to attain women’s freedom and equality in Taiwan.

Selon les Nations Unies, la moitié de la population du Pakistan résidera dans une ville à l’horizon 2030, un taux à comparer à celui de 40% qui est attendu pour l’Inde. Notre thèse décrit les changements des structures familiales qui surviennent dans le cadre de cette transition urbaine au Pakistan. La famille peut jouer un rôle important dans la réussite des processus de transition urbaine et démographique et la maîtrise de la fécondité. Nous avons mené trois enquêtes de terrain à Faisalabad entre Décembre 2011 et Février 2012 et analysé les résultats au moyen de tabulations croisées, d’une analyse factorielle exploratoire et de modèles logistiques binomiaux. Le niveau de vie, les conditions de vie et de logement, la taille des ménages et les structures familiales sont les quatre déterminants sous-jacents associés aux structures familiales et à la transition urbaine. On observe un consensus qui fait la louange de la famille nucléaire. Les migrations contribuent également à l’expansion du système de la famille nucléaire. L’occidentalisation des familles et la promotion du rôle des femmes au sein de la famille et dans la société sont des changements observables à Faisalabad en raison de la transition urbaine. . Les femmes sont beaucoup plus nombreuses que les hommes à vivre au sein d’une famille nucléaire. De même, les classes supérieures sont aussi sont beaucoup plus nombreuses à former des familles nucléaires que les classes populaires. Une personne éduquée a beaucoup plus de chances de vivre dans une famille nucléaire qu’un illettré. Les non-migrants son légèrement moins nombreux à former des familles nucléaires que les migrants. Il y a une plus forte probabilité de rencontrer une famille nucléaire dans une zone urbaine que dans une zone rurale. Cependant, le lieu de résidence n’est pas un facteur déterminant dans les types familiaux lorsqu’il est croisé avec les facteurs sociaux. Ces derniers sont déterminants pour expliquer le contraste observé entre les familles rurales et les familles urbaines. / According to estimates of UNO, by 2030, cities are likely to house about 50 % of Pakistan’s population as compared to 40% for India. Our thesis shows a fascinating picture of changing Pakistani family structure with urban transition in Pakistan. Family can play an important role in successful completion of urban, demographic and fertility transition. We conducted three surveys from December, 2011 to February, 2012 in Faisalabad and analyzed data by cross tabulation, exploratory factor analysis and binomial logistic regression. Standard of living, Urban-Rural divide in housing conditions, household size and family structure are four latent factors which operate in relation to family structure and urban transition. There is a consensus praising the nuclear family system and preference for nuclear family system. Migrations contribute also the expanding nuclear family system. Westernization of family, women empowerment in family and society are three major latent changes in Faisalabad owing to urban transition. Females are much more than males likely to live in a nuclear family system. Upper economic class is also much more likely to live in a nuclear family system than lower economic class. There is much more chance to live in a nuclear family system as education level increases from illiterate to literate. Non-migrants are slightly less likely than migrants to live in a nuclear family system. There is a higher probability to meet nuclear families in urban areas than in rural areas. However, the place of residence has no significance on the family type in relation with social factors. Social factors are determinant in explaining the contrast between urban and rural families.

En 2008, la Banque mondiale a consacré son « rapport annuel sur le développement » à l'agriculture. Cela n’avait plus été le cas depuis 25 ans. Elle y montre que la croissance agricole est plus efficace que celle d’autres secteurs pour réduire la pauvreté. La productivité du travail agricole des actifs agricoles y est paradoxalement à peine citée : ses facteurs explicatifs de court terme comme ses variables structurantes sur le long terme ne sont pas analysés. Cette thèse entend contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des relations dynamiques qu’entretiennent la démographie et le développement non agricole avec le développement agricole (élévation de la productivité du travail agricole). Sous quelles conditions démo-économiques la transformation structurelle d'une économie (baisse du poids relatif du secteur agricole dans l’économie (actifs et valeur ajoutée)) peut-elle s'accompagner d'un développement agricole ? Alors qu’un secteur industriel ou tertiaire qui se développe est généralement attracteur d’actifs, une loi inverse existe-t-elle pour le secteur agricole ? Celui-ci doit-il nécessairement se vider de ses actifs pour se développer ? Y’a-t-il jamais eu, et peut-il y avoir développement agricole dans un contexte de croissance continue du nombre des actifs agricoles ?Notre (hypo)thèse principale est que la combinaison dynamique des facteurs «terre » et «actif agricole », dont la résultante est la « surface travaillée par actif agricole », est la véritable clé du développement agricole, davantage que la productivité de la terre. Nous analysons les déterminants des niveaux et taux de croissance de la productivité du travail agricole au cours de la période 1980 - 2007, à différentes échelles géographiques. Une attention particulière est mise sur la variable « nombre d’actifs agricoles », à l'aide de différents jeux de données (internationales, nationales, données d’enquêtes de terrain), à différentes échelles (monde, Mexique, 31 états fédérés et 2400 Municipes mexicains) et avec diverses méthodes (décomposition factorielle, cartes, classifications ascendantes hiérarchiques, inférence statistique, enquêtes de terrain auprès de ménages agricoles, non agricoles, d’institutions). Au niveau mondial, nous mettons en évidence une « course de vitesse » entre actifs agricoles et terre dans certaines régions du monde et proposons le concept de «transition agricole démographique » ainsi que sa typologie associée. Le Mexique est ensuite choisi pour ses agricultures présentant des niveaux de développement très contrastés, en synchronie comme en diachronie. Nous cherchons à expliquer les différences de trajectoires de développement agricole observées au Mexique. Nous analysons l’influence de variables caractérisant l’économie non agricole, la substitution du capital machine au travail, la libéralisation foncière, la géographie (physique et humaine). Dans les comparaisons internationales comme au Mexique, nous montrons que le taux de croissance de la surface par actif agricole a une influence marginale plus forte sur le taux de croissance de la productivité du travail agricole, que le taux de croissance de la productivité de la terre. Enfin, nous analysons les stratégies économiques de ménages et actifs agricoles, du Municipe de Teopisca dans la région de Los Altos de Chiapas, « piégés » dans un contexte de « transition agricole démographique bloquée » (décroissance tendancielle de la surface travaillée par actif) : diversification des sources de revenus (vers le non agricole) et tentatives d’élévation de la productivité de la terre sont les deux principales stratégies déployées sous contraintes de défaillances des marchés (travail, crédit) et d’accès à l’eau d’irrigation. / In 2008, the World Bank has dedicated its "Annual Report on Development" to agriculture. This had not been the case for 25 years. It shows that agricultural growth is more effective than other sectors to reduce poverty. The agricultural labor productivity of the agricultural workforce is paradoxically barely mentioned: its explanatory factors for the short term as its structural variables in the long term are not analyzed. This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamic relationship between demography and non-agricultural development with agricultural development (increased productivity of agricultural labor). Under what demo-economic conditions can the structural transformation of an economy (i.e. the decline in the relative weight of the agricultural sector in the economy (workers and value added)) be accompanied by agricultural development? While an industrial or service sector that develops generally attracts workers, is there an opposite relationship in the agricultural sector? Does the agricultural sector have to lose its workers to develop? Has an agricultural sector ever developed in a context of continuous growth in the number of agricultural workers? Our main (hypo)thesis is that the dynamic combination of factors « land » and « agricultural worker », whose resultant is the « agricultural area worked per agricultural worker », is the real key to agricultural development, more than the productivity of the land.We analyze the determinants of the level and of the growth rate of the agricultural labor productivity over the 1980-2007 period, at different geographical levels. Special focus is put on the evolution of the « number of agricultural workers », using different sets of data (international, national, field surveys data), at different scales (world, Mexico, and 31 federal states 2400 Mexican municipalities) and with various methods (factor decomposition, maps, hierarchical ascending classifications, statistical inference, field surveys of farming households).Globally, we highlight a « race » between land and the number of agricultural workers in certain regions of the world and propose the concept of « demographic transition agriculture » and its associated typology.Mexico is then chosen for its agriculture showing very contrasting levels of development, for both synchronic and diachronic observation. We seek to understand the differences in agricultural development paths observed in Mexico by analyzing the influence of variables characterizing the non-farm economy, the substitution of machinery capital for labor, land liberalization, geography (physical and human).In international comparisons as within Mexico, we show that the growth rate of the area by agricultural worker has a marginally stronger influence on the growth rate of agricultural labor productivity, than the growth rate of land productivity.Finally, in the Municipality of Teopisca in the Los Altos region of Chiapas, we analyze the economic strategies of farm households « trapped » in a context of « blocked demographic agricultural transition » (downward trend of the agricultural area per worker): income diversification (toward the non-agricultural sector) and attempts to rise the land productivity are the two main strategies deployed under local severe constraints of market failures (labor, credit) and difficult access to irrigation water.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)

[pt] Eu desenvolvo um modelo de ciclo de vida para avaliar a importância relativa de vários determinantes de londo prazo da taxa de juros. O modelo é uma generalização de Gertler (1999), incluindo imperfeições no mercado de crédito e heterogeneidade entre trabalhadores para capturar totalmente os efeitos da transição demográfica. O modelo é calibrado para a economia brasileira, incluindo perfis para os gastos do governo, gastos com previdência, dívida pública, crescimento da produtividade e variáveis demográficas. O modelo explica 71 porcento da variação total na taxa de juros brasileira entre 2000 e 2019. Fatores demográficos, especialmente aumentos na expectativa de vida, são os principais determinantes da queda nas taxas de juros reais. Essas forças são parcialmente compensadas por aumentos na dívida pública e nos gastos com previdência. Além disso, o arcabouço sugere que as taxas de juros reais continuarão caindo nos próximos 20 anos, atingindo o patamar de 1.5 porcento a.a., apesar de aumentos razoáveis na dívida pública. No entanto, possíveis efeitos de prêmios de risco e juros globais nas taxas de juros domésticas não são incluídos na análise. / [en] I develop a life cycle model to evaluate the relative importance of several long-term drivers of real interest rates. The model is a generalization of Gertler (1999), including credit market imperfections and heterogeneity among workers to fully capture the effects of the demographic transition. I calibrate the model to the Brazilian economy, feeding it with profiles for government spending, public debt, productivity growth and demographic variables. The model explains 71 percent of the overall change in real interest rates in Brazil between 2000 and 2019. Demographic factors, especially increases in life expectancy, are the key drivers of the fall in real interest rates. These forces are partially compensated by increases in public debt and social security spending. Moreover, the framework suggests that real interest rates will keep falling over the next 20, reaching a level of 1.5 percent despite reasonable increases in government debt. However, possible effects of risk premia and global rates on domestic interest rates are absent from the analysis.

The purpose of this study is to investigate and get an overview of infant and child mortality in four smaller parishes in Småland County, Moheda, Slätthög, Vislanda and Skatelöv.The study will compare three different periods, 1889-1894, 1910-1915, and 1944-1940. The evidence has been collected from death and burial registers and birth and baptism registers from the parishes.The study's main question is "What proportion of Moheda's, Slätthög's, Vislanda's, and Skatelöv's children up to and including the age of six died during the periods 1889-1894, 1910-1915, and 1944-1949?". The result the study has achieved in relation to the main question is that during the first period 322 children died and during the last period 26 children died, thus the child mortality rate decreased.

This study, located in the disciplines of human geography and demography, explores the socio-spatial boundaries encapsulating Britain’s Jewish population, particularly at micro-scales. It highlights and challenges key narratives of both Jewish and general interest relating to residential segregation, assimilation, partnership formation, exogamy and household living arrangements. It presents a critical exploration of the dual ethnic and religious components of Jewish identity, arguing that this ‘White’ group has become ethnically ‘invisible’ in British identity politics and, as a consequence, is largely overlooked. In addition, the key socio-demographic processes relating to Jewish partnership formation are addressed and a critical assessment of data pertaining to the decline of marriage, the rise of cohabitation and the vexed topic of Jewish exogamy, is presented. The analysis culminates by linking each of these issues to the micro-geographical scale of the household and develops a critical assessment of this key unit of Jewish (re)production. Jewish population change is contextualised within the framework of the second demographic transition. This deliberately quantitative study is designed to exploit a recent glut of data relating to Jews in Britain. It interrogates specially commissioned tables from Britain’s 2001 Census as well as four separate communal survey data sources. It highlights and challenges recent geographical critiques of quantitative methodologies by presenting a rigorous defence of quantification in post-‘cultural turn’ human geography. It emphasises the importance and relevance of this fruitful shift in geographical thought to quantitative methods and describes the role quantification can now play in the discipline. Above all, it synthesises two disparate sets of literature: one relating to geographical work on identity and segregation, and the other to work on the identity, demography and cultural practices of Jews. As a result, this thesis inserts the largely neglected ethno-religious Jewish case into the broader geographical literature whilst developing a critical quantitative spatial agenda for the study of Jews.

Die Dissertation fragt nach den Ursachen der spezifisch niedrigen Geburtenrate in Ost- und Westdeutschland, die seit Mitte der siebziger Jahre deutlich unter dem Reproduktionsniveau liegt. Theoretisch wird die Frage behandelt, inwiefern die gewandelte gesellschaftliche Stellung der Frau – insbesondere ihre höhere Bildungs- und Erwerbspartizipation – mit der Verbreitung geringer Kinderzahlen in Verbindung steht. Für die Analysen werden Scientific Use Files der Mikrozensen 1973 bis 2008 verwendet; diese repräsentieren jährlich 0,7 Prozent der deutschen Bevölkerung. So kann gezeigt werden, dass innerhalb vergleichbarer soziostruktureller Gruppen kaum ein Rückgang der Kinderzahlen auftrat. Differenziert nach Berufsbildungsabschluss, Erwerbstätigkeit und Finanzierung des Lebensunterhaltes zeigt sich, dass einzig Frauen ohne Berufsbildung sowie Frauen, die das Hausfraumodell leben, durchschnittlich 2,0 Kinder haben – dies ist sowohl im Jahr 1982 wie auch 2008 in Westdeutschland der Fall. Innerhalb der Gruppe der erwerbstätigen Frauen liegen die Kinderzahlen je Frau deutlich niedriger. Die Gruppe der Hausfrauen, die ihren überwiegenden Lebensunterhalt durch ihren Ehemann finanziert, hat sich in Westdeutschland im Zeitvergleich seit dem Jahr 1982 von 50 auf 25 Prozent der Frauen halbiert. Dieser strukturelle Wandel hin zu einer unabhängigen weiblichen Lebensführung führte in Westdeutschland zu Kinderzahlen weit unter dem Reproduktionsniveau. Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass strukturtheoretische Modelle mit klassischen Variablen wie Familienstand, Erwerbsumfang und Einkommen die Varianz der Kinderzahl heute besser erklären können als noch in den achtziger Jahren. Im Fazit scheint ein gesellschaftliches „cultural lag“ auf – die gesellschaftliche Unterstützung zur Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und Familie ist offensichtlich zu gering, so dass die Emanzipation der Frau in Deutschland den negativen Effekt niedriger Geburtenraten hervorbringt. / The study focuses on the causes of low birth rates in eastern and western Germany, which has been below the level of reproduction since 1975. Theoretically the changing position of women in society is considered and the possible connections between higher female education, the spread of female employment and low fertility rates are discussed. The analysis is based upon scientific use files of the German micro census from 1973 up to 2008; the data represent annually 0.7 percent of the German population. It is shown, that there is no decline in fertility within similar socio structural subgroups. Controlled by educational/vocational training, employment and female income (financial independence) it is shown that only women with no vocational training and women with no own income have 2.0 children per women – this result is significant for Western Germany in 1982 as well as in 2008. Within the group of employed women the mean number of children is much lower. But the group of housewives declined in half from 50 to 25 percent between 1982 and 2008. This structural change toward female independent lifestyle leads to a very low birth rate in Germany. The empirical analysis shows that classical models using structural variables like family status, employment and income are able to explain a considerable higher variance of birth rates today. Summing up there appears to be a “cultural lag”: women get emancipated, but the public support and the compatibility of work and family stays low, as well as the birth rates of employed women led to low overall birth rates.