中國大陸自改革開放之後，其經濟成長之快速，成功歸究於自由的市場經濟。然而2008金融海嘯爆發後，使得各國開始檢視過度的分權和市場自由化的適度性。中央政府和地方政府，如何在權利和稅收的分配上，達成一最適的規模？如何有效運用財政地方分權？將是一門複雜且重要的議題。 本研究之研究目的主要有以下幾點：第一，希望能藉由相關理論文獻，解釋財政地方分權對中國省、市之間地方財政赤字是否會有所影響或是關聯，將以此為本研究之理論基礎，並且進行實證的檢驗；第二，將以1994年以後中國財政改革以後之財政相關資料，利用中國31個省、市的追蹤資料，資料蒐集期間涵蓋1995年至2010年，以各年各省、市的財政赤字作為衡量該省、市的財政情形，以期能夠了解各地區財政的影響情形； 第三，本研究建立一個二因子固定效果模型，來檢視中國31個省市財政分權對其地方財政赤字的影響，並將各省市的情形做歸納；第四，從實證模型中發現，財政地方分權與地方財政赤字間的關聯性為一非線性關係且具有U型曲線關係；最後，利用實證結果來提供具體的政策建議。 / Fiscal decentralization is considered as one of the successful institutional reforms to promote the development of China.In order to attract the resource, the regions have to improve or maintain their finance. Therefore, what issues will improve the provincial local government deficit becoming an immense problem. How to use fiscal decentralization tool？It will be an important issue. The research purpose of this literature is to use the empirical model with the panel data which includes 31 provinces, cities and regions in China during the period of 1995 to 2010 as well as to search the following question. First , analyse the provincial local government deficit and find out the determinative factors of regional deficit. Second, in order to realize the precise relationship between the fiscal decentralization and the provincial local government deficit, this study establishes 2 ways fixed effect model. Finally, to reducing the mistakes occurred in positive models and enabling the study more rigorous, this study uses more methods to test the models and the result. Finally, to reducing the mistakes occurred in positive models and enabling the study more rigorous, this study uses more methods to test the models and the result.

The master´s thesis on the theme Models of the Budgetary Allocation of Taxes and the Tax Autonomy of Territorial Budgets in OECD Countries {--} Possible Implications for Czech Republic deals with the budgetary allocation of taxes in the Czech Republic and OECD countries. Within the literature search, this thesis treats of basic concepts such as fiscal federalism, the budgetary allocation of taxes, tax autonomy and also appropriate recommendations in respect of tax decentralization. The practical part is focused on an analysis of models of the budgetary allocation of taxes in OECD countries and an analysis of models of the budgetary allocation of taxes in the Czech Republic in the years 1993 to 2008. In the analysis, this thesis deals with changes in a model of the budgetary allocation of taxes and the evaluation of these models in respect of theoretical knowledge and recommendations. In the conclusion of the master´s thesis, there is a summary of knowledge obtained and proposed measures to improve the current situation.

The master´s thesis on the theme Optimalization local fees and taxes of municipal budget deals with the local fees, the budgetary allocation of taxes and tax revenues of practicular municipality. The entire thesis is concentrating on the village as basic level of the local authority. Within literature search, this thesis treats of basic concepts such as local fees, fee elements, theory public finance, the budgetary allocation of taxes, fikal federalism and tax autonomy. In the firs part I deal with the essentials characteristic of the village corresponding to the municipal low. The second part is devoted to the issue of municipalities. The practical part is focused on an analysis of revenues of municipalities and is application to a particular municipality. I chose the town called a Kardašova Řečice. In this town I was born and now I live there.

在全球化趨勢下，地方競爭將取代國家的競爭，地方是國家能否與全球競爭之關鍵，提高地方的競爭優勢與發展地方經濟是各國政府努力的目標。財政制度對長期地方發展扮演重要角色。透過政府間的權限與財源之劃分，一方面可使政府所提供之財貨和勞務適應不同地方人民偏好之制度效率目標，進而使所得成長；另方面可維持全國一致性和地方間的發展平衡，避免各地方所得分配過度懸殊的公平目標。良好的財政制度必須能提升各政府部門自我負責性及經濟效率，促進地方所得成長卻不會傷害地方間均衡發展之公平目標。本文以單根檢定法分析發現民國72年至93年間我國政府部門財政制度變遷，以及民國88年以後財政收支劃分法修正後財政制度調整，的確使政府間財政資源分配更趨向公平，但多個地方政府間財政自主程度並未提升且差異大。又透過民國79年至93年23個直轄市與縣市地方政府長期追蹤資料，分析發現我國財政制度在地方發展上扮演非常重要角色。財政分權制度與地方政府財政收支制度的確對各地方所得成長率與地方所得分配有顯著影響效果。但地方政府財政收支制度無法發揮效率，對地方發展有不利影響。88年財政制度調整後地方財政制度對地方發展之不利影響並未有所改善。本文根據研究結果提出制度建議，以作為未來制定地方財政制度與地方發展政策之參考。 / Local governments faced severe fiscal imbalance problems for a long time, caused in part by long-term structural imbalances between their spending and revenue requirements. May be financial structural has positive consequences on local economic development. The article examines the relationship between the fiscal structure of local government and local economic development. Although most prior empirical studies present inconsistent findings about the effects of local taxing and spending policies, but more empirical works conclude that local income growth relates negatively to tax increases if the revenue finances income redistribution, but not if the revenue finances public services. The study examines these issues with more recent panel data of Taiwan and with more careful attention the effects of fiscal decentralization. We conclude that local economic development relates negatively to local tax increases if the revenue finances local public service . Local Financial structural and fiscal decentralization have negative consequences on local economic development.

中國大陸在近幾十年來的經濟成長舉世矚目，卻也造成了中國大陸東西部發展不平均的隱憂。有鑑於此，江澤民在1999 年的「中央扶貧開發會議」上首次提出了「西部大開發」戰略概念，期能縮小區域發展不均衡的差距。西部大開發預計進行50 年分三個階段進行，截至2010 年已經完成了第一階段。在這十年間，整個西部地區有著巨大的改變。 　　因此，本文的研究目的在於，利用大陸西部12 個省、市、地區自2000 至2010年的追蹤資料，再運用Tobit實証模型進行實證分析。其實證結果顯示，財政地方分權程度、人口密度、地區生產總值、地方政府規模以及地區開放程度等因素，對地方政府效率值之影響為正向；而財政地方分權程度之平方項與地方政府規模之平方項，則對地方政府效率具有負向影響，即財政地方分權與地方政府規模對於地方政府效率之影響可能呈現非單調性。 / The economic growth of China has increased rapidly in recent several decades, but thisgrowth has resulted in the imbalance between the eastern and western region. According tothis situation, Zemin Jiang first proposed the “Grand Western Development Program” in the“central poverty alleviation and development conference” in 1999, hoping to reduce the imbalance in the regional development gap. After carrying out the Grand Western Development Program, the growth ranges of GDP per capita in some of regions have risen quickly. Therefore, the research purpose of this literature is to analyze the empirical estimation of the Tobit model with the panel data which include 12 provinces, cities, and regions in China western area from 2000 to 2010. The empirical results show that the degree of fiscal decentralization, the density of population, gross regional product, the scale of local government, and the degree of openness all have positive influences on the efficiency of local governments. However, the quadratic terms of the degree of fiscal decentralization and the scale of local government have negative influences on the efficiency of local governments. That is to say, the degree of fiscal decentralization and the scale of local government probably have non-monotonic effects on the efficiency of local governments.

The work presented here gives a summary of territorial division and public administration development in Slovakia as the bases for present reform of public administration. This work deals with realization of this reform of public administration and territorial division in Slovakia and evaluate process and fulfillment of purposes of this reform. Key words: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Cette thèse s’intéresse d’une part aux effets macroéconomiques des régimes de change, et d’autre part, aux récentes évolutions sur la politique budgétaire et la décentralisation. La partie I met essentiellement l’accent sur l’interaction entre les régimes de change (RC) et la politique budgétaire, monétaire et fiscale. Tout d’abord, nous mettons en évidence que les RC peuvent avoir un effet stabilisateur sur la politique budgétaire (chapitre 1). Cependant, cet effet stabilisateur des RC n’est pas automatique mais dépendrait plutôt des conséquences d’une politique budgétaire laxiste. Le chapitre 2 s’intéresse quant à lui à la causalité entre RC et crises (bancaire/financière, de change et de dette) et remet en cause la vision bipolaire qui prétendait que les RC intermédiaires sont plus vulnérables aux crises que les solutions en coin (RC fixes/flexibles). Il ressort de notre analyse que les fondamentaux macroéconomiques (la volatilité du crédit au secteur privé, le financement du déficit, et le ratio dette sur PIB) jouent un rôle considérable. Le chapitre 3 met en évidence un lien entre les RC et la politique fiscale. Les pays à RC fixes montrent une plus grande dépendance aux recettes domestiques –telles que la TVA-, comparativement aux pays en change intermédiaires/flexibles pour compenser les pertes de recettes de seigneuriage (effet de substitution). De plus, ces pays avec RC fixes collectent plus de recettes domestiques en compensation de la perte de recettes douanières, suite à la libéralisation commerciale (effet de compétitivité). Dans les trois derniers chapitres (partie II), nous mettons le focus sur la politique budgétaire et les effets de la décentralisation. Le chapitre 4 révèle une relation non-linéaire entre la politique budgétaire et le cycle économique, qui dépend du niveau de la dette publique. Lorsque celle-ci dépasse un certain seuil (87%), la politique budgétaire perd toute propriété contra-cyclique. Nous montrons par ailleurs que l’effet disciplinaire ex-ante des règles budgétaires aide à restaurer la contra-cyclicité de la politique budgétaire. A travers le chapitre 5, nous montrons que la décentralisation budgétaire, dans un cadre politico-institutionnel sein et dépourvu de corruption, améliore l’offre de biens et services publics. Le chapitre 6 conclut que la décentralisation impacte positivement le solde structurel. Cependant une asymétrie entre la décentralisation des dépenses et celle des recettes accroit la dépendance des gouvernements locaux vis-à-vis du gouvernement central en termes de transferts, et amoindrirait considérablement à l’effet positif de la décentralisation. / This thesis explored, in two parts, the macroeconomic impacts of exchange rate regimes (ERR), as well as the recent developments in fiscal policy and fiscal decentralization. Part I has reconsidered the role of ERR and its interplay with fiscal, monetary and tax policy. The first result that emerges (Chapter 1) is that fixed ERR can serve as a credible policy tool for stabilizing fiscal policy. However, this stabilizing effect is conditional upon the inter-temporal distribution of the costs of loose fiscal policy. In assessing the linkage between ERR and crises (banking/financial, currency and debt), Chapter 2 evidenced that the bipolar view is no longer valid, and that, crisis proneness rather depends on the macroeconomic fundamentals (the volatility of private sector credit, the deficit-financing mechanism, and the debt-to-GDP ratio). In Chapter 3, we unveiled a strong relationship between ERR and tax policy. Countries with pegged regimes have greater reliance on domestic taxation -such as the VAT- to make up for the loss of seigniorage revenue (substitution effect). Moreover, peggers tend to collect more VAT revenue to offset the shortfall in cross border taxes following the trade liberalization reform (competitiveness effect). Part II discussed the cyclical response of fiscal policy in high debt periods, and focused on fiscal decentralization issues. In Chapter 4, we showed that the reaction of fiscal policy to the business cycle is non-linear and conditional to the level of public debt. When the debt-to-GDP ratio goes beyond a certain threshold (87%), fiscal policy loses its counter-cyclical properties. Further, we highlighted that carefully-designed fiscal rules help maintaining counter-cyclicality through an ex ante disciplinary effect. Chapters 5 and 6 analyzed the impact of fiscal decentralization on the efficiency of public service delivery and fiscal policy performance, respectively. Chapter 5 revealed that a sufficient level of expenditure decentralization, coupled with revenue decentralization, improves the efficiency of public service delivery. However, the political and institutional environment is critical for reaping decentralization-led benefits. Lastly, Chapter 6 concluded that fiscal decentralization has destabilizing effect by reducing the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy. In addition, we found that decentralization strengthens the structural fiscal balance; however, vertical fiscal imbalances reduce the benefits of decentralization. It is therefore critical to limit asymmetries between expenditure and revenue decentralization, so as to reduce the transfer-dependency of local governments to the central level, and thus prevent decentralization from weakening the fiscal stance at the general government level.

Cette thèse de doctorat s’inscrit dans le domaine des finances publiques et des choix publics et s’articule autour des questions de polarisation idéologique, décentralisation et conflit. Elle est composée de trois chapitres qui peuvent être lus de façon indépendante. Dans le premier chapitre l’accent est mis sur l’importance de la polarisation idéologique entre mais aussi à l’intérieur des partis politiques sur le niveau et la composition des dépenses publiques cantonales. L’analyse est menée au niveau des parlements cantonaux suisses et repose sur l’exploitation et le traitement économétrique d’une base de données très riche.Nous avons fait deux contributions à la littérature sur l’impact de fragmentation politique sur les dépenses publiques.Premièrement, nous avons montré que la dispersion idéologique à l’intérieur des partis politiques est associée à des dépenses publiques plus élevées alors que la dispersion entre partis est associée avec moins de dépenses publiques. Cette constatation implique que le mode d’organisation et la discipline au sein des partis politiques ont de l’importance. Ce résultat est particulièrement intéressant car la littérature précédente a fait abstraction de la dispersion idéologique au sein des partis. Ensuite, nous avons montré que la dispersion idéologique est principalement pertinente pour les dépenses de fonctionnement. Le deuxième chapitre s’intéresse au conflit d’objectifs qui peut exister entre agents économiques dans le cadre d’un jeu en deux étapes avec paiements asymétriques. La littérature a montré que les défaillances de coordination sont fréquentes dans les jeux en une étape et que la communication peut aider les individus à se coordonner par l’emploi de stratégies de take turn pour réduire l’inégalité des gains à long terme. Notre contribution a été d’étudier si la communication a la même capacité dans un jeu en deux étapes où l’équilibre parfait en sous-jeux exige que les deux joueurs fassent des choix opposés aux deux étapes du jeu et acceptent des gains inégaux. Nos résultats montrent que les défaillances de coordination se produisent la moitié du temps et que 18% des paires utilisent la stratégie de take turn. La communication augmente considérablement la coordination sur l’équilibre parfait en sous-jeux car elle augmente la capacité des sujets à amorcer une stratégie de take turn et à la maintenir. Elle leur permet d’établir une stratégie de long terme qui accroît l’efficacité tout en diminuant les écarts de paiements, induits par les gains asymétriques, en échangeant leurs positions relatives d’une manière équitable. Nos résultats montrent que la communication peut résoudre les conflits de coordination, même dans des situations plus complexes que dans les jeux en une étape généralement étudiés jusqu’à présent. Le dernier chapitre s’intéresse à un type de conflit particulier : la sécession politique. Plus précisément il traite du lien entre sécession, décentralisation et identité de groupe. Nous essayons de déterminer, au moyen d’une expérience de laboratoire, si décentraliser l’offre de biens publics permet de réduire la probabilité de faire sécession. Nous mettons en exergue l’importance de l’identité au niveau local. Le protocole expérimental ne permet évidemment pas de reproduire l’ensemble des arbitrages auxquels les mouvements séparatistes font face dans le monde réel. Il permet, néanmoins, de capturer deux forces essentielles: la proximité avec le bien public qui réduit les phénomènes de passagers clandestins et rapproche le bien public des préférences du citoyens et l’importance des identités locales. Nos résultats indiquent que la décentralisation augmente les contributions aux biens locaux et diminue la probabilité de sécession aussi lorsque l’identité locale est rendue saillante. En fait, une forte identité locale augmente la probabilité de sécession seulement lorsque les membres des groupes locaux sont des coopérateurs et qu’ils contribuent aux bien publics locaux. / This PhD thesis falls within the fields of public finance and public choice. It studies the following issues: ideological polarization, decentralization and conflict. It consists of three chapters can be read independently. In the first chapter the focus is on the importance of ideological polarization between but also within political parties on the level and composition of cantonal public spending. The analysis is on Swiss cantonal parliaments and is based on the use and econometric treatment of a very rich database. We made two contributions to the literature on the impact of political fragmentation on public spending. First, we showed that ideological dispersion within political parties is associated with higher public spending while the dispersion between political parties is associated with less public spending. This finding implies that the mode of organization and discipline within political parties are both important. This result is particularly interesting given that previous literature has completely abstracted from ideological dispersion within political parties. Lastly, we showed that ideological dispersion between and within political parties is mainly relevant for current expenditures. The second chapter focuses on the conflict of objectives that may exist between economic agents in a two-stage game with asymmetric payoffs. The literature showed that coordination failures are frequent in one-stage games and that communication can help individuals coordinate with the use of take turn strategies that allow for a reduction in the payoffs’ inequality in the long run. Our contribution was to study whether communication has the same capacity in a two-stage game where the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium requires both players to make opposite choices at both stages of the game and accept unequal payoffs. Our results show that coordination failures occur half of the time and that 18% of the pairs use the take turn strategy. Communication significantly increases coordination on the subgame perfect Nash equi librium because it increases the ability of subjects to initiate a take turn strategy and to maintain it. Thus, communication allows subjects to establish a long-term strategy that increases efficiency and reduces payments differences, induced by the asymmetry in payoffs, by exchanging their relative positions in a fair way. Our results show that communication can solve coordination conflicts, even in more complex situations than in one-stage games usually studied until now. The last chapter focuses on a particular type of conflict: political secessions. Specifically, it addresses the link between secessions, decentralization and group identity. We aim at determining, by means of a laboratory experiment, if decentralizing the provision of public goods reduces the likelihood of secession. We emphasize the importance of local identity. Our experimental design, obviously, do not reproduce all the trade-offs that separatist movements face in the real world. It allows, however, capturing at least two key forces that drive these movements: the proximity to public goods that reduces the phenomena of free-riding and brings public goods closer to citizens’ preferences and the importance of local identities. Our results indicate that the Decentralization treatment increases contributions to local public goods and decreases the likelihood of secessions also when identity is made more salient. If fact, reinforcing local group identity increases the likelihood of secession only when local group members are cooperators.

Environmental positive externalities from public provision, such as the benefits yielded from the public measure of nature conservation, are often not internalized. Potential sub-optimal public service provision can be expected from such a condition, leading to inefficiency, if the benefits at a greater territorial scale are not acknowledged. This holds particularly true for intergovernmental fiscal relations in a decentralizing multi-tiered governmental system. Moreover, in developing countries the fiscal capacities to perform measures of ecological public functions are limited with their fiscal needs for these functions often appearing to outweigh their fiscal capacities. Research at the interface of the economic theory of fiscal federalism, the sustainability concept, and policies related to conservation and the environment is relatively new. Furthermore, in the literature on environmental federalism the emphasis tends to be comparatively less on the benefits of positive environmental externalities. The essential contribution of this study is an extension of this research field that is still in its infancy by applying the specific case of Indonesia as the context, on account of this tropical country‟s ecological significance as well as its recent developments during the fiscal decentralization process. The overall aim of this study is to assess the possibilities of ecological fiscal transfers as a set of instruments in the public sector to internalize environmental externalities. To this end, the study traces the development as well as the current state of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Indonesia in terms of ecological purposes. On the basis of this knowledge, the study offers new policy perspectives by proposing a number of policy options for ecological fiscal transfers in the context of the functioning fiscal transfer system and institutions between the national and the subnational (province and local) governments as well as among jurisdictions at the same governmental level. The incorporation of an explicit ecological indicator into general-purpose transfers is the first option. The second option is derived from a revenue-sharing arrangement. In this arrangement, two sub-options are proposed: first, shared revenues from taxes are distributed on the basis of the ecological indicator and, second, shared revenues from natural resources are earmarked for environmental purposes. Finally, the third option suggests an extension of existing specific-purpose transfers for the environment. The potential and limitations of the respective options are addressed. Additionally, a short treatment is given to the discourse on the possible mobilization of fiscal resources in the context of tropical deforestation and global climate change. The research concentrates mainly on the first option, namely the incorporation of an ecological indicator into the structure of general-purpose transfer allocation. In order to substantiate an explicit ecological dimension in the transfer, it extends the present area-based approach by introducing a protected area indicator while maintaining the remaining socio-economic indicators in the fiscal need calculation. The parameter values of area-related indicators are adjusted and subject to the properties of the existing formula. The simulation at the provincial level yields the following results. First, more provinces lose rather than gain from the introduced ecological fiscal transfer when compared to the fiscal transfer that they received in the reference fiscal year. Second, on average the winning provinces obtain a higher level of transfer from the introduction of an ecological indicator in the fiscal need calculation. The extent of the average decreases for the losing provinces, however, it is lower compared to the extent of the average gain by their winning counterparts. In terms of spatial configurations of the general-purpose transfer with an ecological indicator, provinces in Papua would benefit most from the new fiscal regime whereas provinces in Java and Sulawesi, with a few exceptions, would suffer a transfer reduction. Kalimantan and Sumatera show a mixed pattern of winning and losing provinces. The analysis on the equalization effects of the general-purpose transfers makes the following important contributions. It suggests that, first, the transfers are equalizing and, second, the introduction of the protected area indicator into the structure of these transfers plays a significant role in the equalizing effect, particularly in the presence of provinces with a very high fiscal capacity and when the area variable is also controlled. All of these new insights are imperative in the design of fiscal policy which intends to integrate explicit ecological aspects into the instruments of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Since a formula-based fiscal transfer distribution is intrinsically zero-sum, the aforementioned configuration of winning and losing jurisdictions is conceivable. Among other future perspectives, it is the task of further research to explore ecological fiscal transfer instruments and associated measures that on the one hand seek to induce the losing provinces to join their winning counterparts and, on the other hand, are still subject to the requirements of the rational fiscal transfer mechanism.

人類慾望無窮而資源有限，所以如何將資源做最有效的使用一直是經濟學所追求的課題。有關效率的規範分析中，巴瑞圖最適（Pareto optimality）為接受度最高的準則。基於巴瑞圖效率的觀點，不論是營利組織或非營利組織其經營之基本理念皆是希望以最少的投入獲得最大的產出，因此衡量投入與產出間之相對表現即為效率的評估。非營利組織及公共部門因為有許多產出、投入不易量化，故其效率不易評定。此一情況一直到DEA（Data Envelopment Analysis；資料包絡分析法）發展才逐漸改善。另外，有關DEA的運用幾乎都集中在個別決策單位的效率衡量，將之應用在衡量總體經濟的表現上非常少見。所以論文第肆章是按傳統方式以DEA衡量我國地方政府的效率並分析造成效率差異的原因，第參章則將DEA的概念應用於經濟成長上，探討使經濟成長達到極大化之租稅負擔及租稅結構。又效率的追求為經濟學的主軸，但中央政府的效率目標與地方政府並不相同，由於目標不同，因此彼此所訂的租稅政策亦不相同。本文第伍章試圖提出一理論模型說明中央政府在面對異質地區的垂直外部性下如何有效率的訂定其租稅政策。 / The human desires are infinite but resources are scarce. Using resources effectively is the topic of the economics. In efficient analyses, the Pareto optimality is the highest criterion to accept. Based on Pareto efficiency, the basic idea is to obtain the most outputs by the least inputs. Therefore the efficiency measurement is to calculate the relative performance of inputs and outputs. The nonprofit organization and the public agencies have many outputs and inputs not easy to be quantified; hence, their efficiency is not easy to evaluate. This phenomenon doesn’t improve until DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) was developed. However, the application of DEA concentrates nearly on the efficiency measurement of individual policy-making unit; the application is be rarely used in measuring the performance of the macro-economy. Chapter 4 of this dissertation measures and explains the variation in cost efficiency of the local governments in Taiwan area. Chapter 3 deals with the application the DEA to economic growth, estimating a combination of the tax burden(the ratio of tax revenue to GDP）and the tax structure(the ratio of indirect taxes to direct taxes)which would maximize the rate of growth of GDP of Taiwan. Efficiency is the core of economics, but the national government’s efficient goal is not as same as the local government’s. Because their goals are not consistent, thus the tax policies are different. Chapter 5 attempts to propose a theoretical model to explain how a national or federal government decides its tax policy in the vertical externalities happening in heterogeneous states.