Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-11-18T13:53:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Mateus Di Palma Back_.pdf: 1065653 bytes, checksum: d5a23ae5c08125bd959ac841e5c48e35 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-18T13:53:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mateus Di Palma Back_.pdf: 1065653 bytes, checksum: d5a23ae5c08125bd959ac841e5c48e35 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-16 / Nenhuma / Trata-se de dissertação que compara os conceitos de Direito carregados por categorias diferentes teorias do Direito. O conceito de norma jurídica descrito por Hans Kelsen e o conceito de expectativa normativa descrito por Niklas Luhmann têm em comum somente o fato de serem o produto de observações voltadas para uma realidade normativa. As suas semelhanças se encerram aí. Nesse sentido, a norma jurídica de Kelsen é marcada pela diferença entre o factual e o normativo, enquanto a expectativa normativa de Luhmann é marcada pela diferença entre o cognitivo e o normativo. Ainda que essas categorizações não sejam são diretamente comparáveis, na medida em que ambos esses conceitos são utilizados pelos seus autores para as suas descrições do Direito, esses conceitos tornam-se, na sua diferença, representativos da diferença que existe entre os conceitos de Direito que os fundamentam. Esse trabalho pretende se valer deles para realizar uma análise comparativa de ambas as descrições: entre o conceito normativo de Direito em Kelsen e o conceito sociológico em Luhmann. Ele será um trabalho bibliográfico e comparativo. A metodologia adotada será a seguinte: em um primeiro momento se apresentarão os fundamentos do modo descritivo da teoria do Direito de Kelsen; após, se apresentarão os fundamentos do modo descritivo da sociologia do Direito de Luhmann; e, ao final, se buscará, a partir dos conceitos-chave mencionados, os conceitos de Direito que os fundamentam para realizar a oposição dos diferentes modos de observação do Direito. Como resultado da pesquisa, concluiu-se que, ainda que realmente se compare um conceito analítico com outro funcional, as diferenças referentes aos conceitos não puderam ser resumidas ao potencial transdisciplinar das teorias, mas à uma opção de como se aproximar do objeto de pesquisa. / This is a dissertation which compares the concepts of law as presented by categories of diferent theories of Law. The concept of legal norm described by Hans Kelsen and the concept of normative expectations described by Niklas Luhmann have in common only the fact that they are the product of observations aimed at a normative reality. Their similarities end there. In this sense, Kelsen’s legal norm is marked by the difference between factual and normative, while Luhmann’s normative expectation is marked by the difference between cognitive and normative. These categorizations are not directly comparable, however, to the extent that both of these concepts are used by the authors for their descriptions of the law, these concepts become, in their difference, representative of the difference between the concepts of Law underlying them. This work intends to make use of them to carry out a comparative analysis of both descriptions: between Kelsen’s normative concept of law and Luhmann’s sociological one. It will be a bibliographical and comparative work. The way to do this is as follows: at first it will be presented the fundamentals of the descriptive mode of Kelsen’s theory of law; a second phase will present the fundamentals of the descriptive way of Luhmann’s sociology of law; in the end, it will be sought to derive, from the key concepts mentioned, those concepts of law underlying them for the purpose of oposing the different ways of observing the law. As a result of the research, it was concluded that, although it is really a comparison between an analytical concept with a functional one, differences related to the concepts could not be summarized to the transdisciplinary potential of theories, but to a choice of how to approach the object of research.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The French tradition based the sovereignty of the people on the sovereignty of the parliament, being unthinkable any form of control of the legislative acts. The French Constitutional Council was created, through the 1958 Constitution, with the purpose of safeguarding the powers of the Executive in the face of the acts of the legislator. So the simple creation of the Council has already represented a paradigm shift. In the 1970s, major changes were implemented by the 1971 Council decision and the constitutional revision of 1974. They were essential in the evolutionary leap of the process of constitutionalisation of law in France. Before, the Civil Code was seen as the French Constitution, because its stability was much greater than that experienced in French constitutionalism. Thus, the Constitutional Council stands as a body that controls the constitutionality of laws, an authentic Constitutional Court. It was different from the other Constitutional Courts and Supreme Courts, for only providing for a constitutional control prior to the enactment of laws, the application of the regulations of the National Assembly and the Senate, the ratification of international commitments. A posteriori control was only inserted in the Constitution in 2008 and implemented in 2010. The French tradition based on the private law and the lack of control after the enactment of the laws, differentiating it from the North American and German system, made Luís Roberto Barroso assert that in the French system a true constitutional jurisdiction does not exist. Many brazilian doctrinators follow the same position as Barroso. Such an affirmation is the object of this study, whose purpose is to ascertain its veracity by analyzing the Constitutional Council - its composition, functions and decisions; and the characteristics of the models of constitutional jurisdiction pointed out by the doctrine - the North American and the European model. This study will also analyze the characteristics of a constitutional jurisdiction and doctrinal classifications, since the typological method will be used. The sources will be the bibliographic review and the French legal provisions. It will carried out A simple random sample analysis of Council decisions. / A tradição francesa baseava a soberania do povo na soberania do parlamento, sendo impensável qualquer forma de controle dos atos do legislativo. O Conselho Constitucional Francês foi criado, através da Constituição de 1958, com a finalidade de salvaguardar as competências do Executivo em face dos atos do legislador. Então, a simples criação do Conselho já representou uma quebra de paradigma. Nos anos setenta, foram implementadas grandes transformações pela decisão do Conselho de 1971 e a revisão constitucional de 1974. Elas foram essenciais no salto evolucional do processo de constitucionalização do direito na França. Antes o Código Civil era visto como a Constituição Francesa, pois sua estabilidade era muito maior que a vivenciada no constitucionalismo francês. Assim, o Conselho Constitucional firma-se como um órgão controlador da constitucionalidade das leis, um autêntico Tribunal Constitucional. Ele se diferenciava dos demais Tribunais Constitucionais e Cortes Supremas, por só prever um controle de constitucionalidade anterior à promulgação das leis, a aplicação dos regulamentos da Assembleia Nacional e do Senado, a ratificação de compromissos internacionais. O controle a posteriori só foi inserido na Constituição em 2008 e implantado em 2010. A tradição francesa baseada no direito privado e na inexistência de controle posterior a promulgação das leis, diferenciando-o do sistema norte-americano e alemão, fez com que Luís Roberto Barroso afirmasse que não há no sistema francês uma verdadeira jurisdição constitucional. Muitos doutrinadores brasileiros seguem a mesma posição de Barroso. Tal afirmação é o objeto deste estudo, o qual tem por finalidade averiguar a sua veracidade analisando o Conselho Constitucional- a sua composição, suas funções, suas decisões; e as características dos modelos de jurisdição constitucional apontados pela doutrina- o modelo norte-americano e o europeu. Serão analisadas nesse estudo ainda as características de uma jurisdição constitucional e as classificações doutrinárias, vez que será utilizado o método tipológico. As fontes serão a revisão bibliográfica sobre os temas e os dispositivos legais franceses. Também será realizada a análise de amostra aleatória simples das decisões do Conselho.

Cette thèse se donne pour objectif de mesurer la portée actuelle des principales conceptualisations de Hans Kelsen dans la doctrine et le droit positif international. Pour ce faire, cette étude envisage une reconstruction de la pensée du juriste viennois dans la discipline spécifique de droit international placée à la lumière du contexte de l'évolution normative, institutionnelle et politique de l'ordre juridique international. L'ambition est ainsi de faire ressortir l'originalité de son approche du phénomène international et sa portée actuelle. Il s'agira aussi d'en mesurer les limites et les possibilités de dépassement. / His thesis has the objective of measuring the current scope of the main conceptualizations of Hans Kelsen in the doctrine of international law and international positive law. The study envisages a reconstruction of the thought of the Viennese lawyer in international law placed in the light of the context of the evolving normative, institutional and politic of the international legal order. This is the gift of bringing out the originality of his thought, to measure the presence of the positivist approach in debate of the unity of international law.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Antonio Rossi.pdf: 1400243 bytes, checksum: 2f54e0af614700d9bf2c495d5740d146 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-09 / This thesis aims at analyzing the position of the Supreme Court when examining the constitutionality of the Clean Record Law subsuming the decision on the debate brought by jurists Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on a country s Judicial Review. Through analysis and reflection on who should be the "guardian of the Constitution", this investigation seeks to demonstrate that the Brazilian constitutional system has adopted Kelsen s positivism. However, the amplitude of the 1988 Constitution, the process of Law constitutionalization , the ideology of fundamental rights and the idleness of both the Executive (lack of an efficient public administration) and the Legislative (legislative inertia) transformed Brazilian Supreme Court into a hybrid court: sometimes as a true Constitution Court in the formalistic conception of Kelsen (judgment of the Amnesty Law, for example) or as a true Reich President or a Moderator Power in Schmitt s conception. By addressing and analyzing the judgement of the Clean Record Law this thesis claims that the Brazilian legal system has been going through a crisis caused by too much constitutionalization of law and has therefore caused the Supreme Court to change into an autonomous power: the Legal Reich / A presente tese, subsumindo a decisão diante do debate entre os juristas Hans Kelsen e Carl Schmitt sobre o controle de constitucionalidade pátrio, tem o escopo de analisar o comportamento do Supremo Tribunal Federal no julgamento da constitucionalidade da Lei da Ficha Limpa. A tese, ao analisar e refletir sobre quem deve ser o guardião da Constituição , pretende demonstrar que o sistema constitucional brasileiro adotou o positivismo de Hans Kelsen, mas a amplitude da Constituição de 1988, o processo de constitucionalização do Direito, a ideologia dos direitos fundamentais e a inércia dos Poderes Executivo (falta de uma gestão pública eficiente) e Legislativo (inércia legislativa) transformaram a Corte Suprema brasileira num tribunal híbrido: ora um verdadeiro Tribunal Constitucional, na concepção formalista de Hans Kelsen (julgamento da Lei de Anistia, por exemplo), ora um verdadeiro Presidente do Reich ou Poder Moderador, na concepção de Carl Schmitt. Ao abordar e analisar o julgamento da Lei da Ficha Limpa, a tese quer demonstrar que o sistema jurídico pátrio passa por uma crise ocasionada pela constitucionalização em demasia do direito e, por conseguinte, pela transformação do Supremo Tribunal Federal em Poder autônomo: o Reich jurídico

Diss. Univ. Bern, 2005. / Register. Bibliogr.

Primauté absolue du droit de l’UE ou suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles ? Consacrée à l’analyse des conflits nés ou à naître entre normes constitutionnelle et celles du droit de l’UE, cette étude doctorale s’est focalisée sur l’analyse du lien entre les termes primauté et recours pour relever que dans ce genre de litiges contentieux un syllogisme juridique inédit est appliqué. Il s’agit de celui qui préserve cumulativement le critère hiérarchique caractérisant les ordres juridiques internes des États membres, à son sommet le principe de suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles sur toutes les autres et l’application effective de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union ; les évolutions récentes du droit interne de l’UE convergent toutes dans ce sens : dans le cadre d’un litige contentieux, la primauté n’est plus une problématique de légalité constitutionnelle, le conflit est contourné. En la matière, les débats sur l’autorité et la force du droit international classique sur le droit constitutionnel ne se pose plus. Il a été séparé entre la force et l’effet des traités du droit international de l’Union. Pourtant sur le plan des principes, même au sein d’un État fédéral, le contenu définitionnel et surtout le maniement du texte constitutionnel n’ont pas été revisités ; la Constitution est le fondement sans être le contenu de validité de la primauté du droit de l’Union, le texte suprême opère en tant que technique de renvoi, il cadre deux types de champs en fonction du critère de l’objet du litige contentieux. Suprématie et primauté sont deux principes de nature juridique différente qui ne s’affrontent pas. La prévalence de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union n’affecte nullement la suprématie au sommet de la hiérarchie pyramidale des normes de chacun des États adhérents. / Absolute primacy of Community law or supremacy of constitutional provisions ? Devoted to the analysis of the conflicts born or to be born between EU law and constitutional standards, this doctoral study focused on analysis of the link between the terms of primacy or preemption rule and jurisdictional actions to raise that in this kind of litigation disputes a unreported legal syllogism is applied. It's one that cumulatively preserves the hierarchical criterion characterizing the domestic legal systems of the Member States, at its peak the principle of supremacy of the Constitution over all others and the effective application of the material primacy of Union law ; recent developments in internal law of the Union converge in this sense : in a dispute litigation, primacy is no longer a problem of constitutional legality, the conflict is circumvent. Concerning this matter, the debate on the authority and the force of traditional international law on constitutional law no longer arises. It has been separated between the force and the effect of the treaties of international law of the Union. Yet in terms of principles, even within a federal State, the definitional content and especially the handling of the constitutional text have not been revisited ; the Constitution is the legal basis without being the content validity of the primacy of Union law, the supreme text operates as a reference technique, it fits two types of fields based on the criterion of the contentious issue. Supremacy and rule are two different legal nature principles which do not compete. The prevalence of the material primacy of Union law sets no supremacy at the top of the pyramidal hierarchy of standards of each of the acceding States.

L'objet principal de notre recherche sera d'essayer d'éclairer l'obscurité relative à la figure du contrat normatif, existante particulièrement en espagne, en élaborant une étude minutieuse et en profondeur qui fait actuellement défaut dans la littérature juridique. de même, il sera aussi bien nécessaire d'analyser si la notion de contrat normatif, telle qu'elle est proposée par la doctrine et jurisprudence espagnole et surtout italienne, peut être transposée au droit français des contrats. et, d'autre part, si la notion française de contrat-cadre correspond à celle, espagnole, de « contrato marco ». pour ce faire, il sera nécessaire d'entamer une étude de ses différences et similitudes au moyen d'une comparaison de l'emploi, par les professionnels du droit de chaque pays, de chacun des termes. finalement il sera envisagé, le cas échéant, l'opportunité d'une éventuelle transposition de la figure du contrat-cadre au droit espagnol à travers celle de « contrato marco », l'intégrant comme équivalente ou application de la figure de contrat normatif.ainsi, une fois notre recherche achevée nous serons en mesure de proposer une définition complète et claire de contrat normatif, de déterminer sa nature juridique, d'obtenir ses principaux caractères, d'en tirer sa portée et, enfin, de rassembler ces principales applications pratiques. et ce, naturellement sans oublier de relever tant l'histoire ou la genèse de cette figure que sa valeur actuelle, en tant que nouvelle forme de négociation, d'autorégulation et de limitation volontaire de la liberté contractuelle. / How far are now individuals free to create the most appropriate contractual tool to achieve the satisfaction of their needs and interests? What they have in common figures as diverse as a joint-venture agreement, a franchise agreement or a marriage contract? Is the old general theory of contract adapted to the contractual practice of the XXI century? A deep study of the normative contract in this book provides answers to these and to many other momentous matters of Private Law of Contract. Reconstructed from the detailed analysis of the theory and legal practice, the notion of normative contract as an agreement of cooperative nature could constitute the bridge to a new and inspiring way of conceiving the contract. Not surprisingly, as shown by its main practical manifestations, the contract is often more than just an instrument to organize an exchange of goods and services, a powerful regulatory tool of reality and human behavior. To put it briefly, if on the one hand in this essay the author seeks find a remedy for a situation of great uncertainty regarding the so-called normative contract, in the other hand he also invites the legal community to reflect calmly on the role played by contract in present society.Keywords: Normative contract, Normenvertrag, Alfred HUECK, genesis, concept, pactum de modo contrahendo, contrat-cadre, framework agreements, distribution, collective agreement, financial transactions, joint venture, marriage contract, codes of conduct, Spanish private law, French private law, contractual clause, cooperative agreement, intuitus personae, no-obligational and obligational content of the contract, union of contracts, regulatory function of contract, general contract theory, theory of legal regulation, Hans KELSEN , freedom of contract.