應募人關連性指應募人與私募發行公司之關係。本研究將應募人關連性分為私募前關連性和私募後新關連。私募前關連性分為雇傭關連、合夥關連及治理關連，而私募後新關連則分為新雇傭關連、新合夥關連及新治理關連。本研究探討私募發行公司與應募人間的關連性，以及該關係對於異常報酬、公司治理與績效的影響。應募人與私募發行公司在私募前大都具有關連性，並且在私募完成後形成新的關連性，而新關連大部分為治理關連，即應募人成為新的董事及大股東。 本研究實證結果發現：第一、關連性應募人及新關連在私募宣告日會帶來正的異常報酬；第二、新的非董事關連較容易於私募後取得董事席次，進而改善公司治理；第三、關連性應募人可帶來私募後較佳的績效，但新關連改善績效的效果並不顯著。整體而言，本研究結果與過去私募文獻所探討的一致，即私募可增加對公司的監督，帶來較好的公司治理，因而替公司創造價值。 / This study classifies investor relationship into pre-placement relationships and new relationships. Pre-placement relationships are further classified into three categories: employment agreements, business arrangements, and governance-related relationships. New relationships include new employment agreements, new business arrangements, and new governance-related relationships. This study examines relationships between investors and issuers, and their impact on abnormal return, corporate governance and performance in private placement transactions. Most investors have a relationship with the issuer pre-placement and many new relationships are formed through the placement transactions, which are largely governance-related (board seats and/or 5% or greater blocks). We have three main findings. First, relationship investors and new relationships drive the positive stock price response at announcement. Second, investors with new non-director relationship ties to the issuer are more likely to gain directorships as part of the placement, and therefore improve corporate governance. Third, relationship investors are associated with stronger post-placement profitability, while new relationships are not. Overall, our findings are consistent with private placements creating value when they are associated with increased monitoring and strong governance.

本研究以2003至 2008年間國內上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討公司治理與股票市場流動性之關聯性。公司治理機制包括董事長兼任總經理、外部董監事持股、管理當局持股、機構投資者持股、家族型態以及控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度，並以買賣價差作為衡量市場流動性之變數。 由過去的相關文獻推論，公司治理機制之良窳的確會影響財務報表揭露的透明度，同時產生資訊不對稱的問題，並對市場流動性產生衝擊。實證結果指出，外部董監事持股比率及外資法人持股比率愈高，其買賣價差愈小，市場流動性愈佳；管理當局持股比例愈高、企業為家族企業者以及控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度愈大者，其買賣價差愈大，市場流動性愈差。 / This thesis attempts to examine the influence of corporate governance on stock market liquidity by observing the publicly listed and OTC companies in Taiwan in the period from 2003 to 2008. The governance mechanisms used in this thesis include CEO duality, outside director ownership, management ownership, institutional ownership, family ownership and deviation between ultimate control and ownership. And we use bid-ask spreads to measure market liquidity. The empirical findings of this study are as follows. Firms with greater outside director seats or foreign institutional ownership are negatively associated with bid-ask spreads and positively associated with market liquidity. While firms with greater management ownership, family ownership, and deviation between voting rights and cash-flow rights, are positively related with bid-ask spreads and negatively related with market liquidity.

本論文以1996年至2008年251間在台灣證券交易所上市公司且有辦理現金增資之公司為研究對象，探討公司在增資前一年至後三年經營績效之變化和公司治理程度之間之關聯性，以了解公司治理是否能減少公司內部之代理問題，進而使公司在增資後營運績效有較佳之表現。有鑑於台灣地區上市公司多為股權集中型態，普遍存在控制股東，相較於美國上市公司代理問題多存在於管理者與股東之間，台灣地區公司之內部代理問題主要存在控制股東與小股東之間，故在選取公司治理變數上，著重於與控制股東及小股東代理問題攸關之公司治理變數進行探討，並以調整後資產報酬率與調整後營收報酬率當作經營績效之衡量指標。 本文實證結果發現，無論是以調整後資產報酬率或調整後營收報酬率當作經營績效之衡量指標，公司治理程度較佳之公司，在現金增資後其經營績效之表現皆較佳，且增資前後經營績效衰退幅度顯著較小。此外，現金流量權與股份控制權偏離程度較低、現金流量權與席次控制權偏離程度較低、董監事持股質押比率較低及獨立董監事席次比率較高之公司和公司增資後之長期經營績效及增資前後經營績效變動為正相關，顯示當公司控制股東與小股東代理問題較小時，可避免控制股東不當使用現金增資所募集之資金，剝奪小股東財富，使公司能妥善運用現金增資募集之資金。另外，本研究發現，獨立董監事之設立也具有監督公司董事會之運作之效果，促使公司以現金增資募集之資金運用於良好之投資決策，進而使公司增資後經營績效有較佳之表現，並且具有正向改善現金增資前後經營績效變動之效果。

近年來，公司治理逐漸成為國際間熱門而普及的研究課題，國際經濟合作暨發展組織(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development，簡稱 OECD) 亦分別於民國87年及93年提出了公司治理之原則架構，為各國政府與國際性組織提供公司良善治理之方向。而我國為加速推動上市(櫃)企業之公司治理，協助企業健全發展及保障投資人權益，金融監督管理委員會於民國(以下同)102 年 12 月發佈 以五年為期之「強化我國公司治理藍圖」，並將辦理公司治理評鑑列為重點工作項目。 本研究主要是想透過台灣約前三十大上市、上櫃生技產業公司概況，了解公司的營業績效和公司治理的情形，針對公開資訊站中提供的各項公司資訊如：董事會的組成或特性、公司酬勞分布、股票交易資訊等多方項討論，作分析，找出各項變數對公司營業狀況的關係。 首先將各項變數做相關分析，看變數之間的關聯性，並透過公司股價來看公司的營利情形和其他變數的相關性，由於公司股價可能具有某種資訊內涵，他的波動情形經常反應著公司治理制度是否完善或公司整體的營業績效，因此公司股價除了是投資人用來作為調整投資的重要指標之外，也是對一家公司內部經營好壞的指標，而研究最後利用逐步回歸，找到主要影響公司股價的模型，探討影響公司績效的各項原因以及每一項因素的重要程度。 本研究希望可以藉由股價較高的公司，分析出其公司內部組成、持股比例和其他內部資訊和其他公司的區別，藉以讓其他公司或新創公司作為參考指標，加強其對公司治理的要求，藉此提升公司的整體營運績效。

本研究以2003年到2012年國內上市上櫃公司作為研究對象，探討公司治理與公司績效之關聯性，以及家族與非家族企業公司治理對於公司績效之差異性。公司治理衡量方式是參考葉銀華、李存修與柯承恩（2002），設定一個公司治理綜合指標，綜合指標下有五個構面，為董監事組成、股東權益、管理型態、關係人與介入股市構面，各構面下有其所屬變數，將變數評分後，彙總於該變數所屬構面，最後再依照各構面之重要程度加權過後，即形成公司治理綜合指標。實證結果如下： 一、以全體企業、家族企業和非家族企業為樣本群，皆顯示當公司治理越好時，公司績效越好。 二、在資產報酬率與每股盈餘應變數下，家族企業之公司治理綜合指標對公司績效正向影響程度小於非家族企業。 三、以公司治理綜合指標下之五個構面，分別去探討家族企業與非家族企業對於公司績效之差異。董監事組成構面下之家族企業對公司績效正向影響程度大於非家族企業；股東權益、管理型態、關係人與介入股市構面之各個實證結果，皆是家族企業對公司績效正向影響程度小於非家族企業。 / This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and performance and the difference in that relation between family and non-family ownership using a sample of publicly-traded Taiwanese companies during 2003-2012. Based on Ye, Lee, and Ke (2002, in Chinese), a composite index of corporate governance is set up from five constructs including director and supervisor, shareholders' equity, management style, overinvestment and related party. The empirical results are as follows: 1.The better the corporate governance, the better the corporate performance. This finding is true for each of the three samples including family ownership, non-family ownership and both of them together. 2.Taking return on assets (ROA) or earnings per share (EPS) as corporate performance measure, the effect of corporate governance on performance is stronger for family ownership than for non-family ownership. 3.Except for director and supervisor construct, all other four constructs of corporate governance including shareholders' equity construct, management style construct, overinvestment construct and related party construct have stronger effect on corporate performance for non-family ownership than for family ownership.

摘要 近來公司治理議題廣受注目。而所謂的公司治理泛指公司的管理與監控機制，其目標在於健全公司營運，追求公司最大的利益並使公司股東、員工、債權人等利益關係人，能得到合理、公平的對待。本研究以敘述性統計分析、迴歸分析，選取民國九十年台灣證券交易所上市的500家樣本公司，探討在我國公司治理機制下，董事、監察人特性與公司績效之關聯。 研究結果顯示 （一）董事會規模與公司績效有顯著的負向關係，而監察人規模與公司績效則大 致呈顯著的正向關係。 （二）獨立董事的比例除了與公司績效變數的每股經常利益外，其餘皆達到10%的正向顯著水準。而獨立監察人與公司績效雖呈現正向關係，卻未達顯著水準。不過，若將獨立監察人和獨立董事合併來看，實證結果是與公司績效的四個變數都呈現5%的顯著正相關。 （三）法人董事比例與公司績效各變數分別呈現5%與10%的顯著負相關，此結果可能和我國企業偏好的交叉持股有關，。法人監察人比例亦與公司績效呈現負向關係，然而卻未達統計上的顯著水準。但是如果將法人董事與法人監察人比例合併觀之，則其與公司績效的四個變數皆達1%的負相關。 （四）董、監持股比率與公司績效的四個變數至少皆達5%的顯著正向關係，證實 董、監持股比率越高，因其自身財富與公司財務牽連越深，監督管理者的動機越強進而使公司績效表現較佳。此外，本研究亦發現，董事長是否兼任高階經理人，與公司績效之間並無顯著的關係。 / Abstract Corporate governance, which includes the management and monitoring of a firm, is one of an important issue in recent years. The goal of corporate governance attempt to achieve the maximum profit of a company, and to treat shareholders, employees, and debtors, etc. fairly and reasonably. This thesis tries to find if there are relations between the characteristics of the board, supervisors and firm performance under the related corporate governance practices of Taiwan. The 500 samples are selected from the public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation in 2001. Here are the main findings: 1. The scale of the board has a significantly negative relation with the firm’s performance. However, the number of supervisors seems to have a positive relation with it. 2. The ratio of independent directors may probably have a positive relation with the firm’s performance. The ratio of independent supervisors has a positive relation with the firm’s performance, but is not significantly. 3. There is significantly negative relationship between the ratio of institute directors and the firm’s performance, but the ratio of institute supervisors and the firm’s value do not have so strongly negative relationship. 4. The ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors has significantly positive relationship with the firm’s value. Besides, whether the president serves as the general manager at the same time has no connection with the firm’s performance.

本研究之動機起於麥肯錫顧問公司的調查報告，報告中提到，若企業有良好的公司治理制度，投資者願意支付多一些以持有該公司股票。本研究從公司治理和產業前景兩個角度切入，並參考國內外文獻選出四個代表性的公司治理變數以及從國內券商和金融商情機構所公開之產業研究報告中，建立產業景氣循環相對位置之虛擬變數，目的是量化質性的報告，期望能理出一條脈絡。 根據本研究實証結果可知，就公司治理變數方面，僅有代表資訊揭露品質的指標即”是否有發行海外存託憑證”，此變數與股價溢酬關係為正向且顯著。因此，當我們還在對財務報表的會計師查核簽證感到質疑之時，或是証期會尚未將上市櫃資訊評鑑工作步入正軌之時，本研究所採用之海外存託憑證變數，似乎是現階段可供參考且實用的代表指標；至於所選用之其他公司治理變數，不論董監持股、管理者持股或是否設有獨立董監，都對股價溢酬的影響顯得關係不大，也呼應了行政院對証交法關於獨立董監的設立，採日本以鼓勵自願的做法而非強迫。 就產業前景而言，預測本來就是一件很不容易的工作，更何況是瞬息萬變的高科技產業，由本研究得出的結論恰好與反市場心理法則不謀而合，或許是分析師錯把許多數據指標誤認為是領先指標，並依此對未來前景做預測；但也有可能是現今的投資者都非常的精明，善用反市場心理法則來投資操作，姑且不論問題是出在分析師或是聰明的投資者，但根據本研究，至少發現對兩兆產業而言，若是將產業研究報告建議當作投資的唯一圭臬，似乎並不是明智之舉。 / The motivation of the thesis origin from the reports of McKinsey consulting company. According to the reports that institutional investors would willing to pay premium to hold the stock if the company build up well corporate governance institutions. The thesis decide to incise from corporate governance and industry foresight, and then find four representative variables of corporate governance and constitute dummy variables of industry recycle position. The aim is trying to understand which variable would affect premium through earnings-transmitting effect. Based on the empirical results, with view of corporate governance, the quality of information transparency (whether issue deposit receipt or not) is positive and significant to premium. Consequently it seems to be a practical index when we get confused to the reality of financial reports, moreover, the other variables about corporate governance are nonsignificant including the holding of director and supervisor、the managerial holding or whether constitute the independent director and supervisor. The conclusions about whether constitute independent director and supervisor consist with the act of government which considers that modifying direction of the security law is free to choose instead of forcing every company to do so. With the view of industry foresight, it’s not a piece of cake to predict how it’s going in the future. According to the results that psychological rule of anti-market seems to be a usable method. Keywords：Corporate Governance、industry foresight、industry analysis

隨著1997的亞洲金融風暴、1998下半年陸續發生的台灣上市公司財務危 機事件，以及2001年底美國大型公司企業弊案的層出不窮，除了一再地打擊投資人的信心，擾亂資本市場秩序外，也使投資者與證券主管機關體認到，完善的公司治理機制（corporate governance），是健全資本市場與吸引國際資金的關鍵因素之一。 公司組織的代理關係衍生出盈餘操縱與公司治理的相關問題，本研究在 第一個部分所欲探討的是公司治理的機制是否能抑制管理階層進行盈餘操 縱?另外，一般投資大眾所關心的是他們的投資標的是否為其帶來優異的報酬，而公司股價報酬率是否能提高，除了外在總體經濟的因素外，不外乎是公司本身的變數，因此本研究以董監事特性、經理人特性、關係人特性及股權結構四個構面之公司治理變數，以及盈餘操縱程度為控制變數，探討公司治理與投資人的股價報酬二者間之關係。 研究結果顯示：當董事長兼任總經理時，公司盈餘操縱程度較高。超額 關係人資金往來比例越高，盈餘操縱幅度越高。董事會規模越大，盈餘操縱程度越低。監察人總人數、董監事質押比例、控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離程度、董事會獨立程度、超額關係人進銷貨比例、機構投資人持股比例、大股東持股比例與盈餘操縱的幅度都沒有顯著相關性。 董事會規模與公司公司股價報酬率呈負相關。監察人總人數與公司股價 報酬率成正相關。董監事質押比率與公司股價報酬率呈負相關。董事會獨立程度與公司股價報酬率呈正相關。超額關係人進銷貨比例與股價報酬率呈正相關。控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度、經理人是否由董事長兼任、超額關係人資金往來比例、機構投資人持股比例、外部大股東持股比例均與股價報酬率無顯著相關性。 / Along with Asia monetary crush in 1997, Taiwan business financial crisis happened one after another in 1998 and American large enterprise fraud cases appeared again and again in 2001, not only to beat investors’ confidence and to disturb capital market order, but also make investors and the authorities concerned recognize that a complete corporate governance mechanism is a key factor of healing capital market and attracting international capital. The agency relation of business organization derives problems about earnings manipulation and corporate governance. The first part of this research is want to discuss if corporate governance mechanism can restrain management level from manipulating earnings. The most concern of common investors is that whether their invest target can bring them well return. If we want to raise the stock-price return of a company, in addition to macro economic factors, the condition of business itself is really important. The second part of this research set broad characteristics, management characteristics, related party transaction and equity structure as research variables and earnings manipulation degree as control variables to discuss the relation between corporate governance and stock-price return. The result of the first portion of research shows that when CEO simultaneously serves as Chairman of the board and exceed-ratio of related party capital intercourse is higher, the firms have higher earnings manipulation. There is a negative relation between broad size and earnings manipulation. Total number of supervisors, the rate of directors’ and supervisors’shareholdings that are pledged, the deviation between cash-flow right and seating right, broad independence, exceed-ratio of related party purchase and sales, institutional investor holding rate, outside blockholders holding rate have no relation with earnings manipulation. The result of the second portion of research shows that total number of supervisors, broad independence and exceed-ratio of related party purchase and sales have positive relation with stock-price return. There is a negative relation between stock-price return and broad size and the rate of directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings that are pledged. CEO simultaneously serves as Chairman of the board, the deviation between cash-flow rights and seating rights, exceed-ratio of related party capital intercourse, institutional investor holding rate, outside blockholders holding rate have no relation with stock-price return.

台灣證券交易所於2002年2月22日發佈規定，於發佈日後之申請上市公司，需聘任2席獨立董事與1席獨立監察人，櫃臺買賣中心亦於2002年2月25日發佈相同規定。對台灣上市櫃公司而言，獨立董監事制度之正面效益尚未明確，且可能使公司內部資訊流入外人手中，稀釋最終控制者之決策影響力。本研究從財務特性及最終控制者特性兩觀點，探討影響台灣上市櫃公司自願性設置獨立董監事之因素。另外，本研究認為獨立董監事應可發揮功能，增進公司營運效，故接著探討設置獨立董監事後，對公司後續營運績效是否有正面效益。 在影響台灣上市櫃公司自願性設置獨立董監事因素之分析，多變量迴歸實證結果發現，資訊電子業者、營運規模較小、獨立董監事設置年度前三年之平均股東權益報酬率較高及盈餘分配權與董監席次控制權偏離程度較小之公司，傾向於自願性設置獨立董監事之比例較高。 本研究以營業收益、淨利及持續性淨利衡量樣本公司之股東權益報酬率及資產報酬率，形成六種營運績效變數，探討獨立董監事對公司績效是否有正面效益。單變量實證結果發現獨立董監事對前期績效表現不佳之公司，並無明顯幫助。多變量迴歸分析結果則顯示，獨立董監事之設置與否或比例高低對公司績效，不一定具有關連性，因績效衡量變數方式不同，而有不同結果。本研究認為其可能原因有三，第一為融資決策之影響，第二為後期績效涵蓋期間太短，第三為獨立董監事並未具有足夠之獨立性或專業性。 本研究另測試獨立董監事對員工分紅與董監酬勞佔淨利程度之影響。多變量分析結果顯示，獨立董監事設置與否與所佔比例，與員工分紅與董監酬勞佔淨利之前後期變動程度無關。此結果之可能原因為，本研究所蒐集設置獨立董監事後之期間僅涵蓋2002年及2003年，即使公司有設置獨立董監事，短期間內亦難以改變公司存在已久之董監酬勞與員工分紅制度。

本研究以2001年至2005年為研究期間，從股權結構及董事會監督功能分別探討公股角色對投資標的公司經營績效之影響。本文之研究結果顯示：(1)股權結構變數中，公股投資標的公司之經營績效較無公股投資之公司為佳。(2)公股持股比率愈高，公股投資標的公司之經營績效則愈差。(3)董事會組成變數中，由公股代表出任董監之公股投資標的公司之經營績效較未派任公股代表之公司為佳。(4)當公股代表的席次比率愈高時，公股之投資標的公司之經營績效愈差。(5)公股持股比率偏離公股代表席次比率之程度愈高，公股投資標的公司之經營績效愈差。 / This research from 2001 to 2005 as research period, aim to explore the role of government ownership in the relationship between board composition and firm performance in the enterprises with government ownership. The empirical results document that from ownership structure variables, the effect of government shareholding on firm performance is found to be positive. Furthermore, firm performance decreases with an increased size of government shareholding. From board composition variables, the effect of the board with the government shareholding represents on firm performance is found to be positive. Furthermore, firm performance is worse with an increased size of government shareholding represents in the corporate board composition. Finally, when the government shareholding and the government shareholding represents’ seat ratio deviation degree is bigger, the firm performance would be worse.