本研究針對民國91到95之間，台灣發行員工認股權憑證之上市上櫃公司進行調查，利用羅吉特迴歸模型進行分析，希望能夠透過員工認股權憑證設計與公司治理變數之間的關聯性研究，找出能夠反映員工認股權憑證設計是否偏向管理當局的公司治理變數，並且提供政府與投資人未來在政策制訂與決策上的一些參考依據。 本研究使用「外部股東持股>5%總和」、「政府持有」、「盈餘股份偏離比」、「董事會規模」、「外部董監事」作為公司治理變數；分析結果發現在「盈餘股份偏離比」的部分，於樣本觀察期間，都呈現正向關係，並且於93、94年達到顯著。盈餘股份偏離比越大的時候，一般象徵著盈餘權的不對等，同時也隱含公司治理風險，因此由上述結果本研究推論，當盈餘股份偏離比擴大時員工認股選擇權的設計方式將更朝向管理當局的偏好靠近。支持管理權力假說的看法；當進一步利用同樣的方法針對含公司特性控制變數的迴歸結果進行跨期的一致性分析時，發現盈餘股份偏離比以及董事會規模的顯著性雙雙提高，盈餘股份偏離比依舊為正相關董事會規模也呈現正相關。

過去有許多實證研究探討了公司治理特性對於公司經營績效的影響，特別是關於股權結構及管理階層薪酬方面，而在董事會特性對經營績效的影響上卻未獲致一致性的結論。近年來開始有研究探討董事會特性對於企業的經營策略，乃至於經營績效的關係。本研究參考Baysinger and Robert（1990）及He and Joseph（2006）等人提出之理論架構，針對國內上市公司的公司治理特性、經營策略選擇以及績效表現之關連性進行實證上之研究，研究之主要目的係在瞭解台灣上市公司的公司治理特性對於企業策略選擇之影響，並延伸過往研究，對公司治理特性、企業績效表現，以及不同的策略選擇三者間的關連性，提出實證研究上之證據。 本研究除印證過去文獻所指出董事會特性與股權結構對公司績效具有顯著影響及企業績效顯著受到策略行為影響外，並發現企業的差異化策略強度顯著受到公司治理特性影響。而將差異化策略強度依強弱程度作組別劃分時，差異化策略強度亦與公司治理特性同為影響企業績效的因素；另外，在不同差異化策略強度下，差異化策略強度為董事長雙元性、董事會持股、經理人持股影響企業績效的中介因子。本研究的結果支持Baysinger and Robert（1990）及He and Joseph（2006）等人所提出的理論架構，在探討公司治理特性影響企業績效時，或應將企業的策略行為納入考量。 / Formerly, there were many researchs discussed how corporation governance, equity structure and managerial remuneration especially, effects business performance. But, there were not consistent conclution in how the board attributes effects performance. Recently, there were some researchs discussed the relationship among corporation governance, business strategies and performance. This research dicussed the relationship among corporation governance, business strategies and performance in listed company in Taiwan, and referred to the theoretical frameworks advanced by Baysinger and Robert（1990）and He and Joseph（2006）. This research not only proved the performance effected by the board attributes equity structure and strategic behavior observably, but also discovered that the strength of difference strategy effected by corporation governance noteworthily. In the different degree of strength of difference strategy, the strength of difference strategy was the mediator to corporation governance and performance. This research argued that the strategic behavior should be considered when research how corporation governance effect performance.

公司在追求規模經濟的同時，由於其所有者的時間精力有限，就必須放釋放一定的代理權，以求得企業的規模發展。當代理權釋出後，代理關係就無可避免，利害關係衝突於是產生。代理人會傾向偷懶、保守、自利、短視，以維護自己的利益，引發了所謂的代理成本，於是便需要公司治理機制加以解決。本研究除了繼續以前的研究探討我國上市電子公司之股權結構及董監酬勞與員工分紅對公司績效的影響外，由於我國高科技業的「員工分紅配股」措施，使公司的股本增大，造成其EPS降低、股價的稀釋及選舉權受到侵蝕，因而損害原股東的權益。因此，本研究也欲探討我國上市電子公司股權結構是否會影響其董監酬勞及員工分紅政策。 本研究以1997起至2002年止台灣上市電子公司為樣本，經刪除資料不完整的公司後，共計有55家公司330個觀察值為研究樣本。本研究是以複迴歸模型來進行實證研究。實證結果顯示經理人持股比率、機構法人持股比率、董事監察人持股比率，以及員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率與公司績效呈正相關。經理人持股比率及機構投資者持股比率與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率呈正相關，至於董事持股比率、監察人持股比率及監察人佔全部董事監察人比率，則與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率無關。 / When the size of the company is growing, the owners of the company have the limit time and the energy, the company must have the agent. Once the company has the agent, the interest relationship among the owner and agent will conflict. The agents are easily lazy, conservative, selfish, and nearsighted to pursue their interest, so the agent cost happen. This study beside continue the former research about the relationship between the ownership structure and the company performance, and the relationship between the the the employee bonus and the company performance in the TSE-listed electronic company. Because the high-tech company in Taiwan practice the policy of “the employee stock distribution”, the policy will cause the expansion of the stock. The expansion of the stock lessens the EPS, dilutes the stock price and erodes the right of the election. That damage the right of the original stockholders, and therefore this study examine the relationship between the ownership structure and the employee bonus in the TSE-listed electronic company as well. This study samples are the TSE-listed electronic company from 1997 to 2002, but exclude the company with insufficient data. The rest are 55 companies, and 330 observations that are obtained. This study uses complex regression model on this empirical research. The empirical result indicates the stock ownership of the managers, the stock ownership of the institution investors, the stock ownership of the board, and the bonus rate of the employee are positively related to the company performance. The stock ownership of the manager, and the stock ownership of the institution investors are positively related to the employee bonus rate. The stock ownership of the directors, the stock ownership of the supervisors, and the supervisor rate of the board reveal no significant relationship with the bonus rate of the employee.

有鑑於公司治理優劣對於公司財務狀況影響之議題逐漸受到重視，因此本文首先由20個公司治理篩選對於危機具有鑑別能力之因子，由於公司治理提供財務報表之額外資訊，首先利用邏輯思迴歸進行傳統財務模型危機機率的估計，並利用線性加入公司治理因子、加入公司治理交乘項將原始模型延伸分別進行模型之危機機率估計，並以巴塞爾協定所提供之模型驗證方法進行樣本外資料評估模型鑑別危機與否能力；使用方法包括K-S檢定、ROC曲線、CAP曲線以及其相對應的值化方法包含AUC值以及Gini係數。結果加入利用公司治理資訊之延伸模型在各種驗證方法中皆強於原始財務模型，可提供公司治理對於企業危機預警之預測進行參考。

併購是企業成長最快捷的手段，題企業經營的大戰略，然而併購決策可能隱含著經理人或制股東的自利動機，而不是為長遠的股東權益著想，可能作出錯誤的併購決策而讓股東血本無歸。本研究探究主併企業之公司治理機制可否有效監督管理階層作出審慎的併購決策，從股權結構觀點出發，以發生於1996年至2003年間，主併公司為公開發行公司之併購案件共112件為研究樣本，探討主併公司各種股權結構與併購後長期財務績效的關聯性。 實證結果顯示，未擔任董監事的經理人持股比例與併購後績效呈現顯著的正相關，與利益一致假說相符，機構持股比例與併購後績效亦呈顯著的正相關，符合效率監督假說，衡量控制股東負面侵佔誘因的席次盈餘偏離倍數則與併購後績效呈現顯著的負相關。此實證結果隱喻，控制股東是否具有強烈的侵佔誘因係影響併購決策優劣最重要的因素。 / Mergers and acquisitions are one of the most efficient ways to meet the need of corporation expansion, and therefore are the most important business strategies. Nevertheless, the past studies indicate managerial incentives as well as self-interests of controlling stockholders may drive some mergers that ultimately reduce the long-run value of the firm. This study examines whether corporate governance mechanism helps management make acquisition decisions based on stockholders’ interests. Using a sample of 112 acquisition cases during the period of 1996 to 2003 which the acquiring firms are public traded firms, the study empirically investigates the effect of ownership structure of acquiring firms’ on post-acquisiton long-run financial performance. The primary empirical results show that the shareholdings of managers who don’t serve as directors or supervisors of the board have a positive impact on post-acquisiton performance, institution ownership also has a positive impact on post-acquisiton performance, while the deviation between the seat-control rights ratio and cash-flow rights of controlling stockholder has a negative impact on post-acquisiton performance. The results thus imply that whether the controlling stockholder has strong incentive of expropriation is the key to the quality of acquisition.

本研究係探討公司治理機制是否影響台灣上市櫃公司之現金持有率，並透過檢驗公司治理對公司現金持有價值之影響，來探討公司治理如何影響公司之價值。本研究發現，董事會規模及董事會內部化程度顯著影響公司現金持有率之高低，並發現公司之董事長是否兼任總經理、董事會內部化程度、董監持股率、機構法人持股率、公司是否屬家族控制型態、控制股東之盈餘分配權，以及股份控制權之偏離程度等因素，均影響公司現金之價值，此種結果與現金持有之代理觀點一致。換言之，公司治理機制較差的公司，其管理者（或控制股東）易因個人私利而影響公司現金持有政策，而控制股東與小股東間的核心代理問題，也會顯著降低公司現金持有價值。 / This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and corporate cash holdings of Taiwanese listed companies, and further explores how corporate governance characteristics impact a firm’s value through the value of its cash holdings. Our empirical results show that board size and insider dominance of the board are important determinants of cash holdings. In addition, the duality of chairman and CEO, insider dominance of the board, percentage of equity ownership held by directors, the ratio of institution stockholdings, family-control of a firm, the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights all affect the value of a firm’s cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the agency view of cash holdings. That is, managers in the firms with poor corporate governance have more incentive to influence corporate cash policies for their own benefits, and the core agency problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders affect the value of cash holdings negatively.

現代創業投資活動主要崛起於第二次世界大戰後，我國自1984年引進創投事業發展迄今，對科技事業之發展頗具成效。然自2000年起政府基於租稅公平，取消促進產業升級條例原來賦予創投事業股東的投資抵減優惠，使得我國創投事業資金來源大幅減少。 目前我國創投事業面臨的困境有：一、資金募集困難；二、投資績效不彰；三、國內投資案源不足；四、欠缺熟悉國外創投運作的人才；五、國內外創業投資事業組織型態之不同；六、尚未能開放退休基金投資創投事業。 本研究係探討創投事業法制上相關問題，主要發現節錄如下：一、我國對創投事業之管制方式，已由管理放寬為輔導協助。二、建議適度放寬創投事業之資金來源限制。創投事業之資金來源甚廣，本研究討論之範圍為金融機構之投資限制、政府基金及四大基金之投資等。其中，放寬四大基金投資創投事業，向來為國內創投業界及創投公會之期望，然數年來仍未能達成該項目標。主要為：1.相關法令之限制，2.投資創投事業之風險控管問題。三、利用資本市場活動，協助創投事業退出。四、我國創投事業大部份係委託基金管理公司來管理，故形成雙層的公司治理結構，與國外創投契約型的治理結構不盡相同。五、引進國外有限合夥法制，與國際接軌。 惟引進有限合夥組織時，需考量制度本身之優劣，國情及使用者需求之不同。在有限合夥制度中，一般合夥人必須負無限清償責任，另一方面有限合夥人僅扮演出資者，完全不介入管理。對我國現行投資者習慣依出資比例，分配董監事席次，是否願意僅出資而不介入經營，尚待評估。 / The modern venture capital activities were incepted after World War II. The operation of venture capital were introduced to Taiwan in 1984, having a beneficial impact to the development of Taiwan’s science and high technology. However, since 2000 for the sake of Tax Equity, Our government abolish The Statute for Upgrading Industries was given to venture capital investment in the cause of the shareholders preferential credit, making the cause of Taiwan’s venture capital funding sources substantially reduced. Currently, Taiwan’s venture capital business is facing difficulties are: first, fund-raising is difficult; Second, poor investment performance; Third, the case of domestic investment was not enough; Fourth, the lack of venture capitalist are familiar with the operation of foreign talent; five, types of organizations of domestic and foreign venture capital business are different; six, have not allow pension fund to invest in venture capital business. In this study, is to explore the legal system on venture capital related issues, excerpts from major findings are as follows: First, The control of Taiwan’s venture capital business is from management to relax for the guidance and assistance. Second, it is proposed to deregulate venture capital funding source restrictions. Venture capital business have a wide range of funding sources, this study is to discuss the scope of financial institutions of investment restrictions, government funds and four pension funds. Among them, the relaxation of four pension funds wae the domestic venture capital industry and the Association of venture capital’s expectations, but over the years fail to reach the goal. Mainly for: 1. Relevant legal’s restrictions, 2. The risk management issues of venture capital business. Third, the use of capital market activities to withdraw from the venture capital business. Fourth, the majority of Taiwan’s venture capital business is managed by fund management company, so it’s formed a two-tier corporate governance structure, with foreign venture contractual governance structure is different. Fifth, the introduction of foreign limited partnership law. However, the introduction of a limited partner organizations, is need to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the system itself, the national conditions and needs of different users. In the limited partnership system, the general partner must bear the responsibility of unlimited liquidity, on the other hand, limited partner only play a role of investors, and not allow to intervene the management of venture capital business. Habits of our existing investors is familiar with in accordance with the proportion of funding, to allocate the seats of the Director board, are doubtful only willing to finance and not to intervene the operation, yet to be evaluated.

初次申請上市(櫃)公司適用之公司治理規範，較已上市(櫃)公司嚴格，所以其公司治理的執行情形及成效具指標性的意義。本研究以於2007年度上櫃掛牌之35家初次申請上櫃公司為分析對象，並以其同業上市(櫃)公司作為對照公司，探討初次申請上櫃公司掛牌後對公司治理規範之持續遵行情形，及其掛牌後經營績效與股價表現。 經追蹤樣本公司上櫃後持續遵守公司治理規範的情形，其掛牌後之遵行情形絕大多數繼續遵守較嚴格之公司治理要求，其落實公司治理的情況遠優於對照公司，顯示主管機關對初次申請上櫃公司推行公司治理之政策已見成效。 本研究比較樣本公司上櫃前與上櫃後經營績效、樣本公司上櫃後與對照公司同期間經營績效，以了解公司治理規範寬嚴與經營績效之關係。分析後發現，樣本公司在2007年度財務結構及償債能力方面之績效優於2006年度之績效，而在2007年度獲利能力、現金流量、營業收入成長率及稅前純益成長率方面則較2006年度之績效為差；樣本公司在2008年度財務結構及償債能力方面之績效優於2006年度之績效，而在2008年度獲利能力、現金流量、營業收入成長率及稅前純益成長率方面之績效則較2006年度之績效為差。但從2008年上半年度的分析來看，樣本公司掛牌後之績效表現較對照公司為佳。 本研究亦比較樣本公司上櫃前與上櫃後股價報酬率、樣本公司上櫃後與對照公司同期間股價報酬率，以了解公司治理規範寬鬆與股價表現之關係。分析後發現，樣本公司掛牌後之股價表現未明顯較掛牌前為佳，掛牌後之股價表現亦未明顯優於對照公司。 綜上，受較嚴格公司治理規範之初次申請上櫃公司，其掛牌後經營績效及股價表現未明顯優於掛牌前之經營績效及股價表現，而掛牌後經營績效較同業上市(櫃)公司為佳，但掛牌後之股價表現未明顯優於同業上市(櫃)公司。

由於銀行及保險公司之經營是以吸收客戶存款或保戶所繳保費，並將資金運用於授信或投資，來賺取利息收入及資本利得，以便支付存款利息、保險理賠及營業費用，若發生問題時，勢必將產生擠兌、退保等現象，對國家經濟發展產生負面影響，故公司治理機制對金融業甚為重要，有深入探討公司治理機制對其經營績效影響之必要。因此，本文以2004年至2008年上市之14家金融控股公司作為研究對象，採用三階段DEA法中CCR模型與BCC模型，建立實證模型後，蒐集各金融控股公司之投入與產出資料，應用DEA模型，求算各DMU之技術效率值與總合投入差額，同時利用隨機邊界分析法調整各投入項，再以DEA之實證結果，加以分析解釋各金融控股公司之經營效率。。本研究實證結果如下： 一、由第一階段DEA效率評估結果顯示，各金融控股公司之技術效率、純技術效率及規模效率均有顯著差異，且各項效率值仍有改善空間，無效率之主要原因為資源之浪費。 二、再由第二階段SFA迴歸估計結果顯示，自然人持股比率、外部董事比率，均與公司之經營績效呈現正向相關；公司內部人持股比率、自然人董事比率、董監事持股質押比率、會計師、董事長、總經理、財務主管及內部稽核異動人次、景氣情況，均與公司之經營績效呈現負向相關；全體董事人數則與公司之經營績效無顯著相關；而以票券為主體之國票金融控股公司，經營績效最好，而以證券為主體之元大金融控股公司，經營績效最差；此外，投入差額變異幾乎完全來自於管理無效率之影響，受統計干擾項影響極小。 三、最後，再由第三階段調整後之DEA效率評估結果顯示，與第一階段相同之處在於，各金融控股公司之技術效率、純技術效率及規模效率均有顯著差異，且各項效率值仍有改善空間；若未將規模效率納入考量，純技術效率值將被低估，且規模無效率之主要原因為多數金融控股公司產能未充分發揮。其相異之處在於，調整後必須增加更多之投入；第三階段有較少金融控股公司之純技術效率存在改善空間，而有較多金融控股公司之技術效率及規模效率存在改善空間；無效率主要原因為生產規模之不適當，而非資源浪費。

我國從2002年引進獨立董事制度，並於2007年引進審計委員會制度;且要求公開發行股票之證券投資信託事業、綜合證券商、上市（櫃）期貨商及實收資本額達新臺幣100億元以上未滿500億元之非屬金融業之上市（櫃）公司應於104至106年間完成審計委員會之設置。實收資本額達新臺幣20億元以上未滿100億元之非屬金融業上市（櫃）公司應於106至108年間完成審計委員會之設置。本研究將針對已施行近10年的審計委員會制度做一檢視。 本研究採用朱德芳（2013，2014）關於審計委員會制度之研究理念與作法。邀請五位獨立董事做訪談並將訪談內容作整理分析，初步了解臺灣審計委員會實施概況。本研究發現：宜強化審計委員會的功能，以及調整雙軌制漸漸趨向單軌制。 / The Independent Director System was imported into Taiwan in 2002 and subsequently the audit committee system started in 2007. Public companies, brokerages, listed futures firms and securities firms were then required to establish an audit committee. This new regulation also applied to non-securities firms who has capital between NTD $10Bn and NTD $50Bn. It was stipulated that the changes must be implemented between 2015 and 2017. Furthermore, listed firms whose capital exceeds NTD $2Bn but less than NTD $10Bn must establish audit committees in the period 2017-2019. This thesis intends to review and analyze the implementation of these audit committees. This study adopts concepts put forward by distinguished professor Te-Fang Chu (2013-2014) as well as uses the process she developed to verify the effectiveness of the legislation in the business world. We invited five independent directors to interview and helped us gain a surface-level understanding of the audit committee process.This analysis resulted in two specific recommendations. First, some functions within the audit committee must be strengthened. Second, the two-tier corporate governance system should be flattened to a single tier.