本論文主要包含二個主題，分別檢視公司治理對企業基本財務資訊與股票報酬關係的影響，以及公司治理對企業投資機會與股利政策關係的影響。首先，在探討公司治理是否影響基本財務資訊中，我們資料為台灣上市的 183 家製造業公司。當使用傳統線性模型時，我們發現存貨、銷貨毛利、備抵壞帳費用以及負債比率變化率的係數，出現符合預期的負向符號。但是研發費、管銷費用與員工生產力比率的係數，卻出現違反直覺的正向符號。而每股盈餘變化率、應收帳款、有效稅率以及會計師意見，則是對股票報酬沒有任何顯著的效果。然而，我們使用 Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) 內生性轉換模型(endogenous switching model, ESM) 的方法，而將樣本區分為好的公司治理與不好的公司治理二個區域時，實證結果發現先前違反直覺的係數，已轉變成與我們的預期相符合。 在探討公司治理是否影響企業投資機會與股利政策關係，我們資料為台灣上市的 268 家製造業公司，並參考La Porta et al. (2000) 所提出的「結果模型假說」 (outcome model hypotheses) 以及「替代模型假說」(substitution model hypotheses) 兩個假設。前者強調在好的公司治理區域時，投資機會與股利政策為負向的關係，而後者則是強調在不好的公司治理區域，投資機會與股利政策為正向的關係。為了探討這個議題，我們分別使用兩個轉換模型區分樣本：分別為Hansen (1999) 縱橫門檻模型 (panel threshold model) 以及Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) 內生性轉換模型。最後，經由不同公司治理變數的實證結果比較，發現在好公司治理區域時，高投資機會的公司可能會支付較少的股利政策，相反地，在不好的公司治理區域，股利政策則不受到公司治理的影響。因此本研究結果支持「結果模型假說」，而不是「替代模型假說」的假設。

本研究旨在探討內部人股票交易與盈餘管理之關聯性，並進一步檢視我國近年來為強化公司治理所引進之獨立董監事制度是否能對內部人交易與盈餘管理間之關聯性產生抑制效果。在分析時，本研究係將全部樣本區分為賣出組及買入組，並分別進行驗證。 實證結果顯示，發生內部人異常出售股票交易之樣本公司，其管理階層將於同一期進行使盈餘降低之盈餘管理。而此一結果所隱含之意義為，內部人為降低日後回補持股之成本，會於出售持股當期進行盈餘之操弄，以求影響未來股價。然而，在發生內部人異常買入股票現象之樣本公司，卻未發現如本研究所預期之內部人為極大化未來出售持股利益而從事使盈餘提高之盈餘管理的現象，本研究推測可能原因係內部人買入本公司股票之理由眾多，因此也不必然有拉抬未來股價以求自未來出售股票交易中獲利之考量。 另外，在獨立董事與獨立監察人對於內部人異常交易及盈餘管理間關係之抑制效果的部分，在買入組或賣出組均未發現顯著之抑制效果。對此，本研究認為可能之原因係獨立董監事制度在我國實施之時間尚短，且多數公司係基於法令之要求始設置獨立董監事，而在這樣的現況下，似乎難以預期獨立董監事能有效監督公司內部人之異常股票交易行為以及盈餘管理行為。 / This thesis examines if there is an association between insider trading and earnings management. Furthermore, this thesis examines whether independent directors and independent supervisors can suppress the relationship between insider trading and earnings management. In the analytical process, the whole sample is divided into two sub samples which are sell and buy sub sample. The two sub samples are examined separately. And this thesis finds that there is a negative association between insider trading and earnings management in the sell sub sample which suggests that executives will manage earnings downward in the same period of insider selling to minimize their cost of buying stocks back in the future. And this result is consistent with the hypothesis. But no proper evidence is found about the relationship between insider trading and earning management in the buy sub sample. This may result from that there are many reasons for insiders to buy stocks of their firms. And insiders do not necessarily buy stocks of their firms to make profits by selling them in the future. Besides, in the part of the suppressing effect of independent directors and supervisors, proper evidences do not exist neither in the buy sub sample nor in the sell sub sample. A possible reason is that since the independent directors and supervisors system is still new in Taiwan, and most firms with independent directors and supervisors are just enforced by regulations to set independent directors and supervisors, it's hard to expect that independent directors and supervisors to play their roles effectively.

Despite being the twelfth largest financial market in the world, approximately 90 per cent of the entire trading volume in the Taiwan stock market is accounted for by only a small, but widely dispersed, group of local investors actively participating in the local market during the 1995-1999 period (Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean, 2007); it is, however, also the case that these investors suffer from low levels of investor protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). The discovery of a series of corporate scandals in Taiwan, between 16 June and 15 September 2004 (the event period), offers a unique opportunity to investigate the perceptions of investors on the value of corporate governance. The main line of reasoning in this study is that at times when news of scandals flows into the market, the perceptions of certain types of investors, particularly uniformed outsiders, will lead to a systematic change in their trading habits; thus, they may avoid trading in certain firms altogether, or their incentives to place aggressive orders may be considerably weakened, particularly where there is a likelihood of expropriation by controlling insiders. This dissertation undertakes a comprehensive analysis of trade and quote (TAQ) data for all investors on a sample of 94 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE), and provides evidence of extreme variations in the investment behavior of different types of investors. It is clear that during the event period, a substantial proportion of investors did cease trading altogether, with such cessation of trading even affecting their original non-scandal portfolios. This response was particularly discernible amongst small and medium-sized individual investors, who may often incur losses in firms with high cash-flow rights leverage. It seems that even the better-performed small-sized individual investors, who had previously enjoyed larger positive excess returns, tended to discard their previous trading strategy involving firms with no clear deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights. An examination of this deviation in trading behavior shows that most investors, with the exceptions of foreign institutions and large-sized individual investors, began to enter the market more passively during the event period, particularly in firms in which the ultimate controllers had separate control and cash-flow ownership. However, throughout the event period, the trading strategies of foreign institutions and large-sized individual investors involved more aggressive submission of orders for stocks in firms with strong cash-flow rights leverage. Finally, a direct test of the informativeness of aggressive orders placed by each category of investors, under different ownership structure portfolios, regardless of any order strategy, reveals that small-sized individual investors invariably performed badly during both the pre-event and event periods examined in this dissertation. Each line of our analysis shows that only foreign institutions and large-sized individual investors maintained acceptable returns; in comparative terms, these two groups of investors performed relatively well in portfolios with higher cash-flow rights leverage.

本研究以台灣上市、上櫃及興櫃公司為研究對象，利用問卷發放的方式，探討我國企業公司治理特質與內部稽核對財務報導可靠性貢獻之關係，並調查我國內部稽核之現況，以及內部稽核人員與外部查核人員之互動情形。本研究之實證結果顯示：（1）「公開發行公司建立內部控制制度處理準則」於2005年修訂，規定內部稽核單位應直接隸屬於董事會之後，內部稽核人員普遍認為其地位與獨立性有明顯提升。但我國企業內部稽核規模仍偏低，以1~2人為主；（2）監察人（或審計委員會）複核內部稽核工作之範疇、內部稽核之規模、內部稽核人員與外部查核人員之互動情形等，與內部稽核對財務報導可靠性之貢獻度呈顯著正相關 ；以及（3）針對內部稽核人員與外部查核人員之互動情形（包含工作協調、溝通、外部查核使用內部稽核結果之程度），內部稽核人員的認知普遍優於外部查核人員的認知。 / This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and internal auditors’ assessments of their contributions to financial reporting reliability. This study also investigates the current status of internal auditing in Taiwan and the interaction between internal auditors and external auditors. Our results show that (1) since the applicable laws require that the internal audit department must report directly to the board of directors, internal auditors’ independence and position in their companies have improved significantly. However, the number of internal auditors in most companies is still low; (2) the extent to which the supervisors (or audit committee members) review internal audit results, the total numbers of staff in an internal audit department, and the relationship between internal and external auditors are positively related to internal auditors’ contribution to a firm’s financial reporting reliability; and (3) in general, internal auditors’ perceptions of their interactions with external auditors is better than those of external auditors.

本文係以證券商發言人作為研究對象，探討台灣上市櫃公司發言人的核心能力。有鑑於量化研究較難以發掘核心能力的真實面貌，因此本文是採用半結構式的深度訪談做質化研究，再輔以問卷調查進行交叉分析，進而歸納台灣上市櫃公司發言人所應具備的核心能力，並希望利用這項結果，提供研究者對於發言人核心能力及其職場生態的瞭解，以作為今後對相關領域內學術探討與企業實務的參考。 本研究在學術及實務上的目的有四項，分述如下： （一）探索上市櫃公司發言人核心能力的特質，作為比較依據； （二）了解上市櫃公司發言人從業歷程，彌補既有文獻之不足； （三）作為企業界任命及培訓發言人之參考； （四）提供主管機關未來修訂上市櫃公司發言人制度之參考。 儘管目前學術界缺乏企業發言人的相關文獻可供參考，但經過本文對現 有十家上市櫃證券商進行研究之後，大致可以歸納出以下結論： （一）「專業能力」、「溝通能力」及「情緒管理」是大部份受訪的發言人都擁有的核心能力，也是受訪者建議發言人必須具備的主要核心能力；而「掌握公司文化」與「企業倫理」則是另外發現的兩項非常重要的職能，雖然目前各界的定義或認知可能不同，但這兩項職能未來仍將列入核心能力的範疇之中。 （二）上市櫃證券商發言人通常是由位高權重的資深主管所兼任，他們接任之前的平均專業年資是九．七年，而每天真正花在發言人業務上的時間，大約只占辦公時間的十分之一。 （三）上市櫃證券商發言人希望參加正式的在職訓練課程，以學習法令新知，汲取實務案例經驗，並進行經驗交流。 （四）有關企業購併案的資訊揭露，主管機關應該訂定明確的標準作業程序，以免上市櫃公司必須夾在法令的灰色地帶，一方面要設法在保密過程中推動購併案，另一方面又要擔心資訊揭露太慢而遭受法令處罰。 關鍵字：發言人、核心能力、公司治理、公共關係 / This thesis takes the spokespersons of securities companies as an example to discuss the issue regarding core competencies of spokespersons of the listed companies in Taiwan. To have deeper understanding of the issue, this study conducts in-depth interviews as well as questionnaires on spokepersons of the ten listed securities companies. Quantitative and qualitative data were cross-examined to present the overall picture of the spokespersons of Taiwan’s listed securities companies. By conducting empirical research, this thesis aims to contribute to the academic and practical fields. The major findings of this study are: (1)There are three core competencies that most of the interviewed spokespersons own in this research. They are “Professional ability,” “Communication ability,” and “Emotion management.” These factors are also suggested as criteria for qualified spokespersons by the interviewees. In addition, “Grasping the corporate’s culture” and “Corporate ethics” are also two important abilities emphasized by the interviewees. (2)Generally speaking, the position of spokesperson is not a full-time job. It is only part of the senior managers’ concurrent responsibility. Before taking over the positions, these spokespersons have spent an average of 9.7 years in related professions. The senior managers would spend about one-tenth working hours on the spokespersons’ daily duties. (3)The spokespersons of the listed companies would like to participate in professional training programs to learn new regulations and to share practical experience from case studies. (4)For the listed companies in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), the spokespersons have the obligation to disclose the material information to the public as soon as possible, but the M&A cases might be interrupted or fail due to the immature information disclosure. Therefore, the authorities should set up the standard M&A procedure so that the spokespersons could disclose information step by step, in order to take care of the benefit both for companies and investors. Keywords: Spokesperson, Core competency, Corporate governance, Public relations

關係人交易與公司績效之關係，在過去文獻上並未獲得絕對一致的結論，惟過去文獻並未考慮集團內進行關係人交易的公司，不同公司特徵所誘發進行關係人交易不同之交易動機。因此，本文利用Sharma et al.（1981）及 Le et al.（2006）之調節性多元迴歸分析方法（moderated multiple regression；MMR），考慮集團內個別公司不同特徵下之關係人交易與公司績效之關聯性。基於本文實證結果，發現在集團內不同公司特徵之關係人交易與公司績效的確有不同的關聯性，並且發現集團內具有以下三項特徵的公司，所進行的關係人交易有利公司績效，分別是：1.較高的董監持股 2.較高的機構投資人持股 3.較高的流動比率。而集團內具有以下六項特徵之公司，所進行的關係人交易不利公司績效，分別是：1. 經理人兼任的董監席次較多 2.金字塔股權結構 3.集團的核心公司 4.較高的負 債比 5.較高的長期負債比 6.較低的利息保障倍數。 / The relationship between related party transactions and company’s performance in the past literature has not reached absolutely unanimous conclusion, but the past literature has not considered the different characteristics of individual company in the group and different related party transactions’ motive induced by those characteristics. Therefore, moderated multiple regression（MMR）that adopted by Sharma et al.（1981） and Le et al.（2006）is employed in this study in order to discuss the relationship between the transactions made by individual company with different characteristics in the group and the individual company’s performance. According to the empirical results in this paper, there are indeed different relationships between the transactions made by individual company with different characteristics in the group and the individual company’s performance. On the one hand, the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the related party transactions made by the individual company with the three characteristics in the group and the companies’ performance. The three characteristics are as follows: 1. higher board shareholdings. 2. higher institutional investors’ holdings. 3. higher the current ratio. On the other hand, the results show that there is a negative relationship between the related party transactions made by the individual company with the six characteristics in the group and the companies’ performance. The six characteristics are as follows: 1. managers as more seats in the board. 2. pyramidal ownership structure. 3. the core companies in the group. 4. higher the liabilities ratio. 5. higher the long-term liabilities ratio. 6. lower the time interest earned.

本研究從家族治理、機構投資人持股、董事會組成、董事會效能之角度探討公司治理機制對企業績效與董監薪酬之影響。家族治理方面，家族持股愈多，企業績效愈好，但家族參與經營程度愈高，企業績效卻愈差；而家族治理下，董監薪酬水準、薪酬績效連結性均較低。機構投資者方面，本國金融機構持股愈高，企業績效愈高。董事會組成方面，董事長兼總經理下，企業績效較差、董監薪酬績效連結性較低，而執行董事、獨立董監席次比例愈高，企業績效、董監薪酬績效連結性均愈高；董事長兼總經理下及執行董事席次比例愈高時，董監薪酬水準愈低，而獨立董監席次比例愈高，董監薪酬水準愈高。董事會效能方面，正常營運下之企業，董事會開會次數愈多、出席率愈高，企業績效均提升；董事會出席率愈高，董監薪酬水準、薪酬績效連結性均愈高。 / The study uses family governance, institutional ownership, board structure, and board activities to empirically investigate the influence of corporate governance on firm performance and board compensation. Empirical result shows that the firm performance is higher when family ownership, institutional ownership, executive directors, independent board members, and board activities increase, and that the firm performance is lower when family involvement increase and when chairman and CEO is the same person. In addition, the board compensation is higher when independent board members and board activities increase, and the board compensation are lower when family governance, institutional ownership, executive directors increase and when chairman and CEO is the same person. Moreover, the pay-performance sensitivity is higher when institutional ownership, executive directors, independent board members, and board activities increase, and the pay-performance sensitivity is lower when family governance increase and when chairman and CEO is the same person.

本文以1996年至2007年間台灣銀行業為研究對象，同時考量民營化、購併與加入金控等三類公司治理事件改變對經營績效的影響，並在靜態及動態指標外，另外考慮選取指標，以進一步了解從事公司治理改變的理由，並對過去衡量經營績效的計量模型加以改善。本研究發現選取進行民營化及加入金控的銀行，其經營績效皆顯著高於其他銀行，而銀行從事購併可能是為了提升經營績效及加強競爭力。此外，銀行績效在民營化後較民營化前差，雖然整體績效確有提升，但提升的原因並非民營化所造成；而銀行加入金控後不只無法提升效率，且似乎失去加入金控前所享有的優勢。而「不具穩健性」的檢定結果發現當迴歸模型未同時考慮不同公司治理效果及指標時，檢定結果將有明顯差異。 / Using data from Taiwan banking industry in the period of 1996 to 2007, this study jointly analyze the effects of privatization, merger and joining financial holding companies (FHCs) on the performance of Taiwan banking industry. In addition to static and dynamic indicators, it also considers the selection indicator in order to understand the reason banks involve in corporate governance changes. Emphasis is placed on the importance of including indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model, and the “nonrobustness” checks which purposely exclude some indictors also support this statement. The results show that those undergoing privatization or joining FHCs had particularly better performance beforehand, and those undergoing mergers had poorer performance beforehand. In addition, the performances of banks deteriorate following privatization and following banks joining FHCs. It is possible that banks undergoing privatization or joining FHCs have other strategic or regulatory concerns than improving performances.

自去年金融海嘯爆發，許多公司雖然經營績效不佳，其管理階層卻坐領高薪，經過媒體的大幅報導，使社會大眾開始關注企業肥貓與黃金降落傘之現象。針對上述不合理的現象，投資大眾期能藉由公司所揭露的訊息，瞭解其經營績效與經理人薪酬之間是否具有合理的關係，並進行必要之監督。此外，股東行動主義逐漸抬頭，投資大眾可利用企業所揭露之資訊判斷公司大小情事，其中包括是否存在著公司經營不善，董監事卻溢領高薪的情況。另一方面，坐領高薪之管理階層為避免引起眾怒，可能會減少資訊之數量及降低資訊之品質，以減低其領取不合理之酬勞而引發社會譁然之機率。因此，本研究之目的在於探討公司董監酬勞與資訊揭露透明度之關聯性，並藉由實證資料驗證我國企業是否存在著此種規避資訊揭露之現象。 本研究實證結果顯示，董監事為了確保其本身之利益，而維持高額之董監酬勞時，可能增加董監事與管理階層合謀之機會，而共同隱藏不利之訊息，降低其資訊揭露透明度。此外，董監酬勞占公司淨利之比例增加時，董監事個人利益與公司營運成敗的關係愈密切，而影響董監事之獨立性。換言之，董監酬勞占淨利比較高之公司較會隱藏對其不利之訊息，使得該公司資訊揭露透明度降低。再者，公司董監酬勞異常高於同業平均值時，會促使董監事隱藏與董監酬勞相關之資訊，減少其資訊揭露之數量與品質，而降低其資訊揭露透明度。 / Since the global financial tsunami broke out in 2008, many corporations have performed poorly, but their top management still receives high compensations. Through the reports in news media, people become more concerned with the unreasonable phenomenon of corporate “Fat Cat” and “Golden Parachute”. Investors are paying more attention to determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between corporate performance and directors’ compensations and to perform necessary monitoring. On the other hand, directors who receive high salaries may reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed to avoid public scrutiny and criticism. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between directors’ compensations and corporate information transparency. The empirical results show that for the directors and supervisors to maintain their high compensation, they may collude with the management in hiding negative information and reducing corporate information transparency. In addition, when directors’ compensations were abnormally higher than the industry average, they had a tendency to hide the compensation information or reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed. Consequently, these corporations had lower information transparency.

為因應金融風暴所造成的金融資產巨大評價損失，國際會計準則委員會於2008年10月13日發布有關金融資產重分類的修正條文，我國財務會計準則委員會因而亦於2008年10月17日隨之修訂第34號準則，並發布金融資產重分類之新規定。然而公司管理當局是否利用對金融資產重分類而進行盈餘管理，可能隨著公司治理良窳而有不同，是一個有待實證之問題。 本研究旨是探討根據修訂之會計準則而重分類金融資產的財務報表資訊，是否仍具價值攸關性或只是淪為盈餘操縱的手段。首先，本研究探討公司管理當局是否於97年度第3季追溯對金融資產重分類。其次，本研究分析追溯重分類財務報表資訊之價值攸關性及其相對變化。 實證結果如下： （1）當公司績效愈好或愈差時，公司管理當局較不傾向對金融資產進行重分類以操縱盈餘。 （2）當公司董事會相對較獨立時，公司管理當局較不傾向對金融資產進行重分類。 （3）採用重分類之財務報表仍具價值攸關性。 關鍵字：重分類、盈餘管理、公司治理、價值攸關性 / To respond to the financial crisis that caused huge losses of financial assets to companies, the IASB announced, on October 13, 2008, amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 “Reclassification of Financial Assets”. As a result, Taiwan’s FASB also announced, on October 17, 2008, amendments to its SFAS No.34. It is therefore an empirical question whether or not firms in Taiwan managed earnings by retroactively reclassifying financial assets on financial statements, that likely depends on the soundness of corporate governance. This research aims to examine the value relevance of financial statements information after the retroactive reclassification of financial assets based on the revised SFAS No. 34. Firstly, this research investigates whether or not listed firms in Taiwan retroactively adopted SFAS No. 34. Secondly, this research examines the value relevance of their reclassified financial statements and the association with corporate governance. The empirical results are as follows. Firstly, the better or worse a firm performed, the less it would be willing to retroactively adopt the revised SFAS No. 34. Secondly, the more independent its board of directors, the less it would be willing to to retroactively adopt the revised SFAS No. 34. Finally, the reclassified financial statements were still value relevant. Keywords: Reclassification, Earnings management, Value relevance, Corporate governance.