雙重股權結構現今於美國公司治理上的應用越來越普遍，在此股權結構下的公司透過具不同投票權的股票達到控制權與盈餘分配權分離，使內部經理人可以掌握公司的控制權，但相應而生的可能是經理人與股東間的代理問題，且並非所有等級的股票皆公開在市場上交易，這也使得公司資訊透明度降低，進而影響股票的流動性和公司價值，然而，對於雙重股權結構亦有研究持正面看法，如公司可藉控制權集中提升經營效率等。本研究由此為出發點，欲以聯貸市場的角度來檢驗雙重股權結構公司在進行聯貸時，是否會對聯貸條件產生影響，而貸款銀行面對公司的雙重股權結構又將採取何種風險評估角度。 本研究利用1991至2012年間美國公司的資料，研究結果顯示公司在雙重股權結構下，所獲得之聯貸條件並未呈現負面影響，其中原因可能存在於雙重股權結構的公司特性與其可能為公司創造的價值。

本文旨在探討企業獲利與分配員工間的合理性問題。利用2008年至2014年的公開發行以上公司之資料進行實證分析。首先，本文發現企業營收成長率與員工薪酬成長率、董監事薪酬成長率具顯著正相關，顯示員工薪酬確實隨著企業營收而有所調升。然而，員工薪酬成長率低於營收成長率之幅度達0.2%。董監事薪酬的成長率則顯著高於營收成長率5.1%。顯示企業員工的薪酬成長率低於董監事薪酬的成長率。 本文進一步分析不同公司治理環境對企業營收成長率與員工薪酬成長率、董監事薪酬成長率之影響。實證結果發現家族企業與董監事兼任總經理之企業，其(1)營收成長率高於員工薪酬成長率的情形、以及(2)董監事薪酬成長率高於營收成長率的情形更為明顯。換言之，公司治理對企業的員工薪酬分配或董監事薪酬分配有顯著影響。 基於上述發現，本文認為《公司法》第235-1條應針對勞方的酬勞分配訂定合理的範圍，建議可行的方案為訂定董監事酬勞發放率與員工分紅率的上下限或兩者之相對比率，此比率可隨著產業特性與風險、公司規模做適度的調整，以避免企業分紅政策失去彈性、企業負擔過於沉重或造成中小企業行政困擾的問題。此外，避免企業違背修法的精神，本文建議可參考歐洲的員工董事制度或比照美國立法要求企業揭露高階主管、董監事與一般員工之薪酬差距，並列為公司治理指標。

推動銀行公司治理與風險管理過程中，透過董事及重要職員責任保險機制，適切地降低及分散董事（監察人）及重要職員之責任風險，保障渠之財產權，避免因執行職務遭受第三人或團體起訴而引起之財務損失。使具有專業學識經驗之人士，有意願參與銀行之經營團隊，成為董事或獨立董事、監察人或重要職員，且勇於獨立履行其職責，落實銀行依銀行業公司治理之六大原則：□遵循法令並健全內部管理；□保障股東權益；□強化董事會職能；□發揮監察人功能；□尊重利益相關者權益；□提升資訊透明度。以提升銀行之競爭力及銀行之價值，確保股東及投資人之權益。 / In the process of promoting corporate governance and risk management in the banking industry, through the mechanism of Directors and Officers liability insurance, the risk associated with liability of company directors, supervisors, and officers is appropriately reduced and spread, personal property is protected, and the financial loss arising from lawsuit brought by third party or class action lawsuits against them as a result of carrying out their duties is mitigated. Experienced professionals, willing to join a bank’s management team as its directors or independent directors and supervisors or officers, and able to independently perform their duties, will best ensure the six principles of corporate governance for the banking industry are observed: 1. Comply with pertinent laws and regulations, and establish sound internal controls, 2. Protect shareholders rights and interests, 3. Strengthen the powers of the Board of Directors, 4. Fulfill the functions of supervisors, 5. Respect stakeholders’ rights and interests, and 6. Enhance information transparency. Following these principles of corporate governance will not only enhance a bank’s industry competitive position and increase stock values of the bank, but ensure the protection of the rights and interests of shareholders and investors.

台灣投資市場以散戶居多，控制股東常把持董事會運作，因此容易出現控制股東損害小股東權益之情形。不健全之公司治理是否提供一個管理當局較容易操縱盈餘的環境，並進而導致企業爆發財務危機，即為值得深究之議題。本研究以民國87年6月至91年12月間曾發生財務危機之上市公司為研究樣本，以產業、市值規模及成立年數為條件採1:1配對方式組成控制樣本，探討兩組樣本公司間在盈餘管理幅度、盈餘管理誘因及公司治理變數上之差異及前述因素與財務危機發生之關聯性。 以DeAngelo(1986)模型衡量異常應計項目，實證結果顯示，財務危機公司於危機發生前二年內有進行盈餘管理之現象。此外，危機發生前二年度，有較高比例的危機公司進行現金增資；於危機發生前一年度，危機公司內部人出脫股票的情形亦較正常公司嚴重，顯示管理當局似乎利用美化財務數字，以吸引外部投資者，一旦危機即將爆發則大量抛售手中持股，以獲利了結。 在公司治理議題上，本研究利用La Porta et al. (1999)及Claessen et al.(2000)之最終控制者概念，衡量並分析股權結構和董事會組成特性。實證發現，兩組樣本間之股份控制權、盈餘分配權及其偏離程度並無顯著差異，亦未發現危機公司有較顯著傾向採用金字塔結構或交叉持股來控制被投資公司。兩組樣本之最終控制者參與管理的比例相當，家族控股的型態居五成以上。以最終控制者觀點衡量之董監席次控制權則在兩組樣本上呈現顯著差異，實證分析顯示危機公司之最終控制者實際持股率不高，可享受之盈餘分配率較低，但卻擁有比控制樣本公司更高的董監席次控制權。 此外，本研究更進一步發現，在公司治理不佳、盈餘管理誘因愈強的情況下，企業發生財務危機之可能性較高，顯示公司治理之重要性。 / The Association of Earnings Management and Corporate Governance－on Companies Experiencing Financial Distress Abstract Small shareholders are the majority of the investors in Taiwan capital market. And also that controlling shareholders dominate the operation of board of directors, which might render occasions for controlling shareholders to expropriate easily the interests of the small shareholders. It is worth examining whether weaker corporate governance structure would provide management with cozy environment for earnings manipulation, and firms would therefore be inclined to experience financial distress? A group of firms listed in TSE experienced financial distress over the period of June 1998 to December 2002 and a control sample, using industry, market value and setup years as the matching criteria, compose the sample of this research. Specifically, this research examines the cross-group differences in earnings management and corporate governance, and the impact of the magnitude of earnings management and corporate governance structure on the occurrence of financial distress. Based on the accrual model in DeAngelo (1986), the empirical findings indicate that the management of financially distressed firms manipulates earnings two years earlier before the event day. As compared to the control sample, the financially distressed firms are found to issue more seasonal equity offerings and the insiders sell more of their shares one year prior to the event. It appears that management employs a strategy to manipulate earnings upward two years ahead in order to raise the capital and then cash themselves out before the bad news are disclosed to the market. This research adopts the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders used by La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) to analyze the ownership structure and the composition of boards of directors. In general, we find no evidence that there are significant cross-group differences found in voting rights, cash flow right and the deviation from the two. Neither do we find that financially distressed firms are more inclined to adopt the pyramid structures or cross-holdings as means to enhance their influences. However, we find significant cross-group differences in seating rights. The result therefore suggests that with lower share-holding rights and cash flow rights, the ultimate owners of financially distressed firms exercise their influence on major decisions through procuring higher seating rights. In addition, this research finds that the occurrence of financial distress is associated with weaker corporate governance structure and higher magnitude of earnings management.

1997年亞洲發生金融風暴後，國內亦發生多起企業舞弊案件，再加上2001年底美國大型公司會計醜聞案，公司所揭露的資訊是否仍為投資人所相信，似乎存有許多問號，加強公司治理機制應是一個較佳的解決方案，也逐漸為世界各國所重視。本研究以董監事會特性做為衡量公司治理機制良窳的代理變數，探討其與財務預測準確性之關聯性為何。 本研究以曾發佈民國九十年及九十一年強制性財務預測之上市公司為樣本，實證結果發現，當公司控制股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈高、次大股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈低、次大股東佔全體監察人席次之比例愈低、董事及監察人異動之比例愈高、公司有參與管理的情形、公司沒有獨立監察人的存在以及總經理發生異動時，公司所發佈之財務預測愈不準確，且其更新幅度愈大。 / Since the Asia financial crisis in 1997, there were much fraudulence of the listed companies in Taiwan. Then in the United States, Enron and Xerox were suffered from scandals in 2001. Do investors still believe the information companies disclose? We never know. But one way to recover the belief of investors is to reinforce the corporate governance mechanism and many countries have placed importance on it. Using the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors as the proxy of corporate governance mechanism, this paper examines the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors and the financial forecast accuracy. The research data are collected from listed companies that have released the financial forecast in 2001 and 2002. The empirical result suggests the larger proportion of board seats the controlling shareholders hold, the smaller proportion of board seats and supervisor seats the secondary major shareholders hold, the higher rate of changes of directors and supervisors, participation in management, no independent supervisor and the change of CEO would lead the financial forecast less accurate and the range of renewal larger.

「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」對我國而言，為一種因法規強制要求而產生的新現象。2002年2月時，在台灣證券交易所股份有限公司及財團法人中華民國證券櫃臺買賣中心等單位的努力下，正式引進「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」，規定自2002年2月22日起新申請上市上櫃的公司，需設置獨立董事至少二人，及獨立監察人至少一人，期望以此制度革除積習已久的公司治理弊端。 本研究自選任獨立董事及監察人之事前與事後，從選任席次、素質差異、專業背景差異檢視聘僱事前公司是否有特殊考量，並進一步從盈餘管理的角度，檢視選任事後獨立董事與監察人之預期功能是否對企業整體發揮實際之效用。 實證結果支持本研究認為因監察人得以單獨行使職權，故獨立監察人實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻之比例確實較獨立董事實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻的比例高，且企業所選任的獨立董監素質，因企業之規模大小不同而有顯著差異，另外，亦發現企業確實會考量職能別的差異，進而聘僱不同專業背景之專家。最後，關於獨立董事與獨立監察人在監督管理當局從事盈餘管理行為時之作用部分，未獲得實證結果支持，推測原因，可能係因我國企業於設置獨立董事與監察人後，僅將其視為專業地位崇高的「名譽」董事與監察人，但並未賦予其監督的實際權力，因而造成獨立董事與監察人未能涉入企業核心，致使其無法發揮監督管理當局之預期功能所導致。 / The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors is a new phenomenon arisen from forced enactment made by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gretai Securities Market on February 22, 2002. It claims all new listed corporations to employ at least 2 independent directors and 1 independent supervisor in order to enhance corporate governance in Taiwan. This thesis examines if enterprises have special considerations when employ independent directors and independent supervisors from the viewpoints of actual numbers, grade level and governance expertise. Furthermore, this thesis also examines the actual contributions of them to reduce the earnings management behaviors. Consistent with our hypothesis that due to the different way to oversee the management, this thesis finds that besides achieving the minimum standard threshold, it is more likely for an enterprise to employ much more independent supervisors than independent directors. Moreover, empirical results support that the bigger size of the company, the better independent directors and independent supervisors it will employ. Additionally, this study also finds that corporation will employ different kinds of experts owing to the different functions between independent directors and independent supervisors. Finally, as for reducing earnings management behaviors, this study can’t offer proper evidences. It may result from that enterprise views independent directors and independent supervisors as “reputable” experts, so they can’t have actual power to oversee managements. In other words, independent directors and independent supervisors can’t exercise the role well because of lacking actual power.

董監事會為公司治理之核心，本研究以民國87年至民國91年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司探討董監事會特性與權益資金成本之關聯性，而不同於以往國內有關估計權益資金成本的方法，本研究以Ohlson模型來設算權益資金成本。實證結果顯示： 1.董監事會成員持股比率與企業權益資金成本率之關係並不顯著，若觀測兩者間是否存有非線性關係，本研究亦未發現兩者間的不顯著關係是由非線性因素所造成。 2.複迴歸分析顯示，董監事會持股質押比與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，若進一步區分全體樣本為正、負盈餘樣本，則發現在負盈餘樣本中，董監事會持股質押比與企業權益資金成本呈現顯著正向關係；另外，若以Panel Data分析，本研究則發現在電子業中董監事持股質押比與權益資金成本始呈現正相關。 3.公司是否聘任獨立董監與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，且不論是在有聘任或無聘任獨立董監之樣本間，或是在自願性聘任與強制性聘任獨立董監之樣本間，其權益資金成本並無明顯的差異。 / This study examines the relations between characteristic of board of directors and supervisors and cost of equity capital. It is unlike previous research to use capital assets pricing model（CAPM）, this research adopts an alternative technique for estimating the cost of equity capital. Specifically, we use Ohlson (1995) model to generate a market implied cost of capital. Our samples consist of all public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate over 5 years period 1998-2002. The empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant negative relation between the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. Moreover, we don’t find this relation caused by nonlinear specification. 2.There is no significant positive relation between the pledged share ratio of the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. When the entire samples are divided into the sub-samples of firms experiencing losses and others, the existence of the positive relationship is found only in the firms experiencing losses. In addition, the relation is further proved in the electronic industry when adopting panel data analysis. 3.There is no significant reverse relation between the independent directors and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. And there is also no significant difference in the cost of equity capital between companies with implementing the independent directors and supervisors and those without implementing the regulation.

本體論的目的在表達一個大家能共用分享的概念，且為知識表達的重要基礎，可用來協助電腦搜尋、交換資訊及了解文字。本體論的應用使網路上的資源都能夠透過電腦明確的被定義出來，使機器透過本體論語言的描述，了解自然語言，加強資料檢索效率並達到知識共享的效果。 本體論建置的困難點主要是有太多不同專業領域的領域本體知識需要被定義，所以非常的耗力費時。為了加強建置效率，需要依賴系統化的方法論來進行建置本體工程，並驗證其品質。 為了使電腦能夠理解人類語言，許多研究者透過文字探勘技術發展能讓電腦理解的電子詞典，經過分析後將詞典中的詞彙連結成語意網絡，並將語意網路將應用於各種不同的研究領域。 因此，本研究嘗試利用文字探勘技術協助建置本體知識，而結論包含可利用文字探勘技術半自動化的協助建置公司治理議題詞庫、語意網路，及以公司治理語意網路作為建置本體知識的基礎，並經由建置方法的提出，將語意網路轉化為公司治理本體知識。 / The purposes of ontology are offering reusable and sharable concepts, and being the base of knowledge representation. It serves a smart way of information searching and exchanging, the resources on internet can easily defined, and computer can understand people’s natural language by the application of ontology, improving the efficiency of data indexing. In order to let computer understand natural language, many researchers have worked hard on electronic lexicons containing computer’s logic through text mining technology, by analyzing lexicons for finding out relative vocabularies and connecting them into a semantic network. Therefore, this research try to utilize text mining technology to support on ontology engineering, the results are developing a text mining technology to support the building of corporate governance’s lexicon and semantic network semi-automatically, and take corporate governance semantic network as the bases of ontology engineering, and introduce a method to turn semantic network into corporate governance ontology.

本文參照前人學者實證研究中所選取之財務比率變數，其中包含經營效率、獲利性、償債能力等構面中所選取財務比率變數共17個，另加入董事會特性、股權結構、參與管理等構面之公司治理變數共13個治理變數，以及納入盈餘管理變數與相關控制變數分別建構3個財務預警模型，並將會計資訊變數的資料型態依Platt(1990)之概念分為兩種，用意在分別比較原比率型態之預警模型與相對比率型態之預警模型之差異，樣本公司抽樣於2002年至2005年間，以TEJ資料庫認定為財務危機之企業，從中抽取跨產業41家財務危機之樣本企業，以1：2之比率抽取資產總額相近之82家正常企業樣本，總樣本數為123家樣本公司，實證結果顯示在財務危機發生前一、二年度，整體而言相對比率之預警模型預測能力與類比解釋能力相對優於一般原比率之財務預警模型，而盈餘管理變數確實能提高模型預測準確率，在越接近財務危機發生之時間點，其效果較為顯著，尤其相對比率之盈餘管理變數優於原比率之盈餘管理變數，再者公司治理變數之加入，亦同樣對模型之區別能力有所幫助，總和而言同時加入會計資訊變數、盈餘管理變數與公司治理變數之相對比率預警模型，是為本文所建預警模型中最佳效率之預警模型。

本研究利用離散時間涉險模型，分析台灣上市公司之多角化程度、公司治理與財務危機之關係。本研究分為三階段逐步加入多角化程度變數、公司治理與多角化程度之交叉相乘項及控制變數。首先探討相關或非相關多角化程度是否與公司發生財務危機之可能性具有關聯性。接著納入公司治理之考量，探究公司治理、相關或非相關多角化程度與公司發生財務危機可能性間之關係。 實證結果顯示，無論是相關多角化或是非相關多角化均可顯著降低公司發生財務危機之可能性。當納入公司治理之考量後，實證結果顯示，當公司的董監質押比率、控制股東持股比率、關係人進貨比率、關係人融資比率、席次控制比率、董事席次等6項公司治理指標愈差時，公司的相關多角化程度愈高，發生財務危機的可能性也會提高；而當公司的控制股東持股比率、關係人進貨比率、關係人融資比率、席次控制比率、董事席次等5項公司治理指標愈差時，公司的非相關多角化程度愈高，發生財務危機的可能性也會愈高。 / This study employs discrete-time hazard model to investigate how the distress-diversification sensitivity is moderated depending on the level of corporate governance in nested models which sequentially incorporate diversification and then corporate governance as a moderator. The findings show that diversification reduces the possibility of financial distress while corporate governance moderates the diversification effect on financial distress.