2001年聯華電子公司協助大陸和艦科技公司成立，此案揭露台灣法規與企業追求成長的衝突，於2005年爆發，歷經五年才無罪定讞，最後導致聯電榮譽董事長曹興誠入籍新加坡。本論文主要探討國際投資決策與公司治理兩大議題。 本論文從總體經濟、產業分析、聯電公司基本面分析，進行同業比較：在2001年全球IC產能與人員閒置，因此各國廠商前往最具發展潛力的中國大陸，產生許多競爭對手。台灣IC產業為維持研發技術領先，需尋找廣大市場來支持研究發展支出。台灣晶圓第二的聯電之研發技術未能領先於晶圓龍頭—台積電，因此相較於台積電，更需積極評估聯電前往大陸佈局的利與弊。因中國大陸強大內需市場、牽制大陸IC廠商、站穩全球IC供給鏈一環、比較利益、多元化經營的利益，使得聯電決定以間接方式協助大陸和艦，降低法律風險。 然而因無法公開協助和艦，使得公司治理問題浮現：股權結構、董事會職能、股東權益的保障、資訊透明度等，本文利用臨床測試法（Clinical Test），實證資料顯示，在市場傳出聯電投資和艦的消息後，產生負的累積異常報酬。 / The case, UMC assisted HeJian in 2001, revealed the conflict between regulation and investment decision of company. It was sued in 2005, and finally became inno-cent in 2010. This essay focuses on two issues, international investment and corporate governance. International investment started from the top-down analysis: from microeco-nomic analysis to industry to company fundamental analysis, then also the competitor analysis. Although the global IC industry had suffered recession in 2001, IC demand from China had increased. Therefore, many foreign investors transferred their know-ledge and facilities to assist China’s IC market, and then many potential competitors showed up. Meanwhile, IC enterprises in Taiwan needed large market to support R&D expense to maintain competitive advantage. As one of IC manufacturers in Taiwan, UMC didn’t have the leading technology as TSMC did, therefore, with the benefit of the high demand IC market in China, remaining competitive advantage, comparative advantage, and so on. UMC decided to assist HeJian in privately. The problem of corporate governance emerged because of private assistance. It was doubted that the ownership structure, function of board, the interest of shareholders and transparency could work well. Therefore, when investors knew the information of UMC assisted HeJian, there was negative cumulative abnormal return by event study.

本研究採2003年12月至2010年6月上市上櫃公司為研究樣本，檢驗當期投資人情緒、公司治理、及動能投資策略對下期股價獲利的影響，與先前研究不同之處在於，投資人情緒使用世新大學投資人情緒資料庫所提供之「投資人情緒指數」。實證結果為: 1、當期投資人情緒悲觀會使得當期股價低估，而使下期股價向上修正時有較高的報酬率。 2、公司治理佳的股票報酬率顯著大於公司治理劣的股票報酬率。 3、過去股價報酬率較高者未來也有較高的獲利，反之則較低。 4、投資人情緒相較於公司治理及動能策略而言，為主要的影響股價的因素。 5、金融海嘯時，投資人情緒悲觀仍使下期股價有較高的報酬率，但公司治理劣者報酬率顯著大於公司治理佳者。

本研究主要探討公司國際化程度及公司治理對管理當局自願性盈餘預測行為之影響，而本研究係以2009年公布之美國S&P 500公司作為研究對象，研究期間為2002年至2007 年。實證結果顯示：(1)企業國際化程度與管理當局揭露自願性盈餘預測之意願無顯著關聯性；(2)企業國際化程度越高，管理當局自願性盈餘預測之準確性越高；(3)企業國際化程度越高的情形下，公司治理之良窳與管理當局自願性盈餘預測間無顯著關聯性；(4)企業國際化程度越高，公司治理機制越良好，管理當局自願性盈餘預測準確性越高。 / This study investigates the effects of internalization and corporate governance on voluntary management earnings forecasts. Based on a sample of 2009 S&P 500 companies spanning from 2002 and 2007, I do not find the issuance of voluntary management earnings forecasts to be related with the degree of internalization and the quality of corporate governance. However, the empirical results indicate that the accuracy of management earnings forecasts is positively associated with the degree of internalization and the quality of corporate governance.

本研究以公司治理變數與銀行評等結果之關係為研究對象，並以累積邏輯斯迴歸模型(Cumulative Logistic Regression Model)研究2004年至2010年的31間台灣的上市銀行，探討公司治理對於公司決策的影響，及其是否會進而影響公司的表現，最終並改變公司的評等結果。 本文由股權結構以及董事會的組成這兩大結構來探討公司治理對銀行的評等影響，股權結構的部分主要選擇董監持股、外部法人董監持股、董監持股質押比例、大股東持股、經理人持股、最大外部股東、盈餘席次偏離比、股份席次偏離比等變數，而董事會的組成方面則選擇董事及監事兼任占經理人比例、股監事席次、獨立董監席次等變數來探討。研究發現董監事、大股東及外部法人董監的持股比率越高，對公司的評等結果有正向影響；反之，經理人之持股比率則與公司的評等結果呈負向關係。此外，獨立董監占董事會的席次越高，與公司的評等結果存在正向的關係。 / The bank rating system used to only consider the financial variables instead of corporate governance variables, but whether the corporate governance variables can influence the strategies of managers and the performance of the firm, then further change the outcome of the bank rating had never been considered. This thesis is trying to use cumulative logistic model figure out whether there exist any connection between corporate governance variables and bank rating outcome. This thesis considered 9 difference corporate variables that can be divided into two different sectors, which are ownership structure and boardroom structure. The conclusion of this thesis is that the majority shareholder's holding、Supervisors and Directors' holding and institutional Supervisor and Director's holding、Managers' holding and the number of independent director and supervisor will influence the outcome of the bank rating.

本研究以Gomper, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)利用IRRC針對24個公司反購併措施調查所建構出的G-index，作為衡量公司治理程度優劣的指標，分數越高代表股東權利越弱、公司治理越差。研究樣本為美國1990至2007年的國內併購案，主併和目標公司以中位數作為分組依據，在四種組合中分別從公司治理變化、併購溢價、短期宣告效果、長期股票超額報酬(CAR與BHAR法)、長期經營績效以及簡單最小平方法之迴歸模型，來探討公司治理好壞是否會影響到併購溢價幅度和併購綜效。 整體共計624個併購樣本中，平均溢價為32.54%，其中全以現金作為支付工具有顯著較高的溢價比率。在短期的併購宣告效果中，主併公司在事件窗口(-1,1)下平均累積異常報酬為-2.07%，而目標公司則為18.09%；然而長期來看皆有顯著性異於0的負報酬，以及經過產業調整後的經營績效(ROA)增長率也有負的統計顯著值。顯示整體併購樣本雖支付高溢價，但在長期的股票報酬或經營績效上並無法創造超額報酬或是增強營運效率。 此外，研究實證發現當目標公司治理越差，主併者必須付出較高的溢價比率；以及當主併公司的治理越差，在主併和目標的短期宣告效果上皆會有較低的異常報酬。在影響長期綜效的迴歸模型中，公司治理、主併公司帳面市值比、目標公司資產報酬率對於CAR皆有顯著影響能力；而併購金額、目標公司資產報酬率(ROA)則是對於BHAR有顯著的影響能力。 在不同公司治理四種組合中，以「公司治理好的去併購公司治理差」的組合會付出最高的併購溢價；在短期宣告效果上，表現最好的組合為「公司治理好的去併購公司治理好」；而在長期股票報酬(CAR)方面，則以「公司治理差的去併購公司治理差」組合表現最好，此組合的主併公司有顯著較高的帳面市值比；最後在長期營運績效資產報酬率(ROA)上，以「公司治理好的去併購公司治理好」表現最好。整體來說，本研究重點在「公司治理好的去併購公司治理差」時，雖付出較高的併購溢價，但平均來說享有較好的長期綜效。

This paper discuss the issue of how corporate governance variables affect the cognitions of groups of investors to lead they separate their investment strategies in 1997-2011 sample period, the results indicate that firms with higher management stockholdings, lower blockholders’ shareholdings, smaller board size, more outside independent supervisors, CEO duality, and one of ultimate controllers served as chairman would be appealing to individual investors; the robust test from 2007 to 2011 only positively affects the investment strategies for foreign institutional investors. Moreover, we explore that lower blockholders’ stockings and smaller board size are favorable characteristics for investors to increase firms’ trading volumes but also the trading volatilities. Finally, we compute the corporate governance score for every sample company called CG-Index, and discover a perfect corporate governance mechanism would inspire investing motivations of domestic individuals and foreign institutions, after considering the information disclosure ranking in 5 years sample period, the stockholding of whole individual investors is indicated positive related to the corporate governance degree.

本文採用Platt(1990)所提出的產業相對比率與原始比率來建構企業預警模型，並嘗試加入公司治理變數後，以檢驗是否能進一步提升預測效果。研究發現在無論在樣本內、外產業相對比率預測率均比原始財務比率來的高，ROC和CAP效力驗證也較佳，並可降低型一的誤差。因此將各產業之間的差異因素消弭後，確實能有效降低誤判的現象。在方法論上，則以逐步迴歸分析所建立的產業相對比率模型擁有最高的預測效力。另外納入公司治理變數後，預測效力則有進一步提升效果，整體財務變數方面以T1期為負債淨值比、資產報酬率；T2期為每股現金流量、股東權益報酬率、借款依存度；T3期為每股現金流量、常續性利益率、借款依存度等項目為顯著比率，顯示從負債面、獲利面以及現金流量面三個角度，即可對危機預警產生極為正確的判斷。另外在公司治理因素方面，則以董監持股比率、董監質押比率以及財務人員更動次數最顯著，顯示內部核心人員，因為比圈外的投資者和信貸者掌握更準確的資訊，因此其相對的動態與企業發生危機與否亦有非常緊密的關係。

本研究利用2000年至2004年的資料，分析獨立董事與監察人的設置 (以下簡稱為獨立董監) 與公司債務資金成本的關聯性。在以利息費用除以付息負債做為代理變數的前提之下，本研究的實證結果顯示，無論以當期利率水準、次期利率水準或者利率水準的變化做為被解釋變數，均顯示聘任獨立董監的企業會享有較低的債務資金成本。此外，進一步的分析也發現，無論以簡單的單變量模型、普通最小平方法或者利用縱橫面資料 (panel data) 模型，都得一致性地得到獨立董監得以有助於減緩公司與債權人間代理成本的實證結果。就控制變數而言，與預期相同，較完備的公司治理、較高的企業規模以及較佳的營運績效均與債務資金成本具有負向的關聯性。 / Corporate governance has become an imperative issue recently, especially the focus on the independent director system. Securities and Futures Commission has requested that those applying to be listed companies should set up the independent director systems for the purpose of building better corporate governance systems. In the framework of corporate governance formulated by the World Bank, as an essential capital provider or financial statement user, creditor plays an indispensable role. But few literatures has conducted to evaluate the relationship between the cost of debt financing and corporate governance, much less with the independent directors. Therefore, this study based on a sample of listed companies data in Taiwan Economic Journal over the period of 2000 to 2004 is to explore the relationship between independent directors and cost of debt and expected to provide the financial institutions determining the borrowing rate with some empirical results. The results indicate the cost of debt, whether based on the level analysis or change analysis of ordinary least square model or panel data analysis, is inversely related to the independent directors with significance at 1% level, suggesting that the enterprise with independent directors having the lower cost of debt in favor of the hypothesis. The analysis also indicates the relationship of the control variables of board characteristics, such as the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors is inversely with cost of debt、the higher ratio of the pledged shares held by the board and supervisors with the higher cost of debt and the enterprise with the combined titles of the chairman and CEO has higher cost of debt, follow our expectation again.

本研究以2002年至2005年之上市公司為研究對象，衡量2002與2004年兩年之年報資訊揭露水準，探討資訊揭露水準與機構投資人持股兩者間之關係，並分析兩期資訊透明度與機構投資人持股比率的改變對經營績效與公司價值變動的影響。 實證結果發現，機構投資人持股意願受到前期年報資訊揭露水準高低的影響，顯示資訊揭露水準為機構投資人之選股決策因素之一。前期年報資訊揭露水準愈佳，機構投資人持股比率愈高，但當期資訊揭露程度對同期機構投資人持股意願則無顯著影響。此外，機構投資人持股比率高低與公司同期或次期資訊揭露程度皆無顯著關聯性。企業資訊揭露水準之改善與機構投資人持股比率增加皆與公司經營績效及公司價值之提升呈顯著正相關。 / Based on a sample of firms listed on Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 2002 to 2005, this study first examines the relationship between the information transparency, measured the disclosure level of annual reports, and shareholdings of institutional investors. In addition, this study investigates the influence of increase in the level of disclosure transparency and shareholdings on performance and firm value. The empirical results suggest that firms with higher disclosure level are associated with greater institutional ownership next year, but the same relationship didn’t hold for concurrent period. This finding suggests that disclosure level of annual report is considered by the institutional investors when making their investment decisions. The findings also indicate that improvement in disclosure level and increase in institutional investors’ shareholdings not only enhances the operating performance but also the firm value.

研究以2000至2004年之國內上市(櫃)公司為樣本，探討董事會結構、股權結構、資訊透明度與公司債發行行為(融資決策、公司債資金成本與債務違約)之關聯性。 融資決策之實證結果顯示，當企業有長期資金需求且向外部融資時，公司治理特性之控制權與所有權偏離程度及資訊透明度顯著影響企業之外部融資決策(發行公司債或股票)。股份盈餘偏離倍數愈低、資訊透明度愈高，則公司愈傾向以公司債向外融資，而非發行股票。獨立董監席次比例、機構投資人席次比例及董監事質押比則對融資決策無顯著影響。 公司債資金成本之實證結果顯示，企業之公司治理特性亦影響公司債資金成本之高低。控制權與所有權之偏離程度及資訊透明度與資金成本具有顯著關係，股份盈餘偏離倍數愈低、資訊透明度愈高之公司，在債券市場可以較低之資金成本籌資。獨立董監席次比例、機構投資人席次比例及資訊透明度則對資金成本無顯著影響。 債務違約之分析結果顯示，相較於未違約之企業，債務違約公司之機構投資人席次比例較低、偏離程度較高、營運能力較低，但兩樣本在公司債資金成本上則無明顯差異。