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從公司治理觀點探討家族企業傳承風險 ---以S金控為個案分析 / From the point of view of corporate governance Discussion Family-run Business Succession Risk —A Case Study of S Financial Holding Company劉宏祺, Liu, Hung Chi Unknown Date (has links)
對於台灣本土企業而言,接班風險往往成為一項獨特的經營管理風險。本研究分析某一家未能有效管理接班風險的金控企業,並以另一家係有效管理接班風險的金控企業做為對照標竿,藉以探索金控家族企業因為傳承所面臨的接班風險。透過訪談資深幹部所得之資訊,本研究歸納金控家族企業接班過程的可能問題為潛在接班人的「培訓過程」與「態度問題」。此外,就彙整報章雜誌的額外則發現,接班風險較高的企業有較多因為內控問題而產生的裁罰案件,而若干裁罰案件顯示係因所有權凌駕經營權造成的企業損失,並損及企業的商譽。具體而言,與對照企業相較,接班風險的金控企業有顯著較高的裁罰案件與媒體負面報導,相信本研究所提供的對比分析將可提供台灣本土企業有效降低接班風險的參考。 / Succession risk is a unique risk management for local Taiwanese companies. This study analyzes a financial holding company which fails to effectively manage succession risk, where another benchmark company with effective succession risk management is used as comparison to probe into the succession risk faced by the family-run financial holding company from inheritance. The study applies information acquired from interview with senior managers to conclude that likely problems in the succession process of family-run financial holding companies could lie on the “training progress” and “attitude issue” of the potential successors. Moreover, additional findings from the compilation of newspapers and magazines suggest that companies with higher success risks tend to face with penalty cases due to internal control issues. Several penalty cases would imply corporate loss as a result from ownership overriding management with damage to the corporate reputation. Specifically, compared with controlled company, financial holding companies with succession risk is associated with significantly higher penalty cases and adverse reports from the media. The study is believed to provide a comparative analysis that will provide reference for local Taiwanese companies to effectively reduce succession risk. Read more
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中國大陸下市緩衝機制與盈餘管理之實證研究 / An Empirical Study of the Chinese Delisting Buffer Mechanism and Earnings Management官月緞, Yue-Duan Guan Unknown Date (has links)
摘要
本文主要檢視中國大陸連續虧損公司面臨下市緩衝機制壓力時之盈餘管理行為。本文所謂的下市緩衝機制係指特別處理(簡稱ST)與特別轉讓(簡稱PT)的管制。具體而言,ST管制要求連續兩年虧損的公司,必須冠上ST標記,漲跌幅限制為5%(一般股票為10%),中報需審計;PT管制要求連續三年虧損的公司,必須冠上PT標記,同樣有停板限制,僅允許週五交易。ST與PT管制設計原意係希望提高整體市場新陳代謝與營造理性投資的環境,但盈餘基礎的本質與保守的配套措施反而衍生盈餘管理與投機炒股。此下市緩衝機制實質之經濟後果為管制機關與投資大眾高度關注,但過去相關研究相當有限,本文希望藉由下列研究問題的探索以補充文獻缺口。
第一,中國大陸上市公司面臨下市緩衝機制漸進懲處時,管理當局如何進行盈餘管理以因應連續虧損門檻?第二,各群虧損公司次年扭虧次數與盈餘管理行為差異為何?第三,零損失的法規門檻如何引發盈餘分配的特殊型態;操控前盈餘與盈餘管理關係為何?
依據1998年至2000年267家虧損公司樣本,實證結果簡要彙總如下:第一,虧損公司裁決性應計數字(營業外所得)顯著降低盈餘,特別在虧損第一個年度,此結果顯示管理當局意圖儲存盈餘以因應未來更嚴格制裁之緩衝。第二,ST股與PT股盈餘劇烈震盪,其盈餘型態分別呈現V字型與W字型。第三,1998與1999年連續三年虧損的公司次年扭虧百分比小於其他虧損公司;但2000年結果相反。主要理由乃中國證監會於2001年2月22日要求PT股在未來一年扭虧(過去為三年),否則必須下市。第四,虧損公司次年盈餘分配集中於略高於零損失門檻的區間,隱含實質小虧的公司預支未來盈餘,實質大盈的公司儲存本期盈餘的可能性。第五,虧損公司次年扭虧時,操控前盈餘與盈餘管理呈現負向關係,且操控前盈餘越小的組別其盈餘管理越大。但持續虧損公司操控前盈餘與盈餘管理的關係並沒有系統性的結論。
本文實證結果顯示,中國大陸下市緩衝機制由於仰賴會計基礎管制,衍生相當普遍的盈餘管理行為。建議中國證監會應在下市決策中考量非盈餘資訊,投資大眾亦應關注盈餘以外的訊息以避免功能固著的迷失。 / Abstract
This study investigates earnings management of Chinese listed companies subject to delisting buffer mechanism for reporting losses for consecutive years. The delisting buffer mechanism in China means Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) regulations. Specifically, it requires that companies with two and three consecutive losses be labeled as ST shares and PT shares respectively. ST shares are subject to 5% price limits (one half of common shares) and their interim reports should be audited. PT shares are also subject to price limits and they are allowed be traded only on Friday. Although these regulations originally aim to maintain market’s metabolism and foster rational investment environment, their earnings-based nature and conservative schemes are likely to induce pervasive earnings management and speculation. Their economic consequences are a source of concern by regulators and investors, but previous study is relatively limited. Thus, this paper explores the following research questions to fill this void.
First, how do Chinese listed firms manage earnings in response to consecutive loss thresholds, while facing the progressive sanctions of the delisting buffer mechanism? Second, what differences in positive earnings frequencies and earnings management exist among different group of loss firms in the following year? Third, how does the zero-loss regulatory threshold induce specific types of earnings distribution, and what relationship can be found between pre-managed earnings and earnings management?
Based on a sample of 267 loss firms from 1998 to 2000, the empirical results are briefly summarized as follows. First, discretionary accruals (nonoperating income) of loss firms show significant earnings decreases, especially in the initial loss year, which is consistent with managerial incentives to save earnings for future more severe regulations’ cushion. Second, ST shares and PT shares experience large earnings volatility, and the patterns of ST shares and PT shares’ earnings generally look like V and W respectively. Third, percentage of positive earnings of firms with 3-year losses in the following year is less than that of other loss firms in 1998 and 1999, but more than in 2000. The underlying reason is the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee requires PT shares have positive earnings within the next year rather than next three years after Feb 22, 2001, otherwise they are delisted. Fourth, earnings distribution of loss firms heavily clusters slightly above zero-loss threshold in the following year, which implies firms with small latent losses likely to borrow future earnings and firms with large latent earnings likely to save current earnings. Fifth, the pre-managed earnings and earnings management for loss firms reporting profits in the following year are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the smaller the pre-managed earnings are, the larger the earnings management is. However, the data reveal no systematic relationship between pre-managed earnings and earnings management for firms with persistent losses.
Overall, the empirical results indicate that China’s delisting buffer mechanism, relying mainly on accounting-based regulation, induces pervasive earnings management. The findings therefore suggest that the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee should consider non-earnings information into delisting decisions and investors look beyond bottom-line to avoid functional fixation. Read more
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公司治理與轉投資行為 - 以威盛電子為例 / Corporate Governance and Equity Investment - Taking VIA Technologies as An Example施銘賢, Shih, Albert Min-Hsien Unknown Date (has links)
摘要
一九九七年東亞金融風暴起因之一即為公司治理不佳,其影響所及至數年後仍餘波蕩漾,而根據2000年6月麥肯錫顧問公司所做的全球投資人意見調查發現,有高達80%的美國投資人願意多付18%的價格來買良好公司治理企業的股票;自2001年底以來,美國「恩隆」(Enron)與「世界通訊」(WorldCom)等弊案又陸續爆發,其中所暴露的公司治理問題,讓世人驚覺這已是全球企業刻不容緩的議題,並亟思未來如何防止類似事件之發生。
公司治理經緯萬端,但都與如何確保資金提供者的投資能夠獲得應有的報酬有關。據此,公司治理的重要議題之一即為如何使小股東的權益不受內部人(即大股東與管理者)的侵犯;尤其在當今大企業紛紛進行事業轉投資之際,大股東常身兼轉投資事業之經營者,如何確保外在投資人(小股東與債權人)應得的報酬,並兼顧其他利害關係人的利益,為公司治理中實際且有趣之課題。我國大股東往往基於營運效率、自身利益與控制權的考量,會做出許多便宜行事卻不利公司治理的行為,如轉投資事業與母公司之間的透明度不足、大股東交叉持股或持有間接股權、所有權與經營權不分、母公司與轉投資事業之間可能的利益衝突、乃至於大股東個人風格等,這些大股東在轉投資事業中的角色定位與公司治理間的相互關係是本論文論述之重點。同時,為了加強研究的深度與實證性,作者特別藉由個案公司的實際案例來驗證文獻上的觀點,結論所得與研究相符合,並更能增添對企業經營之變化多端與不易控制之親身體驗。
本文最後並討論世界銀行、OECD及我國所規範之公司治理架構,希望公司治理能實際有助於我國企業之轉投資行為。因為制度的設計與執行若能加強公司治理與監督管理者的行為,當能強化公司競爭力,此乃公司治理積極面的貢獻。 / Abstract
One of the reasons for the East Asia 1997 financial crisis is because of the careless corporate governance. The impact of this financial crisis actually has had deep and board affection even afterward. According to one investigation by Mckinsey & Company in June 2000, there are about 80% of global investors who are willing to pay 18% extra money to buy those stocks belong to companies have better corporate governance. On the other hand, starting from the end of year 2001, the successive collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and other USA companies has exposed the serious and urgency about corporate governance. It makes people in worldwide enterprises realize how significant the corporate governance is and try to avoid similar events occurred.
Although corporate governance has many aspects, it all related to how to secure the deserved return of the capital providers. Accordingly, one of the important topics of corporate governance is to protect the minority shareholder rights from being invaded by the insiders (controlling shareholders and top executives). This topic become even more important especially when controlling shareholders are also top executives of the equity-invested companies. Thus, how to secure the investors’ (minority shareholders and creditors) rights is an interesting and practical issue of corporate governance.
Controlling shareholders in Taiwan are used to manage firms based on their own convenience such as the efficiency of operation, interest of themselves, and control rights, instead of considering corporate governance. This attitude, however, will easily result in some negative behaviors such as the lack of transparency between mother company and her equity investment, cross holding or private holding of controlling shareholders, indifferences between ownership and management, the potential interest impact between mother company and equity investment, and even the affection of firms’ performance by the characteristics of controlling shareholders. This thesis emphasize in the above correlation between corporate governance and equity investment. We also examine a real firm’s case to enhance its conviction.
This thesis also discusses the corporate governance structure of World Bank, OECD, and Taiwan. It is the author’s hope that corporate governance can be practically useful for a firm’s performance as its aggressive contribution. Read more
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管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例關係:企業研發支出之實證研究林鼎堯 Unknown Date (has links)
現今,世界經濟脈動迅速,科技發展日新月異,如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機,端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生,卻易損及企業的競爭優勢,甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面,來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中,機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點,因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討,並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。
本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間,針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係,並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外,本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者,各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形,進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。
實證結果顯示:(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係,而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中,機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係,而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係,而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面,機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係;但在電子產業中,則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。 / Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance.
This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly.
The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative. Read more
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Financial Holding Company and Corporate Governance from the Perspective of Ownership and Control: Case Study of SinoPac Holdings Co., LTD.Yeh,Jessie Unknown Date (has links)
In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.
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公司治理與財務危機:以舞弊事件之上市櫃公司為例 / Corporate Governance, Corporate Frauds and Financial Distress康嫻莉 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究將財務危機分為『經營不善型財務危機』以及『舞弊型財務危機』兩種類型,運用離散時間涉險方法,探討何種公司治理與財務資訊最有可能發生舞弊型的財務危機。同時本研究也探討財務危機對負債比率的敏感性如何受到公司治理中介變數的影響。
實證結果發現當公司治理機制情形不好,但財務報表資訊良好時,發生舞弊型財務危機的可能性將大於經營不善型的財務危機。而財務危機對負債比率的敏感度會受到公司治理中介變數的影響。 / With financial distress being classified as operating-failure financial distress and fraud financial distress, this study employs discrete-time survival model to characterize the fraud financial distress by corporate governance and financial performance. It also investigates the moderate effect of corporate governance on the sensitivity of financial distress to debt ratio.
The empirical results indicate that companies with weak corporate governance and good financial performance are more likely to encounter fraud financial distress than operating-failure financial distress. In addition, corporate governance positively moderates the sensitivity of financial distress to debt ratio.
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Ohlson-Juettner模型在台灣適用性之研究葉珮穎 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究依據Ohlson and Juettner(2005)所提出新的衡量權益資金成本方式,異常盈餘成長評價模型(Abnormal Earnings Growth Valuation Model),探討其是否適合台灣企業作為有效衡量權益資金成本方式之一。並進一步研究已實現報酬與OJ模型估計之權益資金成本關聯性,OJ模型估計之權益資金成本可否作為投資人選擇投資標的時之參考資訊,所得之結論可作為企業管理者與投資人之重要參考依據。最後本研究將OJ模型估計之權益資金成本應用於公司治理之角度,探討權益資金成本與董事會特性關聯性。
實證發現,蒐集台灣企業資料,推算OJ模型估計之權益資金成本與過去研究認為影響權益資金成本的重要風險因子,皆有顯著相關性存在。因此認為OJ模型適用於台灣企業權益資金成本之估計,亦為有效的估計權益資金成本之方式一。另外,利用三因子模型進行複迴歸分析發現,已實現報酬與OJ模型估計之權益資金成本呈顯著正相關,顯示OJ模型估計之權益資金成本愈大的公司,其股票報酬愈高。且以迴歸之局部判定係數分析,於加入ROJ解釋變數後,模型的解釋力增加了,顯示OJ模型估計之權益資金成本對已實現報酬率具有增額之解釋能力,故OJ模型估計之權益資金成本具有解釋股票報酬波動之能力。最後,在權益資金成本與董事會特性之關聯性方面,實證發現權益資金成本與董監事股票質押比率、控制股東掌握之董監事席次比率和現金流量權比率的偏離程度呈顯著正相關。 / In this study, we use Ohlson-Juettner model to generate a market implied cost of capital. We then examine the correlation of cost of capital and risk factors, and the correlation of cost of capital and ex post returns. Additionally, we would like to discuss the relationship between the cost of capital and characteristics of the board of directors and supervisors.
Our empirical results show that cost of capital has expected correlation with risk factors, so the cost of capital estimated through Ohlson-Juettner model can be a effective method to estimate cost of capital in Taiwan. The cost of capital also has expected an economically significant association with ex post returns. Additionally, we find that the percentage of shareholding pledged by board members and supervisors is significantly positively associated with cost of capital. The deviation between the percentage of directors and supervisors controlled by controlled stockholder and cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder is also significantly positively associated with cost of capital. Read more
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企業實施員工認股權制度與公司治理機制之關聯性研究曾偉倫, Tseng,Wei-Lun Unknown Date (has links)
員工認股權之發行,可降低企業代理成本,並達激勵員工之效果。過去研究指出,公司股權結構及董事會組成特性的不同,將對員工認股權獎酬政策產生影響。據此,本研究以員工認股權證發行比例及員工認股權價值,作為衡量員工認股權獎酬指標,並以民國九十年至九十五年間發行員工認股權之台灣上市櫃公司為樣本,探討員工認股權與公司治理間之關聯性。實證結果顯示如下:
一、董監事持股率與員工認股權獎酬無顯著關係。
二、經理人持股率與員工認股權價值呈顯著負相關。
三、內部董事持股率與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆具有顯著正相關,並與後者呈先增後減之倒U型關係。
四、機構投資人持股率與員工認股權證發行比例呈顯著負相關,與價值呈顯著正向關係。
五、董事會規模與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆呈顯著正相關。
六、董事長兼任總經理及獨立董事席次比例皆對員工認股權價值具顯負相關。 / Employee stock option plans are often used to alleviate agency cost and to serve as a tool for motivation. Previous studies have indicated that different ownership structure and composition of board members have impact on employee stock option compensation policy. Accordingly, this study used the ratio of stock option granted to the common shares outstanding and the market value of the total option shares granted as the indication of stock option compensation to test whether employee stock option plans are related in some way to corporate governance. Sample firms are selected from listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC firms granting stock options during the period of 2001 to 2006.
Empirical results are as follows:
1.There is no significant relationship between the percentage of stock holdings of board members and employee stock option plan.
2.The percentage of top management stock holdings is negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option with statistical significance.
3.Internal directors’ stock holding ratio is positively associated with the employee stock option ratio and market value. Specifically, the relation between the internal directors’ stock holding ratio and the market value of the employee stock option is convex.
4.The institutional investors’ stock holding ratio is negatively associated with employee stock option ratio but positively associated with market value of employee stock option.
5.The board size is positively associated with both the ratio and market value of the employee stock option.
6.Both the duality of Chairman/CEO and the percentage of independent directors are negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option. Read more
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中國大陸公司治理與股票報酬之關係張亮勳 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究以中國大陸上市公司為研究對象,探討股票報酬與公司治理間之關係。此外,為了檢視中國大陸公司治理是否為股票市場上之系統風險,本研究採用學術上廣為使用之四因子模式(Carhart 1997)作為基本迴歸模型,藉由控制住影響大部分股票變異之四因子,純粹探討公司治理指標對於股票報酬之解釋能力。最後,本研究進一步比較各公司治理指標對於股票報酬變異之解釋力相對強弱為何。
實證結果發現:
(1)國家股股東持股比率相對較高、董事會規模相對較大、董事長兼任總經 理之公司具有較高股票報酬;而機構法人持股比率相對較高、公眾股股東持股比率相對較高、獨立董事占董事會比率相對較高之公司則具有較低股票報酬。
(2)絕大部分公司治理指標對於超額股票報酬具有顯著影響力,本研究進而推論中國大陸公司治理為股票市場上之系統風險之一。然而,公司治理指標對於提升四因子模式解釋力之程度相當有限。
(3)在原本四因子模式中加入「國家股股東持股比率溢酬因子」、「獨立董 事占總董事人數溢酬因子」二公司治理指標,會比加入「公眾股股東持股比率溢酬因子」、「董事會規模溢酬因子」指標具有較佳之模式解釋力。而在模式中加入「公眾股股東持股比率溢酬因子」、「董事會規模溢酬因子」二公司治理指標又比「機構法人持股比率溢酬因子」指標具有較佳之模式解釋力。 / This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and stock returns in China’s listed companies. Additionally, I apply four-factor model (Carhart 1997) to examine whether China’s corporate governance mechanisms are systematic risks in stock market. At last, I compare the explanation power of excess returns among all corporate governance indexes.
I find that: (1) Firms, with higher level of nation ownership, larger board size and dual roles of chairman and managing director, have higher returns; firms ,with higher level of legal person ownership, of public ownership, of independent directors’ ratio, have lower returns. (2) Most Corporate governance indexes have significant impacts on excess stock returns, so we infer that corporate governance in China is one of systematic risks in stock market. However, I also find that corporate governance indexes add few margin contributions to four-factor model. (3) Governance indexes of nation ownership and of independent directors’ ratio have more impact on stock returns than the index of public ownership and of board size. Meanwhile, index of public ownership and of board size have more impact on stock returns than the index of legal person ownership. Read more
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經營權異動與異動後績效之探討 / The study of executive turnover and the following performance changes游子瑩 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究針對我國1996年至2006年之上市櫃公司,以最終控制集團發生異動之公司作為經營權異動樣本,探討經營權異動之決定性因素,與異動後經營績效表現與公司治理機制間之關聯。
實證結果顯示,董監事持股比率愈低、最終控制者無超額持股、經營控制權與所有權偏離愈大、董監事持股質押比率愈高之公司,其經營權發生異動之可能性愈高。獨立董監事之設置雖與經營權異動之可能性呈正向相關,惟其關聯性未達顯著水準。經營權異動之公司,其財務績效在異動前後並無顯著差異,表示經營權異動之目的可能不在取代無效率之管理當局,也可能表示併購的綜效需要較長的時間才得以顯現。其中,董監事持股比率較高之公司,其經營績效在經營權異動後表現較佳。本研究顯示董監最低持股可發揮利益連結的效果,對於近期金管會擬取消董監最低持股規範之提案,本研究認為有作更深入討論之需要。 / Using companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and GreTai Securities Market over the period of 1996 to 2006, this study empirically investigates the determinants of change in corporate control and the subsequent period performance after the change. The change in corporate control is measured in terms of change in business group of a specific firm.
The empirical results show that companies with less shareholdings owned by their board members, inadequate shareholdings to support their control, larger deviation in cash flow right from voting right, and higher ratio of shareholding pledged by their board members, have higher probabilities of occurrence of change in corporate control. However, the result doesn’t support that independent directors play a role in corporate control change. With respect to the firm performance in the period subsequent to the corporate control change, there exists no significant difference as compared to that of prior period. The evidence thus suggests that the replacing unqualified management may not be the primary purpose of corporate control change, or simply that the synergies take more time to show. In addition, this study also finds that firms subject to corporate control change tend to perform better if their board members hold a larger fraction of shares. This result lends itself to the proposal recently discussed by the Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan Taiwan on abolition of requirement of minimal shareholding by the board members. It appears that shareholdings by the board members can have interest-alignment effect. Read more
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