Purpose: This study is made to analyze and examine effects of an IPO before and after a stock is introduced on the market, and if the age of the company makes a difference on the day it becomes listed. And if it could be associated with an improved financial performance through several assumptions. Theory: This study is based on three different theories, the Pecking Order Theory, Agency Cost Theory and Window-Dressing Theory, but could also be supported by previously recognized research. Method: The theories subjected of the study is based on quantitative elements of deductive and theory-testing approaches in different angles of the company's financial status.  Empiries: 54 companies were involved in a study of Initial Public Offering in the years of 2014 and 2015, the selection of the 54 companies were divided in two groups depending on which stock market they were listed on. We then made further research based on three questions. Is getting listed on the stock market an advantage for financial growth? If the age of the company gives it an advantage in financial growth when it gets listed on the stock market? Does it affect the financial growth depending on where the company got listed? Conclusion:Generally we can see a connection between choice of trading venue and the company's age of an IPO does affect the impact of financial growth and performance. / Syfte: Studien avser att analysera effekter av en börsnotering innan och efter, samt om ett bolags ålder vid noteringsdagen kan associeras med en förbättrad finansiell prestation genom olika antaganden. Teori: Denna studie utgår från tre teorier, Pecking Order Theory, Agency Cost Theory och Window-Dressing Theory, men även en referensram av tidigare forskning.  Metod: Studien utgår från en kvantitativ ansats med inslag av deduktiv- och teoriprövande ansatser.  Empiri: Ett urval bestående av 54 bolag studerades utifrån deras börsnotering som skedde år 2014 och 2015. Urvalet av 54 bolag delades upp i två grupper beroende på vilken marknadsplats som de var listade på. Därefter gjordes en vidare undersökning baserat på tre forskningsfrågor. Leder en börsnotering till tillväxt i bolaget? Påverkar valet av handelsplats ett bolags tillväxt vid börsnotering? Är bolagets ålder vid noteringsdagen associerat med förbättrad finansiell prestation? Slutsats: IPO har generellt sett en påverkan på bolags finansiella prestation. Beroende på val av handelsplats gav den finansiella prestationen olika utslag. Samband mellan ett bolags ålder vid en IPO verkade även ha en inverkan på den ekonomiska tillväxten.

Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between audit quality, with a specific focus on auditor size and audit fees, and the cost of debt and access to debt for medium-sized privately held enterprises in Sweden. Additionally, we seek to explore how family firms moderate these relationships.   Theoretical perspective: This paper combines signaling theory and agency theory to theorize how Big-4 classifications of audit firms and audit fees signal audit quality and different levels of agency cost of debt to creditors. Further, it explores the moderating effect of family firms using socioemotional wealth theory alongside agency theory.   Method: This study is based within the positivistic paradigm, employing a deductive approach. The study uses a quantitative methodology, gathering data from 463 medium-sized privately held enterprises in Sweden. The empirical data is analyzed using multiple linear regressions, with the moderating effects of family firms.    Findings: The findings of this study suggest that firms engaging Big-4 audit firms do not experience lower costs of debt nor improved access to debt. However, audit fees demonstrate a positive relationship with both the cost of debt and access to debt. Further, the study indicates that family firms do not have a moderating effect on these relationships.

Denna studie syftar till att undersöka hur omsättningstillväxten skiljer sig före respektive efter en Initial Public Offering (börsnotering). Urvalet består av bolag som börsnoterats på Nasdaq OMX Nordic under 2009 till 2019. Antalet börsnoterade bolag under denna tidsperiod bestod av 185 och efter bortfall, till följd av studiens kriterier, hamnar urvalet på 96 bolag som studeras. Studien använder sig av en kvantitativ forskningsmetod med en deduktiv ansats där data för omsättning samlas in för respektive bolag. Vidare används ett statistiskt test, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, för att testa studiens hypotes.  IPO är ett omdiskuterat ämne då bolag väljer att gå från privat till publikt för att finansiera verksamhetens tillväxt. Dock är det flera av bolagen som inte undersöker hur en IPO kan eller kommer att kunna påverka den finansiella prestandan, så som omsättningstillväxten. Slutsatsen som tas i denna studie är att det finns skillnader på omsättningstillväxten innan respektive efter en börsintroduktion, där en IPO konsekvenser anses vara negativa för bolagen.

本論文探討公司負債到期結構的實證決定因素。本研究首先選取台灣一般製造業104家樣本，使用複迴歸進行分析，結果顯示此104家樣本公司市價對帳面價值比與實質稅率的係數估計值為負，證明高成長和高預期代理成本的公司，擁有長於三年到期結構負債的比率顯著的較低，驗證資訊不對稱程度較高的企業較不偏好長期負債的假說，並與理論的預測相同。對於負債到期結構之其他三項決定因素，即資產年限、變異性、與超額盈餘而言，結果和假說理論及國外實證研究結果不合，無法驗證資產與負債年限相配之假說，同時以負債到期結構與超額盈餘傳遞訊息假說之理論亦無法成立。由於此六項決定因素皆不具統計顯著性，故而再選取電子業31家樣本進行實證研究。此上市公司電子業31家的實證結果支持代理成本與負債到期結構之間具有負相關的假說，以及企業會配合公司資產年限和負債到期結構的相配假說；然而，實證結果無法驗證此31家電子產業的負債到期結構與企業規模呈現正相關，也無法驗證負債到期結構和公司價值的變異性、超額報酬具有負相關的假說。此外，研究結果並不支持稅負會影響負債到期結構的說法，以及企業會利用負債到期結構發佈訊息的假設。 / This paper investigates the empirical determinants of corporate debt maturity structure by exploring the possible relations between the firm’s debt maturity structure and six firm-specific characteristics of agency-related costs, size, signaling, asset maturity, taxes and variability. This is done by testing the theoretical model of debt maturity structure first using a cross-sectional data set of 104 non-financial Taiwan firms, and then using a data set of 31 Taiwan electronic firms. The results of the test on the 104 non-financial Taiwan firms shows that agency-costs, asset-maturity and taxes exert negative impacts on debt maturity, while size, variability and abcdrmal profit have positive impacts on debt maturity. However, none of these determinants are significant on the debt maturity structure decisions. As for the 31 Taiwan electronic firms, the evidence lends considerable support to the prediction that the impact of agency-costs on debt maturity is negative. The findings also provide support for the notion that these firms match the maturity of their debt to that of their assets. Though firm size is positively associated with debt maturity, it is not a significant determinant. The empirical analysis provides no evidence that taxes and volatility of firm value affect debt maturity structure. Finally, the empirical results are not supportive of the signaling hypothesis that Taiwan electronic firms use their debt maturity structure to signal information to the market.

近年來，我國上市上櫃公司發行公司債籌措資金的情形蔚為風潮。依據我國目前規定，公司擬發行的公司債須由證期會認可之信用評等機構進行評等，並出具報告。既無信用評等向來重視會計資訊的品質，因此引起了本研究探討資訊揭露是否會降低公司債資金成本的動機。關於資訊揭露與負債資金成本的關係，僅見於Sengupta(1998)的研究，而本研究則試圖以資訊揭露能降低代理成本的角度，探討在國內資本市場中，資訊揭露是否與負債資金成本存在一反向關係。 本研究評估揭露指數方法與之前文獻所採用的的內容分析法不同。本研究是以公司發行公司債前一年度盈餘概估情形評估揭露指數口本研究採用最小平方法迴歸分析(OLS)對測試假說，其結果如下： 1.公司發行公司債之增額負債資金成本與資訊揭露程度存在反向關係。 本研究之實證結果顯示，我國資本市場中，公司資訊揭露程度與公司債之殖利率存有顯著的反向關係。顯示在債券的初級市場中，除了債券的條件與公司體質的好壞以外，資訊揭露也可能成為公司債殖利率的決定因素。 2.若公司債的代理成本較高，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本之反向變動關係會較強。 本研究以公司債轉換條款與擔保條款的有無，區分公司債代理成本的高低。實證結果發現，發行具轉換條款公司債之公司與發行不具轉換條款公司債之公司，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本影響顯著較低。驗證了設有轉換條款或擔保條款之公司債將因為債券本身的代理成本下降，而削弱資訊揭露對公司債殖利率的影響。也就是說若公司債屬於普通公司債或無擔保公司債時，資訊揭露對公司債之殖利率影響更大。因此對於有意發行無擔保公司債或普通公司債的公司而言，資訊揭露將更能降低其負債資金成本。 關鍵字：代理成本，負債資金成本，揭露程度，資訊不對稱 / In recent years, it has become a common phenomenon for listed corporations to issue bonds in Taiwan. Currently in Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Committee (SFC) forbids a corporation to issue bonds unless it has been properly rated by a credit rating agency certified by the SFC. Since the credit rating agency all along have generally placed a great deal of emphasis on the quality of accounting information, this research purports to investigate whether fuller disclosure of accounting information can indeed reduce the cost of debt capital. Only one study by Sengupta (1998) focused on the cost of debt capital, and addressed the issue about the relation between the disclosure level the cost of debt capital, and this study attempts to investigate whether a reverse relationship exists between disclosure and cost of debt capital in Taiwan form the angle of the agency cost. The method to determine the score of the disclosure level applied by this research is different from the content analysis method applied by prior studies. This research uses the earning estimation disclosure made in the year prior to the bond issuance, for measuring the disclosure level. This research applies the QLS model to test the hypotheses. After controlling for other variables, this research concludes that: 1.There may exist a reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level. The result shows that there exists a significant reverse relation between the yield to maturity of bond and the corporate disclosure level. This finding leads us to conclude that because of the ability to lower the agency costs and control the information asymmetry, corporate disclosure level, couple with the terms of the bond and the issuing corporation's financial conditions, could be one determinant of the yield to maturity of the bond. 2.If the agency cost of the bond is higher, the reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be stronger. In this research, agency costs are considered low when the bond is convertible or secured, or vice versa. The result shows that for the corporation issuing convertible or secured bonds, the impact of the disclosure is less significant. This finding verifies that when the bond is convertible or secured, the reverse relation between the cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be weakened since the agency costs are lower. Therefore, this research draws a conclusion that for corporations that attempt to issue straight bonds or unsecured bonds, the disclosure level plays a more important rule to reduce the cost of debt capital. Key word: Agency Cost, Cost of Debt Capital, Disclosure Level, Information Asymmetry.

Tidigare finanskriser har resulterat i ett större fokus på bankers risktagande. Kriserna har påvisat hur bankers kris kan få förödande effekt på den globala marknaden vilket har föranlett olika konsekvenser (bland annat i form av nya regelverk) för att hantera bankers tendens mot ett för högt risktagande. Bankers inställning till risktagande kan förklaras utifrån dess ägarstruktur där ägarna kan ha olika riskpreferenser.   Forskningsstudier har påvisat att ett samband existerar mellan ägarkoncentration och bankers risk, dock utan någon konsensus om sambandets utseende. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur ägarstruktur påverkar bankers konkursrisk, där banker inom EU-länder har undersökts. Vidare har karaktären på bankernas största aktieägare tagits i beaktning för att se om sambandet mellan ägarkoncentration och risk skiljer sig beroende på vilka ägare bankerna utgörs av. Därtill har sex hypoteser formulerats som syftar till att undersöka relationen mellan ägarstruktur, agentkostnader och konkursrisk utifrån agentteorin och teorier om bolagsstyrning. För studiens undersökning har  en kvantitativ metod använts tillsammans med en deduktiv ansats.   Undersökningen visar, likt andra studier, att det existerar ett samband mellan ägarstruktur och bankers risk. Mer specifikt visar vår studie att sambandet ser olika ut för olika ägartyper. För vissa ägartyper har vi identifierat ett positivt samband mellan ägarkoncentrationen och bankers konkursrisk medan för andra ägartyper har vi istället identifierat ett negativt samband. Avslutningsvis visar studien att agentkostnader föreligger i större grad när aktieägarna har mindre kontroll över ledningen. / Previous financial crises have resulted in a greater focus on bank’s risk taking. The crises have shown how the bank’s instability may create a devastating effect on the global market, which has given rise to several studies focus on bank’s risk. Bank’s attitude towards risk taking can be explained by its ownership structure where the owners may have different risk preferences.   Research studies have found a relationship between the concentration of ownership and bank risk, but without any consensus on the sign of the relationship. The purpose of this study is to investigate how ownership concentration affects bank’s default risk. The study has been performed on banks within the EU countries. Furthermore, the nature of the bank’s largest shareholders has been taken into consideration to distinguish whether they have an impact on the relationship between ownership concentration and risk. In addition, six hypotheses were formulated which aim to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration, agency costs and the default risk, based on the agency theory and theories on corporate governance. For this study’s survey a quantitative method has been used in conjunction with a deductive approach.   Our findings show that there exists a relationship between ownership concentration and bank risk. More specifically, our study shows that the relationship is different depending on the nature of the owner. For some types of owners, we have identified a positive relationship between ownership concentration and bank’s default risk, while for other types of owners we have instead identified a negative relationship. Finally, this study shows that agency costs are greater when shareholders perform a lower degree of monitoring of the management.

<p>Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att undersöka i vilken utsträckning företag på Stockholmsbörsen följer IAS 36 p. 134, vilket behandlar nedskrivningsprövning av goodwill. Även vilka faktorer som påverkar denna informationsutgivning analyseras.</p> / <p>The purpose of the thesis is to investigate to which extent companies on the Stockholm stock exchange comply with IAS 36 p. 134, and which factors that may affect the compliance with IAS 36 p. 134.</p>

Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att undersöka i vilken utsträckning företag på Stockholmsbörsen följer IAS 36 p. 134, vilket behandlar nedskrivningsprövning av goodwill. Även vilka faktorer som påverkar denna informationsutgivning analyseras. / The purpose of the thesis is to investigate to which extent companies on the Stockholm stock exchange comply with IAS 36 p. 134, and which factors that may affect the compliance with IAS 36 p. 134.

In this thesis, I exploit accounting issues in the Chinese context with a particular focus on the role of government. The thesis consists of three empirical essays, examining how the state coordinates among the state-owned enterprises in executive compensation (essay 1), how the government regulates the dividend payouts of listed firms (essay 2) and how the delisting regulation influences the accounting choices of listed firms (essay 3).The first essay examines relative performance evaluation (RPE) in China. Previous studies of RPE for executive compensations in Western developed markets have produced mixed findings. This is partly because the dispersion of share ownership in Western capital markets does not closely correspond with the single-principal/multi-agent theoretical setting assumed by Holmstrom (1982). In this study, I exploit the existence of a large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China to examine RPE in a setting closer to the theoretical assumption. I find that SOEs are more likely to use RPE for executive compensation than non-SOEs. This is consistent with better cross-firm coordination in executive contracting among SOEs under a common “state” principal than among non-SOEs with dispersed principals similar to Western firms. Furthermore, I find a more pronounced RPE effect among SOEs that are larger or have poorer past performance. This implies that the state principal has greater incentives to monitor strategically important firms or those in distress. The second essay examines the market reaction to and earnings management choices around changes in the regulations requiring a higher minimum dividend payout in China to shed new light on the determinants of dividend payout policy. I find that the market reaction is more positive for firms that paid less than the new required minimum payout than for those that paid more than the new required minimum, consistent with agency cost explanations of dividend payout. In addition, I find that low dividend payers exhibit a greater tendency to manage their earnings downwards to comply with the earnings-based threshold, and investors can “see through” such earnings management behaviors. My findings support the view of DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2009) that agency costs of free cash flow retention are an important part of the dividend payout story. The third essay explores the earnings-based delisting rule in China that provides particularly strong motivation to manage earnings above the loss/profit threshold. I identify two groups of firms that successfully avoid being ST-ed, i.e. firms with a one-year loss before returning to profit, and firms with consecutive small profits. I provide a comprehensive examination of earnings management in terms of accruals management, real earnings management and non-operating income, to investigate whether Chinese firms manage earnings either to avoid reporting a loss or to avoid reporting two consecutive losses. Though there are mixed results sensitive to the research design for earnings management pattern in the two groups of firms, this study provides insights into earnings management induced by a government regulation.

Study project (MAcc)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The most basic principle of agency theory is that an individual will always serve his own interest best. According to Eisenhardt (1989) agency theory describes individuals as rational, risk averse en motivated by egotism. Agency theory also deals with the conflict that exists between different parties in an organization due to people's egoism. This self-interest can lead to goal incongruence if a person is placed in an environment where he has to serve somebody else's interest. Ownership and management vested in the same party until about 130 years ago. These roles were however separated with the development of the modem organization. The principal or owner is now represented by the shareholder and management serves as the agent. The principal thus appoints the agent to serve and manage his interest in the organization optimally. The principal's goal is the maximising of his shareholders' wealth. The agent's goal to carry out his task with the minimum effort and or to obtain maximum benefit for himself. It is thus clear that the goals of the principal and agent might often differ and this will give rise to goal Incongruence. This goal incongruence may give rise to some managerial actions which will be detrimental to optimal value of the company. The agency conflict, which is caused by man's self interest, manifests in the modem organization in a number of ways. These are referred to agency problems in this assignment. Agency problems are found both on a micro- and macroeconomical level. Agency cost is the sum of the difference between the real and optimal value of the company, the monitoring costs of the principal and the bonding costs of the agent. This cost is to the disadvantage of the principal and might even be to the disadvantage of the agent. It is thus essential that agency conflict and agency costs are reduced to a minimum. A number of measures are taken to address the agency problems and to reduce their negative effect on the organization. None of these measures will be efficient enough ifused in isolation. An optimal combination of solutions will depend on the company's specific circumstances. An empirical study was conducted to determine to what extent the agency problems manifest during the demutualisation of a big insurance business. The measures taken to address these problems were also investigated as well as the extent to which these were successful. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die basiese aanname van agentskapsteorie is dat die individu sy selfbelang altyd eerste sal stel. Volgens Eisenhardt (1989) beskryf agentskapsteorie individue as rasioneel, risikoongeneigd en gemotiveer deur selfbelang. Agentskapsteorie handel verder oor die konflik wat tussen die verskillende belanghebbende partye binne 'n organisasie as gevolg van persone se selfbelang ontstaan. Hierdie selfbelang van die mens kan lei tot doelwitinkongruensie, indien die persoon in 'n omgewing geplaas word waar daar van hom verwag word om 'n ander se belange te dien. Eienaarskap en bestuur was tot ongeveer 130 jaar gelede gevestig in dieselfde party. Met die totstandkoming van die moderne onderneming, is hierdie rolle egter geskei. Die prinsipaal of eienaar word nou verteenwoordig deur die aandeelhouer en die bestuur dien as die agent. Die prinsipaal stel dus die agent aan om na sy belang in die onderneming om te sien en dit optimaal te bestuur. Die prinsipaal se doel is die maksimering van sy aandeelhouerswelvaart. Die agent poog om sy taak met minimale inspanning te voltooi en of uitsonderlike voordeel vir homself te behaal. Dit is duidelik dat die prinsipaal en agent se doelwitte meermale sal verskil en doelwitinkongruensie ontstaan dus. Hierdie doelwitinkongruensie word vergestalt in sekere aksies wat bestuur soms neem en wat daartoe lei dat die optimale waarde van die firma nie bereik word nie. Die agentskapskonflik wat as gevolg van die partye se selfbelang ontstaan manifesteer in die moderne onderneming op 'n verskeidenheid van wyses, wat in hierdie werkstuk as agenskapsprobleme gedefinieer word. Agentskapsprobleme kom op 'n mikro- sowel as op 'n makro-ekonomiese vlak voor. Die verskil tussen die werklike en optimale waarde van die organisasie, plus die prinsipaal se moniteringskoste en die agent se gebondenheidskoste, verteenwoordig agentskapskoste. Hierdie koste strek tot die nadeel van die eienaars en meermale ook tot die nadeel van die bestuur. Dit is dus noodsaaklik dat agentskapskonflik en die gepaardgaande agentskapskoste tot 'n minimum beperk word. Daar word van 'n verskeidenheid van maatreëls gebruik gemaak ten einde die agenskapsprobleme aan te spreek en hul negatiewe impak op die onderneming te versag. Nie een van hierdie oplossings kan in isolasie gebruik gemaak word nie en afhangend van die onderneming se spesifieke omstandighede, sal daar hoogstens 'n optimale kombinasie van oplossings ontwikkel kan word. Daar is vervolgens in hierdie werkstuk 'n empiriese ondersoek uitgevoer ten einde te bepaal in hoe 'n mate die agenskapsprobleme tydens die demutualisering van 'n groot versekeringsonderneming manifesteer. Die neem van regstellende stappe om hierdie probleem aan te spreek is ondersoek, sowel as die mate waartoe hierdie maatreëls suksesvol was al dan nie.