RODRIGUES, Adriano Messias. A transformação semiótica da filosofia transcendental clássica. 2011. 123f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2011. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-08T14:30:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2011-DIS-AMRODRIGUES.pdf: 1251543 bytes, checksum: fb11c225ab7ef962ca5b48e436bebd05 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-08T14:58:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2011-DIS-AMRODRIGUES.pdf: 1251543 bytes, checksum: fb11c225ab7ef962ca5b48e436bebd05 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-08T14:58:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2011-DIS-AMRODRIGUES.pdf: 1251543 bytes, checksum: fb11c225ab7ef962ca5b48e436bebd05 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / This paper is on the theme of the transformation of Philosophy held by Karl-Otto Apel from the radicalization of linguistic and pragmatic twist by showing the ineradicable nature of linguistic praxis for the general knowledge by means of a strict self-reflexive attitude of thought along with the language on the assumptions of the irrefutable argument as such. To this end, we investigate the main theoretical features for a semiotic transformation of the classic transcendental philosophy, especially the three-dimensional Peircean semiotics. Moreover, the objective is to demonstrate that a self-reflexive philosophy is able to justify scientific propositions as well as ethical and moral standards. The end of this research points to the relevance of the proposal of Apel when he faces the challenge imposed by the “historicization” of the thought, not through an “untranscendentalizing” posture towards reason but in the way of an eventual non-metaphysical foundation – beyond the social and historical contingencies, thereby reflecting what is specific of the philosophical reflection as the themes of the universal principles of our thinking and acting. / Neste trabalho aborda-se o tema da transformação da filosofia realizada por Karl-Otto Apel a partir da radicalização da reviravolta linguístico-pragmática através da demonstração do caráter ineliminável da práxis linguística para o saber em geral por meio de uma atitude estritamente autorreflexiva do pensamento unido à linguagem sobre as pressuposições irrecusáveis da argumentação enquanto tal. Para tanto, investigam-se os principais delineamentos teóricos para uma transformação semiótica da filosofia transcendental clássica, especialmente a semiótica tridimensional peirceana. Ademais, objetiva-se demonstrar que uma autofundamentação reflexiva da filosofia é capaz de justificar inclusive as proposições científicas e as normas ético-morais. No final desta pesquisa, aponta-se para a relevância da proposta apeliana ao enfrentar o desafio imposto pela historificação do pensar, não por meio de uma postura destranscendentalizante da razão, porém, pelo caminho de uma fundamentação última não metafísica para além das contingências histórico-sociais, retomando assim, o específico da reflexão filosófica enquanto tematização dos princípios universalíssimos de nosso pensar e agir.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, 2008. / Submitted by Albânia Cézar de Melo (albania@bce.unb.br) on 2013-01-03T14:48:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2008_JulianaAmorimSouza.pdf: 882214 bytes, checksum: 315611c6076d89d2f7d913797c93994d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2013-01-21T12:53:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2008_JulianaAmorimSouza.pdf: 882214 bytes, checksum: 315611c6076d89d2f7d913797c93994d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-01-21T12:53:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2008_JulianaAmorimSouza.pdf: 882214 bytes, checksum: 315611c6076d89d2f7d913797c93994d (MD5) / O presente trabalho dedica-se à explicitação da concepção de Direito na ótica de Habermas, em especial sua relação com a Moral e a Democracia. Para Habermas, o Direito ocupa posição de destaque na teoria crítica na medida em que desempenha, com primazia, a função integradora social nas sociedades complexas atuais. Especificamente, busca-se esclarecer o conceito de Direito para o autor, considerando-se a redefinição empreendida, por ele, entre sua Teoria da Ação Comunicativa e sua Teoria Discursiva do Direito, segundo a qual o Direito passou de meio ou instituição a mediador entre facticidade e validade, compreendidas enquanto sua tensão estrutural. Objetiva-se esclarecer as relações do Direito com a Moral e a Democracia, no que concerne às convergências e distinções, a partir do princípio do discurso. Faz-se referência a um possível diálogo crítico entre Habermas e Apel acerca da concepção discursiva de Direito. Isso se dá a partir do confronto da teoria habermasiana com a ética do discurso de Apel, em especial a partir de duas críticas à arquitetônica da diferenciação do discurso elaborada por Habermas na obra Direito e Democracia: entre facticidade e validade , consistentes nas problemáticas: (i) da neutralidade do princípio do discurso; e (ii) da identidade entre os princípios do direito e da democracia. A partir desse diálogo, são apresentadas algumas considerações críticas, à guisa de conclusão, sobre o conceito habermasiano de Direito, destacando-se alguns pontos entendidos como fragilidades, tais como o consensualismo exacerbado e o confronto ínsito ao Direito entre consenso e coerção. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This paper is dedicated to the explanation of the concept of Law from the perspective of Habermas, particularly its relationship with Moral and Democracy. For Habermas, the Law holds a prominent position in critical theory as it plays, with primacy, the role of social integrative function in complex societies today. Specifically, it seeks to clarify the concept of Law to the author, considering the redefinition undertaken by him between his Theory of Communicative Action and its discourse of Law, in which Law is defined as institution and, after, intermediary structure between facticity and validity, understood as a structural tension. The purpose of the research is, moreover, to clarify the relations among Law, Moral and Democracy, in terms of convergence and distinctions from the perspective of the principle of discourse. Reference is made to a possible critical dialogue between Habermas and Apel about the discursive conception of Law. This happens from the confrontation of the Habermasian theory with two critical observations made by Apel regarding his conception of the architectural differentiation of discourse elaborated in "Law and Democracy: between facticity and validity", namely the issues of; (i) the principle of neutrality, and (ii) the principle of discourse and identity, proposed by Habermas. From this dialog, there are some critical considerations on the Habermasian concept of law, including some points perceived as weaknesses, such as consensualism exacerbated and the confrontation between consensus and coercion that is characteristic of Law.

The topic of this study is to what extent standards of rational inquiry can be rationally criticized and revised. It is argued that it is rational to treat all such standards as open to criticism and revision. Arguments to the effect that we are fallible with regard to all standards of rational inquiry are presented. Standards cannot be ultimately justified and with certainty established either as adequate or as inescapable presuppositions. Apel's attempt to give ultimate justifications of certain moral and logical rules is examined and criticized. Special attention is given to our fallibility with regard to logical inference rules. The idea that certain logical rules cannot be put into question because any critical argument presupposes them is criticized. It has been claimed that there must be some basic standards which are such that they cannot be rationally evaluated and hence are rationally unrevisable. This is called "the unrevisability thesis". Related to this thesis is the normative policy according to which rationality requires that some standards be treated as unrevisable, the unrevisability policy. Two arguments that have been used to defend the unrevisability thesis and policy are examined and criticized. The conclusion is that we are not forced to accept either the thesis or the policy. The negation of the unrevisability policy is the revisability policy, according to which it is rational to treat all standards as open to rational criticism and revision. Objections that have been directed against the revisability policy are discussed and criticized. According to the objections, the revisability policy leads to rationality relativism. These objections are refuted, and it is argued that it is, on the contrary, rational to adopt the revisability policy and treat all standards of rational inquiry as criticizable and revisable. It is proposed that the rational change of standards should be viewed as a bootstrap process. General features of a bootstrap view of rational change of standards are presented, and it is argued that it is impossible to formulate a real theory of bootstrapping. Two models of standard change are presented and discussed: Laudan's reticulated model of scientific rationality and Briskman's bootstrap theory. It is claimed that in spite of defects and limitations, these models contribute to a richer understanding of bootstrapping. The fallibility and revisability of standards of rational inquiry have consequences for how the normativity of rationality should be understood. The book ends with an account of how the rationality of cognitive actions is related to the idea of the adequacy of standards. A distinction between absolute and standard-relative rationality is made, and it is argued that what an inquiring agent rationally ought to do coincides with what it is standard-relatively rational for him to do. It is shown that this view of rationality of inquiry is nevertheless inconsistent with rationality relativism, and that it is compatible with an objectivistic view of rationality. / digitalisering@umu

Orientador: Marcos Nobre / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-07T01:46:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cenci_AngeloVitorio_D.pdf: 745270 bytes, checksum: e6ef6fb3f04811ebac536adfef4a626d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Neste trabalho investiga-se o modo como a relação entre moral e razão prática é tratada nos programas da ética do discurso de Habermas e Apel. Defende-se a hipótese de que as controvérsias existentes entre Habermas e Apel acerca da ética do discurso se devem ao modo diferenciado como a esfera da moral do discurso vai ser tematizada no programa de cada autor e que o modo distinto de eles conceberem o conceito de razão prática resultará de tal diferença. As respostas dadas a essa problemática acerca da esfera própria da moral redundarão em dois programas da ética do discurso, que progressivamente vão se distanciando de suas raízes comuns e que irão, ao final, projetar duas concepções de razão prática bastante distintas e, em grande medida, inconciliáveis, de modo a parecer impossível reuni-las sob uma mesma rubrica. Assim, em razão da diferença existente no programa inicial de cada autor entre a formulação de uma noção mais estreita de moral ¿ deontológica, como a defende Habermas ¿ ou mais ampla ¿ deontológico-teleológica, como o propõe Apel ¿ ter-se-á como conseqüência que, para Habermas, a moral e a razão prática ficarão situadas dentro de uma teoria ou filosofia do discurso e a razão prática não poderá ser compreendida em sentido moral; em Apel, ambas as esferas ficarão situadas dentro da própria ética do discurso, de modo que a moral ocupará a parte A e a esfera da razão prática a parte B ¿ teleológica ¿ e será compreendida em sentido moral / Abstract: This works aims at investigating how the relation between moral and practical reason is approached in the programs of discourse ethics by Habermas and Apel. Attempts are made to defend the hypothesis that the controversy between Habermas and Apel regarding discourse ethics results from the different ways the moral sphere of the moral of discourse is dealt with in each author¿s program and that the distinct ways they conceive the concept of practical reason results from such difference. The answers given to the problematic of the moral sphere will lead to two programs of discourse ethics that gradually depart from their common roots and, in the end, project two quite distinct conceptions of practical reason which, on a larger scale, become irreconcilable, so that it seems impossible to classify them under the same rubric. Thus, due to the differences noticed in each author¿s initial program regarding the formulation of a narrower notion of moral ¿ deontological, as defended by Habermas ¿ or broader ¿ deontological-teleological, as proposed by Apel ¿ the consequence is that, for Habermas, moral and practical reason shall be placed within a theory or philosophy of discourse and the practical reason cannot be understood in a moral sense; for Apel, both spheres shall be placed within discourse ethics so that moral is on part A and the sphere of practical reason on part B ¿ teleological ¿ and shall be understood in a moral sense / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Michael Beaumont Wrigley / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-26T16:33:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Almeida_JoaoJoseRodriguesLimade_M.pdf: 22783724 bytes, checksum: d89425ec574b17f375ea3a73ee4f0c1b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2000 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

L'étude qui fait l'objet de ce mémoire, entre philosophie et pédagogie, a pour but d'évaluer dans quelle mesure la communauté de recherche, « l'espace » méthodologique de la démarche de Philosophie pour enfants, autorise chez l'enfant l'émergence d'un comportement démocratique. Pour ce faire, la réflexion s'effectuera d'une part, à partir de la conception « communicationnelle » de la démocratie, issue des travaux de Jürgen Habermas, Karl Otto Apel et Jean-Marc Ferry. Elle explorera ensuite les dimensions démocratiques attachées à la communauté de recherche et laissera finalement la place à une comparaison entre les deux analyses. Il sera ainsi possible de comprendre jusqu'à quel point l'apprentissage effectué dans la communauté de recherche répond aux critères d'une éducation porteuse d'une attitude démocratique, telle que nous en donnons la définition.

在全球化的處境之下，有許多問題無法繼續依賴傳統的方式來解決，特別是關於正義，以及需要人類擔負起共同責任的問題。於是，建立一套放諸四海皆準的倫理學便成了當務之急。 當代哲學家阿佩爾承繼了康德倫理學的基本架構，並在語用學轉向的思潮下，將它由獨我論式的倫理轉化為以「先驗語用學」來終極奠基之「論述倫理學」。論述倫理學以「論辯」為其核心概念，主張在進行論辯時，有應當遵循之「不可規避的」若干預設。一旦否定了那些預設，便不可能藉由溝通達成共識，甚至會導致「實行上的自我矛盾」。阿佩爾的論述倫理學也強調它具有應用的面向，亦即它也處理了在歷史的現實情境中，如何促成實質的道德規範的問題。藉由提出後約定俗成式的道德，來將責任落實在既有的諸般制度之上。 本文試圖闡述論述倫理學的先驗奠基與普世應用的雙重特性，這使得它足以作為一套普遍的「巨型倫理學」，而能替全球化帶來的問題提供解決之道。

The topic of this study is one specific area where the tension between instrumental rationality and value rationality becomes prominent: the question whether we have a rational responsibility for nature or not. Such a responsibility cannot be derived from instrumental reason, but it is argued that it can be derived from discourse ethics and communicative rationality. The study begins with an examination of Georg-Henrik von Wright's cultural criticism. It is argued that his subjectivist view of values limits reason to the realm of instrumental rationality. Horkheimer and Adorno's theory of instrumental reason is examined. They claim that instrumental reason, through the negative dialectics of the enlightenment, have created a vacuum with regard to values. Marcuse's anthropological solution to the problem of values, and his theory of an emancipatory science and technology, are examined and rejected as Utopian. The philosophy of Jürgen Habermas is examined, and it is shown how he solves the problem of his predecessors through the dual framework of work and interaction. His hypothesis of three knowledge- constitutive interests is analyzed, and it is concluded that a general theory of communication is needed in order to solve the problem of value rationality. It is shown how Habermas later theory of communicative rationality and discourse ethics overcomes the shortcomings of his earlier theory. It is argued, among other things, that his theory of communicative rationality is compatible with a correspondence theory of truth, ontological realism and epistemological fallibilism. Discourse ethics makes a rational discussion of values and norms possible. It is argued that it solves the problem of value rationality, but without providing a definition of the good or the right. It is shown that revisabilty is an important part of discourse ethics. This is manifested in the hypothetical status of discourse ethics, and in the revisability of the norms proposed. It is argued that we are in fact able to rationally propose a norm, which demands responsibility for nature within the framework of communicative rationality and discourse ethics, although such a norm must be the result of the outcome of a rational discourse and is itself, revisable. / digitalisering@umu

The aim of the study is to investigate the use of linguistic strategies by Swedish high school students in how they use them to identify the meanings of words. The study also aims to discuss a didactic implementation and the potential of discussing words and their meaning. The empirical data consists of two parts: a survey centred around words which encourages the students to show their linguistic strategical solutions, and also a student discussion where they in groups discuss words and their meaning by applying linguistic strategies. The study shows that there exist strategies that are more commonly used, such as a morphological strategy which had different results. There were times during the discussion where the strategy was being used efficiently to solve the meaning of a word, while in other scenarios it would instead misguide the students. In other words: students generally showed a wide linguistic knowledge and could apply different strategies to solve the meaning of words, but the problem was that they in several cases did not know how to use their linguistic knowledge correctly. To have a wide linguistic knowledge and knowing how to use it correctly are two separate things. The result proves that no matter which linguistic knowledge level they master, the students require assistance in order to make use of their knowledge. A discussion about complex words and their meaning could therefore be a useful resource for teachers to identify what each student needs to improve, while also being an effective teaching method where students can discuss and share their knowledge between each other, thus allowing their personal vocabulary to expand. It is however uncertain how efficient the teaching method is practice. Further research and testing is required to prove that students actually learn and improve from it.

"Dans l'horizon épistémocritique de NATORP, la systématique philosophique s'élabore selon les indications données par KANT en vue de la constitution de la nouvelle métaphysique. Dans cet horizon, la troisième Critique de KANT possède une signification privilégiée. L'analyse du jugement esthétique permet d'établir la science des passages entre théorie et pratique en s'appuyant sur le concept d'adéquation-au-but. Le principe de la réflexion permet d'assumer la continuité entre les thèmes esthétiques et téléologiques. Parallèlement à cette conception de la systématique, APEL et HABERMAS veulent étayer le principe de la réflexion en s'appuyant sur la théorie contemporaine des actes de discours. Dans la rencontre de ces deux tendances se manifeste le problème du fondement de la systématique philosophique. Notre contribution à cette recherche fondationnelle tient à l'accent mis sur l'engagement de la subjectivité dans ses actes de discours thématisés dans l'horizon réflexif."