員工分紅制度用以激勵員工，卻對股東權益有『稀釋效果』，其對股東財富之關係如何？本研究將探討員工分紅制度是否能提高公司的市場績效與財務績效，進而彌補因為稀釋效果所造成股東報酬的減少。此外，本研究認為企業在制訂員工分紅政策時，必定會受到公司特性的影響，故本研究亦探討公司特性與員工分紅政策之間是否具有關連性。實證結果發現，員工分紅制度與公司績效之關連性方面，現金紅利與會計績效間呈現正向相互影響，與市場績效呈現負向相互影響，而股票紅利與市場績效間存有負向相互影響，且無法顯著提升會計績效。員工分紅政策與公司特性之關連性方面，公司規模、人力資源重要性、成長機會與員工紅利成現正相關，唯成長機會與現金紅利無顯著相關。 / The employee bonus policy in Taiwan makes manifest contribution to the upgrade of local high-tech firms. Such policy attracts eminent employees while causing direct losses to the equity of stockholders. Is it definitely a good policy? This study investigates if this policy improves firms’ accounting performance and market performance and if there exists an association between the employee bonus policy and firms’ characteristics. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the employee bonus and accounting performance, but accounting performance doesn’t have significant positive effect on stock bonus. Negative association between the employee bonus and accounting performance exists, but the negative relationship between cash bonus and market performance is not significant. The firm size, importance of human resource and opportunity of growth all have positive effects on the employee bonus, but opportunity of growth has no significant effect on cash bonus.

本研究主要探討裁量性紅利對企業未來財務績效之激勵效果，而本研究係以2010年美國S&P500公司作為研究對象，研究期間為2006年至2010年。實證結果顯示：(1)依據主觀績效衡量所發放的裁量性紅利確實可以對企業未來財務績效產生激勵效果；(2)獎酬契約運用主觀與客觀績效衡量時，主觀績效衡量所發放的裁量性紅利佔總紅利比重愈高，對於企業未來財務績效激勵效果愈高；(3)裁量性紅利對於企業未來後續財務績效具有長期激勵效果；(4)績效較低之企業發予高階經理人主觀績效衡量之裁量性紅利，對於企業未來財務績效仍具有激勵效果。 / The study investigate the impact of discretionary bonus on the future firm financial performance. Based on a sample of 2010 S&P500 companies spanning from 2006 and 2010. I find : (1) Discretionary bonus, which was measured subjectively, can improve future firm financial performance. (2) The more proportion of discretionary bonus to total bonus can improve more future firm financial performance. (3) Discretionary bonus can improve the long-term future firm financial performance. (4) Using subjectively discretionary bonus to CEOs on low-profit-company can improve the future firm financial performance.

No description available.

The aim of this thesis is the comparison of taxation of wages of an employee under gross and super-gross wage. In 2016 the government plans to repeal the tax base super-gross wage and restore the calculation of income tax from the gross income. Renewals for 2016 is to increase the tax rate from 15% to 19%. The practical part is devoted to the characteristics of the company Metaxo s. r. o., which deals with metalworking for agricultural entities. The practical part on examples are compared wage calculation mode super-gross wage and gross wage. In wages they are reflected in other related changes that are related to changes in calculation of tax bases. This is a rate increase for payment of health insurance for employees, increasing tax benefits for second and subsequent child and changes to the calculation of execution and insolvency rainfall. The aim is to examine the implications that affect workers, employers and health insurers and other organizations and the state budget. Model examples are applied to wages from practice.

Diplomová práce se zabývá vlivem bioplynových stanic na lokální ekonomiku venkova. Pro zachycení vlivu bioplynové stanice na lokální ekonomiku byla použita metoda lokálního multiplikačního efektu. Byla provedena analýza vlivu bioplynové stanice na lokální ekonomiku obce Žabovřesky a jejího okolí. Analýza čerpá z empirických dat získaných přímo od provozovatele bioplynové stanice.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:24:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011-02-04Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:30:50Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 loureiro_brc_me_mar.pdf: 705079 bytes, checksum: d2d37e72e7a846d634b22f8d631d359f (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a política de concessão de bônus do governo José Serra (2007-2010) aos professores da rede pública estadual de ensino e suas implicações no trabalho docente e na educação paulista. Para isto, a partir de fontes documentais e análise de legislação, examinamos o Decreto 52.719/08 do governo José Serra, que regulamentou e definiu critérios para a concessão de bônus aos integrantes do quadro do magistério paulista. Também produzimos revisão bibliográfica a respeito da reforma educacional neoliberal paulista, da influência do Banco Mundial na educação dos países periféricos e das definições sobre o neoliberalismo. Procuramos, com isso, analisar o bônus-mérito pago aos professores a partir de uma totalidade política, estabelecendo relações entre o Decreto 52.719/08 e as múltiplas dimensões nas quais este se insere. A partir da década de 1990, a educação paulista passou por um processo de racionalização com objetivos de redução de gastos e gestão eficiente do sistema educacional; uma reforma de caráter neoliberal que estaria se intensificando no atual governo José Serra. Entendemos que o Decreto 52.719/08, além de responder a esse contexto de reforma educacional, representa um mecanismo garantidor das demais políticas educacionais vigentes, já que entre os critérios para o recebimento do bônus, além da assiduidade do docente, está o bom desempenho das escolas nos índices e avaliações do Estado de São Paulo. Portanto, analisamos o Decreto 52.719/08 compreendendo-o como uma política educacional que extrapola um aparentemente simples instrumento de remuneração adicional de professores. / This study aims to analyze the granting of bonus of the José Serra administration (2007-2010) to teachers in public schools of São Paulo and its implications in teaching and for education. For this, from the use of documentary sources and analysis of legislation, examine the Decree 52.719/08 of Jose Serra, which regulates and defines criteria to the granting of bonus of the teachers. Furthermore, produce a literature review about neoliberal educational reform in São Paulo, about the influence of the World Bank in education in peripheral countries and about definitions of neoliberalism. Intend to analyze the granting of bonus from an entire political, establishing relations between the Decree 52.719/08 and the multiple dimensions in which it falls. From the 1990s, education from São Paulo went through a rationalization process of education with goals of cost reduction and efficient management of the educational system; a neoliberal educational reform that would be intensified in the current government. We understand that the Decree 52.719/08, beyond to respond to this context of educational reform, represents a mechanism guarantor of current educational policies. Among the criteria for receiving the bonus, beyond the teacher's attendance, are the good performance of schools and students in the assessments of the state of Sao Paulo. Therefore, we intend to examine the Decree 52.719/08 understanding it as an educational policy that goes beyond a seemingly simple instrument of additional remuneration of teachers.

Submitted by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2016-10-03T11:44:04Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Priscila de Oliveira Moura - 2016.pdf: 2942065 bytes, checksum: 6f050cb4e642b2a3e5313f660344f2b1 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2016-10-03T11:53:16Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Priscila de Oliveira Moura - 2016.pdf: 2942065 bytes, checksum: 6f050cb4e642b2a3e5313f660344f2b1 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-03T11:53:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Priscila de Oliveira Moura - 2016.pdf: 2942065 bytes, checksum: 6f050cb4e642b2a3e5313f660344f2b1 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-13 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This study is inserted in the research line Fundamentals of Educational Processes and it aims to investigate the meritocratic incentive system of bonus/award implemented by the then Secretary of State for Education of Goiás (SEDUC/GO) on management 2011-2014. This is a bibliographic and documentary research which, from the official documents concerning the educational reform called Pacto pela Educação (GOIÁS/SEDUC) and Laws and other legal documents establish the Educational Incentive Bonus and the Student Award, it was guided by the research of the assumptions that underlie the policies of subsidy/award in normative documents of SEDUC-GO management 2011-2014, that establish the conduction of the pedagogical work and the formation of the individuals involved in educational processes that occur at school. Defining itself as qualitative research, this study took contradictory social reality principle that emerges from the antagonistic forces refered to the production processes of human life. It considers the bonus/award a management strategy that emerges with the educational reform processed in State Schools, which incorporates principles and conceptions from other reforms that, among other elements, are based on meritocracy, competitiveness, accountability, control by encouraging/punishment. All these principles are part of a neotecnicist movement that advances in Brazilian public education, in which bonus/awards appear combined to evaluation and large scale tests destined to measure the performance of the students. It concludes that the financial incentive system, presented as a professional and student valorization, has, in its formulation, promotion of individualism and competition among peers. From the reformist proposals follows an understanding of educational management based on managerialism and productivity, subdued to the neoliberal values spread in reforms advocated by guidelines of multilateral organizations. / Este estudo está inserido na linha de pesquisa Fundamentos dos Processos Educativos e tem por objetivo investigar o sistema de incentivo meritocrático de bônus/prêmio implementado pela, então, Secretaria de Estado da Educação de Goiás (SEDUC/GO) na gestão 2011-2014. Trata-se de uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental que, a partir dos documentos oficiais referentes à reforma educacional denominada Pacto pela Educação (GOIÁS/SEDUC) e das Leis e Portarias que instituem o Bônus de Incentivo educacional e o Prêmio Aluno, orientou-se pela investigação dos pressupostos que fundamentam as políticas de bonificação/premiação nos documentos normativos da SEDUC-GO na gestão 2011-2014, que estabelecem como deve ser conduzido o trabalho pedagógico e a formação dos sujeitos implicados nos processos educativos que ocorrem na escola. Definindo-se como pesquisa qualitativa, este estudo tomou como princípio a realidade social contraditória que emerge das forças antagônicas constitutivas dos processos de produção da vida humana. Considera-se o bônus/prêmio uma estratégia de gestão que surge com a reforma educacional processada na rede estadual de ensino, que incorpora princípios e concepções advindos de outras reformas que, dentre outros elementos, fundamentam-se em meritocracia, competitividade, responsabilização, controle por incentivo/punição. Todos esses princípios fazem parte de um movimento neotecnicista que avança na educação pública brasileira, em que bônus/prêmios aparecem combinados às avaliações e testagens em larga escala objetivando aferir o rendimento dos alunos. Conclui-se que o sistema de incentivo financeiro, apresentado como valorização profissional e discente, possui, em sua formulação, a promoção do individualismo e da competição entre pares. Decorre das ações reformistas um entendimento de gestão educacional gerencialista, eficientista, subjugada aos valores neoliberais difundidos em diretrizes de reformas preconizadas por organismos multilaterais.

Submitted by isabela.moljf@hotmail.com (isabela.moljf@hotmail.com) on 2017-08-29T14:05:27Z No. of bitstreams: 0 / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-08-30T14:36:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 0 / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-08-30T14:37:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 0 / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-30T14:37:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2015-11-18 / Este trabalho avalia o impacto do Bônus de Desempenho Educacional (BDE), que constitui um incentivo pago aos funcionários das escolas da rede estadual de Pernambuco, mediante o cumprimento de metas educacionais pré-estabelecidas. A discussão teórico-metodológica passa por algumas pesquisas relevantes na compreensão dessa temática, com destaque para: a) os conceitos e elementos das políticas de responsabilização educacional em Brooke (2006, 2008); b) os resultados diversoS` em Hout e Elliott (2011) e Pontual (2008); c) as diferentes críticas e os efeitos não desejados em Freitas (2012) e Ravitch (2011); e d) alguns trabalhos recentes, que tentaram identificar os efeitos dessas políticas de bonificação no Brasil, como Oshiro e Scorzafave (2011) e Ferraz (2009, 2011). A questão principal é verificar se o BDE propiciou um melhor desempenho nas proficiências das disciplinas de Língua Portuguesa e Matemática entre 2008 0-201-2. Logo, o objetivo principal reside em demonstrar se ocorreu algum ganho e aferir, em caso positivo, a intensidade desse valor. A metodologia para tratar a questão principal emprega o uso de escores de propensão e pareamentos, em que cada escola do grupo de tratamento (rede estadual) "busca" um par no grupo de controle (rede municipal). Em um segundo momento, explora-se o impacto do BDE nas escolas estaduais de Pernambuco. Para tentar responder essa questão, foram realizadas análises descritivas e de regressão, com base nas respostas dos questionários de infraestrutura de escolas, alunos, professores e diretores. Os resultados gerais mostraram um maior número de escolas bonificadas entre 2008 e 2009, com o início da política. A partir de 2010,- há uma estagnação e queda desse número, havendo, no entanto, uma retomada dos patamares próximos aos dos anos iniciais em 2012. Com base nas análises dos pareamentos realizados, afere-se que as escolas estaduais obtiveram, no 9° ano do Ensino Fundamental, um ganho.de 5 (cinco) pontos em relação às escolas da rede municipal. As análises das respostas dos questionários, por sua vez, demonstram que o fato de a escola adotar um funcionamento com horário diferenciado, nas modalidades integral ou semi-integral, e apresentar menor depredação constituem elementos favoráveis ao recebimento de bônus. Também se deve destacar o próprio treinamento para os testes, que, apesar de favorecer o recebimento de bônus, ainda é um ponto controverso. / This study evaluates the impact of Educational Performance Bonus (BDE), which is an incentive paid to employees of schools of the state of Pernambuco, by fulfilling pre-established educational goals. The theoretical-methodological discussion goes through some relevant research in understanding this theme, highlighting: a) the concepts and elements of educational accountability policies in Brooke (2006, 2008); b) the various results in Hout and Elliott (2011) and Pontual (2008); c) the several complaints and unwanted effects in Freitas (2012) and Ravitch (2011); d) some recent studies that have attempted to identify the effects of these bonus policies in Brazil, as Oshiro and Scorzafave (2011) and Ferraz (2009, 2011). The main issue is to check if the BDE provided a better performance in the proficiency of Portuguese Language and. Mathematics disciplines between 2008 and 2012. Thus, the objective lies in demonstrating whether there has been some gain and measure, if so, the intensity of that. Thg methodology to address the main question employs the use of propensity scores and pairings, in which each school in the treatment group (state system) search a couple in the control group (municipal). In a second step, this work explores the impact of BDE in state schools in Pernambuco. Were performed descriptive and regression analysis to try to answer this question, based on responses from infrastructure questionnaires of schools, students, teachers and principals. The overall results show a greater number of subsidized schools between 2008 and 2009, with the start of the policy. As of 2010, there is a stagnation and a decrease of that number, there is, however, a return to levels close to those of the early years in 2012. Based on the pairing analysis performed it assesses that in the 9th year of elementary state schools, obtained five (5) points compared to municipal schools. The analysis of questionnaire responses, in turn, demonstrates that the fact of the school adopt a run with different time, in whole or in semi-integral methods, and have lower predation are elements favorable to the bonus receipt. It should also be noted that the teaching for the tests, which, despite favoring the bonus receipt, is still a controversial point.

Submitted by Luiz Felipe Constantino (constantino.lf@gmail.com) on 2012-10-01T23:52:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - FormatadaFinal.pdf: 1877901 bytes, checksum: 586e0424a6d2af6580e20588f159f408 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vitor Souza (vitor.souza@fgv.br) on 2012-10-02T14:09:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - FormatadaFinal.pdf: 1877901 bytes, checksum: 586e0424a6d2af6580e20588f159f408 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-15T17:58:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - FormatadaFinal.pdf: 1877901 bytes, checksum: 586e0424a6d2af6580e20588f159f408 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-31 / This paper shows that fixed wages are not the optimal solution for a labour contract when the worker’s outside option is a function of a factor that can vary. The worker’s contract will include a bonus that will also be a function of the same factor that modifies its outside option, even though this factor does not depend on his effort and the agent is risk-averse. This result contrasts with the classical theory according to which one should only allocate risk to the employee when such contract is necessary to provide incentives for greater effort from the agent. Another conclusion of this paper is that there is a limit to the risk the employee assumes in the optimal contract, i.e., the value of the bonus is an increasing function of the difference of the values of the worker’s outside options between the possible scenarios only until a certain point, after which the size of the bonus is fixed. / Este trabalho mostra que a solução ótima do contrato de remuneração do empregado não é de salário fixo quando sua utilidade reserva é uma função de um fator que pode variar. A remuneração ótima do empregado incluirá um bônus que será também uma função do mesmo fator que modifica sua utilidade reserva, mesmo que tal fator não dependa do seu esforço e que o agente seja avesso ao risco. Esse resultado contrasta com a teoria clássica segundo a qual só se deveria alocar risco ao funcionário quando tal contrato fosse necessário para prover os incentivos para um esforço maior do agente. Outra conclusão desse trabalho é que existe um limite para o tamanho do risco que o funcionário assume no contrato ótimo, ou seja, o valor do bônus é uma função crescente da diferença dos valores da utilidade reserva nos diferentes cenários possíveis até certo ponto apenas e a partir de determinado valor para essa diferença, a magnitude do bônus se mantém estável.

Le "vir bonus" apparaît à de nombreuses reprises dans les sources littéraires. Néanmoins, le"vir bonus" n’est pas seulement un idéal éthique, mais il est un critère herméneutique qui permet d’interpréter et de compléter des actes juridiques. C’est dans ce sens technique que les jurisconsultes y ont recours, au moins dès le IIe siècle av. J.-C.Le vir bonus doit être encadré dans le phénomène plus large de l’arbitrage à Rome et il doit être distinct de l’"arbiter ex compromisso". Il est surtout employé dans le domaine du droit des obligations et du droit des successions. Il est donc utilisé pour les actes juridiques bilatéraux et unilatéraux. Parfois le renvoi à l’homme de bien implique la présence d’un tiers qui est appelé à décider comme le ferait un "vir bonus" ; il a toutefois souvent une valeur objective.Dans cette hypothèse, le jugement de l’homme de bien (arbitratus boni viri) a une valeur abstraite. Si un lien existe entre les concepts de "vir bonus" et de "bona fides", le critère herméneutique de l’homme de bien est utilisé aussi dans des actes juridiques qui sont sanctionnés par une action "stricti iuris". L’emploi de l’"arbitratus boni viri" permet de rendre plus flexible le jugement sans pour autant remettre en cause la nature de droit strict de l’action. / The “vir bonus” is often mentioned in the sources. However, the “vir bonus” is not only an ethical ideal, but also a hermeneutic criterion that allows us to interpret and integrate the legal acts. This is the technical meaning given to it by the jurisconsults, at least starting from the II century a.C..The “vir bonus” should be replaced in the general context of Roman arbitration and distinguished from the “arbiter ex compromisso”. In particular, the “vir bonus” is used the field of obligation and inheritance rights. Therefore, it is used in bilateral as well as unilateral judiciary stores. At times, speaking of the “vir bonus” a third party is implied, called into question through the role and actions of a “vir bonus”; however, this third party often has an objective value. In this hypothesis, an honest man’s judgment (“arbitratus boni viri”) has an abstract value. Even though there is a link between the concepts of “vir bonus” and “bona fides”, the hermeneutic criterion of the “vir bonus” is also used in the actions that are “stricti iuris”. The use of the “arbitrates”“boni viri” allows judgment to be more flexible without questioning the “stricti iuris” nature of the action.