The retail banking market in Sweden is highly concentrated and oligopolistic. This has been confirmed by numerous reports from different competition authorities within the EU, for example the Swedish competition authority. A considerably high number of different sorts of competition barriers has been pointed out in these reports. The competition barriers are mainly directed to the smaller banks and the potential competition. The retail banking market in Sweden is dominated by four major banks, which together has over 80 percent of all market shares. These four dominating banks more or less control the payment systems and have a great deal of influence within the payment systems. It is necessary for all banks to be able to take part of the payment systems. The control that the four dominants have over the payment systems has been more significant considering their cooperation in so called infrastructure clubs. It is these clubs that have formed the conditions in every contract between the infrastructure club members and other smaller banks, who wants to be able to provide their customers a diversity of banking services. The dominating banks purpose with this infrastructure cooperation is to lower the network-expenses for the owners and to provide a more effective network-system. According to my results, these infrastructure clubs could help create a harder market climate and higher entry barriers for non-members than what ought to be considered as normal for such a market climate. Smaller banks who want to provide a variety of services, so called full-service banks, meet the hardest obstacles to overcome. Therefore there has not started a new full-service bank since 1993. The almost only payment system which the four dominants do not control is Riksbankens payment system “RIX”. The European commission has many different criteria in their search for different violations of abuse and dominant position. I have used nine of these in my paper. Eight of these criteria were concordant with my results whether or not connections exist to abuse and dominant position. My results have pointed out some problems that could be in dispute with Swedish competition law, considering the market position and the key role the members in an infrastructure club possesses. Despite the fact that detailed decisions from the European court of Justice (ECJ) especially obliges dominants to protect and not to distort competition in any way exists, my opinion is that there could be some parallels to a distorted competition on the Swedish retail banking market. Furthermore, the three different steps within the payment system are represented through the dominants participation when they are members in the same infrastructure club. This gives the result that their cooperation is vertically integrated. The cooperation involves important information about the member’s financial strengths and their ability to compete as a market actor, but also information of great importance of the infrastructure and its development and further efficiency. According to my results, the economical cooperation that the members of the infrastructure clubs have, could not be referred to as an “economic entity” in the same way as the ECJ used it regarding their investigations of collective dominance. The dominants cooperation, according to me, is better described as a collective behavior. The dominants cooperation in these infrastructure clubs could also be of that character as referred to in 6 § konkurrenslagen. I do not consider the payment systems owned by the dominants to have the same character as “essential facilities”, since smaller niched banks have entered the market and thus have chosen other channels than the dominants payment systems to reach their customers. I also have the opinion that every effect caused by the cooperation between the dominants could not be defendable as acceptable objective grounds. Due to the above mentioned arguments, I find it sensible to investigate further whether or not the dominants purpose with their infrastructure club is concordant with its means.

The main purpose of this study was to investigate which enter- and exit barriers that exist on the banking market for small enterprises located within the region of Gotland. The reason was to examine and identify which barriers that could affect the mobility among small enterprise bank customers on the bank market. To identify the barriers, the study was carried out partly by a quantitative survey with 33 small business owners respondents located at three different concentrated small enterprise areas within the region of Gotland. And partly by qualitative interviews that were conducted with two employees at Länsförsäkringar Gotland Bank.The result indicated that the enter barrier mostly depended on the aspect that business owners of small enterprises believed that bank switching were complicated. The business owners did also consider bank switching as time demanding. These two aspects created a kind of behavior loyalty towards the business owners present bank regardless if they are satisfied or truly loyal. Therefore according to us the banks should focus of removing the business owners thought of complication. The exit barrier we believe banks on Gotland should contemplate to preserve their current customers is satisfaction and relation which creates a loyalty towards the bank.The main purpose of this study was to investigate which enter- and exit barriers that exist on the banking market for small enterprises located within the region of Gotland. The reason was to examine and identify which barriers that could affect the mobility among small enterprise bank customers on the bank market. To identify the barriers, the study was carried out partly by a quantitative survey with 33 small business owners respondents located at three different concentrated small enterprise areas within the region of Gotland. And partly by qualitative interviews that were conducted with two employees at Länsförsäkringar Gotland Bank.The result indicated that the enter barrier mostly depended on the aspect that business owners of small enterprises believed that bank switching were complicated. The business owners did also consider bank switching as time demanding. These two aspects created a kind of behavior loyalty towards the business owners present bank regardless if they are satisfied or truly loyal. Therefore according to us the banks should focus of removing the business owners thought of complication. The exit barrier we believe banks on Gotland should contemplate to preserve their current customers is satisfaction and relation which creates a loyalty towards the bank. / Problemet vi undersökte var vilka barriärer banker kan utnyttja för att öka tillflödet av nya småföretagskunder men samtidigt behålla befintliga småföretagskunder. Syftet med studien har varit att urskilja vilka inträdes- och utträdesbarriärer som existerar för småföretagare på gotländska bankmarknaden. En enkätundersökning genomfördes som innehöll både slutna och öppna frågor. Intervjuer genomfördes med anställda på Länsförsäkringar Gotland med avsikt att undersöka en banks perspektiv avseende existerande barriärer. Den teoretiska referensramen baseras på befintliga teorier som behandlar finansiella och icke- finansiella barriärer där de icke- finansiella baserades på faktorerna; kundnöjdhet, kundrelation och kundlojalitet. Utifrån den teoretiska ramen och det empiriska materialet genomfördes en analys.Analysen visade att de existerande inträdesbarriärerna främst beror på uppfattningen bland småföretagsbankkunder att bankbyten är komplicerade. Tillsammans med att gotländska småföretagare anser att det är tidskrävande att genomföra ett bankbyte renderar i en beteendelojalitet vilket baseras på att småföretagare stannar kvar hos deras nuvarande bank oavsett omfattning av nöjdhet och lojalitet. Den identifierade inträdesbarriären borde åtgärdas då den hindrar småföretagarna att utvärdera andra bankaktörer.Priset lokaliserades som viktigt bland de undersökta gotländska småföretagarna, både för att attrahera och behålla bankens småföretagskunder. Utträdesbarriärer som vi anser banker ska fokusera på för behållandet av befintliga småföretagskunder är kundnöjdhet och kundrelation, vilka båda resulterar i kundlojalitet.Problemet vi undersökte var vilka barriärer banker kan utnyttja för att öka tillflödet av nya småföretagskunder men samtidigt behålla befintliga småföretagskunder. Syftet med studien har varit att urskilja vilka inträdes- och utträdesbarriärer som existerar för småföretagare på gotländska bankmarknaden. En enkätundersökning genomfördes som innehöll både slutna och öppna frågor. Intervjuer genomfördes med anställda på Länsförsäkringar Gotland med avsikt att undersöka en banks perspektiv avseende existerande barriärer. Den teoretiska referensramen baseras på befintliga teorier som behandlar finansiella och icke- finansiella barriärer där de icke- finansiella baserades på faktorerna; kundnöjdhet, kundrelation och kundlojalitet. Utifrån den teoretiska ramen och det empiriska materialet genomfördes en analys.Analysen visade att de existerande inträdesbarriärerna främst beror på uppfattningen bland småföretagsbankkunder att bankbyten är komplicerade. Tillsammans med att gotländska småföretagare anser att det är tidskrävande att genomföra ett bankbyte renderar i en beteendelojalitet vilket baseras på att småföretagare stannar kvar hos deras nuvarande bank oavsett omfattning av nöjdhet och lojalitet. Den identifierade inträdesbarriären borde åtgärdas då den hindrar småföretagarna att utvärdera andra bankaktörer.Priset lokaliserades som viktigt bland de undersökta gotländska småföretagarna, både för att attrahera och behålla bankens småföretagskunder. Utträdesbarriärer som vi anser banker ska fokusera på för behållandet av befintliga småföretagskunder är kundnöjdhet och kundrelation, vilka båda resulterar i kundlojalitet.

Diploma thesis focuses on liquidity risk management of commercial banks in the Czech banking market in 2002-2015. This main goal is achieved through a comprehensive analysis within a framework that uses several different methods. A theoretical framework for bank liquidity management is drawn up for a theoretical evaluation, summary of the current literature and a summary of the regulatory framework including the newly introduced Basel III requirements and indicators is put together. The research part is focused on assessing the development and current state of liquidity of Czech banks by analyzing of liquidity ratios and regression analysis of panel data. The level of liquidity and the size of the liquid pillow is judged to be sufficient and stable from the results of the individual analyses. The net position of Czech banks on the interbank market on an international scale also reflects a good level of liquidity. The major determinants of Czech bank liquidity in the period under review were mainly capital adequacy, bank size, loan portfolio quality, growth rate of GDP and interest rates.

Cette thèse examine l'impact de la structure du marché bancaire sur l’activité économique et les contraintes financières des petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) et l'efficacité des banques au niveau local. Il comprend trois chapitres empiriques. Le premier chapitre s’intéresse à l’impact du relationship banking sur les contraintes financières des PME et s'appuie sur deux indicateurs alternatifs pour saisir différentes dimensions de ces contraintes. Les résultats soulignent le rôle ambigu de la proximité bancaire et de la relation client face aux contraintes financières des PME. Sur la période 2005-2013, la présence accrue de banques régionales ou géographiquement concentrées contribue à atténuer les contraintes de crédit à court terme des PME françaises mais accroît leur sensibilité aux flux de trésorerie liés aux investissements. En outre, dans les deux cas, les contraintes financières des PME sont renforcées sur des marchés distants sur le plan fonctionnel. De plus, en période de crise, les avantages de la relation bancaire sur la contrainte de crédit à court terme demeurent et, dans certains cas, sont renforcés. Nous constatons également que la présence accrue des banques régionales facilite l'accès au crédit à court terme pour les entreprises plus rentables avant la crise financière mondiale et particulièrement pour celles qui ont connu une forte baisse de leur rentabilité en période de crise. Le deuxième chapitre analyse l’impact des relations de crédit via une plus grande proximité bancaire sur l’activité économique réelle, en s’appuyant à la fois sur des données individuelles de firmes et sur des données macroénomiques au niveau des départements. Il s’intéresse également à l’impact différencié de cette proximité en fonction du degré de dépendance au financement externe des PME françaises sur la période 2005-2013. Nos résultats révèlent que la relation de crédit via une plus grande proximité bancaire est bénéfique pour l'activité économique des PME en temps normal et en période de crise. De plus, parmi ces PME, les avantages de la proximité bancaire sont les plus importants pour les micro-entreprises. De plus, nos résultats montrent une forte hétérogénéité dans l’impact de la structure du marché bancaire local en fonction du degré de dépendance vis-à-vis du financement extérieur. Notre analyse macroéconomique montre également que une plus forte proximité bancaire a un impact positif sur l’emploi et stimule la croissance de l’activité économique. Le troisième chapitre analyse l’impact l'impact des caractéristiques des banques et des marchés locaux sur l'efficacité des succursales bancaires. Cette analyse s’appuie sur un ensemble données détaillé au niveau des succursales en Chine sur la période 2008-2011. Nos résultats suggèrent que les caractéristiques des marchés tant locaux que bancaires affectent l’efficacité des succursales bancaires. Les succursales de banques appartenant à l'État ont l’efficience-profit la plus forte mais l’efficience-coût la plus faible, tandis que les succursales de banques étrangères ont l’efficience-profit la plus élevée. En outre, la concurrence des banques et le développement économique sur le marché local contribuent à promouvoir l'efficacité des succursales. De plus, l’efficacité des banques et l’efficacité du marché bancaire local peuvent influer sur l’efficacité des succursales, l’impact de l’efficacité des banques étant économiquement plus important. Nos résultats suggèrent que la structure du marché bancaire local a un impact statistiquement et économiquement significatif sur l’activité économique et les contraintes financières des PME, l'activité économique réelle et l'efficacité des banques. Les superviseurs bancaires et les régulateurs doivent veiller à maintenir un environnement bancaire diversifié, garantissant la présence de banques locales et géographiquement concentrées, et à renforcer la concurrence des banques afin de stimuler la croissance économique. / This dissertation examines the impact of banking mar ket structure on SMEs financial constraints, real economic activity and bank efficiency at a local level. It comprises three empirical essays as three chapters, the first two chapters are on French banking market and the third one is on Chinese banking mar ket. The first chapter investigates the relevance of relationship lending for SMEs and continuation lending during crisisrelying on two alternative indicators to capture different dimensions of SMEs financial constraints. The findings emphasize the ambiguous role of banking proximity and of relationship banking on SMEs financial constraints. Over the 2005-2013 period, for French manufacturing SME s, higher presence of regional banks or of geographically-focused banks help to alle viate their short-term credit constraint, while lar germarket share of national banks or stronger presence of geographically-diversified banks is beneficial to reduce their investment cash-flow sensitivity. Moreover, in both cases, SMEs’ financial constraints are strengthened in functionally-distant mar kets. In addition, during crisis times, the benefits of relationship banking on short-term credit constraint remains and, insome cases, are reinforced. We also find that these benefits differ according to SMEs pre-crisis financial health, in line with pre vious findings of continuation lending during crisis.The second chapter analyzes the impact of relationship lending through a stronger banking proximity on real economic activity at both firm le vel and county (department) level and the heterogeneity of this impact based on SMEs external financial dependence in France over the 2005-2013 period. Our results confirm the benefits of elationship banking for SMEs as highlighted in the pre vious chapter. A stronger banking proximity is beneficial to SMEs’ economic activity in both ormal and crisis times, even after controlling for times, county, industry and firm level characteristics, and these benefits are stronger for micro firms, the smallest and more informationally-opaque SMEs. In addition, our results show a significant heterogeneity in the impact of local banking market structure among small firms depending on the le vel of dependence on external finance. Further, our macroeconomic analysis also provide evidence that local banking market structure has statistically and economically significant impact on economic activity. The third chapter analyzes the finance-growth nexus from a different perspective by investigating what drives bank branch efficiency. Three efficiency measures are adopted to estimate the impact of bank and local market characteristics on bank branch efficiency using a detailed branch-level dataset in China over the 2008-2011 period. Our findings suggest that both bank and local market characteristics affect bank branch efficiency. Branches of state-own banks are the most profit efficient and least cost efficient, while branches of foreign banks are the most cost efficient. In addition, bank competition and economic development in local market help promote branch efficiency. In addition, both bank efficiency and local banking market efficiency can affect branch efficiency, and the impact of bank efficiency is econ omically more significant. Our findings suggest that local banking market structure has a statistically and economically significant impact on small business lending, real economic activity and bank efficiency, bank supervisors and regulators should pay at tention to maintain a diversified banking environment, guaranty the presence of local and geographically-focused banks, and enhance bank competition to stimulate growth.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T16:44:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adalberto Tacini.pdf: 1675245 bytes, checksum: 373bffcf439d27b397d44d902baba0e3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-09 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The increased complexity in the economic and financial environment all over the world rose the uncertainty level for financial institutions and the National Financial System (SFN). In this context, the Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil - BCB), responsible for authorizing, regulating and intervening in the banking market, along with other countries, requires that banks in Brazil prepare a management Strategy Risk within the capital managing process. This work aims to analyze the contribution of a management strategy technique, scenario planning, in the management of the risks. It is a relevant study because of bank strategic role in the economy and the importance of strategy management risks for SFN. This research has a qualitative and exploratory nature, uses case study methodology and aims the comprehension of an organizational phenomenal. It is supported by Administrational Paradigms and by Gareth Morgan s model. It also utilizes a historical analysis on the SFN and the Brazilian Banking Market. As a result, we observe that planning for scenarios, among other forms, contributes with the risk management strategy as (i) makes the decision-making process more qualified by considering different futures alternatives, (ii) makes the perception of risk inherent in decisions made clearer when organizing and delimit the uncertainties of the business environment and (iii) benefits to senior management by anticipation of possible significant variations in the business environment / O aumento da complexidade no ambiente econômico e financeiro em todo o mundo proporcionou elevação nos níveis de incertezas aos quais estão sujeitas as instituições financeiras e todo o Sistema Financeiro Nacional (SFN). Nesse contexto, o Banco Central brasileiro, responsável por normatizar, autorizar, fiscalizar e intervir no mercado bancário, em linha com autoridades monetárias de outros países, passa a exigir que os bancos no Brasil realizem gerenciamento de Risco de Estratégia, dentro de um processo de gerenciamento de capital. Tendo em vista esse cenário, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a contribuição de uma técnica de gestão da estratégia, o planejamento por cenários, no gerenciamento desse risco nos bancos no Brasil, justificando-se, dentre outros motivos, pela função estratégica exercida pelos bancos na economia do país e pela relevância do gerenciamento de riscos de estratégia para o SFN. Esta pesquisa, de natureza qualitativa e exploratória, utiliza-se da metodologia estudo de caso visando o entendimento de um fenômeno social organizacional, apoiado pela análise dos fundamentos teóricos acerca dos Paradigmas da Administração e do modelo paradigmático de Gareth Morgan, da Gestão de Estratégia, do Planejamento por Cenários, do Risco de Estratégia, além de uma análise histórica acerca do SFN e do Mercado Bancário brasileiro. Como resultado, observa-se que o planejamento por cenários, dentre outras formas, contribui com o gerenciamento de risco de estratégia à medida que (i) torna o processo de decisão mais qualificado por considerar alternativas de futuros diferentes, (ii) torna a percepção de risco inerente às decisões tomadas mais clara ao organizar e delimitar as incertezas do ambiente de negócios e (iii) beneficia a alta administração pela antecipação a possíveis variações significativas no ambiente de negócios

The subject of this dissertation is a cooperative banking in the Czech Republic and Austria. This sector is in the Czech banking system made by credit unions and in Austria made by cooperative banks. Working with the theoretical part deals with the origin and historical development of these institutions, examines the legal environment in both countries, which does not neglect the influence of The European Union directives, and briefly describes the Austrian banking market with the accent on the functioning of the local supervisors. The practical part analyzes the current status and role of the cooperative banking institutions in the Czech and Austrian territory and compares the cooperative sector and banks sector. Finally, it made a brief summary and evaluation of the most important conclusions, where emphasis is placed on a comparison between the Czech and Austrian cooperative banking and their mutual differences.

Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-08-20T18:31:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_MARCELO JOSE RANIERI CARDOSO.pdf: 1849424 bytes, checksum: 45715ba0069ac749c323de7081febcba (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-08-22T12:13:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_MARCELO JOSE RANIERI CARDOSO.pdf: 1849424 bytes, checksum: 45715ba0069ac749c323de7081febcba (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-08-22T12:25:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_MARCELO JOSE RANIERI CARDOSO.pdf: 1849424 bytes, checksum: 45715ba0069ac749c323de7081febcba (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-08-22T13:57:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_MARCELO JOSE RANIERI CARDOSO.pdf: 1849424 bytes, checksum: 45715ba0069ac749c323de7081febcba (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-23 / Maintaining a healthy banking system and with levels of competition to stimulate the supply of financial products that meets society's needs is a desirable goal, but very difficult to be achieved. A major existing difficulty is the fact competes in the same area of regulatory issues topics related to stability and competition issues - A trade-off that is not a consensus. Clearly, the banking systems are essential in the capital flows processing and in the administration of the intermediation between credit savers and borrowers (Freixas and Roche, 2007). This activity has a strong characteristic of solvency risk (Diammond and Dybvig, 1983) but yet there is no reasonable agreement about the causes and way to regulate it (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). On these issues, we developed a historical and institutional analysis in order to contextualize the current condition in Brazil. It is worth noting that in the banking sector, there is no consensus on how to measure some important variables for the Literature of Industrial Organization, such as Market Power and Competition Level. In due to contribute to the methodological discussion about the databases and models of competition, tests were carried out with the models Bresnahan and Lau (1982), Panzar and Rosse (1987) and Boone (2008), besides the usual measures of concentration Cn and HHI, evaluating the banking sector by Units Banks (CNPJ) and the Financial Conglomerates. The tests show there is statistical differences in the use of these bases from 2004. Another existent gap is the lack of models for the simulation of variations in supply of credit promoted by changes in the structure or in competition mode. This work also includes contributions to understanding of relationships of Market Power and the Level of Competition of the Banking Loan Market Brazil's. For this purpose, we performed tests on a structure of production function, where the results confirmed the classical hypotheses regarding the use of market power unilaterally and scale efficiency, in the level of the conglomerate banking. / A manutenção de um sistema bancário hígido e com níveis de concorrência que estimulem a oferta de produtos financeiros que atendam à sociedade é um objetivo desejável, porém difícil de ser atingido. A dificuldade resine no trade-off, ainda não consensual, entre questões ligadas à estabilidade sistêmica e questões concorrenciais. Claramente, os sistemas bancários são indispensáveis no processamento de fluxo de capitais e na administração da intermediação entre poupadores e tomadores de crédito (Freixas e Roche, 2007). Essa atividade tem a característica marcante de risco de solvência (Diammond e Dybvig, 1983), mas, ainda assim, não há conformidade de motivo e forma de regulá-la (Dewatripont e Tirole, 1994). Sobre estas questões desenvolvemos uma análise histórico-institucional com o objetivo de contextualizar o estado atual no Brasil. Vale notar que, no setor bancário, também não há consenso sobre as formas de mensurar variáveis importantes para a literatura de Organização Industrial, como Poder de Mercado e Nível de Concorrência. Para contribuir com a discussão metodológica quanto às bases de dados e aos modelos de competição, foram realizados testes com os modelos Bresnahan e Lau (1982), Panzar e Rosse (1987) e Boone (2008), além das medidas usuais de concentração Cn e HHI, avaliando o setor bancário pelas unidades bancárias (CNPJ) e pelos Conglomerados Financeiros. Os testes apontam diferença estatística no uso destas bases a partir de 2004. Outra lacuna existente na literatura é a ausência de modelos para a simulação das variações da oferta de crédito provenientes de variações na estrutura ou modo de competição. Este trabalho também traz contribuições no entendimento das relações de Poder de Mercado e Nível de Competição no Mercado de Empréstimos Bancário brasileiro. Para tanto, são realizados testes, sobre uma estrutura de função de produção, onde os resultados confirmam as hipóteses clássicas quanto ao uso de poder de mercado de forma unilateral e à eficiência de escala, no nível do conglomerado bancário.

No description available.

Ce travail porte sur la vie du Crédit agricole de la Côte-d'Or depuis la création de sa première caisse locale, en 1896, jusqu'en 1975. Durant cette période, l'organisme dédié au financement de l'agriculture, cantonal puis départemental, est devenu progressivement un établissement pratiquement ouvert à toutes les activités et tous les déposants, représentant un tiers du marché bancaire de la Côte-d’Or. Après avoir défini le cadre mutualiste bien particulier dans lequel agissent les caisses, cette étude cherche à comprendre comment il est respecté durant huit décennies. Les évènements sont multiples : guerres, crises économiques, modernisation de l'agriculture, retrait des aides de l'Etat et besoin de collecte, extension du champ de compétence, croissance et augmentation de la taille des établissements, traitements de masse et large ouverture en dehors de l'agriculture. Progressivement, les groupes d'acteurs changent et se multiplient : sociétaires agriculteurs, sociétaires ruraux, déposants, administrateurs, élus locaux, Etat, personnel, cadres dirigeants. Il convient donc de saisir, dans les principales étapes de cette évolution, la manière dont ces acteurs, de plus en plus nombreux, adaptent la banque mutualiste à des contextes toujours changeants. / This work deals with the history of Crédit agricole of Côte-d’Or since the creation of its first local mutual bank, in 1896, until 1975. During this period, this organization dedicated to the financing of agriculture, in the very local scale of cantons at the beginning and then in the whole Côte-d’Or district scale, becomes progressively a credit institution nearly opened to all activities and all depositors having a banking market share of 30% in this area. After having defined the framework quite particular of mutualism in which are acting these banks, this study tries to understand how they respect it during eight decades. Many events are occurring: wars, economic crises, agricultural modernization, withdrawal of State aids and consequently financial resources needs, widening of the sphere of operation, growth and extension of the branches, processing of mass and large range of activities outside the agricultural sector. Progressively, groups of economic, social and political players are changing and more numerous: farmers, country people, depositors, administrators, local elected representatives, State, staff, members of the management. It is right to understand, at the main stages of this evolution, the way by which these more and more numerous players adapt the mutual bank to ceaselessly changeable contexts.

Pour le superviseur, une approche historique de la banque permet de mieux assimiler ses modes de fonctionnement. Elle sert aussi à mieux comprendre pourquoi ses acteurs, toujours dotés, à raison, de la confiance indispensable au développement des affaires, font preuve parfois d’un sur-optimisme conduisant à leur ruine. La mobilisation du droit : telle est ce qui guide l’action du contrôleur de banque. La dernière crise financière a provoqué une prise de conscience en Europe : l’impossibilité pour chaque pays membre de l’Union d’exercer individuellement une surveillance efficace sans une harmonisation totale. Ainsi est née l’idée puis la construction du MSU. Centralisée à Francfort, la supervision unique est en place depuis le 4 novembre 2014. Mais sa feuille de route porte sur un champ plus diversifiable encore. Par construction, le MSU possède les qualités d’efficacité et de pérennité requises. Mais aura-t-il la volonté de contribuer à la transformation de toute l’Union européenne en zone de supervision optimale ? / For the supervisor, an historical approach of banks allows to better assimilate its ways of functioning. She also serves to better understand why her actors, always endowed of the confidence to develop business, sometimes, show an over-optimism leading to their ruin. The mobilization of the law guides the action of the banking control. The 2007-2008 crisis has provoked awareness in Europe: the impossibility for every member state of the Union to exercise individually an effective supervision without a total harmonization. So was born the construction of the MSU. Located in Frankfurt, the “supervision unique” has been working since November 4th, 2014. But the road map assigned to the supervision a new and more diversifiable field. For sure, the MSU is skilled enough, but is there a will to change the European Union into a “zone de supervision optimale”?